Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III

[Revelation in general is the manifestation of a hidden truth or of an unknown fact.

If a revelation is made by God himself and in an extraordinary or supernatural manner, beyond the ordinary order of his providence, it is called divine.

Moreover, the object of divine revelation can be twofold. For there are certain truths to which even natural reason can attain; but because this reason, weakened by sin, can frequently hesitate even in these and can even err completely, truths of this kind are known more easily, more clearly and more certainly by the aid of revelation, as the Angelic Doctor expressly proves, lib. I Contra gentes, chap. 3|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-primus:liber.1/capitulum.3 and 4. And the Vatican synod teaches the same thing, in the constitution Dei Filius, where we read: « Divine revelation must indeed be credited with the fact that those things which in divine matters are not of themselves inaccessible to human reason can nevertheless, even in the present condition of the human race, be known by all readily, with firm certainty and with no admixture of error. » There are also truths whose knowledge entirely surpasses the perspicacity of the created intellect, such as the dogmas that are properly called mysteries. And it is evident that these truths can be made manifest to an intellectual creature only by God revealing them.

Now certain truths can be revealed by God either to all men indiscriminately, or to a single man or only to some, so that through this one or those few the rest may be taught. If it were done in the former way, which God has in fact never used, the revelation would be called general and common; if in the latter, it must be called peculiar and private. A revelation made by God to someone without any other intermediary is immediate; when it reaches others through the one whom God chose, it is mediate.

Among unbelievers, moreover, some deny every possibility whatsoever of revelation; others represent mediate revelation as in no way suited to man; finally, others attack revelation of the mysteries alone as impossible.

All of these will be refuted in the following articles.]

I answer. Affirmative.

Proof. Divine revelation must be judged possible if it involves no repugnance, whether on the part of God revealing, on the part of man receiving the revelation, or on the part of the things revealed. But on no side is there any repugnance. Therefore.

Proof. The first part of the minor. Since God is infinitely wise and powerful, it belongs to him to judge whether it is opportune, indeed necessary, that he manifest to his creatures truths hidden by their very nature; he has countlessly many ways ready at hand by which he may make known the things that concern him, or his wills. Nor will anyone deny this, unless he be an atheist, that is, a madman, nor even will he call it into doubt. For if any man could lay open all his thoughts to another man, why would this be impossible for God?

Proof. The second part. Man received intelligence and reason from God for no other purpose than to perceive truth, of which God himself is the one and essential source. Nothing therefore on his part stands in the way of his receiving any truths whatsoever proposed by God, just as men are accustomed to communicate whatever things to one another.

Proof. The third part. If certain truths contribute to a more perfect knowledge of God and to his greater glory, as also to the benefit of men, nothing prevents them from becoming the object of divine manifestation, as is evident.

These points are confirmed by the common sense of mankind, which has never detected any repugnance in revelations of this kind; indeed it has judged them necessary, as is clear from the history of all peoples, which have accepted revelations, whether true or fictitious. Therefore.

You will object. It ill beseems the divine majesty to stoop so far as to address wretched creatures. Therefore.

I answer. It did not ill beseem God to create man, and indeed so as to lead him to happiness. Much less, therefore, does it ill beseem him to point out to man the safe way to his end, which man could never find by himself; this is most consonant with the divine wisdom and goodness.

I answer. affirmative. That is, this revelation is possible whereby other men are taught divinely revealed truths through others, who received them from God immediately.

It is proved. It has been demonstrated that immediate divine revelation is possible. Yet nothing prevents a man from communicating to others the truths he has received from God: and in this consists mediate revelation. Therefore mediate revelation is possible.

If any difficulty arises, it arises not so much on the side of the thing itself as on the side of other men, who are in no way bound to extend faith to revelations handed over to them in this way. But, if the revelation has truly proceeded from God, since he made it only for the common good, he will win faith for it by extrinsic helps, and especially by miracles and prophecies; and if these motives of credibility are altogether lacking, no one is certainly bound to grant assent to anyone affirming some revelation or other.

You will object.: The supernatural order ought to be perfectly fitted to the natural order and to correspond with it. Yet God demonstrates natural truths to individual men through reason. Therefore it is more fitting that he open supernatural truths to individuals through private revelation. — I subsume. Yet it is repugnant for God to prefer less fitting means. Therefore mediate revelation is impossible.

I answer. I concede the major, thus understood, that the elevation of the whole of human nature to the supernatural order takes place through means corresponding to each of its faculties, which are not only internal but also external, as happens likewise in the natural order. — I distinguish the minor. God demonstrates natural truths to individual men through reason, not only admonished by the spectacle of his works, in which his invisible things are clearly seen, being understood from the creation of the world through the things that have been made, Rom., 1, 20; but also and necessarily through the discipline which they receive from their instructors: first, that they may perceive primary truths, then that they may make progress in them and avoid the admixture of error: in this sense I concede.

I deny, however, that God demonstrates natural truths to any private man through reason in such a way that man, alone and without any help whatsoever, could apprehend all natural truths, order them, and possess them safely. We have proved, from St. Thomas, in the treatise de Deo creatore, diss. IV, art. 1., that children in the state of innocence would not have been born perfect in knowledge, but would only easily have acquired it with the passage of time. Even then, therefore, they would have needed educators. How much more do they need the same in the state of fallen nature, in which even the external senses are now no longer intact, and the mind has suffered a notable weakening of its native perspicacity? Hence the manifold errors into which, not only private men, but almost the whole human race has lapsed, wherever divine revelation has not bedewed even natural truths with its light. Would it not have to be feared that men, who have so lamentably abused their reason, which nevertheless proceeds from God himself, would likewise abuse private revelations, if God deigned to manifest his mysteries to each individual? Besides, very many would affirm that they had received from God things that would be nothing but ravings of their own mind, and there could be as many religions as heads. God most wisely forestalled this most deadly evil, by manifesting the highest truths to others through selected men, attesting the mission of his heralds by signs truly divine. Therefore, although he could have obtained his end absolutely in another way, by acting thus he truly adapted himself to the condition of fallen man, so that satisfaction is made to the objection. — And thus the following inference is forestalled.]

[A mystery, or an arcane thing, is a truth far removed from our understanding: not indeed in the sense that it lies wholly hidden from us, for we truly know its terms, but because we do not attain the connection of its terms, whence it comes about that we scarcely comprehend it at all. Deists deny that mysteries can be revealed by God. Against whom:

I answer. Affirmatively.

Proof. For there are given truths that surpass the keenness of our mind. Therefore God can reveal them.

A mystery exists as regards us even in the natural order. That man is composed of soul and body united to one another is certain. But in what manner the composite resulting from this union is put together, and how the soul influences the body, and in turn the body the soul, these things altogether pass our understanding. Although bodies are more obvious to us, never has it been permitted to philosophers to determine their intimate nature. However far physicists have advanced in the knowledge of nature, they have not been able to assign the first causes of the laws and forces they have discovered. Whence, as far as one can see, this whole universe of things is a mystery. Moreover, every creature, though incomprehensible, is finite. Why then should truths of this kind not be found in God, whose nature is understood only as infinite? Therefore there are given truths that surpass the keenness of our mind.

Now, what could stand in the way of God's manifesting some of these truths to us, if it so please him, whether to exercise our faith, or to make trial of our obedience and compliance toward him? Surely no repugnancy is perceived on this side. Therefore God can reveal these truths to us.

You will object: God cannot reveal to man what man cannot admit. Now man cannot admit anything except what reason evidently demonstrates to be true, and such things are not mysteries. Therefore God cannot reveal them.

I answer. Let the major pass, or rather I even grant it. For it cannot be supposed that God would reveal to man something which man could not admit from any motive whatsoever. I distinguish the minor. That man cannot admit anything except what reason demonstrates to be true with evidence either intrinsic or extrinsic, I concede; intrinsic only, I deny. For if nothing ought to be admitted unless it is intrinsically evident, very many natural truths would be rejected; for if we tried to scrutinize them to the bottom, before long some mystery occurs that puts an end to our inquiry. It is no wonder, therefore, if truths pertaining to the supernatural order are not intrinsically evident, since they exceed the grasp of our reason. But if their terms are understood, and the historical fact of divine revelation is proved, they become evidently credible from an extrinsic motive, namely on account of the authority of God manifesting them. And this suffices to make the assent of the mind not only reasonable and legitimate, but altogether obligatory. Concerning the possibility and fittingness of supernatural revelation the Vatican Council thus decrees, de Revelatione, canons 2 and 3: « If anyone shall say that it cannot come to pass, or that it is not expedient, that man be taught about God and the worship to be rendered to him through divine revelation: let him be anathema. » — « If anyone shall say that man cannot be divinely raised up to a knowledge and perfection exceeding his nature, but that from himself he can and finally ought, by unceasing progress, to attain the possession of all truth and all goodness: let him be anathema. »]

[Now we have observed that the object of revelation can be either truths of an order superior to human reason, such as we have said the mysteries are, or those things which unaided man can in no way come to know about God, as well as those things which, although revealed, fall within the limits of human reason.

* A twofold necessity is understood in this matter, namely an absolute necessity, founded upon the total incapacity of human reason to attain the knowledge of truths of a certain kind, and a moral necessity, which supposes only a great difficulty in sufficiently understanding truths of another kind.

This twofold distinction being laid down,

I say 1°: Divine revelation was absolutely necessary in order that man might know supernatural truths. And this necessity is only hypothetically absolute, as is plain, namely supposing the supernatural end bestowed on man by God, which God fixed according to his good pleasure which he purposed in him, as the Apostle says, Ephes., I, 9.

Proof. from St. Thomas, I Contra gentes, cap. 5|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-primus:liber.1/capitulum.5 : « Because, he says, men are ordered by divine providence to a higher good than human frailty can experience in the present life, it was necessary that the mind be summoned to something higher than our reason can at present reach, that so it might learn to desire something, and by earnest striving tend toward something that exceeds the whole state of the present life... » It is also necessary that a truth of this kind be set before men to be believed, in order that they may hold a truer knowledge of God. For then only do we truly know God when we believe him to be above everything that it is possible for man to think about God, since the divine substance exceeds the natural knowledge of man. Therefore, through the fact that certain things about God are proposed to man that exceed reason, there is confirmed in man the conviction that God is something above what can be thought... » And therefore, although human reason cannot fully grasp those things that are above reason, yet much perfection is acquired if it holds them at least in some manner by faith. And so it is said : Many things beyond the sense of man have been shown thee, Eccli., III, 25. And : The things that are of God no man knows, but the Spirit of God... But to us God hath revealed them by his Spirit, 1 Cor., II, 10 and 11. »

The Vatican Council asserts this hypothetically absolute necessity, constit. Dei Filius, chap. 2, on Revelation. After teaching that by divine revelation natural truths « can be known with firm certitude and with no admixture of error, » it adds : « Not for this cause, however, must revelation be called absolutely necessary, but because God of his infinite goodness ordained man to a supernatural end, namely to partake of the divine goods that altogether surpass the understanding of the human mind, since eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love him, 1 Cor., II, 9. »

Since the knowledge of truths that exceed the natural grasp of human reason was granted to man only in view of the supernatural end prefixed to us by God, it follows that this end holds logically the first place among truths of this kind, if you except the existence of God, which, as will be said below, belongs at once primarily to reason and secondarily to faith. This Paul testifies, ad Hebr., XI, 6, saying : He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to them that seek him. Afterwards come the mysteries that manifest either the intimate life of God, whose contemplation we enjoy in heaven, namely the Trinity; or the means by which God leads man back, gone astray from his supernatural end through original sin, to this end, namely the incarnation of the Word and redemption, as also the Church, the sacraments and other things of this kind pertaining to the fitting and true worship of God : all which man instructed solely by the natural light would not even have suspected.

I say 2°: Divine revelation was morally necessary in order that man might be able to know natural truths with firm certitude and with no admixture of error.

Proof. 1° from holy Scripture. Sap., XIII, 1, 2, 6, 7, 10 : Vain are all men in whom there is not the knowledge of God, and who could not from the things that are seen understand him that is, nor, attending to the works, acknowledge who was the workman : but they deemed either fire, or spirit, or the swift air, or the circle of stars, or the great water, or the sun and moon, to be gods the rulers of the world... For these perhaps err, seeking God and wishing to find him. For while they converse among his works, they search, and are persuaded that the things seen are good... But wretched are they, and among the dead is their hope, who called the works of men's hands gods... and the likeness of living creatures. Thereupon, most charmingly demonstrating the absurdity of idolatry, the wise man enumerates and pierces with the sharpest marks the manifold crimes born of it. Rom., I, 18-22 : The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all impiety and injustice of those men who detain the truth of God in injustice, because that which is known of God is manifest in them; for God hath manifested it to them. His invisible things, from the creation of the world, are seen, being understood by the things that are made, also his everlasting power and divinity : so that they are inexcusable; because, having known God, they did not glorify him as God, or give thanks, but became vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened; for professing themselves to be wise, they became fools. Here the Apostle, having asserted natural revelation through reason, shows it to have been wholly insufficient for men to stand fast in the true knowledge of God and exhibit to him fitting worship : whence the moral necessity of a new and supernatural revelation is demonstrated, as also in the preceding text. Many other testimonies from sacred letters could be drawn forth.

Proof. 2° from the Council of Trent, sess. v, canons 1 and 2 : « If anyone shall not confess that the first man Adam, when he had transgressed the commandment of God in paradise, immediately lost the holiness and justice in which he had been constituted..., and that the whole Adam, through the offense of prevarication, was changed for the worse in body and soul; let him be anathema. » — « If anyone shall assert that the prevarication of Adam harmed himself alone, and not his posterity...; let him be anathema. » From these it follows that Adam and his posterity lost through sin not only the supernatural gifts, but were also « changed for the worse » in the faculties and powers inherent in nature itself, and consequently in natural intellect and reason; whence, left to themselves, they can no longer perceive even natural truths with sufficient clearness, nor know them with firm certitude and no admixture of error.

Proof. 3° from the reasons excellently drawn out by the Angelic Doctor, I Contra gentes, cap. 4|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-primus:liber.1/capitulum.4 : « This, he says, must be shown concerning that truth which can lie open to the inquiry of reason : lest perchance it seem to anyone that, since reason can be had of it, it was in vain handed over to be believed by supernatural inspiration. » Three inconveniences would nevertheless follow if a truth of this kind were left to be sought out by reason alone.

» The first is that the knowledge of God would be present in few men. For very many are hindered from the fruit of diligent inquiry, which is the finding of truth, for three reasons.

» Some indeed are hindered by the indisposition of their temperament, from which many are naturally indisposed to knowing. Hence by no study could they attain the point of reaching the highest degree of human cognition, which consists in knowing God.

» Others, however, are hindered by the necessity of domestic affairs. For there must be among men some who devote themselves to administering temporal things, and these could not spend so much time in the leisure of contemplative inquiry as to reach the highest summit of human inquiry, namely the knowledge of God.

» Still others are hindered by sloth. For the knowledge of those things which reason can investigate concerning God requires that many things be known beforehand, since the consideration of almost the whole of philosophy is ordered to the knowledge of God. On account of which metaphysics, which deals with divine things, remains the last to be learned among the parts of philosophy. Thus, then, one can arrive at the inquiry of the aforesaid truth only with great labor of study : which labor few are willing to undertake for the love of science, whose natural appetite God nevertheless implanted in the minds of men.

» The second inconvenience is that those who would arrive at the knowledge or discovery of the aforesaid truth would reach it scarcely after a long time, both on account of the profundity of such a truth, for the grasping of which by the way of reason the human intellect is found adequate only after long exercise; and also on account of the many things presupposed, as was said; and further because, in the time of youth, while the soul fluctuates amid the various motions of the passions, it is not apt for the cognition of so lofty a truth, but becomes prudent and knowing in quietness, as is said in VII Physicorum, c. 3. The human race, therefore, if only the way of reason lay open for knowing God, would remain in the darkest shadows of ignorance, since the knowledge of God, which makes men most perfect and good, would accrue only to a few, and even to these few only after a long lapse of time.

» The third inconvenience is that falsity is for the most part mixed into the investigation of human reason, on account of the weakness of our intellect in judging and the admixture of phantasms. And hence among many there would remain in doubt those things which are most truly demonstrated, so long as they are ignorant of the force of demonstration, and especially when they see different things taught by different persons who are called wise. Among the many true things that are demonstrated, something false is sometimes mixed in which is not demonstrated, but asserted by some probable or sophistical argument, which is sometimes taken for demonstration. And therefore it was necessary that, through the way of faith, with fixed certitude, the very truth concerning divine things be set before men.

» Divine clemency therefore provided wholesomely, in commanding that even those things which reason can investigate be held by faith, so that thus all could easily become partakers of the divine knowledge, without doubt and error.

» Whence it is said : Walk you no longer as also the Gentiles walk, in the vanity of their own sense, having the understanding darkened, Ephes., IV, 17 and 18. And : All thy children shall be taught of the Lord, Is., LIV, 13. »

The same the Vatican Council teaches, constit. Dei Filius, chap. 2, on Revelation : « Holy Mother Church holds and teaches that God, the beginning and end of all things, can be certainly known from created things by the natural light of human reason ; for his invisible things are seen, being understood by the things that are made, from the creation of the world, Rom., I, 20 : nevertheless it has pleased his wisdom and goodness to reveal to the human race other things, and those by a supernatural way, himself and the decrees of his eternal will, the Apostle saying : God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spoke in times past to the fathers by the prophets, last of all in these days hath spoken to us by his Son, Hebr., I, 1. » To this divine revelation indeed it must be attributed that those things which in divine matters are not of themselves impervious to human reason, even in the present condition of mankind, can be known by all readily, with firm certitude and with no admixture of error. » In the present condition, therefore, namely with the human intellect weakened and not little obscured by sin, unless divine revelation illumined and strengthened it, human reason would know, not readily, not with firm certitude, and with much admixture of error, even those things which in divine matters are not of themselves impervious to it. Whence arises the moral necessity of divine revelation. What the notes of divine and supernatural revelation are, was said in the treatise de Fide, dissert. II, where the prophecies of the prophets, the miracles, and the wonderful and plainly divine manner in which the Religion of Christ was founded and propagated are assigned as motives of credibility.]