Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III

Charles René Billuart

Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III

Charles René Billuart (1685–1757)


Tractatus I: De fide

Prooemium

Dissertatio I: De objecto fidei

Articulus I: Quodnam sit objectum fidei?

Articulus II: In quid sit ultima resolutio fidei nostrae?

Articulus III: Utrum fides possit subsistere falso?

Articulus IV: De obscuritate in objecto fidei et evidentia in attestante

Articulus V: Utrum mysteria fidei sint evidenter credibilia?

Dissertatio II: De motivis credibilitatis Religionis christianae adversus incredulos, vulgo deistas

Articulus I: Quid sit prophetia? An sit possibilis?

Articulus II: An prophetiae vim habeant probandi veritatem revelationis?

Articulus III: Vaticinia prophetarum de religione christiana et ejus authore

Articulus IV: Miracula Christi et Apostolorum, item promissiones Christi adimpletae in confirmationem religionis christianae

Articulus V: Modus mirabilis et plane divinus quo christiana Religio fuit fundata et propagata

Dissertatio III: De actu interno et externo fidei

Articulus I: Utrum sit de necessitate salutis credere aliquid supra rationem naturalem, et quid?

Articulus II: Caeterae difficultates circa actum fidei internum expenduntur

Articulus III: De actu fidei externo

Dissertatio IV: De habitu et subjecto fidei

Articulus I: De habitu fidei

Articulus II: De subjecto fidei

Articulus III: Utrum vera religio falsae tolerari possit

Articulus IV: Utrum fides rationem naturalem excludat?

I answer. So far is faith from excluding natural reason that it rather elevates it, illumines it, and strengthens it.

Proof. Faith could not exclude natural reason unless it were contrary to reason and impeded its exercise. Yet faith is in no wise contrary to reason; on the contrary, a perfect analogy exists between the two; nor does faith impede the exercise of reason, but, like a higher light, it merely adds strength to reason by elevating it, illumining it, and strengthening it. Therefore it does not exclude it.

Both parts of the minor were expounded and demonstrated more decisively and more clearly by the Vatican Synod, in the constitution Dei Filius, chapter 4, on Faith and Reason: « This perpetual consent of the Catholic Church has held and holds that there is a twofold order of cognition, distinct not only in its principle but also in its object: in its principle, indeed, because in the one we know by natural reason, in the other by divine faith; in its object, moreover, because besides those things to which natural reason can attain, there are proposed to us for belief mysteries hidden in God, which, unless divinely revealed, cannot become known. Wherefore the Apostle, who testifies that God was known by the nations through the things that are made, yet discoursing of the grace and truth which came by Jesus Christ, Ioann., I, 17, pronounces: We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, a wisdom which is hidden, which God foreordained before the ages unto our glory, which none of the princes of this world knew..., but God hath revealed to us by his Spirit; for the Spirit searches all things, yea, even the deep things of God, I Cor., II, 7-10. And the Only-begotten himself confesses to the Father: Thou hast hidden these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them to little ones.

And indeed reason, when illumined by faith, if it seek earnestly, piously, and soberly, attains, with God granting, some understanding of the mysteries, and that most fruitful, partly from the analogy of those things which it knows naturally, partly from the connection of the mysteries themselves with one another and with the last end of man; yet never does it become capable of perceiving them in the manner of the truths which constitute its own proper object. For the divine mysteries of their very nature so far exceed created intellect that, even though handed down by revelation and received by faith, they nevertheless remain covered by the veil of faith itself and wrapped in a kind of obscurity, so long as in this mortal life we are pilgrims away from the Lord; for we walk by faith, and not by sight, II Cor., V, 6 and 7.

But although faith is above reason, there can nevertheless never be any true dissension between faith and reason, since the same God who reveals the mysteries and infuses faith has implanted in the human mind the light of reason; and God cannot deny himself, nor can truth ever contradict truth. The vain show of such contradiction arises chiefly from this, that either the dogmas of faith have not been understood and set forth according to the mind of the Church, or the figments of opinions are taken for utterances of reason. We therefore define that every assertion contrary to the truth of enlightened faith is altogether false. Moreover, the Church, which together with her apostolic office of teaching has received the charge of guarding the deposit of faith, holds by divine right also the right and duty of forbidding knowledge falsely so called, lest anyone be cheated by philosophy and vain deceit, Coloss., II, 8. Wherefore all Christian faithful are forbidden not only to defend as legitimate conclusions of science opinions of this kind which are known to be contrary to the doctrine of faith, especially if they have been reproved by the Church, but they are rather bound to hold them altogether as errors which bear before themselves a fallacious appearance of truth.

Not only can faith and reason never be at variance with each other, but they also render each other mutual aid: right reason demonstrates the foundations of the faith, and, illumined by its light, cultivates the science of divine things; faith, in turn, sets reason free from errors and protects it, and furnishes it with manifold knowledge. Wherefore so far is the Church from opposing the cultivation of human arts and disciplines that she aids and promotes it in many ways. For she neither ignores nor despises the advantages which flow from them to the life of men; nay, she confesses that, as they have issued from God, the Lord of sciences, so, if they be rightly pursued, they lead back to God, his grace helping. Nor does she indeed forbid these disciplines to use within their own sphere each its own principles and its own method; but acknowledging this just liberty, she diligently takes care lest, by withstanding divine doctrine, they take upon themselves errors, or, transgressing their proper limits, occupy and disturb the things that are of faith.

For the doctrine of faith which God has revealed has not been proposed to human minds to be perfected like a philosophical invention, but has been delivered to the Spouse of Christ as a divine deposit, to be faithfully guarded and infallibly declared. Hence also that sense of the sacred dogmas must forever be retained which holy Mother Church has once declared, nor must one ever depart from that sense under the specious name and pretext of a higher understanding. Let understanding, science, and wisdom therefore increase and progress greatly and vigorously in individuals and in all, in one man and in the whole Church, through the steps of the ages and centuries: but only in their own kind, namely, in the same dogma, the same sense, and the same opinion. »

The Angelic Doctor had demonstrated this analogy and concord of faith with natural reason in I Contra gentes, cap. 7|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-primus:liber.1/capitulum.7 : « Nothing, he says, that is instilled into the soul of the disciple by the teacher contains the knowledge of the teacher, unless he teach deceitfully; which it is impious to say of God. Now the knowledge of principles naturally known has been divinely implanted in us, since God himself is the author of our nature. These principles, therefore, divine wisdom also contains. Whatever, therefore, is contrary to principles of this kind is contrary to divine wisdom. It cannot, therefore, be from God. Those things, therefore, which are held by faith from divine revelation cannot be contrary to natural knowledge... From which it is evidently gathered that, whatever arguments are brought against the documents of faith, these do not proceed rightly from principles implanted in nature and self-evident in themselves. Hence they have not the force of demonstration, but are either probable reasons or sophistical, and thus room is left for answering them. »

Concerning the relations of faith with natural reason, the aforementioned Vatican Synod published the following canons. On faith: 1. « If anyone shall say that human reason is so independent that faith cannot be commanded to it by God: let him be anathema. » — 2. « If anyone shall say that divine faith is not distinguished from natural knowledge concerning God and moral things, and that consequently for divine faith it is not required that the revealed truth be believed on account of the authority of God who reveals it: let him be anathema. » — On faith and reason: 1. « If anyone shall say that in divine revelation there are contained no true and properly so called mysteries, but that all the dogmas of faith can be understood and demonstrated from natural principles by reason duly cultivated: let him be anathema. » — 2. « If anyone shall say that the human disciplines are to be treated with such liberty that their assertions, even though they be opposed to revealed doctrine, are to be retained as true, and cannot be proscribed by the Church: let him be anathema. » — 3. « If anyone shall say that it can happen that at some time, according to the progress of science, another sense is to be attributed to the dogmas proposed by the Church than that which the Church understood and understands: let him be anathema. »

That it may be found with what great solicitude the Catholic Church has always watched over the defense of the dignity and rights of human reason, it will help to add here the four propositions by which the excessive ardor of certain men was repressed, who, in favor of faith, had depressed reason too much. Drawn up by the sacred Congregation of the Index on June 11, 1835, they were approved on the 15th of the same month by Pius IX, who ordered them published.

1° « Although faith is above reason, nevertheless no true dissent, no discord between the two can ever be found, since both arise from one and the same unchangeable source of truth, God best and greatest, and thus render each other mutual aid. » — From the Encyclical of Pius IX, November 9, 1846.

2° Reasoning can prove with certainty the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul, and the liberty of man. Faith is subsequent to revelation, and consequently it cannot fitly be alleged to prove the existence of God against the atheist, or to prove the spirituality and liberty of the rational soul against the follower of naturalism and fatalism. » — Subscribed by D. Bautain, September 8, 1840.

3° « The use of reason precedes faith, and leads man to it by the aid of revelation and grace. » Subscribed by the same, on the same day.

4° « The method which D. Thomas, D. Bonaventura, and other scholastics after them made use of does not lead to rationalism, nor was it the cause why philosophy in the schools of today ran headlong into naturalism and pantheism. Consequently it is not lawful to bring into accusation those doctors and masters for having employed this method, especially with the approbation, or at least the tacit consent, of the Church. » — This proposition is opposed to divers propositions professed by D. Bonnetty.

Whoever desires more concerning the relations of reason with faith, let him consult Fr. Perrone, Praelect. theol., De analogia rationis cum fide.]

Dissertatio V: De vitiis fidei oppositis

Articulus I: De infidelitate in communi

Articulus II: De haeresi

Articulus III: De apostasia

Articulus IV: De cultuum libertate

Articulus V: De blasphemia

Tractatus II: De regulis fidei

Dissertatio I: De divina revelatione

Articulus I: De natura revelationis divinae

Articulus II: Utrum possibilis sit divina revelatio immediata?

Articulus III: Utrum possibilis sit divina revelatio mediata?

Articulus IV: Utrum veritatum capitibus nostris excedentium, seu mysteriorum, possibilis sit revelatio?

Articulus V: Utrum divina revelatio fuerit necessaria?

Dissertatio II: De Scriptura sacra

Articulus I: Quid sit et an sit Scriptura sacra

Articulus II: De Scriptura sacra divisione, apographis et versionibus

Articulus III: De Scriptura sacra sensibus

Dissertatio III: De traditionibus

Articulus I: Quid, quotuplex sit traditio, et quanta auctoritas illis?

Articulus II: Utrum traditiones divinae sint necessario admittendae?

Articulus III: De sanctorum patribus

Articulus IV: De sacra liturgia

Dissertatio IV: De Ecclesia

Articulus I: Quomodo Ecclesia christiana existere potuerit ante adventum Christi?

Articulus II: Ex quibus constabat religio primaeva?

Articulus III: Quomodo constituta fuit religio mosaica?

Articulus IV: Utrum divina fuerit religio mosaica?

Articulus V: Utrum lex seu religio mosaica fuerit abroganda?

Articulus VI: Utrum lex seu religio mosaica fuerit abrogata?

Articulus VII: Quid sit Ecclesia, et qui sint in ea?

Articulus VIII: Utrum Ecclesia sit visibilis?

Articulus IX: De notis verae Ecclesiae

Articulus X: Utrum Ecclesia possit decipere seu errare in fide et moribus?

Articulus XI: Utrum Ecclesia sit suprema iudex controversiarum fidei?

Articulus XII: Utrum iudicium Ecclesiae de sensu librorum, seu, ut vocant, de factis dogmaticis, sit infallibile?

Articulus XIII: Utrum Ecclesia sit infallibilis in canonizatione sanctorum?

Dissertatio V: De summo Pontifice

Articulus I: De primatu S. Petri

Articulus II: De primatu Romanorum Pontificum

Articulus III: De vi et ratione primatus Romanorum Pontificum

Articulus IV: De infallibilitate seu inerrantia summi Pontificis in definiendis quaestionibus fidei et morum

Articulus V: De praeminentia summi Pontificis supra concilium generale

Articulus VI: Solvuntur objectiones

Articulus VII: Utrum Pontifici Romano competat summa potestas temporalis?

Articulus VIII: Quid sit Cleri Gallicani de ecclesiastica potestate Declaratio anni 1682, et quid de ea sentiendum?

Articulus IX: Utrum doctrina Declarationis anni 1682, ipsaque Declaratio, Ecclesiae Gallicanae merito fuerit attributa?

Articulus X: De Romani Pontificis principatu civili

Dissertatio VI: De conciliis generalibus

Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit concilium?

Articulus II: Utrum necessaria sint concilia generalia?

Articulus III: Cujus sit convocare concilium generale?

Articulus IV: De convocatis ad concilium generale et illius praeside

Articulus V: Utrum concilium generale sit infallibile in definiendis quaestionibus fidei et morum?

Articulus VI: Utrum concilium generale debeat necessario confirmari a summo Pontifice?

Tractatus III: De spe

Dissertatio I: De spe

Articulus I: De spe secundum se et de ejus objecto

Articulus II: In quibus sit spes

Articulus III: De necessitate spei

Articulus IV: Quae sint vitia opposita spei theologicae?

Tractatus IV: De charitate

Dissertatio I: De charitate secundum se

Articulus I: Complectens omnia quae spectant charitatem secundum se

Dissertatio II: De subjecto, causa, augmento et amissione charitatis

Articulus I: De subjecto, causa, augmento et amissione charitatis

Dissertatio III: De charitate erga proximum

Articulus I: Utrum homo debeat ex charitate diligere seipsum, corpus suum et peccatores?

Articulus II: Utrum inimici sint ex charitate diligendi, eisque exhibenda signa et opera charitatis?

Dissertatio IV: De ordine et praecipuo actu charitatis, qui est dilectio

Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit magis ex charitate diligendus, quam proximus?

Articulus II: Utrum homo debeat ex charitate magis se diligere quam proximum?

Articulus III: Quis ordo servandus sit in dilectione proximorum?

Articulus IV: An et quo sensu liceat diligere Deum et illi servire propter retributionem?

Articulus V: De praecipto charitatis

Dissertatio V: De eleemosyna

Articulus I: Utrum dare eleemosynam sit in praecipto, et quando?

Articulus II: Variae quaestiones circa eleemosynam breviter solvuntur

Dissertatio VI: De correptione fraterna

Articulus I: Utrum correptio fraterna sit in praecipto, et quae conditiones requirantur ut obliget?

Articulus II: De ordine correptionis fraternae

Dissertatio VII: De vitiis charitati oppositis

Articulus I: De odio Dei et proximi, de accidia, invidia, discordia, contentione et schismate

Articulus II: De bello

Articulus III: De duello

Tractatus V: De iure et iustitia

Dissertatio I: De iure et dominio

Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit ius?

Articulus II: Quid et quotuplex sit dominium? Quid ususfructus et usus?

Articulus III: Utrum usus in rebus unico actu consumptibilibus distinguatur a dominio?

Articulus IV: De possessione

Dissertatio II: De subjecto et objecto dominii

Articulus I: De subjecto et objecto dominii in genere

Articulus II: De dominio uxorum et filiorumfamilias

Articulus III: De dominio clericorum

Dissertatio III: De modis acquirendi dominium

Articulus I: De modis acquirendi dominia rerum quae nullius sunt

Articulus II: De primo modo acquirendi dominium rerum quae sunt alicujus, scilicet de accessione

Articulus III: De altero modo acquirendi dominia rerum quae sunt alienus, nimirum de praescriptione

Dissertatio IV: De iustitia

Articulus I: De definitione, objecto et subjecto iustitiae

Articulus II: De divisione iustitiae

Dissertatio V: De actu iustitiae ut sic, nempe de iudicio

Articulus I: Utrum iudicium sit licitum?

Articulus II: De suspicione et iudicio temerario

Articulus III: Utrum dubia de male proximi sint in meliorem partem interpretanda?

Dissertatio VI: De actu iustitiae commutativae, nempe de restitutione

Articulus I: De qualitate et necessitate restitutionis

Articulus II: Ex quotuplex titulo obligetur restitutio, sit affirmativa vel negativa?

Articulus III: Utrum incurratur obligatio restitutionis ratione damni illati absque culpa theologica?

Articulus IV: Utrum culpa theologica vehemens inducat obligationem restituendi, et qualem?

Articulus V: Utrum et quanto culpa iuridica inducat obligationem restituendi ratione contractus et quasi-contractus, seu officii?

Articulus VI: Quomodo sit restituendum a possessore bonae fidei

Articulus VII: Utrum qui bona fide emit rem furtivam, ubi novit esse furtivam, teneatur eam reddere vero domino?

Articulus VIII: De restitutione facienda a possessore mala fidei

Articulus IX: Utrum illi qui impediunt aliquem a consecutione alicujus boni, teneantur ad restitutionem?

Articulus X: De restitutione facienda ab his qui injuriae damnificationi cooperantur

Articulus XI: Quando sit facienda restitutio?

Articulus XII: Quomodo sit facienda restitutio?

Articulus XIII: Quo loco, cujus expensis et periculo restituenda sit?

Articulus XIV: Cui ex pluribus creditoribus prius sit restituendum?

Articulus XV: Quomodo sit restituenda?

Articulus XVI: De causis quae obligationem restitutionis suspendunt

Articulus XVII: De causis quae tollunt obligationem restitutionis

Dissertatio VII: De vitio opposito iustitiae distributivae, quod est acceptio personarum

Articulus I: Quid sit acceptio personarum?

Articulus II: De acceptione personarum in distributione spiritualium

Articulus III: De tributis

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