Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III

Charles René Billuart

Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III

Charles René Billuart (1685–1757)


Tractatus I: De fide

Prooemium

Dissertatio I: De objecto fidei

Articulus I: Quodnam sit objectum fidei?

Articulus II: In quid sit ultima resolutio fidei nostrae?

Articulus III: Utrum fides possit subsistere falso?

Articulus IV: De obscuritate in objecto fidei et evidentia in attestante

Articulus V: Utrum mysteria fidei sint evidenter credibilia?

Dissertatio II: De motivis credibilitatis Religionis christianae adversus incredulos, vulgo deistas

Articulus I: Quid sit prophetia? An sit possibilis?

Articulus II: An prophetiae vim habeant probandi veritatem revelationis?

Articulus III: Vaticinia prophetarum de religione christiana et ejus authore

Articulus IV: Miracula Christi et Apostolorum, item promissiones Christi adimpletae in confirmationem religionis christianae

Articulus V: Modus mirabilis et plane divinus quo christiana Religio fuit fundata et propagata

Dissertatio III: De actu interno et externo fidei

Articulus I: Utrum sit de necessitate salutis credere aliquid supra rationem naturalem, et quid?

Articulus II: Caeterae difficultates circa actum fidei internum expenduntur

Articulus III: De actu fidei externo

Dissertatio IV: De habitu et subjecto fidei

Articulus I: De habitu fidei

Articulus II: De subjecto fidei

Articulus III: Utrum vera religio falsae tolerari possit

[The Latitudinarians, under the specious pretext of entering into mutual concord among all Christians, rise up sharply against Catholics because their intolerance fosters dissentions, and impiously contend that communion must be held with all those who have in any way received divine revelation, even if they have received only some of the things contained in it — persons whom they assert can attain salvation by a faith, though but a halved one, no less than Catholics. And hence has arisen the absurd distinction of the articles of faith into fundamental and non-fundamental ones, although not even they themselves have yet agreed among themselves on assigning them. But from what has been said it is clear how impiously these things are proposed: for without faith it is impossible to please God and to attain eternal life; but a halved faith can in no way be called divine faith. For, as the Apostle says, 2 Cor., VI, 15: What concord hath Christ with Belial? or what part hath the believer with the unbeliever? Therefore

I say 1°: The true religion can tolerate no other religion diverse from itself, and the intolerance of the true religion ought to be its proper character.

Before the proof, I suppose that there can be only one true religion — a point on which both the Latitudinarians and the other sectaries ought to agree, since, as they themselves confess, that is the true religion which follows divine revelation, which rests upon the truthfulness of God revealing, who can neither deceive nor be deceived. That alone, therefore, is the true religion which follows divine revelation in the way that is fitting. And so, if any religion exceeds or falls short in admitting revealed things, or admits things that are not true, or does not admit things that are true, it cannot itself be true. Just as, therefore, if truth be mixed with falsehood, it ceases to be truth and can no longer be called simply true; so, if falsehoods be mixed with the dogmas of the true religion, it ceases to be the true religion and can no longer be called simply true.

I prove, therefore, the conclusion. Tolerance carries with it some association. But the true religion can have no association with the dogmas of another religion diverse from itself, as is clear from the supposition stated above. Therefore the true religion can tolerate no religion diverse from itself.

Nay, just as the proper note of truth is to admit no association with error, so also the intolerance of any other religion ought to be the proper character of the true religion.

Yet it does not follow from this, as the Latitudinarians babble, that men's minds are divided against one another and each becomes an enemy to the other. For Catholics keep before their minds the command of Christ, that they love also those from whom they have received evil. Therefore they ought to conduct themselves on the same ground toward those from whom, although they follow dogmas different from theirs, they receive no harm. Indeed the errors of such men are hated by those who profess the true Christian religion, and they would wish, if they could, to recall them to the way of salvation and of truth; but so far is it from being the case that any traces of alienation of mind appear, that quite the contrary it appears most evidently that nothing is dearer to them than to procure for those men their true and solid welfare. Who does not know that already from the beginnings of the Church the professors of the true religion have taken care, at how great peril to themselves, to lead barbarians and unbelievers to the knowledge of God and to eternal salvation, and still take care? And when they do this, they serve the salvation of men who differ from them in religion, even at the cost of their own life.

I say 2°: Such is the condition of a false religion that, as regards dogmas, it can enter into association with other religions diverse from itself.

Proof. Although truth is opposed to every falsehood, this is not so with falsehood, and nothing prevents two equally false religions from joining in association with each other. And indeed, if it is once laid down that divine revelation proceeds from divine authority, and yet that some revealed things can be rejected by certain Christians, how will those be able to be condemned who have despised and rejected other things handed down and revealed by God? For one must permit others also to use the same right that he himself uses. And hence not only ethnics introduced into their own religion the superstitions of other religions, but Christians too who declined from the truth of the faith either decreed that all sects whatsoever, or at least some, were to be tolerated; and the true Christian religion alone judged that no association with other sects could be entered into as regards dogmas.

Locke objects that it suffices for eternal salvation to believe Christ to be the Messiah and the Son of God, and he tries to prove this by several testimonies of Sacred Scripture in which Christ required this of all. Yet almost all the sects of heretics admit this dogma of faith. Therefore.

I answer with a distinction. That Christ first required this of all, namely that they believe him to be the true Son of God, and that the Apostles were especially solicitous to persuade all of this first, I concede; that Christ required faith in this dogma only, I deny.

Christ, as Son of God, had come to promulgate a new law. Therefore, in order to establish his authority, whereby he was the Son of God, he had first to see to it that all believed him to be the Son of God, and the Apostles likewise strove for the same. The divinity of Christ is therefore, as it were, the base and foundation of evangelical revelation. Yet did not Christ himself will that all should have faith also in everything else that he handed down? He commanded the Apostles to teach all men what they had heard from him, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Mark, I, 15, Christ says: The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand; repent, and believe the Gospel. After the resurrection he commanded the Apostles, Mark, XVI, 15: Going into the whole world, preach the Gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be condemned. And the Apostles, obeying his commands, went forth and preached everywhere, the Lord working withal and confirming the word with signs that followed, ibid., 20.

The Latitudinarians object, together with Bayle, Rousseau and Voltaire: It must be said that a man does not reverence God more than another because he understands Holy Scripture better than the other; it is enough that both accept Holy Scripture as their rule, even though one of them departs from the will of God in particular points and through error. For just as he who receives Holy Scripture in the sense in which he ought receives this sense because he thinks it true, not because it is true in itself, and because, were he to receive another sense, he would think he displeased God; so he who receives Holy Scripture in a false sense prefers this sense, not because it is false, but because it seems true to him, and he judges that he would displease God if he received it in another. Therefore he who follows the sense of Holy Scripture which he thinks to be true can please God and attain eternal salvation.

I answer by asking the Latitudinarians whether they wish Holy Scripture to be the rule of men's own senses, or rather the senses of men the rule of Holy Scripture? If Holy Scripture, as it truly ought to be, is the rule of men's senses, and men ought to accommodate themselves to it in their senses, he fails most shamefully who does not attain its sense and understands it otherwise than he ought. For a rule is the norm to which one must conform, to which one must be subject and upon which one must depend, just as the measure is the norm of the thing measured, not the thing measured the norm of the measure itself. Does he equally reverence his lawgiver — he who not only shows veneration to the law promulgated, but moreover with study and diligence attains its legitimate sense and acts according to it — and he who reverences the law generically as a rule, yet, on account of his malice, obstinacy and culpable ignorance, does not attain its sense and acts against it? Therefore the true sense of Holy Scripture is attributed to it when it is conformed to the mind of God speaking; nor is it true for that reason because he who rightly understands it thinks it true, but because it is right in itself and has conformity with God speaking. Indeed, to avoid deception, it is required that this sense also be thought true; yet it does not for that reason become true because it is so thought. Hence it comes about that he who attributes a false sense to Holy Scripture, although he himself thinks it true, nevertheless does not attribute the true sense, nor does his false judgment make it conformed to the mind of God speaking. Nor does it matter that he intends to please God, both he who rightly and he who wrongly understands Holy Scripture; for he who employed all diligence to attain the true sense of Scripture, and consequently attained it, truly pleases God; but he who, on account of his malice, obstinacy and culpable ignorance, did not attain the true sense of Scripture, although he thought he pleased God, nevertheless thought falsely and impiously.]

Articulus IV: Utrum fides rationem naturalem excludat?

Dissertatio V: De vitiis fidei oppositis

Articulus I: De infidelitate in communi

Articulus II: De haeresi

Articulus III: De apostasia

Articulus IV: De cultuum libertate

Articulus V: De blasphemia

Tractatus II: De regulis fidei

Dissertatio I: De divina revelatione

Articulus I: De natura revelationis divinae

Articulus II: Utrum possibilis sit divina revelatio immediata?

Articulus III: Utrum possibilis sit divina revelatio mediata?

Articulus IV: Utrum veritatum capitibus nostris excedentium, seu mysteriorum, possibilis sit revelatio?

Articulus V: Utrum divina revelatio fuerit necessaria?

Dissertatio II: De Scriptura sacra

Articulus I: Quid sit et an sit Scriptura sacra

Articulus II: De Scriptura sacra divisione, apographis et versionibus

Articulus III: De Scriptura sacra sensibus

Dissertatio III: De traditionibus

Articulus I: Quid, quotuplex sit traditio, et quanta auctoritas illis?

Articulus II: Utrum traditiones divinae sint necessario admittendae?

Articulus III: De sanctorum patribus

Articulus IV: De sacra liturgia

Dissertatio IV: De Ecclesia

Articulus I: Quomodo Ecclesia christiana existere potuerit ante adventum Christi?

Articulus II: Ex quibus constabat religio primaeva?

Articulus III: Quomodo constituta fuit religio mosaica?

Articulus IV: Utrum divina fuerit religio mosaica?

Articulus V: Utrum lex seu religio mosaica fuerit abroganda?

Articulus VI: Utrum lex seu religio mosaica fuerit abrogata?

Articulus VII: Quid sit Ecclesia, et qui sint in ea?

Articulus VIII: Utrum Ecclesia sit visibilis?

Articulus IX: De notis verae Ecclesiae

Articulus X: Utrum Ecclesia possit decipere seu errare in fide et moribus?

Articulus XI: Utrum Ecclesia sit suprema iudex controversiarum fidei?

Articulus XII: Utrum iudicium Ecclesiae de sensu librorum, seu, ut vocant, de factis dogmaticis, sit infallibile?

Articulus XIII: Utrum Ecclesia sit infallibilis in canonizatione sanctorum?

Dissertatio V: De summo Pontifice

Articulus I: De primatu S. Petri

Articulus II: De primatu Romanorum Pontificum

Articulus III: De vi et ratione primatus Romanorum Pontificum

Articulus IV: De infallibilitate seu inerrantia summi Pontificis in definiendis quaestionibus fidei et morum

Articulus V: De praeminentia summi Pontificis supra concilium generale

Articulus VI: Solvuntur objectiones

Articulus VII: Utrum Pontifici Romano competat summa potestas temporalis?

Articulus VIII: Quid sit Cleri Gallicani de ecclesiastica potestate Declaratio anni 1682, et quid de ea sentiendum?

Articulus IX: Utrum doctrina Declarationis anni 1682, ipsaque Declaratio, Ecclesiae Gallicanae merito fuerit attributa?

Articulus X: De Romani Pontificis principatu civili

Dissertatio VI: De conciliis generalibus

Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit concilium?

Articulus II: Utrum necessaria sint concilia generalia?

Articulus III: Cujus sit convocare concilium generale?

Articulus IV: De convocatis ad concilium generale et illius praeside

Articulus V: Utrum concilium generale sit infallibile in definiendis quaestionibus fidei et morum?

Articulus VI: Utrum concilium generale debeat necessario confirmari a summo Pontifice?

Tractatus III: De spe

Dissertatio I: De spe

Articulus I: De spe secundum se et de ejus objecto

Articulus II: In quibus sit spes

Articulus III: De necessitate spei

Articulus IV: Quae sint vitia opposita spei theologicae?

Tractatus IV: De charitate

Dissertatio I: De charitate secundum se

Articulus I: Complectens omnia quae spectant charitatem secundum se

Dissertatio II: De subjecto, causa, augmento et amissione charitatis

Articulus I: De subjecto, causa, augmento et amissione charitatis

Dissertatio III: De charitate erga proximum

Articulus I: Utrum homo debeat ex charitate diligere seipsum, corpus suum et peccatores?

Articulus II: Utrum inimici sint ex charitate diligendi, eisque exhibenda signa et opera charitatis?

Dissertatio IV: De ordine et praecipuo actu charitatis, qui est dilectio

Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit magis ex charitate diligendus, quam proximus?

Articulus II: Utrum homo debeat ex charitate magis se diligere quam proximum?

Articulus III: Quis ordo servandus sit in dilectione proximorum?

Articulus IV: An et quo sensu liceat diligere Deum et illi servire propter retributionem?

Articulus V: De praecipto charitatis

Dissertatio V: De eleemosyna

Articulus I: Utrum dare eleemosynam sit in praecipto, et quando?

Articulus II: Variae quaestiones circa eleemosynam breviter solvuntur

Dissertatio VI: De correptione fraterna

Articulus I: Utrum correptio fraterna sit in praecipto, et quae conditiones requirantur ut obliget?

Articulus II: De ordine correptionis fraternae

Dissertatio VII: De vitiis charitati oppositis

Articulus I: De odio Dei et proximi, de accidia, invidia, discordia, contentione et schismate

Articulus II: De bello

Articulus III: De duello

Tractatus V: De iure et iustitia

Dissertatio I: De iure et dominio

Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit ius?

Articulus II: Quid et quotuplex sit dominium? Quid ususfructus et usus?

Articulus III: Utrum usus in rebus unico actu consumptibilibus distinguatur a dominio?

Articulus IV: De possessione

Dissertatio II: De subjecto et objecto dominii

Articulus I: De subjecto et objecto dominii in genere

Articulus II: De dominio uxorum et filiorumfamilias

Articulus III: De dominio clericorum

Dissertatio III: De modis acquirendi dominium

Articulus I: De modis acquirendi dominia rerum quae nullius sunt

Articulus II: De primo modo acquirendi dominium rerum quae sunt alicujus, scilicet de accessione

Articulus III: De altero modo acquirendi dominia rerum quae sunt alienus, nimirum de praescriptione

Dissertatio IV: De iustitia

Articulus I: De definitione, objecto et subjecto iustitiae

Articulus II: De divisione iustitiae

Dissertatio V: De actu iustitiae ut sic, nempe de iudicio

Articulus I: Utrum iudicium sit licitum?

Articulus II: De suspicione et iudicio temerario

Articulus III: Utrum dubia de male proximi sint in meliorem partem interpretanda?

Dissertatio VI: De actu iustitiae commutativae, nempe de restitutione

Articulus I: De qualitate et necessitate restitutionis

Articulus II: Ex quotuplex titulo obligetur restitutio, sit affirmativa vel negativa?

Articulus III: Utrum incurratur obligatio restitutionis ratione damni illati absque culpa theologica?

Articulus IV: Utrum culpa theologica vehemens inducat obligationem restituendi, et qualem?

Articulus V: Utrum et quanto culpa iuridica inducat obligationem restituendi ratione contractus et quasi-contractus, seu officii?

Articulus VI: Quomodo sit restituendum a possessore bonae fidei

Articulus VII: Utrum qui bona fide emit rem furtivam, ubi novit esse furtivam, teneatur eam reddere vero domino?

Articulus VIII: De restitutione facienda a possessore mala fidei

Articulus IX: Utrum illi qui impediunt aliquem a consecutione alicujus boni, teneantur ad restitutionem?

Articulus X: De restitutione facienda ab his qui injuriae damnificationi cooperantur

Articulus XI: Quando sit facienda restitutio?

Articulus XII: Quomodo sit facienda restitutio?

Articulus XIII: Quo loco, cujus expensis et periculo restituenda sit?

Articulus XIV: Cui ex pluribus creditoribus prius sit restituendum?

Articulus XV: Quomodo sit restituenda?

Articulus XVI: De causis quae obligationem restitutionis suspendunt

Articulus XVII: De causis quae tollunt obligationem restitutionis

Dissertatio VII: De vitio opposito iustitiae distributivae, quod est acceptio personarum

Articulus I: Quid sit acceptio personarum?

Articulus II: De acceptione personarum in distributione spiritualium

Articulus III: De tributis

↑ Top of work