Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III

(St. Thomas, qq. 4 et 5.)

You will ask 1° whether faith is rightly defined by the Apostle, Hebr. XI, 1: the substance of things to be hoped for, the proof of things that appear not.

I answer. ¹ this definition, although the words are not arranged under the form of a definition, is legitimate, because it contains all that pertains to the definition of faith, as will appear from the following explanation.

It is called substance, in Greek hypostasis or subsistence: partly because faith is the beginning, basis and foundation of our hope; for substance is the substratum of all qualities: partly because it makes the things to be hoped for subsist in our intellect, and makes us assent to them as certainly as if they were present.

It is called the proof of things that appear not, taking proof for its effect, or, as another reading has it, conviction; for just as an argument leads the intellect to adhere to some truth, so through faith the intellect firmly adheres to truths that appear not, on account of the authority of God revealing.

It is called, of things that appear not: both because the object of faith is unseen; and to signify that more things pertain to faith than are hoped for, such as past goods and evils to come upon sinners, e. g., hell.

By this definition faith is distinguished from all other intellectual habits. By the phrase, substance of things to be hoped for, it is distinguished from human faith, by which one is not ordered to the happiness hoped for. By τῷ proof, it is distinguished from opinion, suspicion and doubt. By τῷ of things that appear not, it is distinguished from science and the understanding of first principles.

If therefore anyone wishes to reduce these words into the form of a definition, he may say ² that faith is « a habit of the mind whereby eternal life begins in us, making the intellect assent firmly to things that appear not, on account of the authority of God revealing. » And this definition coincides with that other one commonly current: « A virtue infused by God, whereby the intellect firmly assents to those things that have been revealed by God, on account of the authority of him who reveals them. »

[You will ask 2° whether unformed faith is a virtue,

It must be noted that the ultimate form of faith, as of the other virtues, is charity. But charity is not the intrinsic and essential form of faith ³, but is its extrinsic and accidental form, insofar as through charity faith, like all the other virtues, is ordered to the supernatural last end, and thus from charity it has it that its act is perfect and meritorious. This granted,

I answer. Faith is of itself a true virtue, but imperfect.

Proof. of the first part. 1° Because it is the principle of a good act determining the intellect to assent to revealed truths. Hence, although it does not make its possessor good simply, in the moral order, which belongs to a perfect virtue, it nevertheless makes him good in its own order, namely the intellective. 2° Because the definition of virtue applies to it. For it is a good quality of the mind whereby one lives well, namely the principle of a good act, and which no one uses as a bad principle. 3° It is the same habit as formed faith; for charity does not create this habit, but perfects it only extrinsically and accidentally. 4° Precepts are given only concerning acts of virtues. But a precept is given concerning the act of unformed faith, as appears in Hebr., XI, 6: He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to them that seek him. Moreover, he who comes to God is not yet perfectly united to him; which union takes place only through charity. Therefore.

Proof. of the second part ⁴; because unformed faith does not make a man good simply. For although it is the principle of a good act, yet this act is not meritorious in order to the last end, namely eternal life, and thus faith does not have the state and mode of a perfect virtue.]

You will ask 3° whether faith is more certain than all natural cognitions.

I answer. Faith is more certain, in itself, than all natural cognitions, but not as regards us.

Proof. of the first part ⁵, Faith has its certitude from the divine truth, which cannot be deceived, and which is applied with certainty to the revealed truths through the infallible Church. Natural cognitions, however, have their certitude from the natural light of reason, which, although the object about which it deals is sometimes certain, is nevertheless enveloped in darkness through sin and liable to error, nor is it certain that it is applied rightly to the things apprehended. Therefore.

Proof. of the second part ⁶, That is said to be more certain as regards us which the intellect attains more fully, which is more connatural and proportionate to it, and which satisfies and quiets it more, although it assents to it less certainly from elsewhere. Now natural cognitions are more connatural and proportionate to the human intellect, are penetrated more deeply by it, satisfy and quiet it more on account of the evidence of things, in which the human intellect ultimately rests, than does faith, which is concerned with obscure and unevident things: hence it happens that, although it is most certain on the side of the motive, it nevertheless suffers, on the side of the subject, certain undeliberated movements of doubt, on account of the weakness of a mind not yet seeing the truth. Therefore.

You will ask 4° whether faith is discursive.

I answer. negatively; because, as by the same vision we see color and light, so by the same act we assent to the thing revealed and to the revelation; for the object of faith is the thing revealed, not materially, but formally as revealed. In a discursive process, however, the assent to the principles is really distinguished from the assent to the conclusion.

[You will ask 5° whether faith is free.

I answer. affirmatively, from the Vatican Council defining thus: « If anyone shall say that the assent of Christian faith is not free, but is necessarily produced by arguments of human reason; or that the grace of God is necessary for faith alone living, which works through charity; let him be anathema. »]

1°: Faith remains in a sinner who does not commit the sin of unbelief.

It is proved, firstly, from the Apostle, 1 Cor., XIII, 2, where he says: If I should have all faith..., but have not charity, I am nothing. By these words he plainly supposes that charity can be separated from faith while faith remains, and thus that faith can be in a sinner.

Secondly, from Trent, session VI, canon 28, defining thus: « If anyone shall say that when grace is lost through sin faith is always lost with it, or that the faith which remains is not true faith, though it is not living...; let him be anathema. » Hence this conclusion is de fide. To this point tends this proposition condemned by Alexander VIII, the 12th: « When in great sinners all love fails, faith also fails, and even if they seem to believe, it is not divine faith, but human. » Likewise this 52nd of Quesnel: « All other means of salvation are contained in faith, as in its germ and seed; but this faith is not without love and confidence. »

Thirdly, by reason. Not every sin is contrary to faith, nor does it destroy the formal reason of its object: thus one who steals does not for that reason cease to believe that God is the first and infallible truth in speaking. Therefore.

But when the holy Fathers say that there is no faith or any virtue without charity, they speak of living faith and of the virtues in their perfect state of being, as we have already noted.

I say, secondly: In demons and the damned there does not remain infused and supernatural faith ¹.

It is proved. Demons and the damned are stripped of all gratuitous gifts, especially those ordered to beatitude, which they neither hope for nor can hope for. Now faith is a gratuitous gift by its nature ordered to beatitude; for it is, according to the Apostle, Hebr., XI, 1, the substance of things to be hoped for, and according to the Council of Trent, session VI, cap. 8, « the beginning of salvation, the root and foundation of justification. » Therefore.

It is confirmed. For supernatural faith there is required a pious motion of the will, or a good affect of credulity toward the first truth revealing. Now there is in demons and the damned no pious motion of the will, no good will, since it is fixed in evil; and although what they do is sometimes good from its proximate object, yet they always do it from a depraved intention of the end, and thus it is always evil.

You will say: 1° James, II, 19, says: The demons believe, and tremble. Therefore. 2° Demons and damned Christians know in hell the supernatural truths they knew on the way. Now they cannot know these supernatural truths except through faith, which alone among the intellectual virtues is supernatural. Therefore.

I answer to the first. That demons believe with infused faith arising from a pious motion of the will, I deny; that they believe with natural faith, and in a manner coerced, both from the evidence of signs which they penetrate with the keen acumen of a perspicacious mind, and from the miserable experience by which they feel God as their avenger, I concede. Nor does it matter that St. James compares their faith with the faith of sinners, which is true infused faith; for the comparison holds not as to the nature of either faith, but as to the sterility of each, because neither suffices for salvation, since both are without works. The solution is clear from the text.

I answer to the second. I deny the minor. For the faith by which demons and the damned believe and know supernatural truths, although it can be called supernatural on the part of the object, is nonetheless natural on the part of the motive or principle; for it is acquired either from the state of the wayfarer, or from the event of things, or from prophecies fulfilled, or from the punishments they feel: just as, if someone from a merely natural motive, say from the report of parents or of some learned man, were to believe our mysteries, although the object of this faith would be supernatural, the faith itself in itself and on the part of its principle would be natural.

I say, thirdly: Faith does not remain in the blessed ², yet it does remain in the souls in purgatory.

It is proved, first part. 1° From the Apostle, 1 Cor., XIII, 9 and 10, who says: We know in part and we prophesy in part; but when that which is perfect shall come, that which is in part shall be done away. That is, when vision shall have come, faith shall be done away. And 2 Cor., V, 6 and 7: While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord; for we walk by faith, and not by sight. Whence Aug., book XIV On the Trinity, c. 2, n. 4: « For, he says, there will no longer be faith [in heaven], by which things that are not seen are believed, but sight, by which things that were believed are seen. »

It is proved, 2° ³ The formal object of faith being destroyed, faith does not subsist. Now in the blessed the formal object of faith is destroyed; for the formal object of faith is the first truth not seen, which the blessed see intuitively. Therefore.

Hence the second part stands proved. For the souls in purgatory (the same must be said of the Fathers who were in limbo) do not yet enjoy the beatific vision, and thus the formal object of faith remains in them, namely the first truth not seen. Add that they hope for beatitude; but the foundation of hope is faith, since no one hopes for beatitude unless he believes he can attain it.

I say, fourthly: Faith, whether habitual or actual, does not remain in a heretic who pertinaciously discredits even one single article of faith ^{4 5}. This is common opinion with the Author, against a few.

It is proved, 1° from the Apostle, Gal., V, 4, who says to those who held that observance of the legal rites was necessary for salvation: You are emptied of Christ, that is, of the Spirit of faith, as he explains in the following verse. Trent, session VI, cap. 15: « It must be asserted, he says, not only by unbelief, whereby faith itself also is lost, etc. » Now any heresy, even about one article alone, is unbelief.

It is proved, 2°, by reason ⁶ The formal object ceasing, by which habit and act are specified, the habit and act cease and are destroyed. Now in a heretic who pertinaciously denies even one article of faith, the formal object of faith ceases, both habitual and actual. Therefore. — The minor is proved. The formal object of faith, whether habitual or actual, is the first truth in speaking, as manifested by the Church. Now one who pertinaciously denies one article of faith does not believe the others he holds on account of the first truth as manifested by the Church; otherwise he would believe this one too, which he denies, since it also, like the others, was revealed by the first truth and proposed as such by the Church; but he rejects this one and holds the others by his own judgment and his own choice. Whence Aug., book XVII Contra Faustum, c. 3, addressing the Manichees: « You, he says, believe in the Gospel what you wish, and what you do not wish you do not believe; you believe yourselves rather than the Gospel. »

[Let it be noted, therefore, that although faith, on the part of its object, is an integral whole consisting of parts, inasmuch as it regards the many things revealed by God, nevertheless in the character of a habit and a quality it is one and simple in each believer, since it inclines him to assent to many things under one indivisible motive, namely on account of the first truth in speaking; whence this whole and entire habit perishes in a heretic. But if it happens that a heretic after his heresy believes the articles he still holds with the same ease and firmness as before, this happens because heretics believe with the same firmness and ease not only the articles of faith, but also their errors, so that they sometimes die asserting them. Firmness, therefore, comes from sheer obstinacy of the will, but ease from a habit of faith acquired either, according to some, through acts of previous faith, not as supernatural but as vital acts; or, according to others, through acts of faith natural on the part of their principle, though supernatural on the part of their object; for often a believer, whether from the instruction of parents, or from the teaching of catechists, or from custom, without attending to the revealing first truth, elicits acts which, being natural on the part of their principle, generate an equally natural habit, which remains in heresy. But the habit of supernatural faith is destroyed by the destruction of its formal object. Therefore, when a heretic, by denying one article of faith, denies the first truth, and by this act physically destroys in his intellect the object of faith, in the same way he destroys mediately the habit of faith.]

[The Latitudinarians, under the specious pretext of entering into mutual concord among all Christians, rise up sharply against Catholics because their intolerance fosters dissentions, and impiously contend that communion must be held with all those who have in any way received divine revelation, even if they have received only some of the things contained in it — persons whom they assert can attain salvation by a faith, though but a halved one, no less than Catholics. And hence has arisen the absurd distinction of the articles of faith into fundamental and non-fundamental ones, although not even they themselves have yet agreed among themselves on assigning them. But from what has been said it is clear how impiously these things are proposed: for without faith it is impossible to please God and to attain eternal life; but a halved faith can in no way be called divine faith. For, as the Apostle says, 2 Cor., VI, 15: What concord hath Christ with Belial? or what part hath the believer with the unbeliever? Therefore

I say 1°: The true religion can tolerate no other religion diverse from itself, and the intolerance of the true religion ought to be its proper character.

Before the proof, I suppose that there can be only one true religion — a point on which both the Latitudinarians and the other sectaries ought to agree, since, as they themselves confess, that is the true religion which follows divine revelation, which rests upon the truthfulness of God revealing, who can neither deceive nor be deceived. That alone, therefore, is the true religion which follows divine revelation in the way that is fitting. And so, if any religion exceeds or falls short in admitting revealed things, or admits things that are not true, or does not admit things that are true, it cannot itself be true. Just as, therefore, if truth be mixed with falsehood, it ceases to be truth and can no longer be called simply true; so, if falsehoods be mixed with the dogmas of the true religion, it ceases to be the true religion and can no longer be called simply true.

I prove, therefore, the conclusion. Tolerance carries with it some association. But the true religion can have no association with the dogmas of another religion diverse from itself, as is clear from the supposition stated above. Therefore the true religion can tolerate no religion diverse from itself.

Nay, just as the proper note of truth is to admit no association with error, so also the intolerance of any other religion ought to be the proper character of the true religion.

Yet it does not follow from this, as the Latitudinarians babble, that men's minds are divided against one another and each becomes an enemy to the other. For Catholics keep before their minds the command of Christ, that they love also those from whom they have received evil. Therefore they ought to conduct themselves on the same ground toward those from whom, although they follow dogmas different from theirs, they receive no harm. Indeed the errors of such men are hated by those who profess the true Christian religion, and they would wish, if they could, to recall them to the way of salvation and of truth; but so far is it from being the case that any traces of alienation of mind appear, that quite the contrary it appears most evidently that nothing is dearer to them than to procure for those men their true and solid welfare. Who does not know that already from the beginnings of the Church the professors of the true religion have taken care, at how great peril to themselves, to lead barbarians and unbelievers to the knowledge of God and to eternal salvation, and still take care? And when they do this, they serve the salvation of men who differ from them in religion, even at the cost of their own life.

I say 2°: Such is the condition of a false religion that, as regards dogmas, it can enter into association with other religions diverse from itself.

Proof. Although truth is opposed to every falsehood, this is not so with falsehood, and nothing prevents two equally false religions from joining in association with each other. And indeed, if it is once laid down that divine revelation proceeds from divine authority, and yet that some revealed things can be rejected by certain Christians, how will those be able to be condemned who have despised and rejected other things handed down and revealed by God? For one must permit others also to use the same right that he himself uses. And hence not only ethnics introduced into their own religion the superstitions of other religions, but Christians too who declined from the truth of the faith either decreed that all sects whatsoever, or at least some, were to be tolerated; and the true Christian religion alone judged that no association with other sects could be entered into as regards dogmas.

Locke objects that it suffices for eternal salvation to believe Christ to be the Messiah and the Son of God, and he tries to prove this by several testimonies of Sacred Scripture in which Christ required this of all. Yet almost all the sects of heretics admit this dogma of faith. Therefore.

I answer with a distinction. That Christ first required this of all, namely that they believe him to be the true Son of God, and that the Apostles were especially solicitous to persuade all of this first, I concede; that Christ required faith in this dogma only, I deny.

Christ, as Son of God, had come to promulgate a new law. Therefore, in order to establish his authority, whereby he was the Son of God, he had first to see to it that all believed him to be the Son of God, and the Apostles likewise strove for the same. The divinity of Christ is therefore, as it were, the base and foundation of evangelical revelation. Yet did not Christ himself will that all should have faith also in everything else that he handed down? He commanded the Apostles to teach all men what they had heard from him, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Mark, I, 15, Christ says: The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand; repent, and believe the Gospel. After the resurrection he commanded the Apostles, Mark, XVI, 15: Going into the whole world, preach the Gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be condemned. And the Apostles, obeying his commands, went forth and preached everywhere, the Lord working withal and confirming the word with signs that followed, ibid., 20.

The Latitudinarians object, together with Bayle, Rousseau and Voltaire: It must be said that a man does not reverence God more than another because he understands Holy Scripture better than the other; it is enough that both accept Holy Scripture as their rule, even though one of them departs from the will of God in particular points and through error. For just as he who receives Holy Scripture in the sense in which he ought receives this sense because he thinks it true, not because it is true in itself, and because, were he to receive another sense, he would think he displeased God; so he who receives Holy Scripture in a false sense prefers this sense, not because it is false, but because it seems true to him, and he judges that he would displease God if he received it in another. Therefore he who follows the sense of Holy Scripture which he thinks to be true can please God and attain eternal salvation.

I answer by asking the Latitudinarians whether they wish Holy Scripture to be the rule of men's own senses, or rather the senses of men the rule of Holy Scripture? If Holy Scripture, as it truly ought to be, is the rule of men's senses, and men ought to accommodate themselves to it in their senses, he fails most shamefully who does not attain its sense and understands it otherwise than he ought. For a rule is the norm to which one must conform, to which one must be subject and upon which one must depend, just as the measure is the norm of the thing measured, not the thing measured the norm of the measure itself. Does he equally reverence his lawgiver — he who not only shows veneration to the law promulgated, but moreover with study and diligence attains its legitimate sense and acts according to it — and he who reverences the law generically as a rule, yet, on account of his malice, obstinacy and culpable ignorance, does not attain its sense and acts against it? Therefore the true sense of Holy Scripture is attributed to it when it is conformed to the mind of God speaking; nor is it true for that reason because he who rightly understands it thinks it true, but because it is right in itself and has conformity with God speaking. Indeed, to avoid deception, it is required that this sense also be thought true; yet it does not for that reason become true because it is so thought. Hence it comes about that he who attributes a false sense to Holy Scripture, although he himself thinks it true, nevertheless does not attribute the true sense, nor does his false judgment make it conformed to the mind of God speaking. Nor does it matter that he intends to please God, both he who rightly and he who wrongly understands Holy Scripture; for he who employed all diligence to attain the true sense of Scripture, and consequently attained it, truly pleases God; but he who, on account of his malice, obstinacy and culpable ignorance, did not attain the true sense of Scripture, although he thought he pleased God, nevertheless thought falsely and impiously.]

I answer. So far is faith from excluding natural reason that it rather elevates it, illumines it, and strengthens it.

Proof. Faith could not exclude natural reason unless it were contrary to reason and impeded its exercise. Yet faith is in no wise contrary to reason; on the contrary, a perfect analogy exists between the two; nor does faith impede the exercise of reason, but, like a higher light, it merely adds strength to reason by elevating it, illumining it, and strengthening it. Therefore it does not exclude it.

Both parts of the minor were expounded and demonstrated more decisively and more clearly by the Vatican Synod, in the constitution Dei Filius, chapter 4, on Faith and Reason: « This perpetual consent of the Catholic Church has held and holds that there is a twofold order of cognition, distinct not only in its principle but also in its object: in its principle, indeed, because in the one we know by natural reason, in the other by divine faith; in its object, moreover, because besides those things to which natural reason can attain, there are proposed to us for belief mysteries hidden in God, which, unless divinely revealed, cannot become known. Wherefore the Apostle, who testifies that God was known by the nations through the things that are made, yet discoursing of the grace and truth which came by Jesus Christ, Ioann., I, 17, pronounces: We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, a wisdom which is hidden, which God foreordained before the ages unto our glory, which none of the princes of this world knew..., but God hath revealed to us by his Spirit; for the Spirit searches all things, yea, even the deep things of God, I Cor., II, 7-10. And the Only-begotten himself confesses to the Father: Thou hast hidden these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them to little ones.

And indeed reason, when illumined by faith, if it seek earnestly, piously, and soberly, attains, with God granting, some understanding of the mysteries, and that most fruitful, partly from the analogy of those things which it knows naturally, partly from the connection of the mysteries themselves with one another and with the last end of man; yet never does it become capable of perceiving them in the manner of the truths which constitute its own proper object. For the divine mysteries of their very nature so far exceed created intellect that, even though handed down by revelation and received by faith, they nevertheless remain covered by the veil of faith itself and wrapped in a kind of obscurity, so long as in this mortal life we are pilgrims away from the Lord; for we walk by faith, and not by sight, II Cor., V, 6 and 7.

But although faith is above reason, there can nevertheless never be any true dissension between faith and reason, since the same God who reveals the mysteries and infuses faith has implanted in the human mind the light of reason; and God cannot deny himself, nor can truth ever contradict truth¹. The vain show of such contradiction arises chiefly from this, that either the dogmas of faith have not been understood and set forth according to the mind of the Church, or the figments of opinions are taken for utterances of reason. We therefore define that every assertion contrary to the truth of enlightened faith is altogether false. Moreover, the Church, which together with her apostolic office of teaching has received the charge of guarding the deposit of faith, holds by divine right also the right and duty of forbidding knowledge falsely so called, lest anyone be cheated by philosophy and vain deceit, Coloss., II, 8. Wherefore all Christian faithful are forbidden not only to defend as legitimate conclusions of science opinions of this kind which are known to be contrary to the doctrine of faith, especially if they have been reproved by the Church, but they are rather bound to hold them altogether as errors which bear before themselves a fallacious appearance of truth.

Not only can faith and reason never be at variance with each other, but they also render each other mutual aid: right reason demonstrates the foundations of the faith, and, illumined by its light, cultivates the science of divine things; faith, in turn, sets reason free from errors and protects it, and furnishes it with manifold knowledge. Wherefore so far is the Church from opposing the cultivation of human arts and disciplines that she aids and promotes it in many ways. For she neither ignores nor despises the advantages which flow from them to the life of men; nay, she confesses that, as they have issued from God, the Lord of sciences, so, if they be rightly pursued, they lead back to God, his grace helping. Nor does she indeed forbid these disciplines to use within their own sphere each its own principles and its own method; but acknowledging this just liberty, she diligently takes care lest, by withstanding divine doctrine, they take upon themselves errors, or, transgressing their proper limits, occupy and disturb the things that are of faith.

For the doctrine of faith which God has revealed has not been proposed to human minds to be perfected like a philosophical invention, but has been delivered to the Spouse of Christ as a divine deposit, to be faithfully guarded and infallibly declared. Hence also that sense of the sacred dogmas must forever be retained which holy Mother Church has once declared, nor must one ever depart from that sense under the specious name and pretext of a higher understanding. Let understanding, science, and wisdom therefore increase and progress greatly and vigorously in individuals and in all, in one man and in the whole Church, through the steps of the ages and centuries: but only in their own kind, namely, in the same dogma, the same sense, and the same opinion². »

The Angelic Doctor had demonstrated this analogy and concord of faith with natural reason in I Contra gentes, cap. 7|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-primus:liber.1/capitulum.7 : « Nothing, he says, that is instilled into the soul of the disciple by the teacher contains the knowledge of the teacher, unless he teach deceitfully; which it is impious to say of God. Now the knowledge of principles naturally known has been divinely implanted in us, since God himself is the author of our nature. These principles, therefore, divine wisdom also contains. Whatever, therefore, is contrary to principles of this kind is contrary to divine wisdom. It cannot, therefore, be from God. Those things, therefore, which are held by faith from divine revelation cannot be contrary to natural knowledge... From which it is evidently gathered that, whatever arguments are brought against the documents of faith, these do not proceed rightly from principles implanted in nature and self-evident in themselves. Hence they have not the force of demonstration, but are either probable reasons or sophistical, and thus room is left for answering them. »

Concerning the relations of faith with natural reason, the aforementioned Vatican Synod published the following canons. On faith: 1. « If anyone shall say that human reason is so independent that faith cannot be commanded to it by God: let him be anathema. » — 2. « If anyone shall say that divine faith is not distinguished from natural knowledge concerning God and moral things, and that consequently for divine faith it is not required that the revealed truth be believed on account of the authority of God who reveals it: let him be anathema. » — On faith and reason: 1. « If anyone shall say that in divine revelation there are contained no true and properly so called mysteries, but that all the dogmas of faith can be understood and demonstrated from natural principles by reason duly cultivated: let him be anathema. » — 2. « If anyone shall say that the human disciplines are to be treated with such liberty that their assertions, even though they be opposed to revealed doctrine, are to be retained as true, and cannot be proscribed by the Church: let him be anathema. » — 3. « If anyone shall say that it can happen that at some time, according to the progress of science, another sense is to be attributed to the dogmas proposed by the Church than that which the Church understood and understands: let him be anathema. »

That it may be found with what great solicitude the Catholic Church has always watched over the defense of the dignity and rights of human reason, it will help to add here the four propositions by which the excessive ardor of certain men was repressed, who, in favor of faith, had depressed reason too much. Drawn up by the sacred Congregation of the Index on June 11, 1835, they were approved on the 15th of the same month by Pius IX, who ordered them published.

1° « Although faith is above reason, nevertheless no true dissent, no discord between the two can ever be found, since both arise from one and the same unchangeable source of truth, God best and greatest, and thus render each other mutual aid. » — From the Encyclical of Pius IX, November 9, 1846.

2° Reasoning can prove with certainty the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul, and the liberty of man. Faith is subsequent to revelation, and consequently it cannot fitly be alleged to prove the existence of God against the atheist, or to prove the spirituality and liberty of the rational soul against the follower of naturalism and fatalism. » — Subscribed by D. Bautain, September 8, 1840.

3° « The use of reason precedes faith, and leads man to it by the aid of revelation and grace. » Subscribed by the same, on the same day.

4° « The method which D. Thomas, D. Bonaventura, and other scholastics after them made use of does not lead to rationalism, nor was it the cause why philosophy in the schools of today ran headlong into naturalism and pantheism. Consequently it is not lawful to bring into accusation those doctors and masters for having employed this method, especially with the approbation, or at least the tacit consent, of the Church. » — This proposition is opposed to divers propositions professed by D. Bonnetty.

Whoever desires more concerning the relations of reason with faith, let him consult Fr. Perrone, Praelect. theol., De analogia rationis cum fide.]