Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III

You will ask 1° what things are to be believed by necessity of precept.

I answer. All the faithful, in this state of the evangelical law, are bound by a precept binding under mortal sin to believe explicitly, at least as to substance and principal circumstances: 1° all the articles contained in the Apostles' Creed; 2° all the precepts of the Decalogue and of the Church; 3° the Lord's Prayer; 4° the sacraments necessary to be received, which are three: baptism, the eucharist and penance.

The reason of the first part is that the Apostles were bound by the precept of Christ to teach those articles explicitly, according to that saying, Marc., XVI, 15: Preach the Gospel to every creature; and therefore they composed this Creed before they began to preach. Therefore there is in the faithful the obligation of believing them. For the precept of instructing would be useless if there were not the obligation of believing. And so it is prescribed cap. Baptizandos, de consecr., dist. 4, cap. 58. Whence the Roman Catechism, p. I, c. 1, n. 2: « Those things which Christian men must first hold, says he, are those which... the holy Apostles, inspired by the divine Spirit, distinguished in twelve articles of the Creed. »

The reason of the second part is that each of the faithful is bound to keep the precepts of the Decalogue and of the Church. Therefore also to know, or believe, them.

The reason of the third part is drawn from the necessity of knowing those things which we ought to ask of God. These however are contained in the Lord's Prayer.

The reason of the fourth part is that he cannot receive these sacraments rightly who is ignorant of them and of the dispositions required for them.

I said: « At least as to substance and principal circumstances; » because, as the Author says, certain persons are bound to believe more or less explicitly the subtle considerations concerning these mysteries, according as it befits the state and office of each one; more the pastors, doctors, preachers, confessors, who are deputed to instruct others, than the faithful among the people.

You will ask 2° when the precept of faith binds.

Twofold is the precept of faith: one affirmative, to assent to revealed truths; the other negative, not to deny the faith received or acknowledged. The latter binds always; not the former, but at a determined time, like the other affirmative precepts. But at what time?

I answer. 1° The affirmative precept of faith binds per se an adult possessed of reason immediately morally, as soon as the things to be believed and the motives for believing are sufficiently proposed to him; because faith is a necessary means to salvation, as we said. But an adult is bound immediately morally to employ the means necessary for his salvation, especially since, if he do not believe, there is danger lest he positively dissent from the truth acknowledged, and thus sin against the negative precept. Add that, since this precept binds per se at some time, no more convenient time can be assigned than the first instant of moral life, or of sufficient illumination.

I said: « Immediately morally; » because with children one must not act too scrupulously; for it often happens that, even when they have acquired the use of reason, the mysteries of faith are not sufficiently proposed to them, or that they do not apprehend the grave obligation of believing. Whence they rarely sin against this precept by not eliciting at once an act of faith.

2° The affirmative precept of faith binds per se in danger of death, in which the precepts of hope and charity bind, and man reaches his term.

3° Besides these cases, the affirmative precept of faith binds per se many times in life. It is clear 1° from the following propositions condemned by Innocent XI. The first: « It suffices to elicit an act of faith once in life. » It is the 17th among the condemned. Another: « It suffices to have believed those mysteries [namely of the Trinity and Incarnation] once. » It is the 65th. 2° Because, according to Scripture, Rom., I, 17, the just liveth by faith. But how would he live by faith if he elicited only one act of it in the whole of his life? 3° Because the precepts of the other virtues, hope, charity, etc., bind many times in life. Why not also that of faith?

But how often does it bind in life? It cannot be determined with certainty. Marvelously on this point authors vary. For some say on every Sunday and feast day; others, every month; others, once a year; others, on the greater solemnities.

[St. Liguori says, lib. III, n. 7: « The Salmanticenses think quite probably, together with others, that the faithful are bound at least once a year to exercise an act of faith. » And he adds that this opinion is common. The same observes that satisfaction is made sufficiently for this precept also through the exercise of the other virtues, whether through the reception of the sacraments, or from whatever other occasion acts of faith are placed.

It is expedient that the faithful be led to elicit explicit acts of faith every day, when they recite their accustomed prayers, to which the formulas of acts of faith, hope and charity are commonly added. Thus the habit of faith is confirmed, the obligation is abundantly satisfied, and the merit annexed to this virtue is multiplied.

But are we bound to elicit these acts formally, namely from the motive of God revealing? This motive indeed is very well enunciated in an explicit act, but it is sufficiently included in any act of faith, even implicit, although there be no reflex act from the proper motive. « For he who, says St. Liguori, ibid., has often placed faith as the rule of his actions, by which he wishes to tend to God, whatever good he does afterwards, directs to God exercitively by the same rule already, although he advert not. »]

I answer. 2° The affirmative precept of faith binds per accidens when a grave temptation presses, either against faith or against another virtue, which can be overcome only by an express act of faith. 2° Whenever some other precept urges which cannot be fulfilled without faith, as while one is bound to repent, to receive some sacrament, to celebrate or hear mass, etc.; because he who is bound to the end is bound to the means. In these cases however it does not seem necessary that there intervene an express act of faith in actu signato, whereby one say: « I believe that God exists whom I now implore; I believe the sacrament which I now receive; » but it suffices that he believe implicitly and in actu exercito, insofar as from knowledge of the faith, knowing that God exists, that he is the Redeemer, that this is a sacrament, etc., he intends to pray to God, love him, offer sacrifice, receive the sacrament, etc.

[It must be added: after falling into heresy, or denying the faith, because the injury offered to the first Truth must be repaired of necessity. So all.]

You will ask 3° whether a pious motion of the will is required for the assent of faith.

I answer. Affirmatively ¹.

[This the Vatican Council teaches in the constitution Dei Filius, cap. 3, in these words: « Although the assent of faith is by no means a blind movement of the mind, nevertheless no one can consent to the evangelical preaching as is required for attaining salvation without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who gives to all sweetness in consenting and believing the truth ². Wherefore faith itself in itself, even though it work not through charity, is a gift of God, and its act is a work pertaining to salvation, by which man renders to God himself free obedience, consenting and cooperating with his grace, against which he could resist. »

It is proved 1° because at Rom., X, 10, it is said: With the heart we believe unto justice, that is with the will moving the intellect to believe, as the Angelic Doctor explains there, lect. 2. And it is gathered from the usage of Holy Scripture, according to which heart is wont to be taken for will. Whence Augustine, Tract. XXIV in Ioann., n. 2: « Anyone can enter the church unwilling, can approach the altar unwilling, can receive a sacrament unwilling: he cannot believe unless willing. »]

2° The intellect is determined only either by an evident object or by the will. But for the assent of faith it is not determined by the object, which is necessarily obscure and unevident. Therefore by the will.

3° The act of faith is free both as regards exercise and as regards specification, namely in the character of assent rather than dissent. Therefore it needs the motion of the will, whereby the intellect be determined to assent rather than to dissent.

[This motion is called « pious, » because it is necessarily from the help of grace, otherwise it would not be supernatural, and the beginning of salvation would be from us; which was condemned in the semi-Pelagians. Whence the Council of Trent teaches, session VI, cap. 6, that men « are disposed to justice itself, while excited and helped by divine grace, conceiving faith from hearing, they are freely moved towards God, believing those things to be true which divinely have been revealed and promised. »]

This pious motion moreover is a certain complacency or affection, from the help of grace, towards the supreme veracity of God, by force of which it determines the intellect to assent with that firmness which surpasses every firmness arising from any scientific or experimental act.

[You will ask 4° whether it suffices to adhere to the truths defined by the Church as to be believed of faith, neglecting or even considering as free the other doctrinal decisions which the Roman Pontiffs have published.

I answer. Negatively. So decreed Leo XIII in the Encyclical Immortale Dei, 1 November 1885: « Indeed in judging, whatever the Roman Pontiffs have handed down or shall hand down, each thing must be held grasped by stable judgment, and openly professed whenever occasion requires; and specially concerning those which in latest times have been sought under the name of liberties, it behooves one to stand by the judgment of the Apostolic See, and to hold the same as she has judged, each and all. » The reason is that the supreme Pontiff enjoys the inerrancy granted divinely to him not only when he defines something as to be believed of faith, which rarely happens, but whenever as universal doctor he pronounces upon the truth or falsity of any doctrine.

Hence it is that the Vatican Council, having condemned several errors by the constitution Dei Filius, adds: « But since it is not enough to avoid heretical pravity unless those errors also be diligently fled which more or less approach it, we admonish all of the duty of observing also the constitutions and decrees by which such perverse opinions, which are not expressly enumerated there, have been proscribed and prohibited by this Holy See. »

The opposite opinion had already been exploded by the condemnation of the following proposition, which is read in the Syllabus attached to the Encyclical Quanta cura, 8 December 1864, under no. 22: « The obligation by which Catholic teachers and authors are absolutely bound is restricted to those things alone which are propounded by the infallible judgment of the Church as dogmas of faith to be believed by all. » Pius IX had noted this proposition in the preceding year as erroneous and to be rejected by all, in an epistle to the Archbishop of Freiburg.

Whence resolve that anyone formally embracing and pertinaciously holding doctrine proscribed by the Apostolic See as erroneous commits a sin mortal of its genus, although the contradictory proposition be not taught as to be held of faith. I say « mortal of its genus; » because, since the Church freely permits many opposite opinions to be agitated, every error positively proscribed by her ought to be judged grave.]