Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III

(St. Thomas, q. 1.)

[Faith is taken in various senses: 1° For fidelity in promises, as 1 Cor., X, 13: God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able, and elsewhere. 2° For conscience, Rom., XIV, 23: All that is not of faith is sin. 3° For confidence, Jas., 1, 6: Let him ask in faith, nothing wavering. Faith understood in this sense is abused by Lutherans and Calvinists, who say we are justified by faith, that is, by the confidence by which we trust that sins are forgiven us through Christ. Which acceptation of faith, although in this sense it is to be rejected, is nevertheless to be admitted absolutely as an effect of faith, indeed even of hope; for from the fact that we believe God and hope in him, confidence in him is born. 4° For veracity or the inclination to speak the truth, 2 Tim., II, 11: A faithful saying: for if we be dead with him, we shall also live with him. 5° For the doctrine itself, that is, the object of faith, Rom., X, 8: This is the word of faith which we preach.]

Faith is here taken 6° and properly for the supernatural virtue by which we believe truths revealed by God; and it is defined by the Apostle, Hebr., XI, 1: The substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not. But, because every habit is specified by its object, and from that its nature is known, the Author begins this treatise from the object of faith, treating of the habit of faith itself below, q. 4. Adhering to which method,

I say 1°: The formal object which, or, as others call it, the object of attribution of faith, is first truth in being,¹ or God himself as God, exceeding natural reason; which I add, because God, as natural author, can be known by natural light independently of faith.

It is proved.² That is the formal object of some habit which is principally attained by it, and by reason of which the other things are attained: thus health is the formal object of medicine, because it is principally attained by medicine, and by its reason the other things, pulse, urine, remedies, etc., are attained. Now first truth in being, or God, as true God, is that which is principally attained by faith; but the other things, as those pertaining to the humanity of Christ, to the sacraments, and whatever else is contained in the Sacred Scriptures, are attained in order to God as to that which is most excellent among all things, and that he may be known more and more. Therefore.

I say 2°: The formal object by which, or the proper quo, of faith is first truth in speaking, or the divine veracity revealing, connoting first truth in knowing, or the infinite wisdom of God.³

It is proved as to the first part. The formal object by which of faith in common is the veracity of the speaker; for in this the assent of faith is distinguished from scientific assent, that the motive of the assent of faith is the authority of the speaker, while the motive of scientific assent is the truth of the principle from which the conclusion is elicited. Therefore the formal object under which of divine faith is the veracity of God speaking and revealing.

It is proved as to the second part. Faith is certain and infallible. Therefore it must rely on an infallible motive. — I subsume. Now the divine veracity revealing does not have that it be infallible unless it connote the infinite wisdom of God. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. That the divine veracity revealing be infallible, it does not suffice that it cannot deceive out of malice, but it is required that it also cannot deceive out of ignorance, and therefore that God himself cannot be deceived in knowing. Now that God cannot be deceived in knowing proceeds from his infinite wisdom, by which he knows all things as they are, without any admixture of falsity. Therefore.

I say 3°: The adequate material object of faith is everything revealed by God: God himself primarily, the rest secondarily.

It is proved. The adequate material object of some power or habit is all that which it can attain, as it lies under its object, or under the formal ratio under which: thus every colored body is the adequate material object of the visual power, because it can attain it, as it lies under light, which is its formal ratio under which. Now faith attains everything revealed, as it lies under the truth of God revealing, which is its formal object under which, as was said: God however primarily, the rest secondarily, as was also said in the first conclusion. Therefore.

You will object against the first part of the second conclusion: The formal object by which of faith, or, which is the same thing, the motive of the assent of faith, is that into which the assent of faith is ultimately resolved. Now that into which the assent of faith is ultimately resolved is not first truth in speaking, but first truth in being, or the Godhead. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. To one asking why you believe the mysteries of faith, v. g., that God is trine, you rightly answer: « Because God revealed it. » And to one asking further why you believe God revealing, you rightly again answer: « Because he is first truth in speaking. » But finally to one asking why God is first truth in speaking, nothing else remains to answer than: « Because God is, or he is first truth in being. » Therefore.

Nothing else remains to answer, than that because God is, assigning the cause of the thing, I concede; assigning the cause of the assent, I deny. Indeed for this reason God is truthful or first truth in speaking, because God is; but not for that reason do I believe the mysteries of faith, v. g., that God is trine, because God is, or he is first truth in being, but because he is truthful. For the assent of faith (which is to be diligently observed) is not discursive, but simple, and it rests solely in the testimony of the speaker, otherwise it is no longer the assent of faith: thus to one telling me that Rome exists, I assent because he is truthful, and there faith rests; but if you ascend and ask further: « Whence is he truthful? » now you run outside faith. Similarly therefore, to one asking why I believe God revealing, I rightly answer: « Because he is truthful », and there faith or the assent of faith rests, nor could it be asked except foolishly why I believe truth or veracity; but if you ask further why God is truthful, now I shall answer, not as a believer, but as a theologian: « Because God is. »

The question is commonly proposed thus, but it comes to the same as if you asked what the motive of faith is. This can be understood in two ways: either of the motive for assenting to revealed truths, or of the motive or rule for discerning which things are revealed. The first is disputed among Catholics, the second between Catholics and heretics.

[Protestants commonly hold that the motive and rule for discerning revealed truths is sacred Scripture, or the private spirit of each one, that is, the understanding breathed by the Holy Spirit into each one of the Scriptures he inspires.]

I say 1°: The motive for believing and assenting to revealed truths is the authority and veracity of God revealing, not the testimony or proposition of the Church.

It is proved — the first part, from the second conclusion of the preceding article. The motive for believing revealed truths is the formal object quo of faith; for that is called the formal object quo of a habit which is the medium and motive for attaining the formal object quod, as is clear from what has been said. Now the veracity of God revealing is the formal object quo of faith, as was said. Hence, to one asking why I believe God to be triune, I rightly answer: « Because God, who revealed it, is true. »

It is proved — the second part. The proposition or testimony of the Church in no way pertains to the formal object quo of faith. Therefore. — Proof of the antecedent. 1° Because it is something created; but nothing created can enter into the formal object of faith, any more than of hope and charity, otherwise they would not be purely divine and theological virtues. 2° The proposition of revealed truths through the Church is related to faith just as the proposition of goodness is related to love; for just as the will cannot love an object unless it is proposed and known, so the intellect cannot believe unless revealed truths are proposed to it. Now the proposition of goodness, in relation to the will and love, is not its formal object, but only the application of the object and a condition sine qua non. Therefore, similarly, the proposition of revealed truths through the Church, in relation to the intellect and faith.

I say 2°: The rule for discerning revealed truths is not Scripture, nor the private spirit, but the Church alone.

It is proved — the first part. The rule for discerning revealed truths from non-revealed ones must be incorruptible; otherwise it would expose one to error. Now Scripture is not incorruptible; for it can be corrupted and is corrupted daily, whether through the carelessness of typesetters or the malice of men; hence nothing certain can be drawn from it so long as it is not proposed by the Church as authentic and as containing the revealed truths. Therefore. The same must be said of the Creed, which, being scripture, is also liable to corruption, and besides does not contain all the revealed truths, any more than sacred Scripture does.

It is confirmed. Scripture is obscure in many places. Therefore another rule must be assigned for drawing out its true and legitimate meaning.

It is proved — the second part. 1° The rule for discerning revealed truths from non-revealed ones must be certain, and not doubtful. Now the Spirit breathed by God into each one is not certain, but doubtful; for Calvinists deny that it is in Lutherans, Lutherans in Calvinists, and both in Catholics. 2° A sufficient rule for discerning revealed truths from non-revealed ones must be able to settle controversies in this matter. Now the private spirit of each one not only cannot settle controversies about revealed and non-revealed matters, but rather from it there have continually sprung schisms and dissensions, just as if in civil affairs everyone were constituted judge in his own cause. For if a Calvinist says, from his private spirit, that this article is revealed, a Lutheran will deny it, and a Catholic too will deny it, equally from his private spirit. Who will settle the controversy? Who will be able to instruct and convince the other? And hence so many sects mutually opposed among the heretics themselves. 3° Here we are not dealing with private revelation which God can extraordinarily make to some private person, as he once made to the first parents, the patriarchs, the prophets, and the Apostles — in which case the interior light given, or the immediate revelation itself, would be the rule for discerning what must be believed; but we are dealing with revelation common to the whole society of the faithful, and therefore the proposition must be common, not private. On both parts of this see more in the following treatise, dissertation III, article 6.

The third part follows from what has been said, and it is proved both from the notes of the Church and the motives of credibility, of which below, and from the Scriptures, from which we have that the Church is directed by the Holy Spirit and infallible: Matt., XVI, 18: The gates of hell shall not prevail against her. 1 Tim., III, 15, she is called the pillar and firmament of truth.¹ Matt., XXVIII, 20: Behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world.

The heretics have one thing to object, namely that we commit a circle in the resolution of our faith. For, they say, we believe revelation on account of the authority of the Church, and we believe the authority of the Church on account of revelation.

I answer. 1° We believe the authority of the Church not only on account of revelation, but also and primarily on account of the notes of the Church herself and the motives of credibility. Hence in this respect there is no circle. 2° Even if we believe the authority of the Church on account of revelation, it is not under the same aspect under which we believe revelation on account of the authority of the Church, but under a different one. We believe revelation on account of the authority of the Church as applying that revelation; but we believe the authority of the Church on account of revelation or divine veracity, as on account of the formal motive of assent; and thus in a different genus of cause. Now it is the ordinary case that causes are causes of one another in different genera. Thus fire depends upon application, as upon a condition, in order to burn, and the application depends upon the combustive power of fire, as upon an efficient cause. From this it is clear that our circle, in this respect, is only material, and not formal, nor vicious; a circle is vicious whose nature is to run from one thing to another and back again under the same aspect.

This twofold answer is usually explained by the familiar and common example of a messenger carrying the letters of a king. When the trustworthiness of the messenger is not certain, his signs are looked into; once it is established, the letters of the king are accepted on account of the trustworthiness of the messenger: but what is contained in the king's letters is believed, not on account of the trustworthiness of the messenger, but on account of the trustworthiness of the king; and if in the king's letters the trustworthiness of the messenger is asserted, it is thereby confirmed and more firmly believed on account of the trustworthiness of the king. Apply this to the case.

The Church proposes that this and that is revealed by God. Concerning the veracity and infallibility of the Church we have certainty from her notes and motives of credibility, on account of which these things are accepted and believed to be revealed in Scripture or tradition; but the revealed truths themselves contained in Scripture or tradition we believe on account of the authority and veracity of God revealing. Hence you see that the knowledge of the veracity of the Church, though it is strengthened by Scripture, nevertheless does not depend upon it necessarily; for when the Church was being born, there was no Scripture, and yet the veracity of the Church was noted and certain; but it is had primarily from her notes and motives of credibility, though we do not deny that it is confirmed by Scripture: and thus, on the one hand, there is no circle at all, and, on the other, there is no formal and vicious circle, in which one returns to the same thing under the same aspect — just as, conversely, happens in the private spirit of the heretics themselves; for they say they know that this Scripture is true, because their private spirit dictates it to them, and they say they know that they have a private spirit, because Scripture says so.

I insist. According to this solution, it follows that the certainty of our faith is not supreme and divine. — It is proved — the inference.

It hangs, as from an antecedent, upon the veracity of the Church, which is had at first only from the notes and motives of credibility. Now the certainty of the consequent is measured and taken from the certainty of the antecedent. Therefore.

I answer. I deny the inference. To the proof of the antecedent, I distinguish the minor. The certainty of the consequent is measured and taken from the certainty of the antecedent in discursive knowledge — I concede: thus the certainty of the conclusion is derived and measured from the certainty of the antecedent from which it is drawn. In simple knowledge, such as the knowledge of faith is, I deny it. This is clear in the very knowledge of principles, which is simple; for principles are not proved. Although a teacher may set before his disciples many preliminaries, examples, comparisons, suppositions, and other things, to explain them, once these have been explained and made known, the intellect gives its assent with certainty, even though the preliminaries were not certain, but at one time only probable, at another false; for the intellect does not assent to the principles on account of those things, but on account of their clearly seen truth.

Similarly in the case at hand. The proposition of the Church precedes as a preamble explaining what is revealed; once this has been explained and taken as supposed, the intellect assents to the revealed truth, not on account of the Church proposing it — for that is something extrinsic to the assent of faith — but on account of the veracity of God revealing, just as we said above that assent is given to what is contained in the letters of the king on account of the veracity, not of the messenger, but of the king.

[It is objected also: If the judgment of the Church is required in order that what must be believed with divine faith may become known, her sentence will have to be awaited, so that it may become certain that some doctrine pertains to the faith. Hence the faithful could not even have believed the divinity of Christ with divine faith before the Council of Nicaea. But this is repugnant. Therefore.]

I answer. This argument confuses the definition given by the Church concerning the articles to which the heterodox object, with the general and public consent of the Church. Whatever is known with certain and infallible reason to be contained in the word of God pertains to divine faith. That becomes known both from the constant sense and doctrine of the Church, and, where this doctrine seems darkened by new errors, through the decretorial judgment of the Church, which then does not create and introduce a new truth, but authentically and solemnly affirms her constant and universal faith, so that the Christian people, fortified against error, may be confirmed and strengthened in their former and ancient faith.

It is objected besides: The Catholic way, as proposed, abounds in so many and so great difficulties that the multitude cannot follow it. Therefore the opposite way is to be preferred. — Proof of the antecedent. For a Catholic to be secure in his faith, he must know: 1° whether the Church is infallible; 2° whether the Roman Church is the true Church of Christ; 3° what the subject of infallibility is; 4° what this infallible Church teaches; 5° whether her decisions are clothed with all the conditions required for a legitimate judgment; 6° what the meaning of each judgment is; and many other things of this kind. Now it is far more difficult to discuss all these than to investigate the truth of the dogmas by way of examination. Therefore.

I answer. I deny the antecedent. To the proof, answering the first part: I deny the minor. For even if all these things had to be examined by a Catholic, there would be the greatest difference between a discussion of this kind and the examination of each individual dogma, as is clear. — Answer to the second part: I deny the major. If once a Catholic is persuaded that he is in the true Church of Christ, he will at once understand that, by following her, he cannot stray from the truth. Moreover, the arguments that demonstrate the divine origin and infallibility of the Church are obvious and suited to convince even unlearned minds. Protestants alleged that among Catholics there is dispute about the subject of infallibility. But it has always been believed among us that the supreme power of judging in matters of faith was conferred by Christ upon the teaching Church, that is, the body of pastors. This rule, certain and safe from every danger of error, surely sufficed for the faithful. The greater and sounder part of theologians ascribed this magisterium personally to the Roman Pontiff, and at the same time to ecumenical councils, that is, assemblies of bishops judging together with the same Pontiff. After the Vatican Council, of which below, all Catholics firmly hold that the Roman Pontiff, fulfilling the office of teacher of all Christians and defining doctrine concerning faith or morals, is infallible — which takes nothing away from the collective infallibility of the Church together with the supreme Pastor teaching. Now this rule of faith is simple, obvious to all, and easiest in use. Therefore.

You will ask whether private revelations pertain to faith.

I answer. Private revelations concerning things that are ordered to God as their supernatural author pertain to faith as it is a theological virtue, not as it is catholic.

The reason of the former part is that for the notion of faith as a theological virtue only this is required: that it have God for its formal object quod, and the veracity of God revealing for its formal object under which; and this is found here. But the proposition of the Church is something extrinsic and accidental to faith as a theological virtue, as is clear in the angels in the wayfaring state, the first parents, the patriarchs, the prophets, and the Apostles, who had theological faith without the proposition of the Church.

Confirmation. 1° The Council of Trent, session VI, chapter 12, decrees: « apart from special revelation, it cannot be known whom God has chosen for himself. » And canon 16 defines: « If anyone shall say that he will certainly have that great gift of perseverance unto the end, with absolute and infallible certainty, unless he shall have learned this by special revelation; let him be anathema. » Therefore the sacred synod presupposes that private revelation can confer certainty of faith, and by that very fact that it is possible; otherwise the exception supposed in these places would become absurd.

Confirmation. 2° Sacred Scripture, especially in Heb., XI, recounts very many revelations made to the Fathers of the Old Testament, and elsewhere narrates similar ones which the Blessed Virgin, St. Joseph, Zacharias, and others received from God, and no one doubts that these pertained to their theological faith. In ecclesiastical history not a few examples of revelations of this kind are found concerning predestination and the death of certain saints, and other events, which it would be rash to refuse belief.

The reason of the latter part is that catholic faith, that is, universal, is concerned only with truths universal and common to the whole Church and to be proposed through the Church. Hence, if God were to reveal to some private person something pertaining to religion, that private person would be bound to believe it, but not others, even if he swore that it had been revealed to him; because it would not be proposed by the Church, which is the catholic rule for discerning revealed truths, as was said.]

The sense of the question is twofold. First : Can God reveal falsehood, or lie ? Second : Can one elicit from divine faith a false assent, or believe something to be true and revealed by God which is not true nor revealed by God ?

I say 1° : God cannot absolutely lie, or say what is false¹, according to that saying of the Apostle, Hebr., VI, 18 : It is impossible for God to lie.

It is proved. It is absolutely impossible for the first and essential truth to lie. But God is the first and essential truth. Therefore. — Proof of the major. To lie is to fall short of the truth. But it involves a contradiction for the first and essential truth to fall short of the truth ; otherwise it would fall short of itself, and thus would not be the first, essential, and unfailing truth.

Confirmed 1°. If God could absolutely lie, our whole faith would waver. For whence should we know that He had not lied ? From revelation ? But about this very revelation there would be the same difficulty, the same doubt, whether He does not lie.

Confirmed 2°. A lie is intrinsically evil and a sin. Therefore it cannot be absolutely from God.

I say 2° : Falsehood cannot be subject to faith on the part of the believer², that is, faith cannot incline toward a false assent, nor elicit it.

It is proved. 1° Nothing is subject to a power or a habit, or even to an act, except through the formal reason of its object : just as color cannot be seen except through light, nor can a conclusion be drawn except through the middle term of a demonstration. But the formal reason of faith is the first truth in speaking, which, as we were just saying, cannot reveal falsehood. Therefore.

2° An intellectual virtue cannot be the principle of a false assent, just as the virtue of the rational appetite cannot be the principle of a vicious act. But faith is an intellectual virtue. Therefore. — Proof of the major. Every virtue is a good disposition and perfection of a power in relation to its object. But the object of the intellect is the true. Therefore.

Against the first conclusion certain apparent lies referred to in the Scriptures could be objected. But you have them abundantly solved in our larger Work, tract. de Relig., dissert. IX, a. 2, where mental restriction is treated, of which we shall also speak below at the place cited.

You will ask 1° whether the object of faith is necessarily obscure and unevident.

I answer. In the affirmative¹.

It is proved 1° from the Apostle, Hebr., XI, 1, who says that faith is the evidence of things that appear not; and from Augustine, tract. xi, on John: « Faith is to believe what you do not see. »

It is proved 2° by reason². Those things are said to be seen which of themselves move the intellect or the senses to knowledge of them, such as the first principles and conclusions evidently deduced from them, or sensible things duly presented to the senses. But the object of faith cannot of itself move the intellect or the senses to knowledge of itself, since it is not like the first principles, which become known from their very terms; nor like a conclusion, which is deduced from principles by an evident consequence; nor anything sensible, which is perceived by the senses. Therefore.

You will ask 2° how obscurity stands with respect to the object of faith.

I answer. Obscurity in the object of faith does not belong to the formal reason under which there is faith, but is only a condition sine qua non.

It is proved. The formal reason under which there is faith is the motive and reason for assenting to the things that are believed. But the motive and reason why we assent to the things of faith is the first truth in speaking, as we said above, not obscurity; for I do not believe God to be triune because I do not see it, but because God, who is truthful, has revealed it — just as I do not believe Rome exists because I do not see it, but because a trustworthy man told me. Therefore.

It remains, therefore, that obscurity or unevidentness be required for the object of faith, just as the approach of fire for burning, the existence of a cause for causing, the apprehension of an end for moving the will.

You will ask 3° whether at least the evidence in attesting is compossible with faith.

By evidence in attesting we understand the evidence, not of God revealing, nor of the thing revealed, but of the revelation itself, so that it be clearly established for me that it is from God, even though neither God nor the thing revealed is evident to me. Now this evidence can be considered in two ways: 1° alone, without any adjunct; 2° joined with this twofold cognition equally evident, that God cannot absolutely say what is false, and that he speaks in a natural sense, not metaphorical.

I suppose that evidence in attesting, taken alone, can stand with faith; because, however evident it may be to me that God reveals something, yet if it is not evident that he cannot say what is false, or that he does not speak in the literal sense, it will not be evident to me that things are so as God says, and thus the place of faith remains. Hence the question concerns evidence in attesting with the twofold cognition mentioned.

I answer. Evidence in attesting, with its adjuncts, is compossible with faith.

It is proved. That thing we believe by faith, to which we assent while it is unknown in itself on account of the sole authority of God attesting; for in this faith is distinguished from science and vision. But evidence in attesting, with its adjuncts, leaves the thing revealed unknown in itself; for it does not demonstrate the connection of the predicate with the subject, but only that it is revealed evidently, and as such to be certain. Therefore.

I answer : The mysteries of our faith are evidently credible¹, according to that of Psal., XCI, 5 : Thy testimonies are become exceedingly credible.

It is proved. 1° That is evidently credible — with evidence, namely, not metaphysical but moral, excluding reasonable doubt — which is proved by competent witnesses, signs, and other extrinsic arguments. But the mysteries of our faith are of this kind. Therefore. — The minor will be clear from the motives of credibility to be set out below. — The major also is evident; for credibility, like truth, is not taken from within, from the connection of predicate with subject, or from what the thing is, but from extrinsic arguments, namely testimonies, signs, etc. Thus from the fact that competent witnesses affirm something at a trial, there is evidence, not that it is so — for they may lie — but that it is so credible and judgable, without reasonable fear of the other side.

2° Nothing is knowable without the evidence of knowability, nor probable without the evidence of probability. Therefore neither is anything believable without the evidence of credibility.

²

3° The assent of faith ought to be prudent; for it is an act of virtue. And prudence dictates that nothing is to be believed except what is credible: For he that quickly believes, that is, rashly, is light of heart. Eccli., xix, 4. But we are commanded to believe most firmly the mysteries of faith. Therefore they are supposed to be evidently credible, or worthy of faith.

[You will object 1° : What is evidently credible is evidently true. But the mysteries of faith are not evidently true. Therefore.

I answer. I deny the major. For truth, as was said, is sought from within, or from what the thing is; but credibility from testimonies and extrinsic motives.

I insist. What is evidently credible is evidently possible. But, in divine things, to be possible and to be true are the same. Therefore.

I answer. I deny the major; because possibility, like truth, is sought from within. Hence it sometimes happens that false things are more credible and more probable than true ones.

You will object 2° : If the mysteries of faith were evidently credible, all to whom they are equally proposed would believe. But the consequent is false. Therefore.

I answer. I deny the consequence, both because not all attend to them as they ought, but either from perversity of affection, or from carelessness for salvation, or because of the difficulty of the things to be believed in particular, remove their mind from examining them, and because they place an obstacle in the way of interior illumination, as was said elsewhere.

You will object 3° : The mysteries of faith are opposed to reason. Therefore. — Proof of the antecedent. 1° They cannot be understood by reason. 2° They have no agreement with reason. 3° They can be attacked by arguments that cannot be dissolved by reason. Therefore.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent. The mysteries of faith are opposed to reason apparently, I concede; truly and really, I deny. For true and real opposition cannot occur except between things of the same order, one of which directly excludes the other. But our reason is shut up within natural things, while the objects of faith are above nature. There cannot therefore be between them an opposition. true, whereby they would exclude one another, but only in this, that among the ideas of reason there is none that either clearly represents the truths of faith or even evidently excludes them: which opposition is merely apparent. Wherefore it must be diligently noted that it is one thing for something to be above reason, that is, that it is neither understood nor can be understood through the ideas of reason, or that it exceeds and surpasses the grasp of our reason; another thing for it to be against reason, namely that it be evidently excluded through the ideas of reason, which exclusion would be wholly required for true and real opposition. Now the case stands thus between the mysteries of faith and reason, that reason simply does not grasp them. Hence, although they are above, they are not however against reason, nor can they be held by reason to be false.

To the first proof, I distinguish. That the mysteries cannot be understood by reason as to what they are and how they are, I concede; that they are and have a real object, I deny. Also in natural things there are many whose intrinsic mode of subsisting we by no means know, and yet we are certain that they truly exist.

To the second proof, I distinguish. That the mysteries have no immediate agreement with reason, I concede; mediate, I deny. It is not denied that in every cognition some agreement with reason is necessary; for reason is the universal medium of all cognitions. But this agreement is mediate or immediate. In natural things, it is immediate, because reason is of itself apt to know them. But in things placed above nature, recourse is had in vain to the light of reason, which is not proportionate; an immediate agreement is undeservedly demanded which the essence of things does not allow. Recourse must therefore be had to mediate agreement, which consists in this, that on account of the infallible authority of God revealing we know many things that are not contained proximately in the ideas of reason, yet are understood by the light of reason to be most certain, since nothing is more consonant with reason than that full faith be given to God speaking.

To the third proof, I distinguish. That revealed truths can be attacked by arguments that cannot be dissolved by reason, apparently. I concede; truly and really, I deny. For a universal answer let it suffice that, since it has been proved that the opposition between supernatural truths and the ideas of reason is merely apparent, the arguments brought from the principles of reason against the revealed mysteries cannot be truly and really insoluble, but only apparently. Let III Contra gentes, c. 7 be read on this question, where D. Thomas proves by several arguments what he asserts, namely: « Although the truth of the Christian faith exceeds the capacity of human reason, nevertheless those things which reason naturally has indwelling cannot be contrary to this truth. »]

You will ask 1° by what light the knowledge of credibility is had: by a supernatural or by a natural light?

I answer. It is more probably held to be had by natural light aided by some supernatural Light, namely the actual illuminations by which God illumines their intellect to perceive and judge the things that are of God; and it comes about that they attend to those things that are said and preached, as Act., XVI, 14: The Lord opened the heart of Lydia, to attend to those things which were said by Paul; and that in them they observe and judge there to be divine credibility, to which faith finally follows.

You will ask 2° whether, in order that he believe something, it must necessarily be evident to him that the mysteries of faith are credible.

I answer. Affirmatively. It is clear from what has been said; otherwise indeed he would believe imprudently. However, an equal evidence is not necessary for all; for sometimes the mere voice of the preacher suffices, with an interior light persuading the credibility of his words, as is clear in children and ruder believers believing the words spoken by pastors whom they know to speak in the name of the Church, in India believers believing missionaries preaching without miracles, in the Apostles following Christ at his mere call, before they had seen his miracles.