Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III

(D. Thomas, IIae IIae, from q. 1 to q. 16.)

[Since, as St. Thomas says in the prologue of II-II, all moral matter is reduced to the consideration of the virtues, and all virtues are to be further reduced to seven, the Angelic Doctor divides them into three theological and four cardinal virtues, and he undertakes an ordered treatment of them. Beginning therefore with the first, those virtues are called theological which look immediately to God and in a certain way attain him, insofar as they surpass human and natural aptitude and capacity; and for this reason they are not acquired by our acts, but are infused by God alone. Three, however, are commonly counted, namely faith, hope and charity, which we accordingly undertake to investigate here with the same Doctor from q. 1 to q. 44, proposing and resolving the principal questions that are wont to be raised concerning them.

First there is treated faith, which comes first at least in the order of generation.

We judge it opportune to set before this treatise a brief exposition of faith as outlined by the Vatican Synod itself in the constitution Dei Filius, chapter 3, on Faith.

« Since man depends entirely upon God as upon his Creator and Lord, and created reason is subject wholly to the uncreated truth, we are bound by faith to render to God who reveals full obedience of intellect and will. Now this faith, which is the beginning of human salvation, the Catholic Church professes to be a supernatural virtue, by which, with the inspiration and assistance of God's grace, we believe that the things revealed by him are true, not because the intrinsic truth of the things is seen by the natural light of reason, but because of the authority of God himself who reveals them, who can neither deceive nor be deceived. For faith is, as the Apostle testifies, the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not, Hebr., XI, 1.

That nevertheless the obedience of our faith might be consonant with reason, God willed that external arguments of his revelation be joined to the internal assists of the Holy Spirit, namely divine facts, and above all miracles and prophecies, which, since they clearly display the omnipotence and infinite knowledge of God, are most certain signs of divine revelation and suited to the understanding of all. Wherefore both Moses and the prophets, and above all Christ the Lord himself, performed many and most manifest miracles and prophecies; and of the Apostles we read: But they going forth preached everywhere, the Lord working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed, Marc., XVI, 20. And again it is written: We have the more firm prophetical word, whereunto you do well to attend, as to a lamp that shines in a dark place, II Petr., 1, 19.

Although the assent of faith is by no means a blind movement of the soul, no one nevertheless can consent to the preaching of the Gospel as he ought in order to obtain salvation, without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who gives to all men sweetness in consenting and believing the truth¹.

Wherefore faith itself, even when it does not work through charity, is a gift of God, and its act is a work pertaining to salvation, by which man renders free obedience to God himself, by consenting and cooperating with his grace, which he could resist.

Further, by divine and Catholic faith all those things are to be believed which are contained in the word of God, written or handed down, and which are proposed by the Church, whether by solemn judgment or by her ordinary and universal magisterium, to be believed as divinely revealed.

But since without faith it is impossible to please God and to attain to the fellowship of his children, therefore no one has ever obtained justification without it, nor will anyone obtain eternal life unless he shall have persevered in it unto the end.

But that we might be able to satisfy the duty of embracing the true faith and of persevering constancy in it, God through his only-begotten Son instituted the Church, and endowed his institution with manifest marks, so that it could be recognized by all as the custodian and teacher of the revealed word. For to the Catholic Church alone belong all those things, so many and so marvelous, that have been disposed by God toward making evident the credibility of the Christian faith. Nay more, the Church by her very self, on account of her admirable propagation, her eminent sanctity and her inexhaustible fruitfulness in all good things, on account of her Catholic unity and invincible stability, is a great and perpetual motive of credibility and an irrefragable testimony of her own divine legation.

By which it comes about that she herself is like a standard lifted up unto the nations, Is., XI, 12, and she both invites to herself those who have not yet believed, and makes certain her own children that the faith they profess rests upon a most firm foundation. To this testimony indeed an efficacious succor is added from supernatural virtue. For the most benign Lord arouses and helps by his grace even those who go astray, that they may be able to come to the acknowledgment of the truth; and those whom he has translated out of darkness into his admirable light, he confirms by his grace in this same light that they may persevere, never forsaking unless he is forsaken. Wherefore the condition of those who have adhered to the Catholic faith by the heavenly gift of faith is by no means equal to that of those who, led by human opinions, follow a false religion; for they who have received the faith under the magisterium of the Church can never have any just cause for changing that same faith or calling it into doubt. Which things being so, giving thanks to God the Father, who hath made us worthy to be partakers of the lot of the saints in light, let us not neglect so great salvation, but looking on the author of faith and finisher, Jesus, let us hold fast the confession of our hope without wavering, Hebr., XII, 2 and X, 22. »]

(St. Thomas, q. 1.)

[Faith is taken in various senses: 1° For fidelity in promises, as 1 Cor., X, 13: God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able, and elsewhere. 2° For conscience, Rom., XIV, 23: All that is not of faith is sin. 3° For confidence, Jas., 1, 6: Let him ask in faith, nothing wavering. Faith understood in this sense is abused by Lutherans and Calvinists, who say we are justified by faith, that is, by the confidence by which we trust that sins are forgiven us through Christ. Which acceptation of faith, although in this sense it is to be rejected, is nevertheless to be admitted absolutely as an effect of faith, indeed even of hope; for from the fact that we believe God and hope in him, confidence in him is born. 4° For veracity or the inclination to speak the truth, 2 Tim., II, 11: A faithful saying: for if we be dead with him, we shall also live with him. 5° For the doctrine itself, that is, the object of faith, Rom., X, 8: This is the word of faith which we preach.]

Faith is here taken 6° and properly for the supernatural virtue by which we believe truths revealed by God; and it is defined by the Apostle, Hebr., XI, 1: The substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not. But, because every habit is specified by its object, and from that its nature is known, the Author begins this treatise from the object of faith, treating of the habit of faith itself below, q. 4. Adhering to which method,

I say 1°: The formal object which, or, as others call it, the object of attribution of faith, is first truth in being,¹ or God himself as God, exceeding natural reason; which I add, because God, as natural author, can be known by natural light independently of faith.

It is proved.² That is the formal object of some habit which is principally attained by it, and by reason of which the other things are attained: thus health is the formal object of medicine, because it is principally attained by medicine, and by its reason the other things, pulse, urine, remedies, etc., are attained. Now first truth in being, or God, as true God, is that which is principally attained by faith; but the other things, as those pertaining to the humanity of Christ, to the sacraments, and whatever else is contained in the Sacred Scriptures, are attained in order to God as to that which is most excellent among all things, and that he may be known more and more. Therefore.

I say 2°: The formal object by which, or the proper quo, of faith is first truth in speaking, or the divine veracity revealing, connoting first truth in knowing, or the infinite wisdom of God.³

It is proved as to the first part. The formal object by which of faith in common is the veracity of the speaker; for in this the assent of faith is distinguished from scientific assent, that the motive of the assent of faith is the authority of the speaker, while the motive of scientific assent is the truth of the principle from which the conclusion is elicited. Therefore the formal object under which of divine faith is the veracity of God speaking and revealing.

It is proved as to the second part. Faith is certain and infallible. Therefore it must rely on an infallible motive. — I subsume. Now the divine veracity revealing does not have that it be infallible unless it connote the infinite wisdom of God. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. That the divine veracity revealing be infallible, it does not suffice that it cannot deceive out of malice, but it is required that it also cannot deceive out of ignorance, and therefore that God himself cannot be deceived in knowing. Now that God cannot be deceived in knowing proceeds from his infinite wisdom, by which he knows all things as they are, without any admixture of falsity. Therefore.

I say 3°: The adequate material object of faith is everything revealed by God: God himself primarily, the rest secondarily.

It is proved. The adequate material object of some power or habit is all that which it can attain, as it lies under its object, or under the formal ratio under which: thus every colored body is the adequate material object of the visual power, because it can attain it, as it lies under light, which is its formal ratio under which. Now faith attains everything revealed, as it lies under the truth of God revealing, which is its formal object under which, as was said: God however primarily, the rest secondarily, as was also said in the first conclusion. Therefore.

You will object against the first part of the second conclusion: The formal object by which of faith, or, which is the same thing, the motive of the assent of faith, is that into which the assent of faith is ultimately resolved. Now that into which the assent of faith is ultimately resolved is not first truth in speaking, but first truth in being, or the Godhead. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. To one asking why you believe the mysteries of faith, v. g., that God is trine, you rightly answer: « Because God revealed it. » And to one asking further why you believe God revealing, you rightly again answer: « Because he is first truth in speaking. » But finally to one asking why God is first truth in speaking, nothing else remains to answer than: « Because God is, or he is first truth in being. » Therefore.

Nothing else remains to answer, than that because God is, assigning the cause of the thing, I concede; assigning the cause of the assent, I deny. Indeed for this reason God is truthful or first truth in speaking, because God is; but not for that reason do I believe the mysteries of faith, v. g., that God is trine, because God is, or he is first truth in being, but because he is truthful. For the assent of faith (which is to be diligently observed) is not discursive, but simple, and it rests solely in the testimony of the speaker, otherwise it is no longer the assent of faith: thus to one telling me that Rome exists, I assent because he is truthful, and there faith rests; but if you ascend and ask further: « Whence is he truthful? » now you run outside faith. Similarly therefore, to one asking why I believe God revealing, I rightly answer: « Because he is truthful », and there faith or the assent of faith rests, nor could it be asked except foolishly why I believe truth or veracity; but if you ask further why God is truthful, now I shall answer, not as a believer, but as a theologian: « Because God is. »

The question is commonly proposed thus, but it comes to the same as if you asked what the motive of faith is. This can be understood in two ways: either of the motive for assenting to revealed truths, or of the motive or rule for discerning which things are revealed. The first is disputed among Catholics, the second between Catholics and heretics.

[Protestants commonly hold that the motive and rule for discerning revealed truths is sacred Scripture, or the private spirit of each one, that is, the understanding breathed by the Holy Spirit into each one of the Scriptures he inspires.]

I say 1°: The motive for believing and assenting to revealed truths is the authority and veracity of God revealing, not the testimony or proposition of the Church.

It is proved — the first part, from the second conclusion of the preceding article. The motive for believing revealed truths is the formal object quo of faith; for that is called the formal object quo of a habit which is the medium and motive for attaining the formal object quod, as is clear from what has been said. Now the veracity of God revealing is the formal object quo of faith, as was said. Hence, to one asking why I believe God to be triune, I rightly answer: « Because God, who revealed it, is true. »

It is proved — the second part. The proposition or testimony of the Church in no way pertains to the formal object quo of faith. Therefore. — Proof of the antecedent. 1° Because it is something created; but nothing created can enter into the formal object of faith, any more than of hope and charity, otherwise they would not be purely divine and theological virtues. 2° The proposition of revealed truths through the Church is related to faith just as the proposition of goodness is related to love; for just as the will cannot love an object unless it is proposed and known, so the intellect cannot believe unless revealed truths are proposed to it. Now the proposition of goodness, in relation to the will and love, is not its formal object, but only the application of the object and a condition sine qua non. Therefore, similarly, the proposition of revealed truths through the Church, in relation to the intellect and faith.

I say 2°: The rule for discerning revealed truths is not Scripture, nor the private spirit, but the Church alone.

It is proved — the first part. The rule for discerning revealed truths from non-revealed ones must be incorruptible; otherwise it would expose one to error. Now Scripture is not incorruptible; for it can be corrupted and is corrupted daily, whether through the carelessness of typesetters or the malice of men; hence nothing certain can be drawn from it so long as it is not proposed by the Church as authentic and as containing the revealed truths. Therefore. The same must be said of the Creed, which, being scripture, is also liable to corruption, and besides does not contain all the revealed truths, any more than sacred Scripture does.

It is confirmed. Scripture is obscure in many places. Therefore another rule must be assigned for drawing out its true and legitimate meaning.

It is proved — the second part. 1° The rule for discerning revealed truths from non-revealed ones must be certain, and not doubtful. Now the Spirit breathed by God into each one is not certain, but doubtful; for Calvinists deny that it is in Lutherans, Lutherans in Calvinists, and both in Catholics. 2° A sufficient rule for discerning revealed truths from non-revealed ones must be able to settle controversies in this matter. Now the private spirit of each one not only cannot settle controversies about revealed and non-revealed matters, but rather from it there have continually sprung schisms and dissensions, just as if in civil affairs everyone were constituted judge in his own cause. For if a Calvinist says, from his private spirit, that this article is revealed, a Lutheran will deny it, and a Catholic too will deny it, equally from his private spirit. Who will settle the controversy? Who will be able to instruct and convince the other? And hence so many sects mutually opposed among the heretics themselves. 3° Here we are not dealing with private revelation which God can extraordinarily make to some private person, as he once made to the first parents, the patriarchs, the prophets, and the Apostles — in which case the interior light given, or the immediate revelation itself, would be the rule for discerning what must be believed; but we are dealing with revelation common to the whole society of the faithful, and therefore the proposition must be common, not private. On both parts of this see more in the following treatise, dissertation III, article 6.

The third part follows from what has been said, and it is proved both from the notes of the Church and the motives of credibility, of which below, and from the Scriptures, from which we have that the Church is directed by the Holy Spirit and infallible: Matt., XVI, 18: The gates of hell shall not prevail against her. 1 Tim., III, 15, she is called the pillar and firmament of truth.¹ Matt., XXVIII, 20: Behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world.

The heretics have one thing to object, namely that we commit a circle in the resolution of our faith. For, they say, we believe revelation on account of the authority of the Church, and we believe the authority of the Church on account of revelation.

I answer. 1° We believe the authority of the Church not only on account of revelation, but also and primarily on account of the notes of the Church herself and the motives of credibility. Hence in this respect there is no circle. 2° Even if we believe the authority of the Church on account of revelation, it is not under the same aspect under which we believe revelation on account of the authority of the Church, but under a different one. We believe revelation on account of the authority of the Church as applying that revelation; but we believe the authority of the Church on account of revelation or divine veracity, as on account of the formal motive of assent; and thus in a different genus of cause. Now it is the ordinary case that causes are causes of one another in different genera. Thus fire depends upon application, as upon a condition, in order to burn, and the application depends upon the combustive power of fire, as upon an efficient cause. From this it is clear that our circle, in this respect, is only material, and not formal, nor vicious; a circle is vicious whose nature is to run from one thing to another and back again under the same aspect.

This twofold answer is usually explained by the familiar and common example of a messenger carrying the letters of a king. When the trustworthiness of the messenger is not certain, his signs are looked into; once it is established, the letters of the king are accepted on account of the trustworthiness of the messenger: but what is contained in the king's letters is believed, not on account of the trustworthiness of the messenger, but on account of the trustworthiness of the king; and if in the king's letters the trustworthiness of the messenger is asserted, it is thereby confirmed and more firmly believed on account of the trustworthiness of the king. Apply this to the case.

The Church proposes that this and that is revealed by God. Concerning the veracity and infallibility of the Church we have certainty from her notes and motives of credibility, on account of which these things are accepted and believed to be revealed in Scripture or tradition; but the revealed truths themselves contained in Scripture or tradition we believe on account of the authority and veracity of God revealing. Hence you see that the knowledge of the veracity of the Church, though it is strengthened by Scripture, nevertheless does not depend upon it necessarily; for when the Church was being born, there was no Scripture, and yet the veracity of the Church was noted and certain; but it is had primarily from her notes and motives of credibility, though we do not deny that it is confirmed by Scripture: and thus, on the one hand, there is no circle at all, and, on the other, there is no formal and vicious circle, in which one returns to the same thing under the same aspect — just as, conversely, happens in the private spirit of the heretics themselves; for they say they know that this Scripture is true, because their private spirit dictates it to them, and they say they know that they have a private spirit, because Scripture says so.

I insist. According to this solution, it follows that the certainty of our faith is not supreme and divine. — It is proved — the inference.

It hangs, as from an antecedent, upon the veracity of the Church, which is had at first only from the notes and motives of credibility. Now the certainty of the consequent is measured and taken from the certainty of the antecedent. Therefore.

I answer. I deny the inference. To the proof of the antecedent, I distinguish the minor. The certainty of the consequent is measured and taken from the certainty of the antecedent in discursive knowledge — I concede: thus the certainty of the conclusion is derived and measured from the certainty of the antecedent from which it is drawn. In simple knowledge, such as the knowledge of faith is, I deny it. This is clear in the very knowledge of principles, which is simple; for principles are not proved. Although a teacher may set before his disciples many preliminaries, examples, comparisons, suppositions, and other things, to explain them, once these have been explained and made known, the intellect gives its assent with certainty, even though the preliminaries were not certain, but at one time only probable, at another false; for the intellect does not assent to the principles on account of those things, but on account of their clearly seen truth.

Similarly in the case at hand. The proposition of the Church precedes as a preamble explaining what is revealed; once this has been explained and taken as supposed, the intellect assents to the revealed truth, not on account of the Church proposing it — for that is something extrinsic to the assent of faith — but on account of the veracity of God revealing, just as we said above that assent is given to what is contained in the letters of the king on account of the veracity, not of the messenger, but of the king.

[It is objected also: If the judgment of the Church is required in order that what must be believed with divine faith may become known, her sentence will have to be awaited, so that it may become certain that some doctrine pertains to the faith. Hence the faithful could not even have believed the divinity of Christ with divine faith before the Council of Nicaea. But this is repugnant. Therefore.]

I answer. This argument confuses the definition given by the Church concerning the articles to which the heterodox object, with the general and public consent of the Church. Whatever is known with certain and infallible reason to be contained in the word of God pertains to divine faith. That becomes known both from the constant sense and doctrine of the Church, and, where this doctrine seems darkened by new errors, through the decretorial judgment of the Church, which then does not create and introduce a new truth, but authentically and solemnly affirms her constant and universal faith, so that the Christian people, fortified against error, may be confirmed and strengthened in their former and ancient faith.

It is objected besides: The Catholic way, as proposed, abounds in so many and so great difficulties that the multitude cannot follow it. Therefore the opposite way is to be preferred. — Proof of the antecedent. For a Catholic to be secure in his faith, he must know: 1° whether the Church is infallible; 2° whether the Roman Church is the true Church of Christ; 3° what the subject of infallibility is; 4° what this infallible Church teaches; 5° whether her decisions are clothed with all the conditions required for a legitimate judgment; 6° what the meaning of each judgment is; and many other things of this kind. Now it is far more difficult to discuss all these than to investigate the truth of the dogmas by way of examination. Therefore.

I answer. I deny the antecedent. To the proof, answering the first part: I deny the minor. For even if all these things had to be examined by a Catholic, there would be the greatest difference between a discussion of this kind and the examination of each individual dogma, as is clear. — Answer to the second part: I deny the major. If once a Catholic is persuaded that he is in the true Church of Christ, he will at once understand that, by following her, he cannot stray from the truth. Moreover, the arguments that demonstrate the divine origin and infallibility of the Church are obvious and suited to convince even unlearned minds. Protestants alleged that among Catholics there is dispute about the subject of infallibility. But it has always been believed among us that the supreme power of judging in matters of faith was conferred by Christ upon the teaching Church, that is, the body of pastors. This rule, certain and safe from every danger of error, surely sufficed for the faithful. The greater and sounder part of theologians ascribed this magisterium personally to the Roman Pontiff, and at the same time to ecumenical councils, that is, assemblies of bishops judging together with the same Pontiff. After the Vatican Council, of which below, all Catholics firmly hold that the Roman Pontiff, fulfilling the office of teacher of all Christians and defining doctrine concerning faith or morals, is infallible — which takes nothing away from the collective infallibility of the Church together with the supreme Pastor teaching. Now this rule of faith is simple, obvious to all, and easiest in use. Therefore.

You will ask whether private revelations pertain to faith.

I answer. Private revelations concerning things that are ordered to God as their supernatural author pertain to faith as it is a theological virtue, not as it is catholic.

The reason of the former part is that for the notion of faith as a theological virtue only this is required: that it have God for its formal object quod, and the veracity of God revealing for its formal object under which; and this is found here. But the proposition of the Church is something extrinsic and accidental to faith as a theological virtue, as is clear in the angels in the wayfaring state, the first parents, the patriarchs, the prophets, and the Apostles, who had theological faith without the proposition of the Church.

Confirmation. 1° The Council of Trent, session VI, chapter 12, decrees: « apart from special revelation, it cannot be known whom God has chosen for himself. » And canon 16 defines: « If anyone shall say that he will certainly have that great gift of perseverance unto the end, with absolute and infallible certainty, unless he shall have learned this by special revelation; let him be anathema. » Therefore the sacred synod presupposes that private revelation can confer certainty of faith, and by that very fact that it is possible; otherwise the exception supposed in these places would become absurd.

Confirmation. 2° Sacred Scripture, especially in Heb., XI, recounts very many revelations made to the Fathers of the Old Testament, and elsewhere narrates similar ones which the Blessed Virgin, St. Joseph, Zacharias, and others received from God, and no one doubts that these pertained to their theological faith. In ecclesiastical history not a few examples of revelations of this kind are found concerning predestination and the death of certain saints, and other events, which it would be rash to refuse belief.

The reason of the latter part is that catholic faith, that is, universal, is concerned only with truths universal and common to the whole Church and to be proposed through the Church. Hence, if God were to reveal to some private person something pertaining to religion, that private person would be bound to believe it, but not others, even if he swore that it had been revealed to him; because it would not be proposed by the Church, which is the catholic rule for discerning revealed truths, as was said.]

The sense of the question is twofold. First : Can God reveal falsehood, or lie ? Second : Can one elicit from divine faith a false assent, or believe something to be true and revealed by God which is not true nor revealed by God ?

I say 1° : God cannot absolutely lie, or say what is false¹, according to that saying of the Apostle, Hebr., VI, 18 : It is impossible for God to lie.

It is proved. It is absolutely impossible for the first and essential truth to lie. But God is the first and essential truth. Therefore. — Proof of the major. To lie is to fall short of the truth. But it involves a contradiction for the first and essential truth to fall short of the truth ; otherwise it would fall short of itself, and thus would not be the first, essential, and unfailing truth.

Confirmed 1°. If God could absolutely lie, our whole faith would waver. For whence should we know that He had not lied ? From revelation ? But about this very revelation there would be the same difficulty, the same doubt, whether He does not lie.

Confirmed 2°. A lie is intrinsically evil and a sin. Therefore it cannot be absolutely from God.

I say 2° : Falsehood cannot be subject to faith on the part of the believer², that is, faith cannot incline toward a false assent, nor elicit it.

It is proved. 1° Nothing is subject to a power or a habit, or even to an act, except through the formal reason of its object : just as color cannot be seen except through light, nor can a conclusion be drawn except through the middle term of a demonstration. But the formal reason of faith is the first truth in speaking, which, as we were just saying, cannot reveal falsehood. Therefore.

2° An intellectual virtue cannot be the principle of a false assent, just as the virtue of the rational appetite cannot be the principle of a vicious act. But faith is an intellectual virtue. Therefore. — Proof of the major. Every virtue is a good disposition and perfection of a power in relation to its object. But the object of the intellect is the true. Therefore.

Against the first conclusion certain apparent lies referred to in the Scriptures could be objected. But you have them abundantly solved in our larger Work, tract. de Relig., dissert. IX, a. 2, where mental restriction is treated, of which we shall also speak below at the place cited.

You will ask 1° whether the object of faith is necessarily obscure and unevident.

I answer. In the affirmative¹.

It is proved 1° from the Apostle, Hebr., XI, 1, who says that faith is the evidence of things that appear not; and from Augustine, tract. xi, on John: « Faith is to believe what you do not see. »

It is proved 2° by reason². Those things are said to be seen which of themselves move the intellect or the senses to knowledge of them, such as the first principles and conclusions evidently deduced from them, or sensible things duly presented to the senses. But the object of faith cannot of itself move the intellect or the senses to knowledge of itself, since it is not like the first principles, which become known from their very terms; nor like a conclusion, which is deduced from principles by an evident consequence; nor anything sensible, which is perceived by the senses. Therefore.

You will ask 2° how obscurity stands with respect to the object of faith.

I answer. Obscurity in the object of faith does not belong to the formal reason under which there is faith, but is only a condition sine qua non.

It is proved. The formal reason under which there is faith is the motive and reason for assenting to the things that are believed. But the motive and reason why we assent to the things of faith is the first truth in speaking, as we said above, not obscurity; for I do not believe God to be triune because I do not see it, but because God, who is truthful, has revealed it — just as I do not believe Rome exists because I do not see it, but because a trustworthy man told me. Therefore.

It remains, therefore, that obscurity or unevidentness be required for the object of faith, just as the approach of fire for burning, the existence of a cause for causing, the apprehension of an end for moving the will.

You will ask 3° whether at least the evidence in attesting is compossible with faith.

By evidence in attesting we understand the evidence, not of God revealing, nor of the thing revealed, but of the revelation itself, so that it be clearly established for me that it is from God, even though neither God nor the thing revealed is evident to me. Now this evidence can be considered in two ways: 1° alone, without any adjunct; 2° joined with this twofold cognition equally evident, that God cannot absolutely say what is false, and that he speaks in a natural sense, not metaphorical.

I suppose that evidence in attesting, taken alone, can stand with faith; because, however evident it may be to me that God reveals something, yet if it is not evident that he cannot say what is false, or that he does not speak in the literal sense, it will not be evident to me that things are so as God says, and thus the place of faith remains. Hence the question concerns evidence in attesting with the twofold cognition mentioned.

I answer. Evidence in attesting, with its adjuncts, is compossible with faith.

It is proved. That thing we believe by faith, to which we assent while it is unknown in itself on account of the sole authority of God attesting; for in this faith is distinguished from science and vision. But evidence in attesting, with its adjuncts, leaves the thing revealed unknown in itself; for it does not demonstrate the connection of the predicate with the subject, but only that it is revealed evidently, and as such to be certain. Therefore.

I answer : The mysteries of our faith are evidently credible¹, according to that of Psal., XCI, 5 : Thy testimonies are become exceedingly credible.

It is proved. 1° That is evidently credible — with evidence, namely, not metaphysical but moral, excluding reasonable doubt — which is proved by competent witnesses, signs, and other extrinsic arguments. But the mysteries of our faith are of this kind. Therefore. — The minor will be clear from the motives of credibility to be set out below. — The major also is evident; for credibility, like truth, is not taken from within, from the connection of predicate with subject, or from what the thing is, but from extrinsic arguments, namely testimonies, signs, etc. Thus from the fact that competent witnesses affirm something at a trial, there is evidence, not that it is so — for they may lie — but that it is so credible and judgable, without reasonable fear of the other side.

2° Nothing is knowable without the evidence of knowability, nor probable without the evidence of probability. Therefore neither is anything believable without the evidence of credibility.

²

3° The assent of faith ought to be prudent; for it is an act of virtue. And prudence dictates that nothing is to be believed except what is credible: For he that quickly believes, that is, rashly, is light of heart. Eccli., xix, 4. But we are commanded to believe most firmly the mysteries of faith. Therefore they are supposed to be evidently credible, or worthy of faith.

[You will object 1° : What is evidently credible is evidently true. But the mysteries of faith are not evidently true. Therefore.

I answer. I deny the major. For truth, as was said, is sought from within, or from what the thing is; but credibility from testimonies and extrinsic motives.

I insist. What is evidently credible is evidently possible. But, in divine things, to be possible and to be true are the same. Therefore.

I answer. I deny the major; because possibility, like truth, is sought from within. Hence it sometimes happens that false things are more credible and more probable than true ones.

You will object 2° : If the mysteries of faith were evidently credible, all to whom they are equally proposed would believe. But the consequent is false. Therefore.

I answer. I deny the consequence, both because not all attend to them as they ought, but either from perversity of affection, or from carelessness for salvation, or because of the difficulty of the things to be believed in particular, remove their mind from examining them, and because they place an obstacle in the way of interior illumination, as was said elsewhere.

You will object 3° : The mysteries of faith are opposed to reason. Therefore. — Proof of the antecedent. 1° They cannot be understood by reason. 2° They have no agreement with reason. 3° They can be attacked by arguments that cannot be dissolved by reason. Therefore.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent. The mysteries of faith are opposed to reason apparently, I concede; truly and really, I deny. For true and real opposition cannot occur except between things of the same order, one of which directly excludes the other. But our reason is shut up within natural things, while the objects of faith are above nature. There cannot therefore be between them an opposition. true, whereby they would exclude one another, but only in this, that among the ideas of reason there is none that either clearly represents the truths of faith or even evidently excludes them: which opposition is merely apparent. Wherefore it must be diligently noted that it is one thing for something to be above reason, that is, that it is neither understood nor can be understood through the ideas of reason, or that it exceeds and surpasses the grasp of our reason; another thing for it to be against reason, namely that it be evidently excluded through the ideas of reason, which exclusion would be wholly required for true and real opposition. Now the case stands thus between the mysteries of faith and reason, that reason simply does not grasp them. Hence, although they are above, they are not however against reason, nor can they be held by reason to be false.

To the first proof, I distinguish. That the mysteries cannot be understood by reason as to what they are and how they are, I concede; that they are and have a real object, I deny. Also in natural things there are many whose intrinsic mode of subsisting we by no means know, and yet we are certain that they truly exist.

To the second proof, I distinguish. That the mysteries have no immediate agreement with reason, I concede; mediate, I deny. It is not denied that in every cognition some agreement with reason is necessary; for reason is the universal medium of all cognitions. But this agreement is mediate or immediate. In natural things, it is immediate, because reason is of itself apt to know them. But in things placed above nature, recourse is had in vain to the light of reason, which is not proportionate; an immediate agreement is undeservedly demanded which the essence of things does not allow. Recourse must therefore be had to mediate agreement, which consists in this, that on account of the infallible authority of God revealing we know many things that are not contained proximately in the ideas of reason, yet are understood by the light of reason to be most certain, since nothing is more consonant with reason than that full faith be given to God speaking.

To the third proof, I distinguish. That revealed truths can be attacked by arguments that cannot be dissolved by reason, apparently. I concede; truly and really, I deny. For a universal answer let it suffice that, since it has been proved that the opposition between supernatural truths and the ideas of reason is merely apparent, the arguments brought from the principles of reason against the revealed mysteries cannot be truly and really insoluble, but only apparently. Let III Contra gentes, c. 7 be read on this question, where D. Thomas proves by several arguments what he asserts, namely: « Although the truth of the Christian faith exceeds the capacity of human reason, nevertheless those things which reason naturally has indwelling cannot be contrary to this truth. »]

You will ask 1° by what light the knowledge of credibility is had: by a supernatural or by a natural light?

I answer. It is more probably held to be had by natural light aided by some supernatural Light, namely the actual illuminations by which God illumines their intellect to perceive and judge the things that are of God; and it comes about that they attend to those things that are said and preached, as Act., XVI, 14: The Lord opened the heart of Lydia, to attend to those things which were said by Paul; and that in them they observe and judge there to be divine credibility, to which faith finally follows.

You will ask 2° whether, in order that he believe something, it must necessarily be evident to him that the mysteries of faith are credible.

I answer. Affirmatively. It is clear from what has been said; otherwise indeed he would believe imprudently. However, an equal evidence is not necessary for all; for sometimes the mere voice of the preacher suffices, with an interior light persuading the credibility of his words, as is clear in children and ruder believers believing the words spoken by pastors whom they know to speak in the name of the Church, in India believers believing missionaries preaching without miracles, in the Apostles following Christ at his mere call, before they had seen his miracles.

Unbelievers, or deists, are those who acknowledge a supreme being, that is, the true God, but deny that he revealed anything to men, and therefore regard the Christian Religion, with its mysteries, as a human fabrication. They will, however, be led by reason alone in matters that concern God, themselves, or others; and they acknowledge it as the one rule and judge of truth and life in all things.

Hence they pass into various inventions. Some hold that the rational soul is material, and therefore deny its immortality; these are called Materialists; others acknowledge the rational soul to be spiritual and immortal. Some deny divine providence over human affairs, and that God punishes the wicked or rewards the good; others think the opposite. Some reckon justice and injustice to be mere words, and place the supreme rule in their own advantage; others subject the rational creature to certain duties toward God and its equals, according to the dictate of reason. Nor is it any wonder if they are thus torn apart among themselves; for since, as I said, they hold reason alone as their leader and rule, each one forges his own system at the nod of his own reason.

Against this most pestilential error, subversive of all religion and gaining strength in these times, very many and most learned writings have appeared, in which its various systems are effectively assailed and the error utterly routed. But since I aim at brevity, for the benefit of studious youth, I think I have sufficiently accomplished my task if I have invincibly proved that the Christian Religion is divine, revealed and instituted by God. For this being granted, it plainly follows that all the things which it proposes to be believed, such as the mysteries of the Most Holy (it continues on p. 26).

Trinity and of the Incarnation, divine providence over human affairs, the immortality of the soul, the laws of morals, original sin, the eternity of punishments, the resurrection of the dead, the sacraments, etc., are true, and that to them a certain and undoubted faith must be given, notwithstanding their incomprehensibility; for God can neither be deceived nor deceive, as the deists themselves concede; and thus all their fabrications and sophisms vanish. And since these men listen to reason alone, I shall assail them also by reason alone, setting forth the principal motives of credibility of the Christian Religion, against which no one can stand, unless he extinguish within himself the light of human reason.

I argue, therefore, as follows. Reason persuades, indeed compels — unless it be wholly inverted and disordered — to acknowledge as true, revealed and instituted by God, that religion which, first, the prophets foretold long beforehand; secondly, which its author and his coworkers alike confirmed by the prophecies fulfilled and by most manifest miracles; finally, thirdly, which by the power of God alone was born, grew up, and was spread through the whole world against all the laws of human prudence. Now this is the Christian Religion. Therefore. — The major they cannot deny; for the three arguments assigned are the most evident proofs of divinity. Therefore only the minor needs to be proved. Whence it will be demonstrated in the following articles.

[Although reason alone can find the motives of credibility of the Christian Religion, proofs of this kind also belong to faith, as defined by the Vatican Synod thus decreeing: « If anyone shall say that divine revelation cannot be made credible by external signs, and that therefore men ought to be moved to faith by internal experience alone, or by private inspiration of each one: let him be anathema. »]

[I say 1°, with St. Thomas, 2ae 2ae, q. 171, a. 1 : « Prophecy consists first and principally in cognition,. namely, that prophets know things distant and remote from human knowledge... Prophecy secondarily consists in speech, insofar as prophets announce to others, for their edification, the things they know by divine instruction, according to Isa., XXI, 10 : What I have heard from the Lord of hosts, the God of Israel, I have declared unto you. » Prophecy comes from two Greek words, προ, before, and φημί, I speak, and signifies in general an announcement made beforehand of an event. It is commonly defined thus : « A sure presentiment and prediction of some event which could not have been foreknown from natural causes. » Or more narrowly : « The manifestation of a future thing hidden from creatures. » From this notion of prophecy it is clear that three conditions are required for it to be truly and properly such, namely : 1° that it be a sure prediction, not conjectural ; 2° that it be a prediction of a future contingent thing, which accordingly can be known neither by art nor by any natural science whatever ; 3° that it be so determinate that the event is not accommodated to the prophecy, but rather the prophecy determines the event : that is, that it not be so vague, obscure, and equivocal as to fit any event whatsoever, and its application not arbitrary ; so that prophecy, which is a true miracle, supplies its own proof.

I say 2° : Prophecy is possible.

This is against the ancients and the more recent authors who denied the possibility of prophecy. Among the ancients were, on the testimony of Cicero¹, the Colophonian and Epicurus. The latter had no other reason for rejecting all divination than that he did not admit that mankind was of concern to the gods. Such was also the judgment of Carneades, as the same Cicero asserts². Among the more recent, Spinoza and the Socinians deny to God himself the faculty of foreseeing future things. Finally, all rationalists now deny that man can receive a prophetic spirit from God.

Proof. by reason. The possibility of prophecy reduces to these two questions : first, whether God can foreknow things future ; second, supposing the foreknowledge of things future, whether.

God can manifest them to man. But both of these are possible. Therefore.

Proof. of the first part, minor. The first is not only possible but necessary. For in God there is omniscience, and therefore foreknowledge, which is included in perfect and infinite science. If God did not have this foreknowledge, he would not be infinitely perfect under this respect, and consequently would not be God. And this knowledge in God is not properly foreknowledge, but simply knowledge. This is proved by St. Thomas, Iª p., q. 14, a. 13, o : « Since God knows all things, not only those which actually exist, but also those which are in his own power or in the creature's, and since some of these are contingent as to their future occurrence, it follows that God knows future contingents... Now God knows all contingents, not only as they are in their causes, but also as each of them actually is in itself. And although contingents come into actual existence successively, God does not know contingents successively in their being, as we do, but simultaneously, because his knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also his being. And eternity, existing whole and at once, embraces all time. Hence all things which are in time are present to God from eternity, not only by the reason that he has the notions of things present within himself, as some say, but because his gaze is directed from eternity upon all things as they stand in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingents are infallibly known by God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight according to their presentiality ; and yet they remain future contingents in comparison with their proximate causes. » Therefore.

It is confirmed by the manifold testimonies of Scripture, of which the following may suffice to cite. Heb., IV, 13 : All things are naked and open to his eyes. Ps., cxxxviii, 3 and 4 : You have understood my thoughts from afar... you have foreseen all my ways. Wis., VIII, 8 : She knows the signs and wonders before they come to pass, and the events of times and ages. The prophecies recorded in the Scriptures, which were certainly fulfilled even in the smallest particulars, demonstrate this possibility evidently from the fact itself.

Proof. of the second part, minor. If God could not manifest future things to man, the impediment would evidently stand only on the side of man, who would not be capable of such communication. But this incapacity cannot be admitted. Therefore. — Proof. of the minor. Man learns from man the things he does not know, and among these are many that learned men, aided by the natural light alone, foresaw as about to arise from their causes. But if it should please God, man can be taught by him no less, indeed much more, in the extraordinary way of inspiration, that is, of interior illumination whereby future contingents, naturally hidden, are opened up to him. Therefore.

It is confirmed by the consent of the human race; for it has always been the persuasion of men that some have received divine communications concerning things to come. Thence, among the pagans, oracles, divinations, auguries, and magical arts.]

[I answer: affirmative.

Proof. Holy Scripture, which most frequently invokes prophecies as proof of the truth of revelation. Christ himself says, John, v, 39: Search the Scriptures, for you think that in them you have life everlasting. And they are they that testify of me. So that he might prove to the disciples going to the town called Emmaus that all things that had happened of him had come to pass by the divine will, Luke, XXIV, 27, beginning from Moses and all the prophets, he interpreted to them in all the Scriptures the things that were concerning him. St. Peter, after narrating the prodigious transfiguration of Christ, in which the heavenly Father proclaimed him his own Son with an audible voice, adds, to refute more fully the unbelief of the Jews, 2 Pet., I, 19: And we have a firmer prophetic word, whereunto you do well to attend, as to a lamp shining in a dark place, until the day dawn. St. Paul expounded to the Jews the heavenly doctrine, Acts, XXVIII, 23, testifying the kingdom of God and persuading them concerning Jesus out of the law of Moses and the prophets. Therefore.

Proof. by a second argument. Prophecy properly so called cannot be except from God; for, as the Angelic Doctor says, 2a 2ae, q. 171, a. 2, c., « the principle of those things that pertain to supernatural knowledge, which are made manifest through prophecy, is God himself, who is not seen by the prophets through essence. » Therefore, whenever a true prophecy is had as confirmed by the event, so often an unavoidable argument arises for divine and supernatural revelation. — The antecedent follows from the very notion of prophecy itself. — The consequent therefore cannot be denied.

It is confirmed from this, that a true prophecy is a true miracle, and below it will be proved that a miracle demonstrates the truth of the doctrine in whose favor it is wrought.

Proof. thirdly from the Fathers, of whom it will suffice to cite one and another. Tertullian, Apologet., c. 20: « A fitting testimony of divinity, I think, is the truth of divination. Hence among us faith in things to come also is safe, because they were foretold along with those things which are daily proved. » Splendid is this passage of Augustine, serm. 43 de Script., n. 5. Having recounted out of St. Peter the transfiguration of Christ, and having cited these words: And we have a more certain prophetic word, he says: « That voice sounded from heaven, and the prophetic word is more certain... Who among us does not marvel that, the voice having been brought down from heaven, the Apostle said the prophetic word was more certain? He said indeed more certain: more certain, not better, not truer. For that voice from heaven was as true as the prophetic word, as good, as useful. What then is more certain, except that in which the hearer is more confirmed? Why this? Because there are unbelieving men who so disparage Christ as to say that he did what he did by magical arts... But the prophets were before: I do not say before that voice, but before the flesh of Christ. Christ was not yet when he sent the prophets... Behold why the Apostle Peter says: We have a more certain prophetic word. A voice from heaven, whereby the faithful are admonished; a prophetic word, whereby the unbelieving are convinced. » Therefore.]

The prophecies of the Christian religion are contained in the books of Moses and of the other prophets.

1° God spoke to Moses, and revealed to him the Jewish religion, as is clear from Exod., XIX, 3-6. Further, if the Jewish religion is true and revealed, then Christ is the Messiah. Therefore the Christian religion, which he instituted, and of which the Jewish religion was the foundation, is true and revealed.

2° In the books of Moses and the prophets are foretold the Messiah, his birth, the place, the time of his birth, his life, doctrine, works, miracles, passion, death, resurrection and other things pertaining to this, the calling of the nations, the rejection of the Jews, the abolition of the temple and of sacrifice, the substitution of a new law and a new sacrifice, etc. And yet all these things have been verified exactly of Jesus of Nazareth, the author of the Christian law. Therefore he himself is the Messiah; therefore his religion is true and divine.

Proof of the minor. 1° Our Christ was born after the scepter had been taken away from Judah, according to the prophecy of Jacob, Genes., XLIX, 10; at the time fixed in the 70 weeks of Daniel, Daniel, IX, 24-27; before the destruction of the second temple, as Aggaeus, II, 8-10, and Malachias, III, 1 had foretold. — 2° He was born in Bethlehem, as had been foretold, Mich., V, 2; of the tribe of Judah and the family of David, Isa., XI, 1 and 10; of a virgin, Isa., VII, 14. — 3° His coming was preceded by him who would prepare his ways, Malach., III, 1. — 4° He worked miracles, as Isaias, LXI, 1 seqq. had foretold. — 5° He was sold for thirty pieces of silver, with which the potter’s field was bought, as Zacharias, XI, 12 foretold. — 6° He was spat upon and struck in the face, Isa., L, 6. — 7° He was scourged, Psal. XXXIV, 15 and CXXXVII, 3. — 8° His hands and feet were pierced, Psal. XXI, 17. — 9° He was crucified among thieves, Isa., LII, 12. His garments were divided, cast by lot for the robe, Psal. XXI, 19. Hanging on the cross, he was given gall to drink, Psal., LXVII, 22. As he was dying, the sun suffered an eclipse,

Amos, VIII, 9; he rose again, Psal. III, 6;¹ he ascended into heaven, Psal. LXVII, 34; he sent the Holy Spirit, Ioel, II, 28. — 10° He called the nations through the Apostles to his religion, and destroyed idolatry, as had been foretold, Genes., XXII, 17 et 18; Isa., II, 2, 3 et 18; XIX, 19; XLIX, 6 seqq.; Zach., XII, 2, and elsewhere. — 11° He substituted a new priesthood for the Levitical, a new law for the Mosaic law, and finally rejected the Jews, as foretold everywhere in the prophets, Isai., Ierem., Ose., Amos, Mich.

Seek all these things set out more fully in our previous Work, tract. de Incarn., dissert. II, a. 3.

What will the deist say to these things? Will he say that Moses is a teller of fables and an impostor, who fraudulently sold false and invented things to the Israelites as true?

Sed contra : 1° Moses calls the Israelites themselves eyewitnesses of the things he narrates. He narrates the plagues of Egypt, harmless to the Israelites looking on. He narrates that they passed unharmed through the Red Sea, while the Egyptians were drowned in it. He narrates that manna was given them from heaven for forty years, and that during that time their garments were not worn out. He narrates that the law was given them by God on Mount Sinai amid lightnings and thunders. He narrates that he drew forth a fountain from the rock for their relief, and that Dathan and Abiron, while they looked on, were swallowed alive into the earth, as he had foretold; he subjects them to a most harsh law, even under pain of death in certain matters. He narrates that he ordered twenty-five thousand men to be killed by the Levites for idolatry, and many other things. If therefore all these things are false, and Moses fraudulently sold them to the Israelites as true, it must be that Moses was foolish, to hope that he could persuade the Israelites that they had seen what they had not seen, and thereby subject them to a most harsh law; and that the Israelites were in like manner foolish, to believe that they had seen what they had not seen, and thereby subject themselves to a most harsh law.

2° In memory of the deeds and prodigies which Moses narrates, feasts and sacrifices were then instituted which are still scrupulously observed by the Jews. But who would believe that a whole nation instituted feasts and sacrifices for events not certainly known to it, or fabulous, and observed them so religiously through so many centuries.

3° Moses not only narrates deeds and prodigies, but foretells many future things that depend solely on the will of God, and which were fulfilled: likewise the other Prophets. But it is not for an impostor, nor for any other man whatsoever, to predict future things that depend solely on the will of God.

Perhaps he will reply that neither Moses nor the prophets ever existed; or, if they existed, that the books attributed to them are not their own, but were fabricated after the birth of Christianity by some impostor.

Sed contra : 1° It is as certain that Moses and the prophets existed and wrote the things that are attributed to them, as it is certain that Cyrus, Alexander, Caesar, Cicero, Virgil existed, and that the writings attributed to them are their own. Of these latter no one doubts, on account of the constant tradition, against which nothing can be opposed. Therefore neither may one doubt about the former.

Likewise, it is as certain that Moses and the Prophets existed, and that the works inscribed with their names were written by them, as it is certain that the Jewish nation existed and now exists, which always venerated and venerates them as Prophets and saints, and has always kept their writings, as divine, with the greatest diligence, and keeps them. But that the Jewish nation existed before the rise of Christianity is known to the whole world.

2° Aristeus, one of the legates of Ptolemy to Eleazar, high priest of the Jews, whose book exists in the Bibliotheca Patrum, tom. VII, Josephus and Philo, both Jews, relate that the Old Testament was translated from Hebrew into Greek by the 70 Interpreters, under Ptolemy king of Egypt, two hundred years before Christ was born. Likewise profane historians, Cicero, Phlegon, Tacitus, Suetonius, Sallustius, Quintus Curtius, make mention of the law, the temple and the wars of the Jews.

3° By what art could this impostor have persuaded the Jews that this was the history and law of their nation handed down by God, of which they had never heard anything, and which contains many things disgraceful to them and commands most harsh things, and could he have obtained from them so scrupulous an observance of this most harsh law, such as they profess even now? Whoever had attempted this would without doubt have been regarded by the Jews as a fanatic.

4° If the Old Testament is the work of a recent impostor, the same must be said of the New, since the latter is nothing but an explanation and fulfillment of the former, and Christ often appeals the Jews to Moses and to the prophets of the Old Testament.

5° Let the deists say who this impostor was, of what condition, stock and religion: whether a Jew, a Samaritan, or a Christian? If a Jew, he would have obtained nothing from the Samaritans, the bitterest enemies of the Jews. Likewise, if a Samaritan, with respect to the Jews. Moreover, neither would have inserted in these books things so ignominious to the Jewish and Samaritan nation, namely their crimes, ingratitudes, idolatries and punishments. If a Christian, how would he have been acceptable to the Jews and Samaritans, alike the bitterest enemies of the Christians?

6° Likewise, let them say at what time, in what year, in what part of the world this impostor appeared; whom he first deceived; how the Jews, Samaritans, and Christians dispersed through the whole world were at once and together furnished with copies of all these books, in every language, Hebrew, Syriac, Chaldaic, Greek, as they were at the birth of Christianity. To these things the deists fall silent. Let them acknowledge therefore their fictions, and that they betray themselves as impostors, while they plead the cause of a fictitious impostor.

Let there remain unmoved, therefore, that the books of Moses and the prophets are their genuine works, that the prophecies which they contain concerning the Christian religion and its author are divine and revealed, and consequently that the Christian religion is true, divine and revealed; for there is no more efficacious argument for the truth of any doctrine than prophecies concerning its author and its truth, since no one but God, or one inspired by the divine Spirit, can long beforehand predict future things, which depend solely on the will of God, with all their circumstances, according to that of Isa., XLI, 23 : Announce the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that you are gods.

Obi. 1° that paganism also had its oracles.

I answer. 1° No oracles ever, whether from the priests of idols, or from pythonesses, or from demons through idols, issued forth concerning a future event that depended solely on the will of God, like the oracles of Christianity; but they were either concerning recent events already accomplished elsewhere, or which they themselves were about to do, or concerning natural futures which they predicted conjecturally from circumstances; and therefore concerning these Cicero himself, book II de Divinat., says that they were « partly false, partly true by chance. »

2° The oracles that looked to the future were ambiguous, such that whatever had happened, they were verified. Such was the oracle of Apollo of Delphi given to Croesus, king of Lydia, that « if he crossed the river Halys, he would destroy a great kingdom. » Whether his own, or another’s? this remained to be divined. Likewise this one of the same Apollo given to Pyrrhus consulting about the outcome of the war against the Romans : « I say that you, descendant of Aeacus, can conquer the Romans, » which signifies both that the Greeks can be conquered by the Romans and that the Romans can be conquered by the Greeks.

3° These oracles of paganism ceased at the birth of Christ and the advance of Christianity. Suidas, s.v. Augustus, Suetonius, in the Octavius, Nicephorus, lib. I, c. 17, relate that Apollo of Delphi, after having long remained mute, was finally compelled to answer Caesar Augustus consulting him thus :

« Me a Hebrew boy, God himself ruling the gods, commands to yield my seat, and to return sad beneath the earth. Depart therefore henceforth in silence from our altars. »

It is known that Apollo of Daphne in the suburb of Antioch long fell silent in like manner, notwithstanding the repeated sacrifices of Julian the Apostate, and finally answered him that the cause of his silence was certain dead men buried in a nearby place. These however were the holy martyrs, among whom St. Babylas.

Tertullian in the Apolog. affirms that any Christian meeting one first can render the demons mute and cast them out of bodies; and he challenges the Romans to make the experiment, consenting that this Christian be condemned to death if he should fail. Likewise Lactantius, lib. de vera Sapientia, relates that every Christian by the sign of the cross renders the demons mute and expels them from bodies.

I insist. The sibylline verses have always been most celebrated, not only among the Gentiles, but also among the ancient Fathers of the Church, in which many future things are predicted. Moreover the pagans had their oracles. Therefore there were true prophecies also among them.

I answer. that the sibylline oracles have long been held in low esteem by the learned. Even if, however, the authenticity of those verses be admitted, and that the virginity of the Sibyls was rewarded with the gift of prophecy by God, as St. Jerome says, contra Iovin., unbelief finds in them no support, since many monuments of ancient tradition are contained in them, many prophecies concerning Christ and his religion, as can be seen in digr. 2 at the end of dissert. II in tract. de incarnat., in our greater Work. Therefore the holy Fathers cited the verses of the Sibyls with praise, because they saw in them religion rather confirmed than weakened. As to the other prophecies and oracles of the pagans, although there are not lacking those who attribute all of them to the frauds of priests, whose very many arts of deceiving Herodotus himself reports, lib. 5, 6, 7 and 8, yet theologians commonly judge that not all those are to be ascribed to human arts, but that many also were produced by demons. Whence St. Cyprian, lib. de Idol. vanit., has thus : « These spirits therefore lurk beneath statues and images; these inspire the breasts of seers with their breath, and work oracles. » Although true prophecy is proper to God alone, nevertheless, considering the intelligence and nature of demons, they can know and foretell many things which can strongly excite the admiration of men. Thus they can predict evils of which they themselves will be the authors, manifest at almost the same moment what is done in a distant region, conjecture from present things certain ones soon to come, as has already been said. Since, however, the event even of things soon to come often depends on the free determination of men, and on the concourse of other things, which cannot certainly be foreseen from natural causes, hence the oracles of demons concerning these events were partly false, partly true by chance, commonly ambiguous and turning every way, so that they could be drawn even into contrary senses. The falsity of the oracles was attested, in Theodoret, by Porphyry himself, saying : « Asked about many things, they are found liars oftentimes. » They cannot therefore, except by the greatest folly and audacity, be compared to our prophecies by the oracles of the heathen, which Celsus did, whom Spinoza and other unbelievers followed. Let them show themselves any falsity, however small, in our prophecies : which they will in no way be able to accomplish; for it is evidently demonstrated that all oracles were fulfilled in Christ and in the Church. Hence augurs and soothsayers have existed indeed among all nations, but prophets nowhere, except in the people of God.

Obi. 2° with Rousseau : That prophecy may be a certain argument of truth, it would be required 1° that he who heard the prophecy be also witness of the event, 2° that it be certain that what was predicted did not happen by chance. But these do not concur in the same prophecy. Therefore.

I answer to the 1st: on this way of philosophizing nothing done by others can be believed, nothing said, unless it be heard with one’s own ears. Therefore there will no longer be any historical faith, no certainty. Moreover, although the things Rousseau requires are not found joined in every prophecy, yet it happens in many cases. Thus the resurrection of Christ had been foretold to the Apostles, who afterwards saw him alive with their own eyes.

I answer to the 2nd: there is not here question of one or another deed predicted through ambiguous words, or of one or another prophecy announced through conjectures or natural causes, but of the prophets, who succeeded one another through many centuries, who although far apart among themselves in age, regions and manners, wonderfully agreed in predicting events, not only free and contingent, but depending uniquely on God, whose places, times, and even the smallest individual circumstances they foretold, as we saw above. But who would be so senseless as to say that everything responded by chance to oracles so manifest?

Obi. 3° : Prophecies are not the work of God alone, if a natural faculty of prophesying be granted. But distinguished philosophers taught that this faculty is granted, as Aristotle, Plutarch, etc. Therefore.

I answer. I deny the minor. Those testimonies of the Gentiles prove nothing else than the common persuasion of all that divination exists; since they did not know its true origin, they took refuge in uncertain suppositions of this kind. For neither from reason nor from experience can any argument be brought forward by which this opinion is proved. We speak of prophecies properly so called, not of certain presensions arising from natural causes, whose sufficient reasons are already contained in things present or past.

Obi. 4° : A prophecy cannot be judged from the event, 1° if it can be fulfilled by the event without being true, as is said Deut., XIII, 1-3 : If there arise in the midst of thee a prophet... and foretell a sign and a wonder, and it come to pass that which he spoke, and he say to thee : Let us go and follow strange gods..., thou shalt not hear the words of this prophet; 2° if the event does not always follow a prophecy made in the name of God, as Isaias foretold to Ezechias death for the morrow, Jonas the overthrow of Nineve. 3° An event, announced only after a long time, cannot be an argument of truth; which happens in countless prophecies. Therefore.

I answer to the 1st. Since a prophecy that contradicts certain truth is necessarily false, it follows that the one treated of in Deuteronomy cannot be held a true and proper prophecy. Other interpreters think those words contain an impossible hypothesis, to express the matter more forcibly, which hypotheses are not rarely used in common speech, as the Apostle, to the Galatians, I, 8 : Though an angel from heaven evangelize to you otherwise than we have evangelized to you, let him be anathema.

Finally nothing prevents understanding those words of a prophet who, after he had uttered true prophecies, afterwards fallen into idolatry, abused his authority to corrupt the faith of the people.

I answer to the 2nd. Those predictions were not prophecies uttered in confirmation of any doctrine, but threats made, which were for the most part conditional.

I answer to the 3rd. A prophecy to be fulfilled long after could not be an argument of truth to those living at the time of the prophet, but to those who saw the event. Thus the prophecies concerning the Messiah proved nothing to the Jews living in the time of Isaias and Jeremias, but to those who were to be convinced from the prophecies in the time of the Messiah. Moreover the prophets always predicted even things soon to be, that by the events of the earlier prophecies they might win faith for the later ones.

Obi. 5° : The prophecies that foretell the last calamity of the Jews contain many things that were not fulfilled in the destruction of the city of Jerusalem. Therefore they prove nothing.

I answer. the objection speaks of the prophecy read in Matth., XXIV, Marc., XIII and Luc., XXI, in which, according to the common opinion of interpreters, Christ spoke at once of the consummation of the world, of which the extreme calamities of the Jewish nation exhibit the prelude. Yet it is not difficult to distinguish between the two, especially in the series of the narration related by St. Mark. 1° The destruction of the city of Jerusalem is treated from v. 1 up to 24. 2° The overthrow of the whole world from v. 24 to 27. Both events having been foretold, Christ answers this question of the disciples : Tell us when these things shall be. And indeed returning at v. 28 to the first event, he announces it as near at v. 30 : This generation shall not pass, until all these things be done. But as to the time of the final consummation of the world, he says at v. 32 that it pertains to the hidden judgments of God : But of that day or hour no man knoweth.]