justification, as in Paul and Magdalene, then justification is rightly called miraculous.]

St. Thomas, q. 114.

Merit, taken broadly, signifies the dignity of a thing on account of which it demands something; and thus it suits even inanimate things: thus it is said that an elegant painting deserves to be seen, that a fertile field deserves to be cultivated. Merit, taken properly, suits acts only, and is the property of a morally good human act denoting proportion to reward; for we speak here of merit in the good part, not in the bad, which, for distinction's sake, is called demerit.

Merit is distinguished as twofold: one de condigno, the other de congruo. Merit de condigno is an work whose value equals the value of the reward and to which the reward is rendered out of justice. Merit de congruo is an act whose value does not equal the value of the reward, and to which the reward is owed not out of justice but out of congruity only and seemliness, friendship or liberality of the rewarder.

Merit de condigno is properly and simply merit; merit de congruo only improperly and secundum quid, because it has no equality to that which is given on its account.

The example is usually placed in a generous soldier, to whom his own stipend is given de condigno, de congruo however a benefice of nobility or some donative from the king.

Merit de condigno is twofold: one of the rigor of justice, another of condignity only. The first imports such equal value to the reward as excludes every grace done to the meriting person by him who rewards, and such was the merit of Christ. The other imports indeed value equal to the reward, but with some grace supposed done to the meriting person by the rewarder; and of this merit before God there is question here principally.

§ I. — Conditions required for merit.

Six conditions are wont to be required for merit: the first, that the act be free; second, that it be good; third, that it be done in service of the rewarder; fourth, that the one operating be a wayfarer; fifth, that he be in the state of grace; sixth, that his act be ordained by God to reward.

The sixth condition is explained, concerning which there is some difficulty.

The sixth condition is the ordination or promise and pact of God ordaining the good act to reward or recompense: not that the good act have its intrinsic value or condignity from that promise; but because beyond the dignity, which it has entirely from grace, the promise of rendering recompense is necessary, in order that he who operates well from grace may have right to the recompense, and God be bound to render it to him. So commonly against Vasquez and certain others.¹

It is proved 1° From Scripture. Matth., XX: the father of the family, by whom God is signified, made an agreement with the laborer about the daily denarius. 2° ² Thus defined Trent, sess. VI, cap. 16. 3° ³ The same teaches Augustine, serm. 158. 4° Finally it is proved by reason. Merit imports in the meriting person right to the good of the rewarder, and in the rewarder obligation to render it. Yet, howsoever good man's act be, without the promise of God it cannot produce in man right to the good of God, nor in God obligation to render it. Therefore. — Prob. min. From good works already otherwise owed to God, man acquires no right toward God, nor is God bound to render him any reward, unless he have promised it. Yet all goods whatsoever of man are owed to God under several other titles, namely creation, supreme dominion, ultimate end, etc. Therefore.

[There can be added a seventh condition required for merit, namely the influx of charity. For the merit whereby the essential reward is obtained is founded in charity alone, in which the perfection of life essentially consists. Consequently merit can belong to no other virtue except through the motion and command of charity toward it. Whence I Cor., XIII, 2 et 3, it is said: If I have not charity, I am nothing, nothing profits me.]

I say : Justified man can truly and properly merit something from God, even eternal life itself.

This is of faith, decided in various councils: Arausican II, can. 18 ; Lateranense IV, under Innocent III, cap. Firmiter ; and lastly in Trid., session VI, cap. 16 and can. 32, against the Lutherans and Calvinists, who, since they contend that all works are evil, acknowledge in him no work that is meritorious at least of eternal life.

It is proved 1°. By merit we understand nothing else than a good work compared to a reward. Now Scripture everywhere proposes to us eternal life as to be rendered to the good works of the just. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. Matth., V, 12, it is said : Rejoice and exult, because your reward is great in heaven. Ibid., cap. XIX, 27-29, to Peter asking what reward there will be for one who leaves earthly things for Christ, Christ answers : He shall receive a hundredfold, and shall possess life everlasting. And cap. XX, he explains it by the example of the father of a family who renders to his laborers a day's denarius as the reward of slight labor. Hebr., XIII, 16 : Do not forget beneficence and fellowship ; for by such hosts God is merited. II Tim., IV, 8 : There is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me. Hebr., VI, 10 : For God is not unjust, that he should forget your work. And similarly elsewhere. Therefore, according to Scripture, there is promised to the good works of the just, not some kind of reward whatever, as the sectaries say, but eternal life itself ; not from mere liberality and mercy, as others say, but from justice, and therefore with merit properly so called.

Christ : You shall receive a hundredfold, and shall possess life everlasting. And chapter XX explains this by the example of the householder who gives the laborers a daily denarius as the reward of slight toil. Hebr., XIII, 16 : Do not forget beneficence and communication ; for by such sacrifices God is merited. II Tim., IV, 8 : As to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day. Hebr., VI, 10 : For God is not unjust, that he should forget your work. And so elsewhere passim. Therefore, according to Scripture, there is promised to the good works of the just, not a reward of whatever kind, as the sectaries say, but life eternal itself ; not from mere liberality and mercy, as others say, but from justice, and therefore as merit properly so called.

It is proved 2°. God confers on man through grace the virtue of acting well, and promises to his works done through grace a certain reward, indeed glory itself, as has been said ; all the other conditions required for merit can concur, for none is repugnant. Therefore man can merit even glory itself.

We do not understand here merit de condigno to which reward is owed out of justice. For since to the works of the just, howsoever good and wrought from grace, recompense is owed only out of ordination and acceptation of God — who could not ordain nor accept them to reward, as we said — the consequence is that the works of the just are not, in this sense, properly and intrinsically meritorious de condigno, but only extrinsically, out of divine ordination and acceptation.

True, because condignity, as the very word sounds, denotes equal dignity between two things, condign merit denotes equal dignity of the act to the reward. Merit de condigno therefore, as here understood with the Author, is that between which and the reward there is equality of value, or that which is of so great value under the ratio of merit as the reward is under the ratio of reward. And in this sense we ask whether the good works of the just are meritorious de condigno of glory, or whether the value of the act from grace equals the excellence of glory, although elsewhere, that it be owed by God out of justice, his ordination and acceptation be required. In this sense therefore,

I say: The works of the just wrought from indwelling and moving grace are properly and intrinsically meritorious de condigno of eternal life ¹ .

It is proved 1° From the sacred Scriptures, wherein the just through good works are said worthy of God and eternal life. Sap., III, 5 : God tried them, and found them worthy of himself. Coloss., I, 10 : That you walk worthy of God. II Thessal., I, 4 et 5 : So you endure all tribulations,... that you may be counted worthy of the kingdom of God.

It is proved 2°.² Merit de condigno is that whose value equals the excellence of the reward. Yet the value of the works, as they are from the Holy Spirit and from indwelling and moving grace, equals the excellence of eternal life. Therefore. — Prob. min. 1° They are of supernatural and divine order, like glory itself. 2° Their condignity is attended both according to the virtue of the Holy Spirit, who, Joann., IV, 14, is called the fountain of water springing up into eternal life, that is, principle of operations conducing thereto; and according to the dignity of grace, whereby man becomes partaker of the divine nature, and consequently can operate worthily of God. Therefore.

It is confirmed. Ephes., I, 14: grace is called the pledge of our inheritance. But a pledge is worth as much as the thing, or more, as says the Author on this passage, lect. 5. Therefore.

[Obj. The saying received among theologians: God rewards the just beyond condignity. Therefore.

Resp. I deny the consequence. That God rewards beyond condignity is not so to be understood as though the works of the just did not merit de condigno eternal life, but that beyond the degree of glory which they merit de condigno God adds something more out of his liberality; which we deny not. What however that may be, although it be not easy to explain, nevertheless it is likely that it is a certain perfection of vision or fruition of beatitude greater than the works merit.]

Besides eternal life, which, as is evident from what has been said, is the principal object of merit, there are several other things concerning which it is disputed whether they fall under merit, which we undertake to discuss here.

But before all, that equivocation may be removed and certain contrary opinions about merit de congruo reconciled, it must be observed that we distinguish here with the Author, a. 6, c, a twofold merit de congruo, one proper and strict, the other broad and improper. Merit de congruo proper and strict we place in amicable right to reward, whereby it is distinguished from merit de condigno, which imports a debt of justice. Merit de congruo taken broadly and improperly we place in the exigency of form by way of disposition or impetration.

You will ask 1° whether man can merit for himself first grace.

I answer. No one can merit for himself habitual first grace, neither de condigno, nor de congruo proper, but only improper ¹.

I said, « first habitual grace, » because about actual grace no Catholic doubts. For so it was defined against the Pelagians, which definition the Tridentine renewed, sess. VI, chapter 5, and it is evident from what we said above that no one can by the forces of nature dispose himself even to that first actual grace ^[2. « God touching the heart of man through the illumination of the Holy Spirit, nor does man himself do nothing at all,

by the forces of nature he cannot indeed dispose himself to that first actual grace.

The first part is proved, which also seems of faith, 1° from Scripture. Rom., I, 24 : Being justified freely by his grace. And from the Council of Trent, sess. VI, chapter 8, where expounding the aforesaid words of the Apostle, it says: « We are said to be justified freely, because none of those things which precede justification, whether faith or works, merits the very grace of justification. »

2° The principle of merit cannot fall under merit, as we shall show below. But first grace is the principle of merit. Therefore.

The second part is proved. Merit de congruo properly taken consists, as we said, in amicable right to reward; whence there is required for it not only congruity of the work, but also of the one working, namely that he be acceptable to the rewarder, not hostile to him, nor unworthy of his benefits; such nevertheless is man in the state of sin before justification. Therefore.

The third part stands; because the good works preceding justification and the prayers of the sinner humbled and penitent exact grace by way of disposition and impetration, wherein we place merit de congruo broadly taken.

You will ask 2° whether the just man can merit first grace for another.

I answer. No one, besides Christ, can merit for another first grace de condigno, yet well de congruo.

The first part is proved. Our work has the account of merit de condigno from the force of the motion of divine grace; and thus the just man properly merits de condigno only those things to which the motion of divine grace extends. But grace conferred on the mere man is particular, and moves him to receive that inspiration, since he can both cast away and receive it; yet without the grace of God he cannot move himself by his own free will toward justice before him. » — 1. Ibid., a. 6, o. — 2. Ibid.

his own perfection and salvation, not truly that he sanctify others; for that is proper to the grace of head and universal, such as was in Christ, which according to the present providence is granted to no particular just man. Therefore.

The second part is proved; because, since man constituted in grace, acceptable and friendly to God, fulfills his will, it is congruous, according to the proportion of friendship, that God fulfill the will of man in the salvation of another, provided however no impediment of excessive obstinacy or other on the part of him whose salvation the holy one desires be present.

You will ask 3° whether the just man can merit reparation after falling for himself.

I answer. No one can merit for himself reparation after falling, neither by merit of condignity, nor by merit of congruity properly so called.

The first part is proved. Merit de condigno depends upon the motion of divine grace, and therefore does not extend beyond it. But that motion is interrupted by sin, and thus does not extend to benefits posterior to sin. Therefore.

It is confirmed 1°. All the merits which the just man acquired for himself are suspended and impeded by subsequent sin. Therefore this sin cannot be removed by the force of those merits, nor consequently can fallen man be repaired.

It is confirmed 2°. The just man could not merit that an unworthy one be rewarded. But fallen man is unworthy. Therefore.

It is confirmed 3°. If the just man merited de condigno reparation after falling, he would infallibly obtain it, and thus all just men would be predestined, seeing that they would be finally restored to grace. Therefore.

The second part is proved. Merit de congruo properly taken imports amicable right to reward, so that there be not only congruity and aptitude on the part of the work, but

²

also of the one working. But the just man has not amicable right to reparation after falling, because through sin the friendship of God is lost, he becomes unworthy of divine benefits, and therefore every preceding merit is suspended, whether of condignity or of congruity.

What can be objected against the second part must be understood of merit of congruity improperly and broadly taken for congruity and aptitude on the part of the work, not on the part of the one working, because by sinning he lost amicable right to reparation and renders himself unworthy of divine benefits.

You will ask 4° whether the just man can merit for himself increase of grace or charity.

I answer. The just man can merit for himself de condigno increase of grace or charity ³, according to that of Augustine, Tract. V in Epist. Joann.: « Charity deserves to be increased, that increased it may deserve to be perfected ^[2. Here the words are not quoted, but the sense of Augustine saying there, n. 4: « Numquid mox ut nascitur [charitas]. ». ». So it was defined under anathema by the Council of Trent, sess. VI, can. 32 ⁴. And it stands from Scripture, which so often exhorts us to obtain that increase by good works, as Ephes., IV, 15 ⁵, and elsewhere.

The reason is ⁶, because that falls under merit de condigno to which the motion of God extends; but the motion of any mover extends not only to the ultimate term of motion, but to the whole progress in motion. But the term of the motion of grace is eternal life, but progress in this motion is according to increase of grace or charity, according to that Prov., IV, 18 : The path of the just as a shining light goes forth, and grows even to the perfect day, which is the day of glory. Therefore.

You will ask 5° whether man can merit for himself the gift of final perseverance.

I answer. No one can merit for himself de condigno the gift of perseverance. So commonly with the Author ⁷.

It is proved 1° from the principle of the Author received by all ⁸. The principle of merit does not fall under the merit of the work proceeding from that very principle; for nothing can be its own merit and reward, cause and effect. But if the gift of perseverance fell under merit, the principle of merit would fall under the merit of the work proceeding from the very principle. Therefore. — Proof of minor. The gift of perseverance consists in the divine conserving motion of the first grace given. But divine motion, as conserving grace, is the principle of merit, or holds itself on the part of principle. Therefore. — Proof of minor. Divine motion, as conserving grace, is the same entitatively as the first production of grace; for conservation of a thing is continued production of the same thing; consequently the conserving action of a thing is not entitatively distinguished from its first production, the Author saying, Ia p., q. 104, a. 1, ad 4: « Conservation of things by God is not through some new action, but through continuation of the action which gives being; which action indeed is without motion and time: just as also conservation of light in the air is through continued influx from the sun. » But the first production of grace is the principle of merit, or holds itself on the part of principle. And so, just as no one can merit his conservation, because conservation is not an action distinct from creation, which does not fall under merit; so no one can merit perseverance in good, because it is nothing else than conservation of grace, which is not

⁹ — ¹⁰

distinguished from its first production, which does not fall under merit, as was proved above.

It is proved 2°. Whatever anyone merits de condigno, that he obtains from God infallibly, unless impeded through sin. If therefore perseverance fell under merit, since scarcely anyone is just who has not meritorious works, scarcely anyone would be who had not the gift of perseverance, against that Matth., XX, 16 : Many are called, few are chosen.

It is proved 3°. For merit de condigno is required the promise of God, or pact of rendering reward for the work. But God nowhere promised perseverance to those working well; nay rather Scripture cries out that even the just ought to work their salvation with fear and trembling, Philipp., II, 12, and that he who stands ought to be solicitous lest he fall, I Cor., X, 12. Therefore.

There remains therefore that the gift of perseverance falls under merit de congruo only ¹¹. Some say de congruo proper; others de congruo broadly taken for impetration from the liberality and benignity of God.

¹²

APPENDIX

ON THE DISSERTATIONS ON MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE, GRATUITOUS PREDESTINATION AND GRACE PER SE EFFICACIOUS.

Since our prescribed limits do not allow a complete treatise upon this matter, it will be permitted us to join only those things which might seem omitted by Billuart in solving the arguments of recent Molinists. We shall speak therefore 1° of certain facts pertaining to history, 2° of middle knowledge, 3° of gratuitous predestination, 4° finally of physical premotion.

I. — ON CERTAIN HISTORICAL FACTS

1° On the meeting of Cardinals held before Paul V, on the 28th of Aug. 1607 ¹³.

There is reported to have been found a certain autograph of Paul V, in which is narrated that, of the nine assembled Cardinals, three, namely Pinellus, de Bubalis and S. Eusebii, did not open their mind on the matter in controversy; four however, namely Asculanus, de Giuri, Bianchettus and Arrigonius, stood on the side of the Dominicans; two finally, namely Bellarmine and Perronius, affirmed that the opinion of physical predetermination was of Calvin and Luther, and condemned by the Council of Trent in these words, sess. VI, chapter 5 : « Man can cast away grace. » Which things heard, Paul V pronounced thus: « In the grace of the Lord defined by the council it is necessary that free choice be moved by God; the difficulty turns upon this, whether he moves physically or morally... The opinion of the Preachers differs greatly

¹⁴

from Calvin; — for the Preachers say, grace does not destroy, but perfects free choice, and has that force that man operate according to its mode, that is freely; — but the Jesuits differ from the Pelagians, who posited the beginning of salvation to be made from us; those indeed hold altogether the contrary. Therefore, no necessity pressing that we come to definition, the business can be deferred until better counsel time shall bring.... » But when Carol. Pinellus and Bellarmine had felt that « a bull could be published, by which certain propositions, about which there is agreement between both parties, would be condemned, » the Pontiff adds, « that proposition, that a constitution should be issued whereby those things outside controversy would be declared, did not please, because neither is it necessary and it offers occasion of caviling to heretics. » Not long after this council, Paul V gave a rescript whereby the Congregations were terminated ¹⁵

Another autograph however was found, in which are noted those things which the Pontiff himself said to the legate of the king of Spain on this account, or certainly was about to say: « The matter was deferred for three reasons: The first is, that the matter may stand most certain, and that time is wont to teach and show the truth. The second, that both sides accord with the heads of Catholic truth, and teach that God by his efficacious grace excites us to act and makes of unwilling ones willing ones, and bends and changes the wills of men, of which there is question in this case; but they differ in mode of explaining, since the Preachers say he predetermines our wills physically, that is really and efficiently, while on the contrary the Jesuits hold that he acts congruously and morally : each of which opinions can be defended. The third is, that in these times.... much concerns it that we protect and defend the reputation and faith of either religion..... To be followed is the doctrine of conc. Trid., sess. VI, cap. 5 : free choice moved, excited, helped by divine grace, and able freely to assent and dissent; touched upon by the Con-

¹⁶

cilium Fathers the question of the mode of divine motion, but passed over as useless and superfluous.... »

From these it is perspicuous: 1° that the Pontiff himself vindicated the opinion of premotion from the calumny of Bellarmine and Perronius, who seem not to have understood the nature of this motion; 2° that that doctrine of the Jesuits was judged Catholic by the same Pontiff, which teaches that God « excites us by the efficacy of his grace to act, and makes of unwilling ones willing ones, and bends and changes the wills of men. » Which doctrine indeed is not purely Molinian, but expresses the opinion of the Congruists. That it may appear more clearly it must be said

2° On the famous decree of Cl. Aquaviva, General Prepositus of the Society of Jesus.

Bellarmine obtained from the General Prepositus of the Society of Jesus that he decree these things: « Since... for the good reputation of the Society among foreigners it matters greatly, especially in more grave matters, to cut off as much as possible occasions of continually devising new opinions,... it seemed to us seriously to be established and gravely commanded... that, in handing down the efficacy of divine grace, ours follow that opinion which, handed down by most writers of our Society, and in controversies concerning helps of divine grace, as more consonant with Sts. Augustine and Thomas, by judgment of the gravest Fathers, has been expounded and defended. Ours henceforth teach altogether that between that grace which actually has effect and is called efficacious, and that which they call sufficient, there is not only difference in act second, because from use of free choice, having also cooperating grace, it obtains effect, the other not so; but in the very act first, which, the knowledge of conditionals posited, from the efficacious purpose and intention of God of effecting most certainly in us good, deliberately

¹⁷

else confers that same sentiment, and in that mode and time in which he sees it about to have effect infallibly, using others if he had foreseen this inefficacious. Wherefore always, morally and in the account of benefit, somewhat more is contained in act first in efficacious than in sufficient grace; and by this reason God effects that we do in reality, not only because he gives grace whereby we can do. The same must be said of perseverance. »

By whose words of the Prepositus it is established beyond controversy: 1° what mode of efficacy the Jesuits attributed to and defended for grace before the congregations, and consequently of which opinion of the Jesuits Paul V wrote; 2° that that mode is not the one Molina teaches, but the one peculiar to the Congruists. For against some wishing to confound Molinism and Congruism, while many however justly and deservedly protest, thus speaks a recent Molinian author of the work Bannez et Molina ¹⁸, pag. 127 et seqq. : « In vain labor those who try to show that Molina and Suarez taught the same thing... It stands that after this decree pure Molinism was no longer received and handed down among us, but everywhere in our schools Congruism reigned, an opinion indeed intricate, placed in the middle between Molinism and Thomism, agreeing with the former in saving free choice, yielding to the other in the absolute account of every good act and of predestination to glory being assigned in the antecedent decree. »

Which things being so, it is manifest that pure Molinists have no right to appeal to the autographs and rescript of Paul V; for by these Congruism alone, Aquaviva testifying, is said not contrary to Catholic doctrine, and seemed more consonant with Sts. Augustine and Thomas to the gravest Fathers of the Society. What therefore of the doctrine of Molina? was it not abandoned? was it not therefore routed? Were perhaps those Molinian propositions, which Bellarmine himself thought could be condemned by apostolic constitution in the council of 28 aug. 1607?

¹⁹

3° On the disputation held in the Tridentine Council upon physical premotion.

It is circulated that certain theologians in the Council of Trent, in some congress preceding session VI, raised the question of physical premotion, and that they suffered repulse from the other Fathers and theologians, and were vehemently attacked by the illustrious brother Dominic Soto, of the Order of Preachers. Whence it appears that the opinion of physical premotion was rejected by the Fathers of the council.

But Dominic Soto himself, in his book on Nature and Grace which, at the request of the Tridentine Fathers, he wrote against Lutherans and Calvinists, thus speaks ²⁰ : « Lutherans play comedies against the kingdom of free choice, wherein they teach that man, « like an inanimate instrument or brute beast, » is so disposed while he is justified. Nay there are even among Catholics whom we have heard asserting this dogma with living voice, defending it against our protests, namely that God draws us to himself with a certain force and necessity, so that in our conversion we have ourselves merely passive and receptive. Concerning which therefore the sacred synod pronounced in session VI. » From these, in my judgment, it is most evident what should be thought of the fable wickedly spread abroad against Thomists. For Thomists teach that free choice moved by God does not hold itself merely passive, but truly and properly acts.

But that there may appear how great is this calumny, I shall briefly relate what Dominic Soto himself answers to a certain Molinian arguing against Thomists. For he was present at those prior congresses and at session VI; he knew therefore excellently what sense the Fathers wished to express and define. This he has ²¹ : « In the same way is diluted the argument which the Lutherans use everywhere as their Achilles. If, when God moves us either to good or to evil, it be in our power not to be moved, the motion of God would not be efficacious, and accordingly would not even be omnipotent. With which argument they per-

²² — ²³

suade themselves, as often as God moves us, that he infers necessity upon us. Their inference however is of no force. (Mark that Soto indeed does not deny the principle, namely that God moves us efficaciously, but only the inference of the Lutherans. So Thomists; on the contrary Molinians.) That God moves us freely fights nothing against his omnipotence and efficacy; nay thence more ampliously appears his infinite virtue and wisdom, that he instituted other causes to move naturally, and others freely, and to concur with each in its proper mode... (Behold the very exposition of the Thomists.) But something moreover remains to be explained. Either we are free in actions of this kind before the moment of time in which God moves us, or with the motion of God present: not before, because without him moving we cannot be moved; nor when he actually moves us, because it does not stand that he moves us without our being moved together: for to move and be moved are correlatives, as action and passion. » Is this not the Achilles of the Molinians against premotion of Thomists? Let attention then be given to the answer of Dominic Soto, theologian most illustrious of Trent: « It is not doubtful, he says, but that the concourse of God, although it accompany, as they say, action, is nevertheless required of every second cause in order to act, yea truly by nature prerequisite, since not only is God the cause of the effect of the second cause, but he himself also moves it to act. (Is not this the physical premotion of Thomists? physical motion, intrinsically cause, prior by nature to act, according to that of St. Thomas ²⁴ : « Motio moventis praecedit motum mobilis ratione et causa. ») But, although that concourse be prerequisite, nevertheless, it posited, it also is in the faculty of the will to act and cease.... The solution therefore of the doubt is, that at that moment of time in which God concurs with me, I am free to refuse then to act. For, while he moves freely, I can in the divided sense not act, and then the concourse of God will cease; although in the composed sense they fight mutually against each other, God acting toward me with that action, and my not acting. » Is this not the most famous tho-

²⁵

One thing I ask, that those things be attentively read in the Tridentine Catechism which are said concerning divine concourse, and it be considered whether « that intimate virtue and most hidden force, whereby God, anticipating the efficiency of secondary causes, compels them to action », is Thomistic or Molinian.

Is it not physical motion, necessary to all second causes in order to act, intrinsic to them, prerequisite to their efficiency? It is therefore true physical premotion. Were the Fathers Molinian, or Thomistic?

4° On a certain newest argument, whereby Thomists are accused of standing against St. Thomas.

The Molinian author of the work Bannez et Molina argues thus: « When some doctrine is attributed to any great philosopher from which follows something that seems impossible, it must always be judged that he saw the difficulty, and proposed and solved it directly. But nowhere in the works of St. Thomas is read explicitly the enormous difficulty of Thomists in saving human liberty; Thomas did not even suspect it. Therefore that does not exist in the truly Thomistic doctrine of divine concourse. Therefore wholly different is the doctrine of St. Thomas from that which is attributed to him. » What more? — I answer the major is conceded most gladly; but in place of the minor assumed, this must be set on the contrary: But wherever St. Thomas discourses of the knowledge of God, or will, or providence, or governance, or of human free choice, or of sin, he always proposes to himself the explication of the accord of human free choice and divine operation. Therefore the doctrine of St. Thomas on this matter is not that of Molinists, but of Thomists. For evidence of our minor it would be needful to run lightly through the works of the Angelic Doctor; but few things recited will suffice, as I judge.

^{26 27}

I p., q. 83, a. 1, objects to himself 3° : « That is free which is cause of itself. What therefore is moved by another is not free. But God moves the will... Therefore man is not of free choice. » The same is had q. 105, a. 4 ; q. 3 de Potentia, a. 7 ; q. 24 de Verit., a. 1 ; q. 3 de Malo, a. 2 ; q. 6 ibid., a. unico, etc... — He answers : « It must be said that free choice is cause of its own motion, because man through free choice moves himself to act. Yet this is not of the necessity of liberty, that it be first cause of itself of that which is free; just as neither for something to be cause of another is it required that it be first cause of it. God therefore is first moving cause both of natural and of voluntary causes. And as by moving natural causes he takes not away that their actions be natural; so, moving voluntary causes, he takes not away that their actions be voluntary, but rather does this in them: for he operates in each one according to its proper condition. » The same he teaches ibid., q. 105, a. 4, c ; q. 3 de Potentia, a. 7, c ; q. 24 de Verit., a. 1, c ; q. 3 de Malo, a. 2, c, and ibid., q. 6, a. unico.

II p., q. 10, a. 4, is objected 1° : « Every agent that cannot be resisted moves of necessity. But God, since he is of infinite power, cannot be resisted... Therefore God moves the will of necessity. » It is answered : « It must be said that the divine will extends not only that something be done through the thing which it moves, but also that it be done in that very mode which suits its nature. And therefore it would more repugn divine motion if the will were moved of necessity, which suits not its nature, than if it were moved freely, as suits its nature. » The same q. 6 de Malo, a. unico.

Ibid. is objected 3° : « Possible is that whose position entails nothing impossible. But impossible follows if it be posited that the will does not will that to which God moves it, for thereupon the operation of God would be inefficacious. It is not therefore possible for the will not to will that to which God moves it. Therefore of necessity it must will it. » The same where above.

It is answered : « It must be said that, if God moves the will to something, it is incompossible with this position that the will not be moved to it. It is nevertheless not simply impossible. Whence it follows not that the will is moved by God of necessity. » The answer cited above of Dominic Soto expresses the same doctrine.

Q. 3 de Potentia, a. 7, is objected 13° : « The will is mistress of its act. This however would not be, unless it could act only with God operating in it, since our will is not mistress of the divine operation. Therefore God operates not in our will while operating. » It is answered : « It must be said that the will is said to have dominion over its act not by way of exclusion of the first cause, but because the first cause acts not so upon the will as to determine it of necessity to one thing, as it determines nature. And therefore the determination of act is left in the power of reason and will. » The same I p., q. 83, a. 1 ; q. 24 de Verit., a. 1 ; q. 6 de Malo, a. unico. — The dominion which the will has over its acts, whereby it is in its power to will or not will, excludes determination of virtue to one, and violence of the externally acting cause; but it does not exclude the influx of the superior cause, from which is its being and operating. And thus causality remains in the first cause, which God is, with respect to motions of the will, so that God, knowing himself, can know such things. ²⁸

Here you have, if I mistake not, both all the heads of the Molinian arguments against Thomists, and all the principles of the solutions of Thomists. Thomists therefore are true disciples of St. Thomas. — I wish the notes attentively observed, what determination is contrary to liberty: none indeed other than determination of virtue or nature to one. Whence, when the Angelic Doctor says that the will is not determined by God, such locution is to be understood only of this determination to one by way of nature. For thus St. Thomas explains his own mind here most manifestly, and where he says III Contra gentes, chapter 90 : « That Damascene says, that God foreknows those things which are in us, but does not predetermine them, must be expounded so as to be understood that those things which are in us are not subject to divine determination, quasi receiving necessity from it. » — Note also incidentally what was said above, namely in what God knows free acts. In nothing, except in himself. And why? because God is the first cause of such motions. Thence is utterly overthrown scientia media.

By the same Molinian argument it is shown that Molinists are not disciples of Augustine. For heretics were rising up against the bishop of Hippo because he destroyed free choice. Whence Prosper also asked him to explain « how through that preoperant and cooperating grace free choice is not impeded. » Who ever anxiously asked this among the followers of Molina? Whence deservedly and justly Molina glories: « Which if they had always been given and explained, perhaps neither would the Pelagian heresy have arisen; nor would Lutherans have dared so imprudently to deny the liberty of our choice, objecting that it cannot cohere with divine grace, foreknowledge and predestination; nor would so many faithful from Augustine's opinion and contentions with Pelagians have been troubled and fallen away to Pelagians, and easily would the remains of those Pelagians in Gaul have been extinguished, as is evident from those things whereby the letters of Prosper and Hilary testify that those men met with Catholics and disagreed with them. » ²⁹ Excellent. Therefore not the same is the opinion of Augustine and Molina. For Molina boasts himself that the French would have been content. Indeed I do not contradict. For how would it have been Augustine's, since Molina recants « this our manner of reconciling liberty with divine predestination handed down hitherto by no one whom I have seen? »

5° On the older Thomists

Molinists heap together texts from older Thomists, by which the doctrine of Bannes seems reproved, or also certain things are said opposed to the sayings of new Thomists in controversies about grace. All these certainly deceive, and are apt to bring doubt into beginners, or those who

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cannot have the genuine sense of the words recited. Yet to these it suffices to respond in common:

1° In true Thomism several secondary opinions can be held about one thing: whence nothing wonderful that some of the Thomists reproved certain private opinions of Bannes. For they follow not Bannes as leader, but one Thomas; Thomas is always to be proved in Bannes, as also in others; whoever departs from Thomas is to be left. — 2° There is no reason why you wonder that more recent Thomists differ from the older in words. For before controversy has arisen about anything whatsoever, theologians, or even Fathers, are not wont to speak so formally, so to speak, and properly, and signify what they think. An example are the French, who made no small complaint against Augustine, that he spoke and taught much otherwise than the older writers, yea truly contradicted himself writing before the birth of the heresy of Pelagius. « They defend by antiquity, writes Prosper, and affirm that those things which are brought forward from the Epistle of the Apostle Paul to the Romans, written toward manifesting the divine grace preventing the merits of the elect, were never so understood by any ecclesiastical writers as they are now felt. » Similarly argued all heretics, from Arius down to Jansenists, against defenders of Catholic faith. I shall not deny therefore that both the older disciples of Thomas sometimes used terms which afterwards were held Molinian, and consequently avoided and reproved in the Thomistic school; and that the more recent, controversies arisen, chose some most formal and most proper terms for expressing the doctrine without any obscurity or tergiversation, and also most cautiously avoided less formal words, whatever could be drawn to the contrary part, after the manner of the holy Fathers and councils: whence the more recent may seem to differ from the older. But one is the principle of whole Thomism, namely that: « Whatever is moved, is moved by another. » Let therefore the older Thomists be compared with the more recent on the interpretation of this principle, and it will be made evident to all most clearly, that one is the school of Thomas from beginning until now, that all agree in sense in necessary things, although they may seem sometimes to differ in words. ³² To this responded Augustine to the French appealing to the ancients: « What need is there that we search the little works of those who, before this heresy arose, had not necessity to busy themselves in this difficult question to solve; which without doubt they would do if compelled to respond to such men? Whence it happened that what they thought about the grace of God they touched briefly and transiently, but lingered in those things which the Church disputed against other enemies. » And elsewhere he says that the older Fathers always professed those principles whereby he himself now sustains the true and Catholic doctrine on predestination and grace: which certainly ought plainly to suffice.

6° On the new Molinian metaphysics.

The Molinian author of the work Bannez et Molina has this: « I confess that it is most difficult for me to admit that according to St. Thomas divine cooperation is nothing else than simultaneous concourse. In this matter also the Dominicans obtained the cause against the Jesuits, by bringing forward texts in which the Angelic Doctor teaches that divine motion is received in the second cause. » ³³ — « However simultaneous concourse be expounded, it is attacked by most subtle arguments of metaphysics. Moreover by mere concourse toward effect or action can by no means be explained all those texts in which St. Thomas teaches that the second cause itself is moved by God. This is the infirmity of the Molinian opinion », ³⁴ — « Which metaphysical difficulty indeed against simultaneous concourse, in my opinion, is truly grave; whence, since St. Thomas did not see it, the consequence is that he did not posit divine operation in creatures as the favorers of simultaneous concourse posited. » ³⁵ — Therefore the concourse of Molina and Suarez is opposed both to metaphysical and to Thomistic doctrine. But let that Molinian tell us what St. Thomas truly teaches: « The divine operation, that second causes act, he says, is not a certain concourse received only in the effect, by no means truly in the cause, as the Suarezian school teaches. It is truly motion of the second cause itself, whereby mediating, the first cause attains the effect... Indeed I do not bear the name of physical premotion, because these words are perversely taken in Thomistic language. Nevertheless, in my sense, if anyone wish to follow the doctrine of Thomas, he must read that the second cause is really moved by the first, and that a certain influx of God is received in the second cause before it attains the effect. » ³⁶ — « Whether the action of the second cause be considered, or the effect be considered, divine operation is necessary, prior by reason; (for in the order of efficient causes cause precedes effect at least by reason,) entitatively more principal; but the second cause is only a subordinate cooperatrix, moved, only determining and specifying the effect, whose substance is from the first cause. » ³⁷ — From these it is manifest that this Molinian, while he repudiates the name of premotion, nevertheless seems to admit the thing and receive it from St. Thomas. But why he rejects the name must be seen. « The reason of premotion of Thomists, he says, is that it determine the indeterminate second cause. Moreover, according to the principles of St. Thomas, the motion of the first cause needs to be determined by the second cause, rather than that it determine it itself. » ³⁸ There is no one among Thomistic tyros who cannot remove this prejudice. For very often says St. Thomas « the influx of the first cause is determined and specified through the proximate cause, » in this sense namely, that God operates in each one according to its nature and mode, in natural causes necessarily, in voluntary ones freely, intellection with intellect, volition with will: « and therefore, says St. Doctor, the effect imitates the similitude of the proximate cause. » Moreover that the motion of God is thus determined by secondary causes, passively or receptively, so to speak, Thomists proclaim, with this reason especially demonstrating that free choice is not impeded by God but perfected while it is moved. True is the indifference or indetermination of secondary causes, which is unto exercise, while they are in act first or potency, as it is called; and that it may be removed, since no being can pass from potency into act except through some being in act, necessary is the intimate, efficacious motion of the first cause in second causes, prior by nature, as is evident. In this sense only do Thomists posit, the Angelic leading, that second causes are efficaciously determined by God, yea predetermined, since it is incompossible with this position that the second cause not be moved, and always the motion of mover precedes the motion of the movable by reason and cause, as the same Doctor himself says. Thomists therefore fight not against Thomas. For it is true that divine motion determines and is determined according to diverse accounts.

From these it could seem that this Molinian posits that we are physically premoved by God to free acts. But that conclusion, necessary beyond the expectation of all, he avoids with wonderful flight. Certainly, he says, « if any being entitatively distinct from others is, it ought to be from the first cause immediately: the consequence holds, and therefore thomism is logical. » ³⁹ — « Among Thomists, the undeliberated act and the deliberated act are two successive acts, distinct, entitatively different... Whence it follows that ly consentire is immediately from the first mover. Among us however ly consentire or ly dissentire adds nothing real, physical. The undeliberated act does not differ physically from the deliberated act. Whence it follows that it is not necessary that ly consentire be effected specially by the first mover. » ⁴⁰ — Indeed what easier and more apt for avoiding the subtle metaphysics and rigorous logic of Thomists than to deny that the free act is some real being and distinct in nature? I deny not that this is a most apt medium; but is it Thomistic, philosophical? Let even the Molinists themselves pronounce, who « too much, alas! placed the real distinction between potency and its act, whereby they exposed an open side to Thomists. » ⁴¹

I judge that one must not linger longer in confuting that opinion. For all philosophers and theologians cry out with St. Thomas, Ia p., q. 83, a. 4, ad 2 : « Electio (here the deliberated act) and voluntas, that is the very willing (here the undeliberated act) are different acts, as also to understand and to reason.

7° On the most famous response I II, q. 9, a. 6, ad 3.

From which Molinists infer that, according to St. Thomas, divine motion does not determine the will to this or to that.

In this place St. Thomas objects to himself 3° : « God is not cause except of goods... If therefore the will of man were moved by God alone, it would never be moved to evil. » He answers : « It must be said that God moves the human will as universal mover to the universal object of the will, which is good; and without this universal motion man can will nothing. But man through reason determines himself to willing this or that, which is true good or apparent good. Sometimes nevertheless specially God moves some to willing something determinately, which is good, as in those whom he moves through grace, as will be said below, q. 109 et 112. »

That the Molinian inference is against the mind of St. Thomas is most manifest: 1° From the conclusion of his very answer. For God is said to move some through grace to something determinately. Therefore some motion of God is to this or to that. — 2° From the motion of God to the act of sin. Ia IIae, q. 79, arg. Sed contra : « The act of sin is a certain motion of free choice. But the will of God is cause of all motions... Therefore the will of God is cause of the act of sin. » Ibid., in corp. : « The act of sin is a being and is an act, and from both it has that it is from God. For every being, in whatever mode it exist, must be derived from the first being... God also is cause of every action, inasmuch as it is action. » Therefore God

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promotes to free acts determinately. — 3° Because St. Thomas thus speaks expressly in III Contra gentes, chapter 69 : « Certain men not understanding how God can cause the motion of the will without prejudice to liberty,... said that God causes in us to will and to accomplish inasmuch as he gives us the faculty of willing, but not so that he makes us will this or that... Against which authorities of Sacred Scripture resistance is made evidently. » Ibid.: « Above (chapters 67 and 70) it was shown, that God is cause of every action and operates in every agent. He is therefore cause of motions of the will. » — 4° Because both this article, and the objection, and the response suppose evidently that St. Thomas teaches not simultaneous concourse (for who ever argued thus against him?) but physical premotion, which is required for any passage whatsoever from potency to act. For Ia IIae, q. 109, a. 1, c, he says: « However perfect some nature be supposed to be, whether corporal or spiritual, it cannot proceed into its act unless it be moved by God. » Ibid., a. 9, c : « No created thing can proceed into any act whatever except by virtue of divine motion. » — The depravity therefore of the Molinian inference appears manifestly.

But the same is expounded Thomistically thus. — St. Thomas teaches that possibility of actually sinning is had in the will moved, by this that not God alone moves, but the will itself also moves itself. Whence he excludes not suchwise that God moves to this or to that, but only that God moves alone in order to the act of sin. God therefore moves to this or to that, but not alone. Behold the inference true and from purpose of the text. — According to the doctrine of St. Thomas, that created will can actually sin, several successive acts are necessary in it. For it is impossible that the first of all acts of the will, since it is from God alone, be evil, although it can be free and meritorious. ⁴³ And thence it is that in the series of acts, whose last is sinful,

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as St. Thomas teaches in this response, God moves first, as universal motor, to universal good: which motion nevertheless is to a determinate act, as is evident from art. 4 of the same question. Which first act is not evil. But the will moved begins to move itself through deliberation of reason, as is there said; for God moves it according to its nature. Whence it becomes possible that the will determine itself to apparent good. When however God wills to move some specially to good, he permits them not to decline to evil. Behold the truly Thomistic sense. (Confer Ia IIae, q. 111, a. 2.)

Thence you see that here St. Thomas moves transiently some particular question. Whence it is not equitable that we now only ask what he thought concerning divine motion. The rule of criticism is, that of whatsoever teacher the doctrine about anything whatsoever be always drawn from those places in which he himself institutes the question ex professo; but locutions dispersed in other writings referring to the same be expounded according to the doctrine handed down by institution. Thus act Thomists; on the contrary Molinians, leaving or dissimulating special treatises, are wont to appeal to words transiently uttered, and seem able so to adjudicate to the author opinions not his own.

II. — On middle knowledge.

1° Indeed not a few, that they may demonstrate middle knowledge in God, never exhausting erudition, heap together innumerable texts from Scripture, councils, Fathers, reason, and others, if there be any, sources, whereby they prove most evidently that God knows with omnimodal certitude future conditionals free, or futuribles. But these labor in vain, running outside the field. For one question alone there is, namely: whether God knows futuribles before every decree of the will, that is, in that sign of reason wherein God is considered as if he had freely willed nothing as yet.

2° That they may satisfy which inquiry, Molinists seem now to agree in proposing as medium the determination of truth of one of contradictory enunciations. But that this medium is most inept may be demonstrated, it suffices to observe that our question is not of propositions in necessary matter, whose predicate is of the essence of the subject, e.g.: man is animal; but of propositions in contingent matter, whose predicate accrues to the subject, e.g.: Peter will sin. Whence, since truth follows upon being, before one of propositions in contingent matter be true, it is necessary that the thing signified have being. But the thing signified is only conditionate futurity of some free act. Therefore before all it is needful to assign where this futurity has to be in the sign of reason before every divine willing. Not in the condition indeed, since it is not connected with it; nor in the free cause or will, since the will is essentially indifferent between acting and not acting, nor can anything extrinsic determine it infallibly. Where then? Nowhere certainly. Wherefore reasonably Thomists say that such middle knowledge in God is not; but to every futurity of act, wherein it consists in the determination of cause to acting, and consequently to its cognition, the divine will is necessarily presupposed, which is the first mover and first cause of all. Let us hear the Angelic saying, Ia p., q. 16, ad 3 : « That which now is was future from this, before it existed, because it was in its cause so as to come to be... Whence, the cause removed, that would not have been future to come to be. But the first cause alone is eternal. Whence from this it does not follow that it has always been true that things which are are future, except inasmuch as in the eternal cause it was that they would be future; which cause God alone is. » But future things are not in God except through this, that God wills some things to be future, as is manifest from this, that, as our Doctor says, Ia p., q. 14, a. 8, c, « his knowledge must needs be cause of things, with will conjoined. » — An example are two contradictories in contingent matter: the world will be, the world will not be. Evident is that neither of these is determinately true of necessity before God decreed the world to be future; for it would follow that the world was created of necessity, and thus divine power would be subjected to a certain fate.

It is therefore openly false that of two contradictories one is always determinately true of necessity; but truth is determined by the first cause which gives being to the thing.

Excellent therefore St. Thomas I Contra gentes, chapter 68 : « Causality remains in the first cause, which God is, with respect to motions of the will, so that God, knowing himself, can know such things. » In I Periherm., lect. 13 : « False therefore is it that everything which is true has been determinately said to be future...; for in this mode is something true, whereby it has being... Something is in its own cause purely in potency, which is no more determined to one than to another: whence it remains that in no mode can it be determinately said of anything of them that it is future, nor that it is or is not. » Wherefore the Molinian author of the work Bannez et Molina confesses ⁴⁵ that « none of the proposed speculations makes [the question] sufficiently examined. »

3° But that the mind of St. Thomas appear most clearly, let there be read the questions on the knowledge and truth of God in I Contra gentes, chapter 49, and from chapter 64 to 71, especially 68, and in Ia p., q. 14, especially art. 5 and from art. 8 to 14. From these it will be evident that the whole doctrine of Thomists is contained in these terms: « The knowledge of God is cause of things, will conjoined. »

For it follows of necessity from the Thomistic principle: « Whatever is moved, is moved by another; » whence it becomes consequent that of whatsoever action the futurity is found prior and more principally in the divine will, which is the most efficacious principle of all motion. — When however St. Thomas assigns the reason of divine cognition of futures in their presence in the eternity of God, it appears to one considering that he speaks of knowledge of vision and of absolute futures, and that that admirable presence of things presupposes the determination of the divine will. Whence by what reason these places, e.g., Ia p., q. 14, a. 13, are objected to Thomists, I by no means see.

II. — On gratuitous predestination.

1° Concerning gratuitous election to glory Congruists and Augustinians agree with Thomists against pure Molinians. Whence whatever Molinists reproach to Thomists, disciples of Augustine can respond that it is vanity, and by what consent even appears that middle knowledge profits nothing in solving this question, since the Congruist approves that knowledge.

2° In this matter indeed Molinians separate the cause of adults from the cause of infants. For it cannot rationally be affirmed that infants who die without baptism in whatever case were on that account reproved because divine science foresaw that God would have them to be wicked in later years, if they were preserved to active life (which certainly Semi-Pelagians posited, as is had in epist. Prosperi to Augustine, and the bishop of Hippo reproved); nor on account of this that God foreknew their demerits, since they who led the briefest life without use of reason could merit nothing at all in reality. It is necessary therefore to say that infants are reproved without their own demerits foreseen. Different therefore is the cause of infants and another the cause of adults. Whence it appears most manifestly that Molinians differ from Augustine toto coelo, who from infants took most ample and valid argument to the cause of adults ⁴⁶. Say therefore Molinians, « God wills the salvation of all infants through baptism, under condition, namely if the free wills of men and the natural physical order do not stand in the way. » Whence it appears that the condition of the antecedent will of the salvation of infants depends totally on the free will of God. For the order of the universe, whether of natural or of free causes, is constituted by free decree of God. What therefore Molinians argue against Thomists, namely « that it is ridiculous for God to will the salvation of anyone under a condition which depends on God himself, » they must themselves first solve in the cause of infants, and show it to be frivolous; it is necessary. The Molinians therefore are themselves compelled to demonstrate that the Thomistic exposition of the antecedent will involves no contradiction.

3° But neither in the cause of adults can Molinians rationally differ from the disciples of Augustine and Thomas, unless they wish to contradict themselves. For, since Congruists posit that the antecedent will is to be so expounded as to be understood that God wills the salvation of all, if they consent to grace and persevere in it, and at the same time hold that God reproves some negatively without foreseen demerits, Molinians press them that they assert contradictories; for they fight among themselves, God willing to save someone if he consent, and by the same sign of reason, that is before prevision of dissent or demerit, infallibly reprobating the same. This, in my sense, is excellently said by Molinians. But I think they must suffer the same. For that foreknowledge of merits or demerits, upon which, according to Molinists, follows either election to glory or positive reprobation, by no means precedes that inscrutable judgment or decree of God whereby the reprobate are absolutely, infallibly and most efficaciously separated from the elect. For God by middle knowledge, which is necessary and therefore prior by reason to every decree, knows only those merits or demerits which are conditionately future, that is which would be absolutely, if men were created in these or those circumstances. But men are not elected or reproved on account of merits thus conditionately only future, as is manifest; but are truly elected or reproved on account of merits or demerits absolutely future. Moreover merits conditionately future do not become absolutely future except through position of condition, namely through constitution of man in those circumstances in which God foresaw him about to consent to grace and to persevere. But in these circumstances man is not constituted from eternity except through absolute, infallible, most efficacious and most free decree of God.

Therefore foreknowledge of merits on account of which anyone is glorified follows upon the most free and most gratuitous decree whereby God disposes him from eternity to persevere. Similarly of foreknowledge of demerits. Moreover by decrees of this kind is made infallibly and absolutely the discrimination of those to be elected and of those to be reproved. Thus therefore reason orders things in God, so as to be understood 1° middle knowledge of conditionate futures, 2° separation made by free will of reprobates from elect, 3° vision of merits and demerits absolutely future.

Indeed Molinians contend that the reprobate are separated from the elect by middle knowledge, not by divine will. For they posit thus: 1° an absolute and totally gratuitous decree, whereby God predestines all to grace; 2° prevision of consent and perseverance of some, but of others dissent and impious death; 3° finally election of the former to glory, but reprobation of the others. But no one does not see that, before it be understood that God predestines to grace, that is absolutely constitutes men in certain circumstances (which is a free act in God), there is pre-intelliged to know by middle knowledge (which is necessary cognition) what will happen concerning each one: whence by this free and gratuitous decree God knowingly and infallibly constituted these about to persevere and to be saved, those on the contrary about to dissent and to be damned. Not therefore divine foreknowledge, but gratuitous and absolute will makes the separation of those to be reproved and of those to be elected. Although it be true that according to Molinists the efficacy of grace arises solely from divine foreknowledge.

This posited, thus I argue. It is contradictory that in the same sign of reason, namely before foreknowledge of merits or demerits absolutely future, God be at once understood to will to save someone, and to reprobate him, which is not to save him. But thus it must be understood, according to Molinists; for they say God wills the salvation of someone if he consent, and they posit God to will the same absolutely not saved, before prevision of dissent. Therefore.

Moreover, since prevision of merits or demerits absolutely future, upon which follows election or reprobation, depends upon the free will of God, as was shown, for it follows upon some free and gratuitous decree of God, it seems that also in the cause of adults the antecedent will is with a condition depending on the free will of God. Let therefore Molinians first solve what they object to Thomists.

Excellently therefore says the Molinian author of the work Bannez et Molina ⁴⁷ : « Do not ask why God chose rather this order of circumstances than that, nor why he predestined Peter by this absolute efficacious decree, but reprobated Judas; I have nothing indeed except that apostolic saying: O altitudo! »

4° By what reason therefore Molinists are unwilling that God elect to glory prior and without foreseen merits, I do not even suspect. But one says: « He who most orderly wills an end to another formally as a reward for merits, does not will him this end as a reward for merits independently of his acquiring them — I concede; as a reward for merits infallibly to be given by himself — I deny. It is moreover manifest that God gives merits most freely. Therefore he can will absolutely to reward without foreknowledge of merits, but cannot will to reward without willing at the same time to give merits.

Those who teach gratuitous predestination to glory lean upon this principle: The will of means presupposes the will of end. — Roundly answers the Molinian author of the aforesaid work ⁴⁸, that this principle is not verified in divine wisdom and truth. That he may show this, he invokes the question placed Iª p., q. 19, a. 5, namely: « Whether it belongs to the divine will to assign some cause? » to which the Angelic answers negatively, because « as God by one act understands all things in his essence, so by one act he wills all things in his goodness. » But questions this Molinian confounds. For here is treated of the cause of the divine will on the part of act of willing; but our cause concerns the cause of the divine will on the part of things willed. This distinction our Doctor places Ia p., q. 23, a. 5, ad 3° : « It was said above, q. 19, a. 5, that no cause is to be assigned of the divine will on the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be assigned on the part of things willed, namely inasmuch as God wills something to be on account of something else. No one therefore ever existed of mind so insane as to say that merits are the cause of predestination on the part of the act of predestinating; but this is brought under question, whether on the part of effect predestination have some cause. » By no mode therefore do these favor the Molinian. Meanwhile mark that, even if it were doubtful whether God, determinately willing the salvation of some, assigned glory to them according to the account of merits, or rather defined merits according to glory prepared, outside controversy nevertheless would remain, in the doctrine of St. Thomas, that God elected some before others, before prevision of any merits whatsoever, to salvation (which imports in its own account both merits and glory). For he asks ibid., a. 4 : « Whether the predestined are elected by God? » But he answers: « Nothing ordered to an end is directed thereto unless the will of the end pre-exist. Whence predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes, by way of reason, that God wills their salvation: to which election pertains..., inasmuch as he wills this good to some before others, while he reprobates certain ones, as was said. » Therefore, according to St. Thomas, in predestination there occurs prior, by reason, the will of glorifying some before others. Thomas however follows Augustine, Augustine truly Paul.

IV. — On physical premotion.

In this matter indeed arise special difficulties concerning Thomistic doctrine, and those most grave, namely concerning the accord of human liberty and divine motion, concerning motion to the act of sin, and concerning sufficient grace.

Molinists are wont to set these implications first before the eyes, and by that method to agitate minds against Thomism, lest the clarity and ineluctable force of the principles of Thomistic doctrine be able to be perceived. But this method is adverse to reason. For it is natural to the human mind, when it proceeds from sensible things to intelligible ones, and composing and dividing and reasoning further, but not intuitively contemplating, to arrive at high truths, to be variously impeded and to suffer many doubts in the cognition of intelligibles, especially of higher ones. Whence principles are easier and more certain, as simple, consequently appear evidently; but conclusions are much less ready and often uncertain, as composed, for whose demonstration many principles concur, whose concord in the same point to discern is sometimes laborious, but once truly impossible. To whom are not obscure those problems concerning the liberty and immutability of God, concerning the presence of futures in eternity, concerning the union of body and soul, concerning the mode of human cognition, concerning matter, nature, quantity, etc.? Who nevertheless among Catholic philosophers denies the principles because of the difficulties of conclusions? for that from non-Catholics many on account of these go off into this or that species of skepticism is most certain. Natural therefore is the process of human reason toward acquiring science, that, principles posited and weighed, it ascend gradually to higher and more difficult things, obscurities reasonably contemned, contradictions alone certainly rejected.

Moreover this has the Molinian author of the work Bannez et Molina ⁴⁹ : « Thomistic doctrine indeed arises from a principle as august as solid, namely from the notion and right of first cause. In wonderful order also, and rigid logic, it deduces all consequences: all things seem concatenated, simple, clear, easy. These are commonly signs of the true. Nevertheless in the end that doctrine offends both the sanctity and goodness of God, and human liberty and imputability of merits and demerits, yea seems contrary to decree of Catholic faith. Nor does it exit from those difficulties except through long, obscure, most intricate explications. » Reasonably therefore proceeds Thomism.

But in elucidating Thomistic difficulties, first must be weighed the principles, and these rightly followed, absurdities alone avoided. Which principles we enunciate briefly: It is impossible that the same be at once and not be. — It is impossible that the same be at once in potency and in act. — Each thing acts according as it is in act, but is acted upon according as it is in potency. — Nothing passes from potency into act except through some being in act. — Whatever is moved, is moved by another. — Nothing operates except in virtue of God the first mover and first cause. — Thence necessity, account, nature of divine motion; thence physical premotion.

Thence it becomes evident that premotion cannot offend human liberty. For natural to the divine will is motion, which makes nothing else in it than to bring the faculty of will into act, certainly according to the mode of this faculty, namely actively and freely. This is the demonstration of fact, so to speak, of the accord of divine motion with human liberty.

Obscure remains the mode, I confess; yea easily I concede that it can neither be comprehended nor explained. What thence? Must the fact be denied, and principles so « august as solid » be renounced? By no means, but the weakness of human reason is to be acknowledged. Who wonders that cannot be comprehended, and that most obscure and inexplicable to us is the mode whereby infinite being creates finite being, and conserves it in being, and operates in it? Is it not consonant with reason that thus stand the things? Truly I who cannot comprehend so many finite beings, if I comprehended this influx of the infinite, I should transcend the limits of created intellect. Let us hold therefore the fact, wherein nothing absurd is detected, and demonstrated by rigid logic. All arguments indeed are radically solved by the distinction of composed and divided sense.

If diligently the other difficulties be considered, from this obscurity wherewith it is cast over liberty alone do they emerge. For the mode whereby efficacious grace is contained and had in sufficient becomes not obscure to us, nor the mode whereby the will moved by God sins, except because there appears not to us how in the potency of the will moved it be that it determine itself to true or apparent good. That it however be in the potency of the will, yea that this be made in it through divine motion so that it be, is most certain to one considering the reason of premotion. Divine premotion therefore is not offensive to divine goodness.

Indeed most obscure is this matter; yet nothing absurd in it will every keen-sighted one perceive. Nor wonder, as I judge, that Thomists have proposed varied or even sometimes opposite things in solving those difficulties. Delights me surely more the sobriety of St. Thomas. The fact indeed he affirms and proves; but the mode in these, as also in some other questions, he leaves, content with solution of arguments to the contrary.

These are the things whereby it has seemed opportune to repel the aggressions of recent Molinists. We have brought forward nothing new indeed, but that nothing new was opposed to Thomistic doctrine all, as we judge, will easily concede.