Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

Charles René Billuart

Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

Charles René Billuart (1685–1757)

Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae. Tomus II.

First published 1884

Charles-René Billuart, O.P.'s Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae, Tomus II, treats human acts, passions and virtues, sin, law, and grace in the Thomistic manual tradition. Schola presents the complete Latin Tome II from the Paris Vives edition of 1884.


Tractatus I: De actibus humanis

Dissertatio I: De voluntario et involuntario

Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit voluntarium?

Articulus II: Utrum omissio et effectus ex ea secutus sint voluntaria sine praecepto ponendi actum qui omittitur?

Articulus III: Utrum violentia causet involuntarium?

Articulus IV: Utrum metus causet involuntarium?

Articulus V: Utrum concupiscentia causet involuntarium?

Articulus VI: Utrum ignorantia causet involuntarium?

Dissertatio II: De voluntario libero, sive de libertate creata

Articulus I: Praenotanda

Articulus II: Utrum in homine lapso sit libertas arbitrii seu indifferentiae?

Articulus III: Utrum ad merendum vel demerendum, in hoc statu naturae lapsae, requiratur libertas a necessitate, seu libertas indifferentiae?

Dissertatio III: De actibus humanis speciatim sumptis

Articulus I: Utrum voluntas possit velle malum sub ratione mali?

Articulus II: De motivo voluntatis quoad specificationem

Articulus III: De motivo voluntatis quoad exercitium

Articulus IV: De modo quo movetur voluntas : an libere, an necessario?

Articulus V: De actibus elicitis a voluntate

Articulus VI: De actibus imperatis.** D. Thomas, q. 17

Dissertatio IV: De actibus humanis in esse moris

Articulus I: In quo consistat moralitas in communi actuum humanorum ?

Articulus II: De principiis moralitatis

Articulus III: De concursu multiplicis moralitatis simul in eodem actu

Articulus IV: Utrum dentur actus indifferentes?

Articulus V: Utrum et quomodo voluntas humana, ut sit bona, debeat conformari voluntati divinae?

Articulus VI: Utrum actus exterior addat bonitatem vel malitiam actui interiori?

Articulus VII: Utrum eventus sequens addat ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus exterioris?

Dissertatio V: De conscientia

Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit conscientia?

Articulus II: An et quomodo teneamur conformari conscientiae erranti?

Articulus III: Cujus speciei et gravitatis sit peccatum agere contra conscientiam?

Articulus IV: Quomodo se gerere debeat confessarius cum poenitente quem deprehendit laborare conscientia erronea?

Articulus V: De conscientia scrupulosa, per varias quaestiunculas

Articulus VI: Utrum liceat agere cum conscientia dubia, probabili, aut probabiliori?

Dissertatio VI: De opinionum probabilitate et delectu

Articulus I: Utrum sit licitum sequi opinionem minus probabilem et minus tutam, in concursu probabilioris et tutioris?

Articulus II: Utrum in conflictu duarum opinionum aeque probabilium, de honestate objectiva actus, liceat sequi minus tutam faventem libertati, relicta tutiori favente legi ?

Articulus III: Utrum liceat sequi opinionem probabiliorem minus tutam in concursu minus probabilis tutioris, ubi agitur de sola honestate objectiva actus?

Articulus IV: Varia quaestiunculae circa praesentem materiam breviter resolvuntur

Dissertatio VII: De probabilismo moderato

Articulus I: De natura probabilitatis

Articulus II: Quaenam systemata prodierint circa probabilitatem in practicis?

Articulus III: An liceat sequi opinionem vere et solide probabilem faventem libertati, relicta tutiore aeque probabili, vel etiam probabiliori, ubi de sola liceitate actionis agitur?

Articulus IV: De usu probabilitatis et de regulis specialibus quibus conscientia in dubiis practice formatur

Articulus V: Utrum liceat sequi opinionem probabilem, aut etiam probabiliorem, relicta tutiore, cum adest obligatio certa finem determinatum obtinendi?

Articulus VI: De probabilismo compensativo

Tractatus II: De passionibus et virtutibus

Dissertatio I: De passionibus

Articulus I: De passionibus in particulari

Dissertatio II: De virtutibus

Articulus I: Quid sit virtus, et quotuplicis generis?

Articulus II: De subjecto virtutum

Articulus III: De causa virtutum

Articulus IV: De proprietatibus virtutum

Tractatus III: De peccatis

Dissertatio I: De natura peccati

Articulus I: Quid sit peccatum?

Articulus II: Utrum formale constitutivum peccati commissionis consistat in positivo, an in privativo?

Articulus III: De peccato omissionis

Dissertatio II: De distinctione specifica et numerica peccatorum

Articulus I: Varia peccati divisiones

Articulus II: Unde petatur distinctio specifica peccatorum?

Articulus III: Utrum peccata commissionis et omissionis specie distinguantur?

Articulus IV: Unde petatur distinctio numerica peccatorum?

Dissertatio III: De comparatione peccatorum ad invicem

Articulus I: Utrum omnia peccata sint inter se connexa et paria ?

Articulus II: Unde sumatur inaequalitas peccatorum ?

Dissertatio IV: De subjecto peccati

Articulus I: Quodnam sit peccati subjectum ?

Articulus II: Utrum peccatum saltem veniale possit esse in et a solo appetitu sensitivo, absque omni actuali influxu voluntatis; omnesque motus sensualitatis sint peccata?

Dissertatio V: De causis peccatorum

Articulus I: An et quae ignorantia sit causa peccati, eaque ipsa sit peccatum?

Articulus II: Utrum possit dari ignorantia invincibilis juris divini positivi?

Articulus III: Utrum dari possit ignorantia invincibilis juris naturae?

Articulus IV: Utrum ignorantia invincibilis juris naturae excuset a peccato?

Articulus V: De inadvertentia ad peccatum

Articulus VI: Utrum ignorantia excuset a poenis per leges positivas statutis?

Articulus VII: Utrum Deus sit causa peccati?

Dissertatio VI: De peccato originali

Articulus I: Utrum sit peccatum originale ab Adamo ad posteros transmissum?

Articulus II: Variae quaestiones circa traductionem peccati originalis breviter resolvuntur

Articulus III: Utrum beatissima Virgo Maria peccatum originale in sua Conceptione contraxerit ?

Articulus IV: Utrum S. Thomas negaverit beatam Virginem Deiparam fuisse a peccato originali immunem?

Articulus V: In quo sita sit essentia peccati originalis ?

Dissertatio VII: De effectibus peccati

Articulus I: Utrum ex peccato actuali remaneat in anima macula seu peccatum habituale, et quid sit ?

Articulus II: De reatu poenae

Articulus III: Qualis poenae reatum inducit peccatum?

Articulus IV: DE POENA DEBITA PECCATO ORIGINALI

Dissertatio VIII: De peccato mortali et veniali

Articulus I: Utrum detur peccatum veniale ex natura sua distinctum a mortali ?

Articulus II: In quo et quomodo peccatum mortale et veniale inter se differunt ?

Articulus III: Utrum veniale disponat ad mortale, possitque fieri mortale, et e contra mortale fieri veniale ?

Articulus IV: Quis sit finis ultimus tam peccantis mortaliter quam venialiter?

Articulus V: Utrum peccatum mortale in ratione offensae sit gravitatis simpliciter infinitae?

Articulus VI: Utrum homo in primo instanti morali usus rationis teneatur se convertere ad Deum, possitque esse peccatum veniale cum solo originali?

Tractatus IV: De legibus

Dissertatio I: De lege in communi

Articulus I: Quid sit lex?

Articulus II: Utrum promulgatio sit essentia legis?

Articulus III: Quinam possunt ferre leges?

Dissertatio II: De lege aeterna et naturali

Articulus I: De lege aeterna

Articulus II: De lege naturali

Articulus III: Utrum lex naturalis pati possit dispensationem ?

Dissertatio III: De lege humana

Articulus I: De quidditate, necessitate, qualitatibus et divisionibus legis humanae

Articulus II: Qualis legis humanae promulgatio requiratur ut obliget?

Articulus III: Utrum lex pendeat ab acceptatione populi?

Dissertatio IV: De potestate legis humanae

Articulus I: Utrum lex humana possit praecipere aut prohibere actus internos?

Articulus II: Quomodo debeat poni opus praeceptum, ut legi satisfat?

Articulus III: Utrum leges humanae obligent in conscientia?

Articulus IV: De lege poenali

Articulus V: Quandonam leges humanae obligant sub peccato mortali?

Articulus VI: Quaedam aliae quaestiunculae circa obligationem legum humanarum breviter resolvuntur

Articulus VII: Quinam subjiciantur legibus humanis?

Dissertatio V: De mutatione legum

Articulus I: De mutatione legum per abrogationem et cessationem finis

Articulus II: De consuetudine

Articulus III: De dispensatione

Articulus IV: De interpretatione legum

Articulus V: (APPENDIX) — De privilegiis

Tractatus V: De gratia

Dissertatio I: Praeambula de variis erroribus circa gratiam

Dissertatio II: Praeambula de variis naturae humanae statibus

Articulus I: Explicantur quinque status naturae humanae

§ I: Status naturae purae

§ II: Status naturae integrae

§ III: Status justitiae originalis, naturae lapsae, et naturae reparatae

Articulus II: Utrum status naturae purae fuerit possibilis ?

Articulus III: Utrum homo in statu naturae lapsae nondum reparatae minores vires habeat ad bonum morale, quam habuisset in statu naturae purae?

Articulus IV: Utrum tam Adamo quam angelis fuerit necessaria gratia per se efficax ad perseverandum?

Dissertatio III: De necessitate gratiae

Articulus I: Quid intelligatur nomine gratiae?

Articulus II: Utrum homo sine gratia possit aliquod verum cognoscere?

Articulus III: Utrum homo lapsus possit facere vel velle aliquod bonum absque gratia?

Articulus IV: De necessitate gratiae ad amorem Dei naturalem super omnia tam affectivum quam effectivum, et ad vitanda peccata

Articulus V: Utrum homo possit se praeparare ad gratiam sine gratia?

Articulus VI: Utrum homini justificato necessaria sit gratia actualis ad singulos pietatis actus?

Articulus VII: Utrum homo in gratia constitutus indigeat speciali auxilio gratiae ad finaliter perseverandum?

Dissertatio IV: De essentia et divisione gratiae

Articulus I: De essentia gratiae

Articulus II: Variae divisiones gratiae

Articulus III: De gratia gratis data speciatim

Articulus IV: Utrum detur in hoc statu naturae lapsae gratia sufficiens?

Articulus V: Quo sensu admittenda sit gratia sufficiens ?

Articulus VI: Quid et quotuplex sit auxilium gratiae sufficientis ?

Articulus VII: DE GRATIA EFFICACI

Articulus VIII: Expenduntur varii modi explicandi efficaciam et causalitatem gratiae per se efficacis

Articulus IX: De causa gratiae

I suppose as certain that the proximate final cause of habitual grace is the eternal salvation of him who has it (habitual, I say, because it is of this precisely that we inquire, and only indirectly of actual grace, insofar namely as it is a motion toward habitual grace, as toward its form and term); the remoter cause is Christ; the ultimate, God, according to that, I Cor., III, 22 and 23: All things are yours, and you are Christ's, and Christ is God's. Moreover, the material cause is the essence itself of the soul; there is no formal cause, because grace is a simple form; the instrumental cause is the humanity of Christ together with the sacraments of the Church; angels and men are ministerial causes — angels by supplying the illuminations by which we come to grace, men not only by instructing but also by administering the sacraments; finally, the principal meritorious cause is Christ, and the less principal is just man, who can merit for himself de condigno the increase of grace, and for another de congruo first grace and then the increase of this grace . These things supposed,

You will ask 1° whether God alone is the principal efficient cause of grace.

I answer. affirmatively.

It is proved 1° from Scripture. Job, XIV, 4, it is said: Who can make clean him that is conceived of unclean seed? Is it not thou who alone art? Psal. LXXXIII, 12: The Lord will give grace and glory.

It is proved by reason. 1. Nothing can efficiently produce by its own power anything nobler, more perfect and of a higher order than itself; for the principal efficient cause is of greater or at least equal perfection with its effect. Yet grace is something nobler, more perfect and of a higher order than any created agent, since it is a participation of the divine nature, as was said above. Therefore.

It is confirmed. To produce grace by way of principal efficient cause belongs to him alone whose it is to deify, to give right to the inheritance, and to forgive sins. Yet this is proper to God alone: he only can deify others who is himself God by his own nature; he only can give right to an inheritance who is lord of the inheritance; he only forgives sins whom sin offends. Therefore.

You will ask 2° whether grace is created, or educed from the obediential potency of the soul.

Some hold that grace is created, some co-created, others, and more commonly, that it is educed from the potency of the soul. With these latter

I answer. Grace is not created, nor co-created, but is educed from the obediential potency of the soul.

The first part is proved. To be created is proper to a subsistent thing . Yet grace is not a subsistent being, but an inhering accident. Therefore. — Prob. maj. To be created is a kind of becoming, and this becoming is ordered to esse, nay is esse begun: whence to become and be created properly belong to those alone to which esse belongs. Yet esse properly belongs to subsistents only, whether they are simple, as separate substances, or composite, as material substances. Ergo. — Prob. min.

To those properly belongs esse which has esse and subsists in its esse. Yet accidents are not called beings as if they themselves were, but because something is such by them , as whiteness is called a being on that ground only because by it the subject is white: whence an accident is more properly said of a being than a being. Ergo.

The second part is also proved, namely that grace is not co-created, and it is evident. For an inhering form is said to be co-created when it is produced by the creative action of the subject itself. Yet the action producing grace in us does not create its subject at the same time, but presupposes it, namely the soul. Ergo.

Hence the third part is proved, namely that grace is educed from the obediential potency of the soul. For creation and eduction are contradictorily opposed: creation consists in a becoming from no presupposed subject; eduction, on the contrary, is a becoming from some subject presupposed. Yet grace is neither created nor co-created, as was proved above. Ergo it is educed.

It is confirmed. To be educed is to come to be dependently upon a subject. Yet grace in its connatural becoming depends upon a subject. Ergo. — Prob. min. From that from which grace depends in its esse, it depends in its coming to be; for the reason of both is the same, if it comes to be connaturally. Yet in its esse grace depends on a subject. Ergo.

You will object: Grace is said in Scripture to be created. Psal. L, 12: Create a clean heart in me, O God. Galat., VI, 15: In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth any thing, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature, namely grace. Ephes., II, 10: We are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus in good works; which can be understood only of grace. Ergo.

I answer. that grace is said to be created quasi morally, because it presupposes no merit . But it is not created physically; for it presupposes a subject. Whence it is also expressed in Scripture more rarely by creation, but more often by generation, vivification, reformation, resurrection, and similar terms.

You will ask 3° whether some preparation or disposition on the part of man is required for grace.

I answer. 1°. As to actual grace, it is certain that no preparation is required on the part of man as preventing the divine assistance, but rather whatever preparation can exist in man is from that assistance of God moving the soul to good.

I answer. 2°. According to the common course of divine providence, there is required on the part of an adult in possession of himself a certain disposition to grace: which disposition is an act and motion of free will toward God. I said, « of an adult in possession of himself; » for it is agreed that infants do not receive grace through baptism mediated by a disposition of free will, of which they are not capable, as not either perpetual madmen.

Each part of the answer seems decided by faith by the council of Trent, sess. VI, cap. 6, in these words: « Adults however [are disposed] to justice itself, when, excited and assisted by divine grace, conceiving faith from hearing, they are freely moved toward God. » And can. 9: « If anyone shall say, that the impious is justified by faith alone, so as to understand that nothing else is required which cooperates toward obtaining the grace of justification, and that it is in no way necessary that he be prepared and disposed by the motion of his own will; let him be anathema. »

This also Sacred Scripture clearly intimates. I Reg., VII, 3: Prepare your hearts unto the Lord. Zach., I, 3: Turn ye to me, saith the Lord of hosts, and I will turn to you.

The first part is proved by reason . A perfect and complete form, giving fixed and permanent esse, according to the common course of divine providence is not introduced into a subject unless it be disposed and prepared. Yet habitual grace is a perfect and complete form, giving fixed and permanent supernatural esse. Ergo. — The minor stands. The major also is evident both in natural things and in supernatural. Thus in natural things substantial forms, whether animate or inanimate, are introduced only into disposed matter; in supernatural things, the divine essence, as intelligible form, is not united to the blessed intellect except through the light of glory disposing it.

The second part is likewise proved by reason . Grace is conferred on an adult man by God moving him. Yet God moves all things according to the mode of each; but man is by nature of free will, and therefore it is proper to him to be moved through free will. Ergo in the adult there is not made by God a motion to grace without a motion of free will.

It is confirmed. According to the common course of divine providence, a form is introduced only into a subject disposed according to its proper mode. Yet the proper mode by which a man in possession of himself disposes himself to good is through the act of free will. Ergo.

I said, « according to the common course of divine providence; » because it must not be denied that God of absolute power can confer grace on one not disposed, as on one sleeping, since in this there is nothing repugnant. But reasoning must be about commonly contingent things only, as constituting rule and law.

Note, that acts of free will moved by God concur to grace not effectively, but dispositively only. For the council of Trent, sess. VI, cap. 7, teaches this: « The causes of this justification are:... efficient, the merciful God;... instrumental, the sacrament of baptism. » And St. Thomas says, q. 28 de Veritate, ad 2: « The sacrament of penance has to confer grace by virtue of the keys, by which the penitent subjects himself. Contrition therefore, if considered in itself, has reference to grace only by way of disposition; but if considered inasmuch as it has the virtue of the keys in vow, thus it operates sacramentally in virtue of the sacrament of penance, as also in virtue of baptism, as appears in the adult who has the sacrament of baptism in vow only. From this therefore it is not had that contrition is the efficient cause of the remission of guilt, speaking per se, but the virtue of the key or baptism. » He teaches the same in IV Sent., dist. 17, q. 2, a. 5, quaestiunc. 1.

You will ask 4° whether grace is greater in one than in another.

I answer. affirmatively . That Scripture indicates everywhere.

The reason is, because it is common to every subject to receive the form more or less, according as it is more or less disposed to it. The proximate reason therefore of this inequality of grace is the inequality of dispositions on the part of man; the first and remote one is the will of God, which is author not only of grace but also of the disposition to it, dividing to each as he wills, I Cor., XII, 11, and giving to each one grace according to the measure of the donation of Christ, Ephes., IV, 7. Whence, as he bestows unequal grace, so also unequal disposition to it, unto the consummation of the saints, unto the edification of the body of Christ, as is added in the same place, that is, that out of diverse grades the beauty and perfection of the Church may arise, as also in natural things he instituted diverse grades of beings, that the universe might be perfect.

You will ask 5° whether anyone can be certain he is in grace.

I answer. Special revelation set aside, no one can be certain that he is in grace with absolute certainty, under which falsehood cannot lie, or which at least excludes all dread; but only with certainty secundum quid, moral and conjectural. This is against the Lutherans and Calvinists asserting that each Christian is bound to believe that he was justified, and that men are justified by this faith alone. It is also against certain Catholics, among whom Catharinus contends that a man can be certain he has grace with absolute certainty — indeed not immediately of faith, but through theological discourse; Vega, with moral certainty which excludes all dread, such as is certainty about the existence of the city of Rome.

The first part is proved. 1° From Holy Scripture. Eccles., IX, 1:

There are just men and wise, and their works are in the hand of God; and yet man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred. Eccli., V, 3: Be not without fear about sin forgiven. I Cor., IV, 4: I am not conscious to myself of any thing, but yet I am not hereby justified; but he that judgeth me, is the Lord. Paul says this of himself, who certainly was then just.

2° From the council of Trent, sess. VI, cap. 9: « Although it is necessary to believe that sins neither are remitted nor ever were remitted, except gratuitously by divine mercy for Christ's sake; yet must it not be said that sins are forgiven or have been forgiven to anyone who boasts of his confidence and certainty of the remission of his sins, and rests on that alone... But neither must this be asserted, that they who are truly justified ought to settle within themselves without any doubt whatever that they are justified, and that no one is absolved from sins and justified but he who believes with certainty that he is absolved and justified, and that by this faith alone absolution and justification are perfected: as if he who believes not this doubted of the promises of God and of the efficacy of the death and resurrection of Christ. For, as no pious person ought to doubt of the mercy of God, of the merit of Christ, and of the virtue and efficacy of the sacraments; so each one, while he regards himself and his own weakness and indisposition, may fear and tremble concerning his own grace, since no one can know with the certainty of faith, which cannot be subject to error, that he has obtained the grace of God. » By this decree the aforesaid errors are refuted.

3° By reason from St. Thomas. After demonstrating here q. 112, a. 3, c. that this cannot be certainly known except by revelation, if perchance it be present, he adds in what manner the same cannot be known: « In another way man knows something by himself, and this with certitude. And thus no one can know that he has grace. For certitude cannot be had of anything unless it can be judged by its proper principle; for thus certitude is had of demonstrative conclusions through indemonstrable universal principles. But no one could know that he had knowledge of any conclusion if he were ignorant of the principle. Now the principle and object of grace is God himself, who on account of his excellence is unknown to us... And therefore his presence in us and absence cannot be known with certitude, according to that, Job, IX, 11: If he shall come to me, I shall not see him; if he depart, I shall not understand. And therefore man cannot judge with certitude whether he himself has grace, according to that, I Cor., IV, 3 and 4: But neither do I judge my own self... But he that judgeth me, is the Lord. »

The second part is proved. That a man can know with certainty secundum quid, moral and conjectural, from signs and indications, that he is in grace, no one denies. What these signs and indications are the Angelic Doctor explains in the same place: « In a third way something is known conjecturally through certain signs. And in this way anyone can know that he has grace, insofar namely as he perceives himself to delight in God and to despise worldly things, and insofar as man is not conscious to himself of any mortal sin. According to which mode can be understood what is had Apocal., II, 17: To him that overcometh I will give the hidden manna,... which no man knoweth, but he that receiveth it; namely because he who receives it knows by a certain experience of sweetness, which he experiences not who does not receive it. This knowledge nevertheless is imperfect. Whence the Apostle says, I Cor., IV, 4: I am not conscious to myself of any thing, but yet I am not hereby justified; because, as is said in Psal. XVIII, 13 and 14: Who can understand sins? From secret ones, etc. »

Even the sweet disposition of divine providence persuades that, as man ought not to have all manner of certainty of his own justice, lest he be carried away into pride and presumption; so congruously he ought to have moral and conjectural certainty, lest he be tortured by perpetual disturbance of soul, but between fear and hope work out his salvation.

Dissertatio V: De justificatione peccatoris

Articulus I: Utrum in justificatione impii peccata vere deleantur et auferantur, et non solum tegantur ?

Articulus II: Utrum ad remissionem peccati, qua est justificatio impii, requiratur gratiae infusio ?

Articulus III: De actibus ad justificationem peccatoris adulti requisitis

Articulus IV

Articulus V: Quaedam questiunculae ad complementum questionis D. Thomae breviter resolvuntur

Dissertatio VI: De merito justi

Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit meritum ? quas conditiones requirat ?

Articulus II: Utrum homo possit aliquid mereri a Deo ?

Articulus III: Utrum opera justorum quae fiunt ex gratia, sint meritoria de condigno vitae aeternae ?

Articulus IV: De his quae cadunt sub merito

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