Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

[There are to be exposed first the various systems concerning sufficient and efficacious grace.

1° Jansenius feigned that the distinction between the state of innocence and the state of fallen nature consisted in this, that in the former there were only sufficient graces hanging upon the will of Adam, while in the latter there are only efficacious graces absolutely dominating the will of man. From which principle he acknowledges no other cause of the necessity of inherent grace in the present state than the infirmity of nature corrupted and wounded by sin. This grace is nothing else than spiritual delight, or the indeliberate motion by which heavenly delight impels us to good, as concupiscence is the indeliberate motion of earthly delight by which we are impelled to evil: whence, according as one or other delight is superior, it becomes victor, and necessarily carries us away either to good or to evil. Jansenius does not deny indeed that in the state of fallen nature small graces are given to man which move him somehow toward good; but since in his system the force of grace is relative to concupiscence, these graces, which man resists, neither are nor can be sufficient, because they confer no true and expeditious power for overcoming the contrary concupiscence. Consequently Jansenius acknowledges in the present state no sufficient grace besides the efficacious, by giving which to act he gives at once also the power; nay rather, he gives the power because he gives the act. See above, de Actib. hum., dissert. II, a. 1, what liberty seems to this author to be, according to his doctrine.

2° The Thomistic School, after its Doctor, professes the following things: 1° A twofold grace, namely sufficient and efficacious, is necessary in every state. The former is less perfect and less valid, which gives only power, rendering man apt for supernatural act; the latter is more powerful and more valid, because it confers action. For the power of acting and action are two distinct entities in order both supernatural and natural; but man is a second cause subordinated to the first, indifferent of himself in acting and undetermined to acting or not acting, and of himself incapable, especially with his powers weakened by sin, of effecting any supernatural and meritorious act of salvation.—2° Sufficient grace is given to all, that is salvation is offered to each; efficacious grace is conferred on some only, namely from the twofold will which is in God relative to the salvation of men, the antecedent namely and the consequent, of which there was ample treatment in the tract. de Deo, dissert. VII, de voluntate Dei, art. 3 and 4.-3° Each grace is absolutely gratuitous; for each will of God concerning the salvation of men is a mere effect of his infinite mercy, wholly independent of their merits.—4° Efficacious grace is such of itself and from within, that is, from the most omnipotent will of God, and does not become efficacious from the consent of free will, which is always the effect and never the cause of this efficacy; so that it is always true to say a priori, God makes man consent because the grace is efficacious, never truly therefore that the grace is efficacious because man consents; otherwise God would not be first and immediate cause of this consent, and consequently of salvation.—5° From this efficacy no prejudice is inferred to liberty. For since the omnipotence of God extends to all entities and all differences and modes of entity, the motion which flows from it confers not only the substance of action, but also the mode in which it must come forth conformably to the nature of the second cause; so that if the cause be necessary, it moves so that it act of necessity, if the cause be free, it moves so that it act freely; and removing only passive indifference, it leaves entire active indifference, that is a true and complete power, the circumstances standing the same, of not acting, of resisting it, of doing the opposite, no otherwise than if will alone determined itself. Require what has been said abundantly concerning this gravest matter in tract. de Deo, dissert. VIII.

3° Very much at variance with Thomistic doctrine is the system of the Congruists. Louis Molina, celebrated theologian of the Society of Jesus, from whom his followers are called Molinists, taught that no graces are given except sufficient of themselves, but that they become efficacious from the consent of human will, and that God often confers stronger and more abundant graces on those who resist than on those who actually convert; but that he predestined to the kingdom those whom through middle science he foresaw from innate liberty would consent to grace offered to all and would persevere in it. This middle science was exploded in tract. de Deo, dissert. VI, art. 6. Since the doctrine of Molina appeared new to many and displeasing, they attacked it, among others, distinguished theologians of the same Society, whose chief were Bellarmine, lib. I de Gratia et libero arbit., c. 12, Henriquez, in the twofold censure given in the years 1594 and 1597, and Mariana, de Regimine Societ., c. 4; and it lacked little that it were destroyed by the censorial judgment of the holy See, after having been solemnly weighed in the congregations de Auxiliis, as was narrated in the dissertation cited above, § 6. The Society therefore tempered the system of this author, and prescribed to its alumni that they hold the system of congruous grace handed down by P. Suarez.

Further, in the theory of the Congruists grace is twofold: The former is incongruous, so called because it is not sufficiently accommodated to the disposition, inclinations, place, time, and other conditions and circumstances in which stands him who receives it, so as to obtain his consent, and therefore is only sufficient. The latter is congruous, because it is thus accommodated to the conditions and circumstances in which is constituted him to whom it is given, so as to obtain his consent; whence it is always efficacious, otherwise it would not be congruous. It has this infallible efficacy not of itself, as Thomists will, but, according to some of its asserters, from its congruity, according to others from divine prescience itself (which reduces to middle science), or from both together. Grace of this kind, as to physical being, has nothing more, on the part of God, than incongruous grace; but it has something more as to moral being, insofar namely as God, from special benevolence, confers it upon someone in those circumstances in which he certainly foresaw him about to consent, when he could confer it otherwise. Whence Congruists affirm that such grace is a greater benefit than incongruous grace, and distinguished from it not only as to the second act and on the part of the consenting creature, but even as to the first act and on the part of God.

4° The theologians called Augustinians agree with pure Molinists as to the state of integral nature, but with Thomists as to the state of fallen nature, except that they seek the necessity of grace efficacious per se from the sole infirmity of nature, whereas Thomists seek it moreover from the dependence of the second cause on the first, and from its indifference.

5° All theologians who admit neither the system of Molina nor of the Congruists, or middle science, stand for the system of grace efficacious per se as to substance, but differ among themselves only as to the mode of explaining this efficacy. For some explain it through sympathy, some through moral motions, some through delight, some through indeliberate acts, some through the sole divine decree, some through multiplication of assists, some finally through physical premotion, which is admitted in our school.

6° There is another singular system formerly championed by Alphonse Le Moine, and afterwards revived by Honoré Tournely, concerning sufficient grace in the Molinist sense for easy works, especially prayer: as if Christian prayer, attended with all its conditions, such as it must be to become impetratory, were not a difficult and most excellent work of salvation, and could withdraw itself from the graciousness of grace.

Therefore this system must be reduced to Molinism, and is attacked by the same arguments.

These things premised,

I say: Besides efficacious grace, there is given in the state of fallen nature a sufficient grace. This is against Jansenius, nor does it seem possible to deny it saving faith.

It is proved. Sufficient grace is that which gives the power of doing salutary good, even in those who do not do it, or which gives the faculty of a holy work, but lacking effect through the fault of created will. But grace of this kind is given in the state of fallen nature. Therefore. — The major is the notion of sufficient grace, as we understand it. — Proof of minor 1° Of faith it is that the commandments of God are possible to the just, who nevertheless do not fulfill them, as defined by council Trid., session VI, chapter 11 and can. 18^1, and by supreme Pontiffs in the condemnation of the first proposition of Jansenius. Therefore there is given them the grace whereby they become possible; for they are not possible to them by forces of nature, especially since among them are supernatural things: and this grace is not efficacious, because, as I suppose, they do not fulfill it. Therefore sufficient.

¹

It is proved 2° the same minor from SS. Augustine and Thomas.

Augustine lib. de Natura et Gratia, c. 43, n. 50, teaches that God does not command impossibilities^1. Therefore he supposes there is given grace whereby they become possible, even in those who do not keep them. Therefore sufficient grace. St. Thomas, I^a II^ae, q. 106, a. 2, ad 2: « The new law, he says, of itself gives sufficient help against sinning. » Others from the holy Doctor I shall relate in the following article.

Add to these this second condemned proposition of Jansenius: « To interior grace, in the state of fallen nature, resistance is never made. » Therefore there is given interior grace which is resisted, and which therefore is not efficacious, but only sufficient.

Objections are solved.

The Jansenians object 1° several texts of Augustine in which he requires efficacious grace, that man may be able to will and do good.

I answer. Augustine must be understood of consequent power joined with act, not of antecedent power of mere possibility.

You will insist. Augustine, de Corrept. et Grat., chapters 10, 11 and 12, n. 26-39, establishes this difference between the grace of the state of innocence and the grace of the state of fallen nature, that sufficient grace would be proper to the state of innocence, but efficacious grace proper to the state of fallen nature. Therefore, according to Augustine, no merely sufficient grace is given in the state of fallen nature.

I answer. I deny the antecedent. Augustine indeed teaches that there was given to Adam only sufficient grace unto perseverance, and that now efficacious grace is given to the predestined; but he does not say that this latter is proper to this state, and the former proper to the state of innocence. But herein he places the difference between the graces of both states, that man in this state needs for perseverance actually, not only grace moving and applying according to the com-

²

mon course, but special grace healing and strengthening his infirmity; but Adam, whose nature was sound and robust, needed only grace applying and moving according to the common course, not another special one healing and strengthening beyond the common course. See what I said more than enough concerning that difficulty in dissert. II of this treatise, a. 4.

Obj. 2°: According to Thomists, every interior grace, even that which they call sufficient, has an effect. Therefore every interior grace is efficacious, and none merely sufficient.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent. Every grace has an imperfect and less principal effect, I concede; perfect and principal, for which it is given, I deny. Whence I distinguish the consequence. Therefore every grace is efficacious secundum quid and with a diminishing addition, I concede; simply and absolutely, I deny. It is explained.

Thomists indeed teach that there is no actual grace intrinsically received, even that which they call sufficient, which has not some effect, because it is impossible that God move my will and my will be not moved; for the action of the mover in the moved is motion. Truly, because the effect which grace produces, which remains sufficient, is not the principal one which it intends and for which it is given (for it tends, both from the will of God giving it, and from its own nature, to a further and more perfect effect, namely either conversion or meritorious act, which it does not obtain, seeing that it disposes to it and confers the power), therefore it cannot be called simply and absolutely efficacious; but, on the contrary, saying under restriction that it is efficacious as to some less principal effect, namely a power more or less proximate to acting, it must be said simply and absolutely inefficacious, for the reason that it does not obtain the principal effect to which it is ordered and disposes, and for which it confers power: because, according to the philosophers, the simple and absolute denomination of anything is sought from that which is in it more perfect and principal.