Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

DISSERTATION IV

St. Thomas, q. 110 and 111.

In this article the question is principally of habitual and sanctifying grace, which by antonomasia is called grace, whereby namely we are constituted sons of God and heirs of the kingdom, to which actual grace is reduced, as disposition to form and motion to term; and which therefore does not constitute a species distinct from habitual grace.

You will ask 1° whether grace is an intrinsic gift.

I answer. Affirmatively ¹. It was decided of faith in the Council of Trent, sess. VI, can. 11, against Lutherans and Calvinists.

[There is read: « If anyone says that men are justified either by the sole imputation of the justice of Christ, or by the sole remission of sins, excluding grace and charity which is diffused in their hearts through the Holy Spirit and inheres in them, or even that the grace whereby we are justified is only the favor of God: let him be anathema. »]

And it is evident from the Apostle, I Tim., IV, 14, saying: Neglect not the grace that is in thee. And II Tim., I, 6: I admonish thee, that thou stir up the grace of God which is in thee. This matter will return when we treat of justification.

²

You will ask 2° whether habitual grace is a quality of the soul.

I answer. Habitual grace is a habitual gift remaining in the soul, and therefore of the genus of quality ³.

The first part, which the Council of Vienne had chosen as more probable, the Clementine de fide defined, Trent, sess. VI, chapter 16, saying: « Our justice is said to be ours, because we are justified by it inasmuch as it inheres in us. »

(In the aforesaid Clementine, lib. I, tit. I, cap. unic., it is said: « Since with respect to the effect of baptism in infants certain teachers of theology are found to have held contrary opinions, some of them saying that through the power of baptism guilt indeed is remitted to infants, but grace not conferred; others, on the contrary, asserting that both guilt is remitted to them in baptism and the virtues and informing grace are infused as to habit, if not for that time, as to use: but we, attending to the general efficacy of the death of Christ, whereby it is applied equally to all the baptized through baptism, have judged, with the approval of the sacred council, that the second opinion, which says that informing grace and the virtues are conferred in baptism upon infants as well as adults, ought to be chosen as more probable and more consonant and in accord with the sayings of the saints and of the modern teachers of theology. ») According to the opinion which the Council of Vienne approves, grace is in the soul as form. But form is of the genus of habit, as is said in the exposition of this opinion. Therefore grace is a habitual gift. Whence by the Tridentine it was defined that it inheres in us.)

The reason is 2° ⁴. God provides no less for those whom he loves toward having supernatural good than for creatures whom he loves toward having natural good. But he so provides for natural creatures that he not only moves them to natural acts, but also bestows on them certain forms and virtues which are principles both radical and proximate of acts, so that of themselves they be inclined to such

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motions, and thus the motions whereby they are moved by God be connatural and easy to creatures, according to that, Sap., VI, 1: He disposeth all things sweetly. Therefore much more those whom he moves toward obtaining eternal supernatural good he infuses certain forms or supernatural qualities, according to which they may be moved sweetly and promptly by him toward obtaining eternity. Now these supernatural forms are grace and the infused virtues, grace as radical principle of supernatural operations, the virtues as immediate principle.

The second part also is evident. Quality is a permanent habit difficultly movable, disposing the subject so that it be well or ill disposed in its being or operating. But sanctifying grace is permanent, as is evident from what has been said; it is difficultly movable, as much as lies in itself and its principles, namely leaning upon divine influx, and of itself importing an inclination contrary to sin, which is destructive of it, although per accidens, by reason of state and subject, it can easily be moved; and finally it disposes man, of himself indifferent to good and evil, so that he be well disposed concerning divine things. Therefore.

You will ask 3° whether sanctifying grace is a participation of the divine nature.

I answer. ⁶ Sanctifying grace is a participation of the divine nature, not only morally, consisting in rectitude of will and imitation of the holiness and justice of God in his works, but also physically: not in this sense, that through grace the divine nature as to essence is communicated to man; but in this sense, that it is a gift distinct indeed from the divine nature, but analogically and imperfectly imitating and expressing it, according to that express saying of St. Peter, epist. II, 1, 4: By whom (Christ) he hath given us most great and most precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of the divine nature. The reason is. By divine nature we understand that which in God is conceived as root of the divine perfections and radical principle of the divine operations, namely seeing himself intuitively, loving himself with beatific love, making all things outside himself. But sanctifying grace physically imitates and expresses this fountal and primitive perfection of God. Therefore. — Proof of minor. The just man by force of sanctifying grace is radically disposed and inclined toward seeing God intuitively, toward loving him with blessed love, and toward doing all things for him. Moreover he [grace] is the root of the infused virtues, which are images and participations of the attributes. Therefore.

You will ask 4° whether sanctifying grace is really distinguished from charity.

[Durandus holds that it is distinguished by name only; Scotus, formally; some, virtually, by reason of diverse offices; the Thomists, with the Angelic Doctor and many outsiders, really. With these latter, more probable.]

I answer. Affirmatively ⁷.

It is proved 1° by authority. The Apostle, Rom., V, 5, says: The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us. By Spirit however is understood the grace whereby the Holy Spirit dwells in us. Trent, sess. VI, chapter 7: « The renewal of the interior man takes place through voluntary reception of grace and gifts. » Augustine, de Dono perseverantiae, c. 16, n. 41: « Grace precedes charity. » Therefore.

It is proved 2° by reason ⁸. Charity supposes grace. Therefore. — Proof of antecedent. Virtue supposes nature proportioned to itself. Whence, as human virtue supposes human nature, which it disposes in order to obtaining a natural end, so supernatural virtue supposes a nature elevated to supernatural being, which it disposes congruously in order to obtaining a supernatural end. — I subjoin. But charity is a supernatural virtue, and supernatural being is communicated through grace, as was said. — It is confirmed. Grace is a participation of the divine nature; charity, a participation of the divine will. But these participations are distinct. Therefore.

For the solution of objections, note that the same effects are not rarely attributed in Scripture to grace and charity, not because they are one habit, but because they are interconnected among themselves and inseparable from their nature, and each in its mode concurs toward justification.

You will ask 5° in what grace is subjected.

I answer. To be subjected in the very essence of the soul, and not in any of its powers; because the perfection of a power is an active virtue, but grace is not an active virtue, but something prior to virtue, as we said. Therefore.

It is confirmed. Through grace we are regenerated into sons of God. But generation terminates to essence prior to its termination to powers. Therefore.

Grace as such, taken theologically, insofar as we treat of it here, is « a supernatural gift granted gratis by God to a rational creature in view of the merits of Christ, in order to eternal salvation. »

[It is called « a gift, » which holds the place of genus. It is called « supernatural, » that it be distinguished from natural gifts, which are called graces only in a wide sense. Yet by this there is not excluded a certain disposition of natural things by singular providence in order to salvation; for this is supernatural on the part of the end and of the principle. It is called « granted gratis, » that is, owed in no way, otherwise it would not be grace, as the Apostle says, Rom., XI, 6. It is said to be « granted by God to a rational creature in view of the merits of Christ¹

in order to salvation. » By the first particles is designated the subject or material cause of grace; by the following, the efficient cause; by the next, the meritorious cause; by the last, the final cause.]

Grace thus taken is divided 1° into external and internal. External grace is that which does not affect man intrinsically, but extrinsically only, such as are the divine law, the preaching of the Gospel, miracles, the examples of Christ and of the saints, occasions of doing good prepared by supernatural providence, occasions of sinning removed by the same providence: in one word, every effect of supernatural providence ordered to our salvation. Internal grace is that which affects man intrinsically, either by inhering, as habitual grace and the infused virtues, or by moving inwardly, as are the actual graces of intellect and will.

2° Internal grace is divided into grace gratis data and grace gratum faciens. Grace gratis data is that which is per se primo ordered to the salvation of others; grace gratum faciens is that which is per se primo ordered to the salvation of the recipient.

[3° Grace gratum faciens is divided into habitual, which sanctifies formally and resides in the essence of the soul, and actual, which concurs efficiently to justification. 4° Actual grace is divided into operating and cooperating. St. Thomas explains here, q. 111, a. 2, c, this division founded upon the Scriptures, councils, and Fathers thus: « The operation of some effect is not attributed to the thing moved, but to the mover. In that effect, therefore, in which our mind is moved and not moving, but God alone is the mover, operation is attributed to God; and accordingly grace is called operating. But in that effect in which our mind both moves and is moved, operation is attributed not only to God but also to the soul; and accordingly grace is called cooperating. » The Angelic Doctor proceeds, applying this distinction to the internal and external acts of man: « There is in us a twofold act. The first indeed is interior, of the will. And with respect to this act, the will stands as moved, but God as moving, especially when the will begins to will good, whereas before it willed evil. And therefore, according as God moves the human mind to this act, grace is called operating. » But another act is exterior; and since it is elicited by the will, it follows that for this act operation is attributed to the will. And because God also aids us toward this act, both inwardly confirming the will that it may arrive at the act, and outwardly offering the faculty of acting, with respect to such an act grace is called cooperating. » And he teaches this from Augustine saying it, and proving it from Scripture, lib. de Gratia et libero arbit., chapter 17, n. 33: « He [God] works in us that we may will without us, who cooperates with those willing, perfecting. On which account the Apostle says, Philipp., I, 6: Being confident of this very thing, that he who has begun a good work in you will perfect it unto the day of Christ Jesus. Therefore that we may will he works without us; but when we will, and so will as to do, he cooperates with us. »

It must be noted, however, that it is certain that the will does not stand merely passive toward that first act; for it is a vital volition of good, consequently an act elicited by the will. Nor does it follow that the will in this first volition is not free; for that the will act freely it is not necessary that it move itself from a preceding act, but it suffices that the object be proposed under an indifference of judgment; for then there intervenes a virtual deliberation. Compare what is said on this in the treatise de Angelis and in the treatise de Actib. hum.

5° Grace is divided, by the same St. Thomas, into prevenient and subsequent, according to the order of prior and later effects. For he says here, q. 111, a. 3, c: « As grace is divided into operating and cooperating, according to different effects, so also into prevenient and subsequent, however grace be taken. Now there are five effects of grace in us: the first of which is, that the soul is healed; the second, that it wills good; the third, that it efficaciously carries out the good it wills; the fourth, that it perseveres in good; the fifth, that it attains glory. And therefore grace, according as it causes in us the first effect, is called prevenient with respect to the second effect; and as it causes in us the second, it is called subsequent with respect to the first effect. And just as one effect is posterior to one effect and prior to another, so grace can be called prevenient and subsequent, according to the same effect, with respect to different ones. And this is what Augustine says in the lib. de Natura et Gratia, chapter 31, n. 35: « He prevents us that we may be healed; he follows after that being healed we may be strengthened; he prevents us that we may be called; he follows after that we may be glorified. »]

6° Grace is divided into sufficient and efficacious. That which suffices for something is said in two ways: 1° simply and in every respect; 2° secundum quid, that is, in one genus only, but not in every respect. Thus healing suffices for life simply, but not in every respect, so as to be perfect health; for it fails in another genus, as will be more fully explained below. By sufficient grace here we do not understand that which suffices simply and in every respect, but that which suffices in its own genus, that is, in the reason of a power of acting. By efficacious grace, moreover, we understand that which applies this power to act. To this notion suit the various definitions which are current concerning each. Sufficient grace is that which confers the faculty of acting well; efficacious that which provides the good use of this faculty. Likewise, sufficient grace is that which gives the good power, if we will; efficacious that which makes us will. Likewise, sufficient grace is the grace of possibility, efficacious the grace of action. And finally, according to Augustine, sufficient grace is the aid without which not, efficacious grace the aid by which. All coincide. This is the most celebrated division of grace, about which the gravest difficulties are raised, which we shall endeavor to elucidate in the following articles.

[You will ask 1° what grace gratis given is, and of how many kinds it is.

I answer. Grace gratis given is that by which one is ordered per se and first to the salvation of others. It is defined as « the gift of God gratuitously bestowed for procuring the salvation of others, » according to what the Apostle says, I Cor., XII, 7 : The manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit, namely the profit of others.

I said « per se first, » because secondarily it can conduce to the salvation of the recipient, if he use it from charity toward God and neighbor, just as sanctifying grace can secondarily conduce to the salvation of others, through the example of the virtues.

Nine species of grace gratis given are enumerated by the Apostle at the place cited, namely : word of wisdom, word of knowledge, faith, grace of healings, operation of virtues, gift of prophecy, discernment of spirits, kinds of tongues, interpretation of speeches.

You will ask 2° whether this division is a fitting one.

I answer. affirmatively. And St. Thomas proves it¹ by the following reasoning, which also sufficiently manifests what each of these graces is. For the edification of the body of the Church and for the salvation of others three things are required : 1° that man be allotted the fullness of the knowledge of divine things, and be able to instruct others; 2° that he be able to confirm and prove what he says, so that his doctrine may be efficacious; 3° that he be able to set forth fitly to his hearers the things he conceives. Now all these are found in the graces enumerated. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. As to the first, three things are necessary, as also appears in human teaching. That anyone should instruct another in any science, it is necessary : 1° that the principles of that science be most certain to him, and for this faith is posited; 2° that the doctor be rightly disposed regarding the principal conclusions of the science, and thus word of wisdom is posited, whose office is to conclude from the higher principles; 3° that he abound in examples and in the knowledge of natural effects, so that the invisible things of God may be clearly seen through the things that are made, understood, as is said Rom., I, 20, and for this word of knowledge is posited; for science is the knowledge of human and natural things. As to the second, for confirming the things of faith that exceed reason, there must be employed those things that are proper to divine power, and this in two ways : 1° by doing what only the power of God can effect, in miraculous works, whether particular ones, for the salvation of bodies, and grace of healings is posited, or general ones, operating upon the whole order of nature, and operation of virtues is posited; 2° by knowing and revealing what God alone can know : to which, if future contingents are meant, prophecy is posited; if hidden things of hearts, discernment of spirits is posited. As to the third, two things are required : 1° that he who teaches be well versed in the tongue of those whom he instructs, and for this kinds of tongues are posited; 2° that he expound the sense of the word of God, which is sometimes hidden, and interpretation of speeches is posited. Therefore.

For the solution of the objections, note the following : 1° Faith here is not taken simply for theological faith, but for the special understanding and eminent certitude which inwardly firm up the mind concerning the principles of faith, and which, manifesting itself outwardly in words, renders them efficacious for instructing and confirming others in the faith. 2° Wisdom and knowledge are gifts of the Holy Spirit, and pertain to sanctifying grace, insofar as they render man apt to be moved by the Holy Spirit for his own utility concerning the truths of faith; but insofar as they import an aptitude for expounding and unfolding the mysteries of faith for the utility of others, which faculty does not redound to one's own advantage nor is found in all the just, it pertains to grace gratis given. 3° The grace of healings and the operation of virtues are indeed akin to each other, but they differ : partly because they are often separated; partly because in the former especially shines the benignity of God toward the misery of men, while in the latter there rather appears the omnipotence of God commanding the whole of nature : and partly because the former allures to faith by way of benefit, the latter by way of prodigy, which displays the power of God revealing. 4° The priestly character, jurisdiction in the internal forum, and the special assistance granted by the Holy Spirit to the Church, are not graces gratis given, but pertain to operation and ministration, which the Apostle distinguishes from the graces gratis given, saying I Cor., XII, 4-6 :

Now there are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit. And there are diversities of ministries, but the same Lord. And there are diversities of operations, but the same God, who worketh all in all. These however are distinguished, inasmuch as grace gratis given imports only the manifestative act of faith; but ministration or ministry denotes the authority for exercising some act in order toward others, as episcopacy and whatever prelacy; but operation is the execution of the ministry.

You will ask 3° which of the graces is the more excellent : grace gratis given, or sanctifying grace?

I answer. That sanctifying grace is the more excellent, the Apostle himself declares, at the place cited, after enumerating the graces gratis given, saying, 31 : Yet I show unto you a more excellent way. For sanctifying grace joins man immediately to God, whereas grace gratis given only causes others to be disposed for conjunction with God; whence, although the latter is ordinarily conceded to the just, nevertheless it can exist in sinners and wicked men, if it so seem expedient to God. Moreover, nothing is more excellent than conjunction with God, which is effected immediately by sanctifying grace.]

[There are to be exposed first the various systems concerning sufficient and efficacious grace.

1° Jansenius feigned that the distinction between the state of innocence and the state of fallen nature consisted in this, that in the former there were only sufficient graces hanging upon the will of Adam, while in the latter there are only efficacious graces absolutely dominating the will of man. From which principle he acknowledges no other cause of the necessity of inherent grace in the present state than the infirmity of nature corrupted and wounded by sin. This grace is nothing else than spiritual delight, or the indeliberate motion by which heavenly delight impels us to good, as concupiscence is the indeliberate motion of earthly delight by which we are impelled to evil: whence, according as one or other delight is superior, it becomes victor, and necessarily carries us away either to good or to evil. Jansenius does not deny indeed that in the state of fallen nature small graces are given to man which move him somehow toward good; but since in his system the force of grace is relative to concupiscence, these graces, which man resists, neither are nor can be sufficient, because they confer no true and expeditious power for overcoming the contrary concupiscence. Consequently Jansenius acknowledges in the present state no sufficient grace besides the efficacious, by giving which to act he gives at once also the power; nay rather, he gives the power because he gives the act. See above, de Actib. hum., dissert. II, a. 1, what liberty seems to this author to be, according to his doctrine.

2° The Thomistic School, after its Doctor, professes the following things: 1° A twofold grace, namely sufficient and efficacious, is necessary in every state. The former is less perfect and less valid, which gives only power, rendering man apt for supernatural act; the latter is more powerful and more valid, because it confers action. For the power of acting and action are two distinct entities in order both supernatural and natural; but man is a second cause subordinated to the first, indifferent of himself in acting and undetermined to acting or not acting, and of himself incapable, especially with his powers weakened by sin, of effecting any supernatural and meritorious act of salvation.—2° Sufficient grace is given to all, that is salvation is offered to each; efficacious grace is conferred on some only, namely from the twofold will which is in God relative to the salvation of men, the antecedent namely and the consequent, of which there was ample treatment in the tract. de Deo, dissert. VII, de voluntate Dei, art. 3 and 4.-3° Each grace is absolutely gratuitous; for each will of God concerning the salvation of men is a mere effect of his infinite mercy, wholly independent of their merits.—4° Efficacious grace is such of itself and from within, that is, from the most omnipotent will of God, and does not become efficacious from the consent of free will, which is always the effect and never the cause of this efficacy; so that it is always true to say a priori, God makes man consent because the grace is efficacious, never truly therefore that the grace is efficacious because man consents; otherwise God would not be first and immediate cause of this consent, and consequently of salvation.—5° From this efficacy no prejudice is inferred to liberty. For since the omnipotence of God extends to all entities and all differences and modes of entity, the motion which flows from it confers not only the substance of action, but also the mode in which it must come forth conformably to the nature of the second cause; so that if the cause be necessary, it moves so that it act of necessity, if the cause be free, it moves so that it act freely; and removing only passive indifference, it leaves entire active indifference, that is a true and complete power, the circumstances standing the same, of not acting, of resisting it, of doing the opposite, no otherwise than if will alone determined itself. Require what has been said abundantly concerning this gravest matter in tract. de Deo, dissert. VIII.

3° Very much at variance with Thomistic doctrine is the system of the Congruists. Louis Molina, celebrated theologian of the Society of Jesus, from whom his followers are called Molinists, taught that no graces are given except sufficient of themselves, but that they become efficacious from the consent of human will, and that God often confers stronger and more abundant graces on those who resist than on those who actually convert; but that he predestined to the kingdom those whom through middle science he foresaw from innate liberty would consent to grace offered to all and would persevere in it. This middle science was exploded in tract. de Deo, dissert. VI, art. 6. Since the doctrine of Molina appeared new to many and displeasing, they attacked it, among others, distinguished theologians of the same Society, whose chief were Bellarmine, lib. I de Gratia et libero arbit., c. 12, Henriquez, in the twofold censure given in the years 1594 and 1597, and Mariana, de Regimine Societ., c. 4; and it lacked little that it were destroyed by the censorial judgment of the holy See, after having been solemnly weighed in the congregations de Auxiliis, as was narrated in the dissertation cited above, § 6. The Society therefore tempered the system of this author, and prescribed to its alumni that they hold the system of congruous grace handed down by P. Suarez.

Further, in the theory of the Congruists grace is twofold: The former is incongruous, so called because it is not sufficiently accommodated to the disposition, inclinations, place, time, and other conditions and circumstances in which stands him who receives it, so as to obtain his consent, and therefore is only sufficient. The latter is congruous, because it is thus accommodated to the conditions and circumstances in which is constituted him to whom it is given, so as to obtain his consent; whence it is always efficacious, otherwise it would not be congruous. It has this infallible efficacy not of itself, as Thomists will, but, according to some of its asserters, from its congruity, according to others from divine prescience itself (which reduces to middle science), or from both together. Grace of this kind, as to physical being, has nothing more, on the part of God, than incongruous grace; but it has something more as to moral being, insofar namely as God, from special benevolence, confers it upon someone in those circumstances in which he certainly foresaw him about to consent, when he could confer it otherwise. Whence Congruists affirm that such grace is a greater benefit than incongruous grace, and distinguished from it not only as to the second act and on the part of the consenting creature, but even as to the first act and on the part of God.

4° The theologians called Augustinians agree with pure Molinists as to the state of integral nature, but with Thomists as to the state of fallen nature, except that they seek the necessity of grace efficacious per se from the sole infirmity of nature, whereas Thomists seek it moreover from the dependence of the second cause on the first, and from its indifference.

5° All theologians who admit neither the system of Molina nor of the Congruists, or middle science, stand for the system of grace efficacious per se as to substance, but differ among themselves only as to the mode of explaining this efficacy. For some explain it through sympathy, some through moral motions, some through delight, some through indeliberate acts, some through the sole divine decree, some through multiplication of assists, some finally through physical premotion, which is admitted in our school.

6° There is another singular system formerly championed by Alphonse Le Moine, and afterwards revived by Honoré Tournely, concerning sufficient grace in the Molinist sense for easy works, especially prayer: as if Christian prayer, attended with all its conditions, such as it must be to become impetratory, were not a difficult and most excellent work of salvation, and could withdraw itself from the graciousness of grace.

Therefore this system must be reduced to Molinism, and is attacked by the same arguments.

These things premised,

I say: Besides efficacious grace, there is given in the state of fallen nature a sufficient grace. This is against Jansenius, nor does it seem possible to deny it saving faith.

It is proved. Sufficient grace is that which gives the power of doing salutary good, even in those who do not do it, or which gives the faculty of a holy work, but lacking effect through the fault of created will. But grace of this kind is given in the state of fallen nature. Therefore. — The major is the notion of sufficient grace, as we understand it. — Proof of minor 1° Of faith it is that the commandments of God are possible to the just, who nevertheless do not fulfill them, as defined by council Trid., session VI, chapter 11 and can. 18^1, and by supreme Pontiffs in the condemnation of the first proposition of Jansenius. Therefore there is given them the grace whereby they become possible; for they are not possible to them by forces of nature, especially since among them are supernatural things: and this grace is not efficacious, because, as I suppose, they do not fulfill it. Therefore sufficient.

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It is proved 2° the same minor from SS. Augustine and Thomas.

Augustine lib. de Natura et Gratia, c. 43, n. 50, teaches that God does not command impossibilities^1. Therefore he supposes there is given grace whereby they become possible, even in those who do not keep them. Therefore sufficient grace. St. Thomas, I^a II^ae, q. 106, a. 2, ad 2: « The new law, he says, of itself gives sufficient help against sinning. » Others from the holy Doctor I shall relate in the following article.

Add to these this second condemned proposition of Jansenius: « To interior grace, in the state of fallen nature, resistance is never made. » Therefore there is given interior grace which is resisted, and which therefore is not efficacious, but only sufficient.

Objections are solved.

The Jansenians object 1° several texts of Augustine in which he requires efficacious grace, that man may be able to will and do good.

I answer. Augustine must be understood of consequent power joined with act, not of antecedent power of mere possibility.

You will insist. Augustine, de Corrept. et Grat., chapters 10, 11 and 12, n. 26-39, establishes this difference between the grace of the state of innocence and the grace of the state of fallen nature, that sufficient grace would be proper to the state of innocence, but efficacious grace proper to the state of fallen nature. Therefore, according to Augustine, no merely sufficient grace is given in the state of fallen nature.

I answer. I deny the antecedent. Augustine indeed teaches that there was given to Adam only sufficient grace unto perseverance, and that now efficacious grace is given to the predestined; but he does not say that this latter is proper to this state, and the former proper to the state of innocence. But herein he places the difference between the graces of both states, that man in this state needs for perseverance actually, not only grace moving and applying according to the com-

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mon course, but special grace healing and strengthening his infirmity; but Adam, whose nature was sound and robust, needed only grace applying and moving according to the common course, not another special one healing and strengthening beyond the common course. See what I said more than enough concerning that difficulty in dissert. II of this treatise, a. 4.

Obj. 2°: According to Thomists, every interior grace, even that which they call sufficient, has an effect. Therefore every interior grace is efficacious, and none merely sufficient.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent. Every grace has an imperfect and less principal effect, I concede; perfect and principal, for which it is given, I deny. Whence I distinguish the consequence. Therefore every grace is efficacious secundum quid and with a diminishing addition, I concede; simply and absolutely, I deny. It is explained.

Thomists indeed teach that there is no actual grace intrinsically received, even that which they call sufficient, which has not some effect, because it is impossible that God move my will and my will be not moved; for the action of the mover in the moved is motion. Truly, because the effect which grace produces, which remains sufficient, is not the principal one which it intends and for which it is given (for it tends, both from the will of God giving it, and from its own nature, to a further and more perfect effect, namely either conversion or meritorious act, which it does not obtain, seeing that it disposes to it and confers the power), therefore it cannot be called simply and absolutely efficacious; but, on the contrary, saying under restriction that it is efficacious as to some less principal effect, namely a power more or less proximate to acting, it must be said simply and absolutely inefficacious, for the reason that it does not obtain the principal effect to which it is ordered and disposes, and for which it confers power: because, according to the philosophers, the simple and absolute denomination of anything is sought from that which is in it more perfect and principal.

I say : Sufficient grace must be admitted in the Thomistic sense, and not otherwise.

It is proved. Sufficient grace, in the Thomistic sense, is that which confers on man the faculty of acting well; beyond which, in order that he may act well, or use this faculty well, another stronger assist is required, namely the efficacious. But sufficient grace in this sense must be admitted. Therefore. — The minor, as to the first part, namely that grace must be admitted which gives the power of doing good even to those who do not do it, remains proved from the preceding article. — The second part is proved. Good action is something distinct from the power of acting well, something nobler and more perfect than it, and what is principal in the work of salvation. But God is the first and immediate cause of salvation and of every salutary act. Therefore, as by sufficient grace there is constituted the first and immediate cause of the power of acting well, so by efficacious grace distinct from the sufficient there ought to be constituted the first and immediate cause of the salutary act.

It is confirmed. Sufficient grace cannot be admitted in the sense of Molina or of the Congruists. Therefore it must be admitted in the sense of the Thomists. — The antecedent is proved. According to Molina, the good use of sufficient grace, or the consent which man gives to it, is not from God as from the first cause giving it, but God expects it from the created will; and at most it is from God as concause through simultaneous concurrence; which cannot be admitted. The same must be said of congruous grace; for this, its Congruist defenders being judges, has nothing more in the order of physical entity and of assist than the grace of Molina. Therefore. These few things for now; for whatever proves the necessity of grace efficacious of itself, of which below, proves this conclusion.

Obj. 1° : This grace is not sufficient, beyond which another is required. But beyond grace sufficient in the Thomistic sense another is required. Therefore. — The major is evident; because sufficient is that beyond which nothing is required.

I answer. I distinguish the major. This grace is not sufficient on every side and in every genus, beyond which another is required, I concede the major; it is not sufficient in its own genus, I deny the major. To make plain its sense I distinguish the minor. But, beyond grace sufficient in the Thomistic manner, another is required in a diverse genus, I concede the minor; in the same genus, I deny the minor. Whence to the proof of the major I similarly distinguish. That is sufficient beyond which nothing else is required in any other genus whatever, I subdivide. Only this is said to be sufficient, I deny; and moreover that is said to be sufficient beyond which nothing else is required in its own genus, although something else be required in a diverse genus, I concede.

We say therefore that grace, which so gives man the faculty of acting well that, if he do not act, this is not because he cannot, but because he wills not: we say, I say, that such grace, in its proper and natural sense and according to the common mode of speaking, is and is called sufficient, although for actual action another efficacious grace be required. For indeed it is not sufficient in every genus and order, since another of another genus and order is required; but it is sufficient in its own genus and order. And we say that to speak thus is to speak in the proper sense and as we commonly speak. For daily we say that fire is sufficient for burning, although moreover it must be applied to the combustible subject; that bread is sufficient for nourishing, although besides it must be chewed, swallowed and digested; that the intellect is sufficient for understanding, although it never understands unless further intelligible species be employed and the object applied by a further motion; that the passion of Christ is sufficient for saving us, even if it never save us, unless his merits be applied to us from elsewhere; and six hundred other things: thus, I say, we speak in common speech. So speaks St. Thomas, bringing forward the same examples here I^a, q. 109, a. 1, c, and III^a p., q. 61, a. 1, ad 3.

Therefore just as, when we say that fire is sufficient for burning, the intellect for understanding, bread for nourishing, the passion of Christ for saving us, these phrases do not signify, in the proper sense and common mode of speaking, that for burning, understanding, nourishing, saving us, de facto nothing else is required in any other genus besides fire, or intellect, or bread, or the passion of Christ; but only that, as to the power of burning, understanding, nourishing, saving us, no other power is required than that of fire, or intellect, or bread, or of the passion of Christ: so, when we say that grace is sufficient for acting well, this phrase, in the proper sense and according to the common mode of speaking, does not signify that, for actual action, nothing else is required in any other genus; but only that, without any other power of the same order, it confers on us the sufficient faculty of acting well, if we will. Wherefore it is unskillfully objected to us that we abuse terms, and that we teach a sufficient grace which does not suffice.

You will ask: Passing over the question of the name, and granting that grace sufficient in the Thomistic sense can be called sufficient with sound sense, inasmuch as it gives sufficiently the power: at least it is truly insufficient for actually operating, or for actually observing the commandment. But for this it ought to be sufficient, because God does not command us that we may be able to observe the commandments, but that we observe them de facto. Therefore. — The major is proved. That grace is insufficient for actually observing the commandment, to which something is wanting for its actual observance which is not in our power. But efficacious grace, which the Thomists require for actual observance, is wanting, and is not in our power. Therefore. So Honoratus Tournely, quest. VII on Grace, a. 4, concl. 3.

I answer. I deny the major. To the proof I distinguish the minor. Efficacious grace is not in our power, as an effect subsisting under it, I concede; as a cause by which it is made ready for it, I deny. For God, as far as in him lies, is ready to give efficacious grace to all who have sufficient grace, nor does he deny it to anyone except on account of fault, which at least in order and nature precedes the subtraction of efficacious grace. You have this difficulty drawn out at greater length in the treatise on God, dissert. IX, a. 4, § 3. See.

Obj. 2°: Grace sufficient in the Thomistic sense is utterly useless.

Therefore it is not to be admitted. — The antecedent is proved. That grace is useless which no one ever uses. But with grace sufficient in the Thomistic sense no one ever uses. Therefore.

I answer. With our Goudin, I distinguish the antecedent. Grace sufficient in the Thomistic sense is useless of itself, I deny; per accidens, through man's defect, I concede. For it gives of itself true power, which is useful; and if man use it not, the fault is man's, not grace's. But God, as in nature, so in grace bestows many things useful of themselves which, through our defect, lack their effect.

To what is added, that with grace sufficient in the Thomistic sense no one ever uses, I distinguish. No one uses grace sufficient in the Thomistic sense, reduplicatively as merely sufficient, I concede; specificatively as giving the faculty of good, I deny. Sufficient grace can be considered in two ways, which, as the praised Goudin observes, most people do not sufficiently advert to: 1° as it is merely sufficient, under which notion it connotes God's permission that man fail it and resist it; and in this sense it is true that no one uses that grace well. 2° It can be considered as to its proper entity and its own precise effect, which is to give the power of good; and in this sense it is false that no one uses it well; for most, considering it thus, use it well and act well, although this very thing, that they use it well, is an effect of efficacious grace. Therefore as the power of bearing fruit in plants is not in vain, although in most, on account of accidental defects, it remain without effect, because in others it bears fruit; so, in like manner, in our case.

I say : Sufficient aid does not consist in one single determinate indivisible thing, but in several things concurring to our acts, each one in its own genus and inadequately.

It is proved. By the name of sufficient aid we understand all that which God grants us so that we can perform a salutary work, in such a way that, not from defect of aid, but from man withdrawing himself from divine aid, the good is omitted or evil is done. Now God helps us in a manifold way toward good: at one time externally by law, by preachings, exhortations, examples, miracles, scourges, benefits, etc.; at another internally, by illuminations of the mind, motions of the will and infused habits of virtue. Therefore.

It is confirmed. That is sufficient aid which man resists. Now Scripture sets forth several kinds of graces which man resists, such as those I was just recounting. Therefore.

Hence you will gather that there are various divisions of sufficient aid.

1° It is divided into external and internal. To the external belong what I have already said: law, preaching, exhortation, example, miracles, adversities, benefits, indeed even a certain disposition of created things directed and ordered by special providence in ordine to salvation. The internal is that which God works within man, to advance him toward good and call him away from evil. It is twofold: one transient, such as are illuminations of the mind and motions of the will; the other permanent, such as are infused habits.

2° Sufficient aid is divided into moral and physical. To the moral belong the external aids by which God moves us to good, either by showing the good, or by threatening evil. To it also belong the illuminations of the mind, which although they are physical with respect to the mind, are nevertheless moral with respect to the will, inasmuch as they move it only objectively, by the proposal of good or evil. Physical is that by which God, as efficient cause, moves man, acting upon the will and changing it.

3° It is divided into proximate and remote. Proximate is that by which one is said to be able to do a good work in such wise that he is, e.g., proximately able with respect to his acts, as infused habits. Remote is that by which one is indeed not proximately able for the act, but yet can do something more easily, which if he does, he will arrive at the act: e.g., a sinner is not proximately able to overcome grave temptations, but he can pray through grace, which if he does, he will become proximately able to overcome temptations. This difference Trident., session VI, chapter 11 indicates from Augustine, when it says: « God does not command impossibilities, but by commanding admonishes you both to do what you can » — behold proximately sufficient aid — « and to pray for what you cannot » — behold remotely sufficient aid. This distinction is especially useful for resolving many difficulties.

Whence should its efficacity be sought, and is it per se efficacious?

By efficacious grace we understand here that which has its effect in reality and to which no resistance is made, so that, of what power soever it be strong, if it attain not its effect, it is not efficacious; because efficacious grace is taken here as distinguished from sufficient. Sufficient is called that which gives the power, efficacious that which gives the acting.

That efficacious grace is given in this sense no one denies. But the difficulty is there, and a most grave and celebrated one: whence does this grace have that it be efficacious? I say not whence it have the force of effecting howsoever, which is to be efficacious in first act; for it is certain that it has this from God: but whence it have that it certainly and infallibly obtain our consent, which is to be efficacious in second act, and in that mode in which we understand efficacious grace here, as appears from what has been said.

Pure Molinists seek the efficacity of grace from the event, so that, according to them, only graces sufficient of themselves are given, which become efficacious from the consent of the human will, or because the human will consents to them.

Congruists seek the infallible efficacity of grace from the direction of middle knowledge, and because it is given in those circumstances in which it was foreseen to have its effect; but since neither circumstances nor foreknowledge confer anything of virtue upon grace, as the Congruists themselves confess even in this opinion, just as in the opinion of Molina, the efficacity of grace is sought from the very consent of the will, so that it be efficacious because the will consents, but not that the will therefore consent because it is efficacious. Whence, in both systems, sufficient and efficacious grace are not distinguished entitatively and by their intrinsics, but, in the system of the Congruists, by extrinsic circumstances; for entitatively the same grace which is efficacious in one who consents is inefficacious in another who does not consent.

Thomists seek the efficacity of grace from intrinsics, whether from the most omnipotent will of God and his supreme dominion which he holds over the wills of men, as over other creatures: so that between grace and effect there be an infallible connection, not only with the infallibility of foreknowledge, as the Congruists wish, but of causality; nor is the infallibility of operation founded in the foreknowledge of our consent, but, on the contrary, the foreknowledge of our consent is founded in the infallibility of divine causality.

I say: The efficacity of grace must be sought not from the event, nor from the direction of middle knowledge, nor from the congruity of circumstances, but from the most omnipotent will of God and his supreme dominion over our wills; and thus it is per se infallibly efficacious, not with the infallibility of science only, but also of causality.

This conclusion directly prove whatsoever things I said in the treat. on God, dissert. VI, against middle knowledge and for per se efficacious decrees. Wherefore I shall not repeat all at full length, but compendiously only, indicating the places, yet with certain things added.

1° It is proved from Scripture.

1° The Apostle, I Cor., IV, 7, says: Who distinguisheth thee? And what hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received? But if grace be not efficacious of itself of our consent, but expect it from us and become efficacious through it, man has something which he has not received and wherein he can glory and distinguish himself from another who, prevented by equal grace, does not consent, namely the very consent to grace, which he has not from grace, but from himself. Therefore. Seek this argument more fully drawn out, with the various replies of adversaries, in the treatise on Middle Knowledge, § 2.

2° According to Scripture, God makes that we do, Ezech., XXXVI, 27: I will cause you to walk in my commandments. He makes that we will, Philipp., II, 13: He worketh in you both to will and to accomplish, according to his good will. He makes of the unwilling willing, taking away the hardness and resistance of the will and giving obedience or consent, Ezech., XI, 19 et XXXVI, 26: I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh and give you a heart of flesh. Whence Augustine, de Praedest. sanct., c. 8, n. 13: « By this grace, which is bestowed upon human hearts secretly by divine largess, no one repels with hard heart; for it is bestowed precisely that the hardness of heart be first taken away. » But God gives us not that we will and do, takes not away the stony heart, that is, the resisting heart, gives not a heart of flesh, that is, a docile and consenting heart, takes not away the hardness and resistance of the heart through a pendulous grace abandoned to the free arbitrament of the will, expecting its obedience or resistance, its consent or repulse, as appears from the terms; but through a grace of proper force productive of good volition and of a docile, obedient and consenting heart, and victorious over the hardness and resistance of the will. Therefore.

3° According to Scripture, grace is infallibly efficacious of our consent from the most omnipotent will of God and the supreme dominion he holds over our wills. Therefore not from the consent of the human will. — Proof of the antecedent. In Esther, XIII, 9 et 11, Mardochaeus praying God to convert the heart of king Assuerus hostile to the Jews, says: Lord almighty King, for all things are in thy power, and there is none that can resist thy will, if thou decree to save Israel... Thou art Lord of all, and there is none that resisteth thy Majesty. And cap. XIV, 12 et 13, queen Esther thus prays: Lord King of gods and of all power,... turn his heart into hatred of our enemy. And cap. XV, 11, it is subjoined: And God turned the spirit of the king into mildness. By which words the infallibility and efficacity of the divine motion and grace is referred evidently to the omnipotence of God, and not to a foreseen consent of Assuerus. Whence Augustine, lib. I contra duas epist. Pelagian., ad Bonif., c. XX, n. 38, weighing these words, says: « The heart of the king... he converts and transfers by a most hidden and most efficacious power from indignation to lenity. » Likewise Prov., XXI, 1, the heart of the king in the hand of God is compared to the divisions of waters in the hand of the gardener: As the divisions of waters, so the heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord: whithersoever he will he shall turn it. Eccli., XXXIII, 13, man in the hand of God is compared to clay in the hand of the potter. Isa., X, 15, the axe is compared [to him], the staff, the rod in the hand of the man using them as he wills. By which comparisons it becomes manifest that God by the force of his power and dominion disposes wills at his nod, and does not wait upon them to see who may will.

Honoratus Tournely replies that these things are objected in vain, since no one denies that the force and efficacity of grace derive from the most omnipotent virtue of God. Here Tournely plays with words and mocks. So indeed. No one denies that the force and efficacity which grace has derive from the most omnipotent virtue of God; but the Molinists and Congruists deny that grace has the force and efficacity, from the most omnipotent virtue of God, of determining the will infallibly to consent, as the cited texts bear, seeing they wish it to be efficacious through the very consent. And so they denied in the Congregation held before Paul V, September 20, 1605.

2° It is proved from Augustine.

And first from the terms whereby the holy Doctor expresses the efficacity of grace. Lib. I de Peccat. meritis et remiss., cap. 9, n. 20, calls efficacious grace « the most hidden grace of the Holy Spirit. » Lib. de Gratia Christi, cap. 24, n. 25: « That internal and hidden, admirable and ineffable power whereby God operates in the hearts of men, not only true revelations, but also good wills. » Lib. IV contra Julian., cap. 8, n. 42: « Most omnipotent will. » Lib. I contra duas epist. Pelag., c. 20, n. 38: « Most hidden and most efficacious will and power, which converts and transfers the hearts of men from indignation to lenity. » Lib. de Corrept. et Gratia, c. 14, n. 45: « Most omnipotent power of hearts to be inclined. » De Praedest. sanct., c. 8, n. 13: « Grace which no one repels with hard heart, because it is given first to remove the hardness of heart. » But these things befit grace efficacious per se and from intrinsic, nowise grace abandoned to free arbitrament, and rendered efficacious by its consent or by the circumstances of place or time. For 1° this grace does not operate in hidden, admirable and ineffable modes; for the cause why it operates is, in this system, obvious and open, namely the consent of the human will. 2° It is not most powerful and most efficacious, since it can effect nothing if the human will resist. 3° It effects not that man be willing and consenting, since, on the contrary, it is efficacious because man wills and consents. 4° Finally, it inclines not hearts whither and when God pleases, but rather man bends the divine power whither and when it pleases himself. Therefore.

2° Augustine, de Praedest. sanct., cap. 10, n. 19, says: « When God promised Abraham the faith of the Gentiles in his seed,... he promised not of the power of our will, but of his own predestination. For he promised what he himself was about to do, not what men. Because, although men do the goods which pertain to worshipping God, he himself makes that they do the things he commands, not they make that he do what he promised: otherwise, that the promises of God be fulfilled would be in the power not of God, but of men, and what was promised by the Lord would be rendered to him by themselves. But Abraham believed not thus, but believed giving glory to God, because that which he had promised he is able also to perform, Rom., IV, 20 et 21. He says not « to preach, » he says not « to foreknow »... but, he is able to perform, and hence deeds done not alien, but his own. » But if grace be not per se efficacious of our consent unto faith or of the work of piety, but expect it and depend upon it that it be efficacious, it follows: 1° that, when God promised faith to Abraham, he promised not of his predestination, but of the power of our will. 2° That he promised, not what he himself was about to do, but what men. 3° That he makes not that men do the things he commands, but that they make that he do what he promised. 4° That the promises of God be fulfilled would be in the power not of God, but of men. 5° That he be able to preach and to foreknow the things he promised, but not able to perform, since these depend upon the human will, and thus that he promised deeds done alien, not his own: all which things are directly against Augustine. Therefore.

It is confirmed. Augustine, de Corrept. et Gratia, c. 14, n. 45, proves « that God makes of the wills of men what he wills, when he wills; » because « he holds more in his power the wills of men than they their own. » But man, from the power which he has over his own will, determines himself efficaciously, and what is capital, his liberty remaining safe. Therefore, a fortiori, God from the greater power which he has over the wills of men determines them efficaciously, their liberty remaining safe: otherwise how should he hold more in his power the wills of men than they their own?

4° According to Augustine, it is difficult to reconcile liberty with grace. Thus lib. de Gratia Christi, c. 47, n. 52: « This question, where the arbitrament of the will and the grace of God are disputed of, is this, difficult for discerning, so that when free will is defended, the grace of God seems denied; when however the grace of God is asserted, free will is thought taken away. » And lib. II contra litt. Petiliani, cap. 84, n. 185: « If I propose to you the question, how God the Father draws unto the Son those men whom he left in free arbitrament, perhaps you will find it difficult to solve. For how does he draw, if he leaves it that each choose what he will? And yet both are true; but few can penetrate this by understanding. » But, in either system of the Molinists and Congruists, all can easily penetrate the accord of liberty with grace. For who, though most stupid, understands not that liberty remains with a grace which hangs upon his nod? Nay, those systems were fabricated precisely that this accord might easily be perceived. By this alone it is patent how far those systems differ from the system of Augustine.

3º It is proved from St. Thomas.

From innumerable [texts] I select a few. 1° The holy Doctor says, Iª IIª, q. 10, a. 4, ad 3: « If God moves the will to anything, it is incompossible with this position that the will not be moved to it; not however is it simply impossible. » Q. 6 de Malo, a. unico, ad 3: « God indeed moves the will immutably, on account of the efficacity of the moving virtue, which cannot fail; but, on account of the nature of the will moved, which holds itself indifferently toward divers things, necessity is not induced, but liberty remains: as also in all things divine providence operates infallibly, and nevertheless contingent effects proceed from contingent causes, inasmuch as God moves all things proportionably, each one according to its mode. » I p., q. 19, a. 8, c: « Since the divine will is most efficacious, it follows not only that those things come to pass which God wills to come to pass, but that they come to pass in that mode wherein God wills them to come to pass. But God wills some things to come to pass necessarily, some contingently, that there may be order in things, unto the complement of the universe. » And ad 2: « From this very thing that nothing resists the divine will, it follows not only that those things come to pass which God wills to come to pass, but that they come to pass contingently or necessarily which he thus wills to come to pass. » These things are plain and open, and expressly in terms declare that the infallible efficacity of grace must be sought from the efficacity of the divine will, and, what is of chief moment, that liberty remains safe under it.

Both again are drawn out from q. 22 de Verit., a. 8, c, where he says: « Every action of the will, inasmuch as it is an action, is not only from the will as immediate agent, but also from God as first agent, who impinges more strongly. Whence, as the will can change its act into another, so and much more can God. » Nothing more urgent. For thence I thus form the argument: God, as first agent, impinges more strongly upon the will than it itself, as second agent, upon itself. But the will, as second agent, moves itself in the genus of efficient cause and determines itself to act with its liberty safe. Therefore much more God, as first agent in the genus of efficient cause, moves and determines it with its liberty safe.

2º According to St. Thomas, the use of grace is from grace. Therefore by its own force it is efficacious. — The holy Doctor teaches this I p., q. 23, a. 5, c; q. 6 de Verit., a. 2, ad 11; lect. 1 in cap. 15 I ad Cor.; lect. 3 in cap. 9 ad Rom., where he says in terms: « The use itself of grace is from God. »

4º It is proved by reasons.

The reasons are the inconveniences which I deduced against middle knowledge and which now I summarize compendiously thus.

1° Efficacious grace per se being taken away, and efficacious grace from the event or from foreknowledge and circumstances being posited, that is, a pendulous grace abandoned to the determination of free arbitrament and expecting its consent and determination, it follows 1° that there is taken away from God the reason of first cause and first mover, because the will determines itself, not determined by God. 2° That there is taken away from him the reason of universal cause; because there is something, namely the consent and free determination of the will, which escapes his causality. 3° That the omnipotence of God be curtailed, and the supreme dominion he holds over our wills; because he cannot incline our wills into good in whatever circumstances. 4° That there be taken away, chiefly on this side, the necessity of prayer; for, in that opinion, it is not necessary to ask of God that we consent to grace, since that is from us, and not from God. 5° That we ought not give thanks to God for what is the head of the business of salvation, namely for the determination unto good, which is from us, and not from God. 6° That we ought to rest not upon the hope of grace alone, but principally upon our liberty, since it is always in our power to render it efficacious; and thence that we ought not fear so anxiously for our salvation, nor keep watch over it with such solicitude. 7° That this opinion seems akin to Semi-Pelagianism, inasmuch as it makes a composition with God, vindicates a part to man and a part to God, and — what is worse — man takes the first place, drawing forth from himself his own consent, gives to God the later: in which, according to Augustine, lay the error of the Semi-Pelagians. 8° Specially against the system of congruous grace, that in it God should be no more author of good than of evil works; because, in that system, God is said to be author of good works inasmuch as he places man in those circumstances in which he foresees he will use grace well, and concurs simultaneously with him unto the work. But he likewise places him who acts ill in those circumstances in which he foresees him about to use badly the grace offered, and concurs simultaneously with him unto the evil work. Therefore. All these things more fully expounded, with the replies of adversaries, especially Honoratus Tournely, seek in the treat. on God, dissert. VI, on Middle Knowledge, a. 6, § 1.

Add again, specially against the same system of congruous grace, that it lies subject to nearly all those difficulties which are proposed against per se efficacious grace. For he to whom congruous grace is denied and only incongruous given does no more, nor will do more, than he to whom per se efficacious grace is denied and only thomistic sufficient given, as we have observed not once in the treat. on God and in this present [work]. Whence Martinonus, a writer of the Society of Jesus, in his Anti-Jansenio, disp. 26, sect. 3, n. 25, concludes that that sentiment was uselessly devised for explaining the difficulties concerning the auxiliaries of grace. And Honoratus Tournely, q. 7 de Grat., a. 4, concl. 4, rejects it, because either it slides back into the sentiment of Molina, or is pressed by the same difficulties as the thomistic system.

2° Consult diligently the treat. on God, dissert. VIII, on Decrees, a. 2, where the first reason embraces summarily nearly everything hitherto said, with all the refuges of adversaries shut off. Thereunto we added, for coronis, that the adversaries elsewhere acknowledge our determination unto good not to be from God; which here they deny, that they may decline the odium of so many absurdities. Hold all these things here for said, lest we be compelled to repeat the same.

But one thing only must be observed, which I already observed in part § 2 on middle knowledge, namely that to the arguments whereby it is proved, in the opinion of Molinists and Congruists, that grace is subjected to the will, determined by it and its handmaid, two replies are everywhere employed by Tournely. 1° He says it is absurd that a superior be said to be subjected to an inferior, when the inferior executes the mandates of the superior. 2º He likewise pronounces it absurd that what is of itself a certain determination, inclination, impulse toward something, be said to be determined, when the will follows the determination thereof or its motion and impulse. Grace however, he says, is of itself a certain determination, inclination, propension toward good, which when the will follows, it determines not grace unto good, but rather follows its determination, and executes the mandates of God the superior. So the Sorbonic doctor.

I answer to the first. Indeed it is true that it is absurd for a superior to be said subjected to an inferior, when the inferior executes the mandates of the superior, standing there and in the moral order. But if, that the inferior execute the mandates of the superior, he stood in need in the physical order of the concourse of the superior, and the superior offered him that indifferent and determinable by himself unto whatsoever he willed, it would not be absurd, but plainly true, to say that, in this case, the superior, as to the use of his offered concourse, is subjected to the inferior. But this is our case.

To the second there must be uncovered the equivocation latent in the word grace. There is a certain grace physically premoving and determining the will to undeliberated acts. Adversaries, at least some, admit such grace not unwillingly, but of it there is no question here; for the question is concerning grace moving us to the deliberated consent of the will. Respectively therefore toward that deliberated consent it is, according to all, a moral preventing grace, alluring and moving objectively the will as to specification, in the genus of final cause, not of efficient: Tournely acknowledges no other preventing grace with the Molinists. And indeed even in their opinion this needs not to be determined as to species, but as to this it can be called a determination and impulse; it needs however to be determined as to exercise, because it posited, the will is still indifferent and undetermined whether it follow it or not: whence on this side we already have in this system grace determinable by the will. But, what is of chief moment, besides this moral grace the Molinists acknowledge another to be necessary whereby God concur physically to my deliberated consent. This concourse or grace they say is offered by God, not determined to one — otherwise, say they, liberty would be injured — but indifferent and abandoned to the determination of the will. Therefore of this concourse or grace it cannot be said that it is determination and impulse, but truly is said that it is versatile, pendulous, indifferent, determinable by the will and its handmaid; and thus, the equivocation removed, the replies of Tournely remain shut off.

3° Man, in the state of fallen nature, is exceedingly weak toward good and wholly prone to evil, seduced without by objects and examples, carried away within by passions. « When covetousness, says Cyprianus in Augustine, lib. II cont. Julian., c. 8, n. 25, together with wantonness, together with anger, together with ambition, has an encounter with us; when with carnal vices, with secular enticements there is a continual and troublesome struggle, the mind besieged, girt round on every side with the devil's inroads of man, scarcely meets them one by one, scarcely resists. » We are therefore incited unto evil from every side in such sort that, if grace fortified not the will against evil by its most potent force and converted it not unto good, but left it to itself, scarce or hardly one of a thousand would not succumb. Whence Augustine, de Corrept. et Grat., c. 12, n. 38, says: « If in so great infirmity the will of its own... were left to men themselves,... amid so many and so great temptations the will itself would succumb through its infirmity, nor would they will, or not so will through the infirmity of the will, that they could. Succor therefore was brought to the infirmity of human will, that by divine grace it be borne along indefectibly and insuperably, and hence, although weak, yet would it not fail, nor be overcome by any adversity. »

Objections.

As to the objections which are wont to be raised from a fourfold head: 1° from authority, 2º from injury to liberty, 3° from the insufficiency of the help which is called sufficient, 4° from affinity with Calvinism; you have these solved abundantly in as many §§ of the often cited dissert. VIII on Decrees, a. 2. Wherefore I judge it superfluous to renew them here afresh. See the place cited.

Only this must be observed in addition, that it is often objected by Honoratus Tournely that per se efficacious grace holds an essential connection with the act, and thence he infers that liberty is injured. But again there is an equivocation in rò essentialem. For per se efficacious grace holds not an essential connection with the act as though it necessarily bring it forth, as e.g. essence brings forth properties; but so as to have from itself the virtue of infallibly obtaining consent. Whence it can thus be distinguished: It holds connection essential, that is infallible, with the act; I concede; that is, necessary, I deny; because it moves the will not howsoever, but that it freely consent, and with the power of dissenting.

Those who admit grace per se efficacious explain its efficacy and causality not in one way alone. Five modes are more commonly circulated. Some explain it by the multitude of helps; some by moral causality; others by indeliberate acts; others by victorious delight; and finally others by physical promotion. These five modes we shall examine in the following §§, and shall establish the truth.

There are examined and rejected the three first modes.

I. — To explain the efficacy and causality of grace per se efficacious by the multitude and accumulation of helps is not to explain the thing sought, nor to touch the knot of the difficulty; for no one denies that God attracts man to himself by many helps, both extrinsic and intrinsic. But the question is, first, whence that help among these many to which the will consents is efficacious : by its own proper virtue? How is that efficacy to be explained, and wherein to be placed?

None of which does this opinion declare. For if it say that this help is efficacious by its own proper virtue, all assertors of grace per se efficacious say this; but they ask how and wherein that efficacy and virtue is to be placed : in moral motions? in indeliberate acts? in victorious delight? in physical premotion? And this the present mode does not explain. If it say that it is efficacious from the consent of the will, it now rejects grace per se efficacious and returns to the opinion of Molina, and is bound to admit the middle science, whereby God explores toward whom the will is about to consent; which middle science nevertheless the patrons of this mode do not admit.

II. — Others place the efficacy and causality of grace per se efficacious in moral helps — not indeed fallibly moving in the sense of Molina or of the Congruists, who employ the middle science, whereby God explores toward whom out of innate liberty we are about to consent — but in helps infallibly moving, or which they judge to move infallibly, and to which they attribute whatever we attribute to physically moving helps. But, since moral help moves only objectively, inviting, alluring, persuading, etc., and only under the character of final cause, however much it be posited, the will itself always remains in potency and undetermined so as to consent to it, especially a will weak, hard, and unteachable unto good, unless it be changed and determined through something received intrinsically in it. Nor say that it is changed and determined by the very consent and operation; both because it ought to be changed and determined in order to operate and consent : therefore antecedently to consent and operation; and because operation changes not the agent actively, but the patient, since operation issues from nothing except as it is in act, and suffers as it is in potency : therefore, inasmuch as the agent operates, it is not changed effectively by its own operation, for thus it would suffer inasmuch as it operates : therefore, if it is changed, it is antecedently to the operation. And by this reason also is proved that the efficacy and causality of grace per se efficacious cannot be explained by sympathy, or by the divine decree immediately, without something received intrinsically in the will, as some wish.

III. — The third mode places the efficacy and causality of grace per se efficacious in indeliberate motions, namely pious affection, which, if it be stronger than temptation, will conquer and be efficacious. So Gonzalez among our authors. But although an indeliberate pious affection helps and is the seed of a good work, nevertheless, however strong it be supposed, in order that the will infallibly follow it deliberately and consent to it, it must be determined by further grace or cooperating motion; otherwise it will remain void, not only on account of a stronger temptation, but even from the instability of the human will, or from several other causes, as often happens and as we know from experience. This opinion will be confuted further from what must be said in the following §.

§ II

Is examined and rejected the fourth mode, by victorious delight.

Not a few place the efficacy and causality of grace in victorious delight, which they call also love and charity, inspiration of love and charity; for they use these names promiscuously, and they contend that St. Augustine taught this expressly.

But they are not of one mouth nor one sense. Some fight for indeliberate delight, others for deliberate. Among the former, some maintain an indeliberate delight necessitating; but Jansenius, whose error is condemned in the third proposition out of the five famous ones. Some defend an indeliberate delight not necessitating : thus generally the Augustinian Fathers, whose opinion seems to coincide with the third of the preceding §.

That these various opinions may be understood, it must be observed that delight can be taken in a twofold manner : 1° strictly, and it is the repose of appetite in a good possessed; if the appetite be rational, it is spiritual delight; if sensitive, sensible delight. Repose is here taken privatively for cessation from every act, as in insensible things, which, while they attain their perfection, do not perceive it, and are therefore held to rest by the mere cessation of motion. But cognitive beings, while they attain their perfection and good, perceive or acknowledge it, and from that cognition is caused a certain movement of the soul complacent and resting in the good present; and this movement is delight. 2° Delight is taken in a wider sense for the affection or inclination of the will toward good as fitting and consonant with nature and reason. And taken in either sense it can be deliberate or indeliberate.

Likewise, that grace per se efficacious consist in delight can be understood either in the formal sense, namely that efficacious grace be the victorious delight itself, or in the causal sense, that efficacious grace be the cause of this delight.

That Augustine understood it in this last sense, the following things prove : Book I of De Nuptiis et Concup., c. 30, n. 33, he says : « The concomitant delight in the law of God according to the inner man comes to us from the great grace of God. » Book De Spirit. et Litt., c. 3, n. 5 : « But we say that the human will is so divinely assisted to work justice, that, besides the fact that man was created with free choice of will, and besides the doctrine by which it is prescribed to him how he ought to live, he receive the Holy Spirit, whereby there becomes in his mind that delight and love of the highest and immutable good which is God. » Book I ad Simplic., q. 2, n. 21 : « Since therefore those things delight us whereby we make progress toward God, this is inspired, and the grace of God is offered. » Therefore, according to Augustine, delight is not grace, but its effect.

Natural reason also evinces it. 1º Delight is an act of a vital power; but grace is not a vital act, otherwise it would be effected by a vital power. 2º Spiritual delight concerning supernatural good, taken in any manner whatsoever, is a good act. Therefore it is from grace. 3° While the mind is affected with delight wherewith it was before not affected, it is intrinsically changed; but an efficient cause of this change must be assigned, which can be none other than grace. These things being premised, I say 1° : Grace works not always in us delight taken strictly, nor are we inclined and drawn to good by that alone, but by various other modes.

It is proved 1° from Scripture, which sets forth fear as conducing to good. Eccli., I, 1 : He that feareth God shall do good. Jerem., XXXII, 40 : I will give my fear in their hearts, that they may not depart from me. Matth., X, 28 : Fear ye not them that kill the body, and are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him that can destroy both soul and body into hell. Psal., CXVIII, 120 : Pierce thou my flesh with thy fear; for I am afraid of thy judgments. Thus elsewhere everywhere. Whence Trent, session VI, chapter 6, enumerates the fear of divine justice among the dispositions required for justification. And canon 8 strikes with anathema those who should say that « the fear of hell, whereby we take refuge in the mercy of God, grieving for sins, or whereby we abstain from sin, is sin. » Finally, session XIV, chapter 4, resolves decretorially that attrition conceived from the fear of hell « is a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit, not indeed inhabiting, but moving, by which the penitent being helped prepares for himself a way unto justice. » Where you have plainly that fear is an effect of grace and conduces to salvation.

It is proved 2º from Augustine. Serm. 348¹ he says : « When punishment is feared which [God] threatens, is learned the love of the reward which he promises, and thus by the fear of punishment itself a good life is retained. » Book De Correp. et Grat., c. 5, n. 7 : « Thou dost not wish thy vices to be shown to thee, nor that they be smitten, and that useful grief arise, whereby thou mayest seek the physician : ... as if the fear of the corrected man, or shame, or grief did nothing at all. » Ibid., n. 8 : « These thus, those otherwise, and others otherwise, are called in diverse and innumerable ways, that they may be reformed. » And book I cont. duas epist. Pelag., c. 19, n. 37 : « He is drawn therefore in wondrous ways to will, by him who knows to work inwardly in the very hearts of men, not that men believe unwillingly — which cannot be — but that they become willing from unwilling. » Further, if we are drawn to God in wondrous, diverse, and innumerable ways : then not by delight alone.

It is proved 3° The Christian religion teaches us to follow, not the delightful, but the right and honest, however hard and bitter; or, that I may use the words of Christ, not joy, but the cross; and to love God, not because he delights, but because he is worthy. Therefore to will that men be always led to act by the motive of delight, never by reason, by duty, by honesty pure from all alluring delights, savors of the religion of Epicurus, not of Christ.

It is proved 4° by experience, whereby it stands established with us that the just often withdraw from evil and do good, with no delight soothing them, but induced either by fear of punishment, or by the sole motive of duty and of the eternal law, amid wearinesses, sadnesses, and pains, nature wholly resisting.

I say 2° : Grace per se efficacious always works delight taken in the wider sense for the affection or inclination of the will toward fitting good; because its proper effect is to incline and apply the will to good, and consequently to effect that what is more fitting be always proposed to the will. For neither does the will fear evil except from the love of the opposite good, and because it judges that fitting and good for itself, namely to flee this evil; so that love is the first-born act of the will.

Of delight therefore thus taken Augustine speaks mostly, when he says that grace is, or works, delight, which he calls also love and charity, taking charity widely for any volition of good. And this the Augustinian defenders of victorious delight seem to concede; for when Laurentius Berti, book XLV, c. 8, had objected to himself from Scripture and Trent that not delight alone, but also the fear of the Lord, is the principle of our actions, he came at length so far as to call delight « the fervor of good will, » and « inspiration of good will. »

I say 3° : Delight taken in whatever sense, whether strictly or widely, whether deliberate or indeliberate, is not that in which consists the efficacy of grace per se efficacious; because that in which the efficacy of grace consists is that whereby it obtains its effect infallibly and indefectibly. But delight in God not yet clearly seen in this life, taken in whatever sense, is not that whereby grace obtains its effect infallibly and indefectibly; since all theologians teach, with St. Thomas, that delight and love of God not yet clearly seen in this life is not indefectible and irrevocable, but can, even by subsequent potency, be conquered and destroyed by fear or by the love of created good.

You will say : How therefore is that celebrated saying of Augustine to be understood, in Epist. ad Galat. : « What delights us more, of necessity we work according to that? » — which, says Jansenius, book IV of De Grat. Chr., c. 6, deserves to be written in golden characters.

Answer. It certainly cannot be understood in the sense of Jansenius, as if it were not free for man to resist the greater delight : both because the Church condemned this sense in Jansenius himself; and because Augustine himself acknowledges that he did not always do what delighted him more : « I did not, » he says, book VIII of Conf., c. 8, n. 20, « that which with incomparable affection pleased me more. » And book LXXXIII Quaest., q. 70, he says that man could restrain, even with grief, the great delight of hunting; finally because, according to Augustine, greater and greatest was the celestial delight in Adam and the angels sinning, which however they did not follow.

Therefore, 1° granting that Augustine speaks there of indeliberate delight : it is answered that he understands a moral necessity taken for great difficulty of acting otherwise, because men are wont to do what delights them more. Yet Augustine says this not universally and absolutely, but on the hypothesis that no other motive occur. For, as we saw, he teaches that fear often draws us away from what delights more; which other motives of duty, honesty, utility, etc., can likewise accomplish. And so it is plain, even granting this sense, that the efficacy of grace does not consist in delight alone. But

2° And more truly Augustine understands these words of deliberate delight, taken for the affection and inclination toward fitting good following the free election of the will; just as if he had said : Of necessity we work what we more deliberately love, what we judge practically more fitting, what pleases more. But this necessity, as is plain, is not absolute, but hypothetical; not of the consequent, but of the consequence; not antecedent, but consequent upon our liberty. In this sense therefore the saying of Augustine is most true, that we necessarily do what delights us more, that is, what we more love after deliberation and freely choose before another; but the present question remains intact : whence has grace, which is the cause of this deliberate delight and love, that it efficiently and infallibly effect it, and fix our heart therein so firmly that no good draw us away from it? For, as we already said, delight and love of any good whatsoever, even of God, in this life, is of itself defectible and losable. We shall say, as will presently appear, that grace has this from the divine motion, which effects that the love of God be always proposed to us as more fitting, and inclines us to him efficiently and freely.

You will object : St. Augustine speaks of the delight of preventing grace, whereby it comes about that we will. Therefore he does not understand delight deliberate and following free volition. — Proof of the antecedent. Book I of De Spir. et Litt., c. 35, n. 63 : « Who knows not, » he says, « that it is not in the power of man what he knows, nor is it a consequence that what has been known to be to be desired be desired, unless it delight as much as it ought to be loved? » And book I of De div. quaest. ad Simplic., q. 2, n. 22 : « The will itself, unless something occur which delights and invites the mind, can by no manner of means be moved. But that this occur is not in the power of man. » Therefore.

Answer. I distinguish the antecedent. Augustine understands sometimes of preventing and indeliberate delight, I concede; always, I deny. In those places closely objected therefore we confess that he understands of indeliberate delight which grace produces, and which is nothing else than an indeliberate effect toward good as fitting, whereby it comes about that the will, placed in act, can freely move itself into a further deliberate act, yet through further grace moving the will thereto intervening. But it is false that Augustine, where necessitating delight is in question, understands indeliberate delight. It is plain from what has been said.

Besides, this instance again does nothing for the present question. For from this, that the will, in order that it will and love deliberately, must be preceded by delight or affection of fitting good indeliberate, it does not follow that in that delight or indeliberate affection sits the efficacy of grace, which we seek; since even that indeliberate affection is an effect of efficacious grace, and moves efficiently and infallibly to a deliberate act only through further motion or grace intervening.

§ III. — Is examined the fifth mode, by physical premotion.

Finally the Thomists commonly place the efficacy of grace in physical premotion or predetermination.

By premotion or physical predetermination they understand nothing else than the active application of a power to its act, according to its mode, namely so that it acts freely, if it be a free power, necessarily, if it be a necessary one. Further, supposing such premotion to exist, no one can deny that it is the most expeditious mode of explaining the efficacy of grace; for since it repugns that there be active application without passive, it follows that there is an infallible connection between grace applying the will to act and the will acting.

But the adversaries deny that such premotion exists, on many grounds, but chiefly from injury done to human liberty. That this exists the Thomist philosophers prove by every kind of arguments, which may be seen in their works. Lest however I dismiss the reader wholly fasting in this celebrated controversy, I will bring forward certain things for its assertion drawn from philosophy. Whence

Physical promotion is briefly asserted from St. Thomas.

The holy Doctor, q. 3 De Potentia, a. 7, whose title is : Does God operate in the operation of nature? says : « Since no thing moves or acts of itself unless it be a mover unmoved, a thing is said in a third way to be the cause of another's action, insofar as it moves it to act; in which is understood neither the collation nor the conservation of active virtue, but the application of the virtue to action : as man is the cause of the cutting of the knife from this very fact that he applies the sharpness of the knife to cutting, by moving it. And since the agent inferior by nature acts not unless moved,... it follows of necessity that God be the cause of the action of any natural thing whatsoever, as moving and applying the virtue to acting... In a fourth way one thing is the cause of another's action, as the principal agent is the cause of the instrument's action; and in this way also it must be said that God is the cause of every natural action. » Finally he concludes the article thus : « Thus therefore God is the cause of any action whatsoever, inasmuch as he gives the virtue of acting, and inasmuch as he conserves it, and inasmuch as he applies it to action, and inasmuch as by his virtue every other virtue acts. And when we have joined to these that God is his own virtue, and that he is within any thing whatever, not as part of its essence, but as holding the thing in being, it follows that he himself operates immediately in every operator, the operation of will and nature not excluded. »

Iª 2ae, q. 109, a. 1, c. : « As all bodily motions are reduced to the motion of the heavenly body, as to the first bodily mover, so all motions both bodily and spiritual are reduced to the first mover simply, which is God. And therefore, however perfect any bodily or spiritual nature be supposed, it cannot proceed into its act, unless it be moved by God. »

That this is the opinion of St. Thomas was acknowledged by the more eminent theologians of the Society.

1° The little book on the reason of studies composed in the Roman College itself, in the year 1586, by six Fathers of the Society of Jesus a-

-p pointed by the most Reverend Father General for this purpose. Such is the fifth rule : « In theology let our men follow the doctrine of St. Thomas, as is provided in the fourth part of the constitutions, chapter 14, excepting a few. » Among those few exceptions, at number 6 is read : « Second causes to be properly and univocally instruments of God, and, when they act, that God first inflows into them, or moves them. » That this book is kept in the convent of St. Thomas Aquinas at Toulouse, Father Anthony Massoulie testifies, and that he himself often read it, and transcribed with his own hand from it these things which we relate. Indeed another was afterwards published at Antwerp, wherein these things are wanting : with what mind or cause I inquire not. It suffices us that those six Fathers, the original authors, thus judged.

2° Molina himself confesses that this opinion of prime motion was handed down by St. Thomas, in the Concordia, q. 14, a. 13, disp. 26. Likewise the Jesuits of Coimbra, in book II of the Physics, chapter 7, q. 15.

Premotion is asserted by reasons drawn from St. Thomas.

The first reason is proposed thus. God is the first mover and first efficient cause, to whom all second causes and all created movers are immediately subordinated in acting and moving. But, physical premotion set aside, the primacy of cause is not saved in God, nor the subordination of second causes in acting. Therefore. — The major is a principle constant in St. Thomas, proved among all theologians and philosophers, so that he would be rash who denied it. For as certainly God is the first being, from whom all beings are immediately participated, so he is the first efficient cause, to whom all second causes are immediately subordinated and from whom they depend in acting. — Proof of the minor. The subordination of causes in acting consists in this, that the first move and apply the seconds to acting, and that the seconds act not unless moved by the first. « If there be many agents ordered, » says St. Thomas, Iª p., q. 105, a. 5, c., « the secondary agent always acts in virtue of the first agent; for the first agent moves the secondary to act. And according to this all things act in the virtue of God himself. » This also is plain, not only in natural things, but even in artificial ones : inferior workmen are and are said to be subordinated to some first workman, soldiers to a general, monks to an abbot, insofar as they act according to the moral application and determination received — workmen from the architect, soldiers from the general, monks from the abbot; so that if an inferior workman act without the moral application of the superior architect, a soldier fight without the command of his general, a monk conduct himself by his own nod and not the abbot's, by this very fact the subordination is overthrown. But the motion whereby the first mover, or first cause in the genus of efficient cause, moves and applies the second, is physical premotion; for, as we said above and as is evident per se, the motion of the mover is prior in nature and causality to the motion of the moved. Therefore.

It is confirmed. The primacy of cause in God and the subordination of second causes to him in acting cannot be saved through simultaneous concourse, nor through moral motion, nor through this, that God gave to second causes the virtue of acting. Therefore through physical premotion alone, or previous concourse. The consequence is plain from a sufficient enumeration; for nothing else assignable exists whereby the subordination of causes could be saved.

Proof of the first part of the antecedent. Not through simultaneous concourse; because simultaneous concourse moves not the second cause, inflows not into it, makes it not to act, but acts together with it, and inflows into the effect alone; otherwise it would not be simultaneous but previous, and so we should have our intent. Whence God through it is co-cause, but not first cause. Nor stands in the way that it be more perfect and worthier than the concourse of the second cause. That indeed makes and shows the cause more perfect and worthier, that is, first under the character of dignity and perfection, but not first in causing and in the genus of efficient cause, which is here in question.

You will say : Simultaneous concourse is even unto the action of the creature, and not merely unto its effect. Therefore.

Answer. I distinguish the antecedent. Simultaneous concourse is even unto the action of the creature as effect, I concede; reduplicatively as action, or as formally from the second cause, I deny. For through simultaneous concourse God moves not the second cause to act, nor makes it to act, but only acts with it; otherwise, as already said, it would not be simultaneous, but previous. But for subordination in acting it suffices not that he produce the action together with the second cause, nor that he act with it; but it is required that he move and determine it to act, and make it to act. Confer the tract on God, dissert. VI on the middle science §§ 4, 6 and 7, and dissert. VIII on the Decrees a. 1 and 2.

Proof of the second part of the antecedent. Not through moral motion; because moral motion indeed can constitute subordination in the moral order and in the genus of final cause, but not in the physical order and in the genus of efficient cause, which is here treated; for God is first mover and first cause in the physical order and in the genus of efficient cause, and not only in the genus of moral and final cause. Otherwise he would be merely first mover and first cause with respect to free agents, which alone are capable of moral motion, not of natural agents. Confer On the Decrees, place last cited.

Proof of the third part of the antecedent. Not through this, that God gave to second causes the virtue of acting : 1° because St. Thomas proscribes this opinion as erroneous, III Cont. gent., chapter 88. 2° Because Pelagius admitted it, and was condemned. 3° Because it falls back upon the opinion of Durandus, denying the immediate influx of God into the actions of creatures, which all reject. 4° Finally because it constitutes the subordination of second causes to the first not in causing, but only in being, as is plain from what has been said. Confer On the Decrees, place cited.

The second reason is proposed thus. A cause indifferent of itself and undetermined to act or not to act, to do this or that, cannot be determined to one rather than to another, except through physical premotion. But man is indifferent to act or not to act, to do this or that. Therefore. — The minor is certain; for in this indifference lies the liberty of man. — Proof of the major. A cause indifferent of itself and undetermined to this or that cannot determine itself to one rather than to another; because, since it is supposed indifferent, there is no reason why it should incline to this rather than that; nor from an indifferent cause, as such, can a determined effect proceed more than heat from cold. Nor can it be determined through simultaneous concourse; because, from the very adversaries, simultaneous concourse is offered indifferently to either alternative, and elsewhere inflows not into the cause so as to determine it, but supposes it determined. Nor through moral motions; because, as I already said, moral motions move the will only objectively and by alluring, not intrinsically, by changing it : whence, any moral motion whatever being posited, the will is still undetermined and indifferent to this or that. There remains therefore that it can be determined through physical premotion alone.

The third reason. God is the immediate and universal efficient cause of every being and of all its modes. Therefore he is the immediate physical cause of action reduplicatively as action is, and as it proceeds formally and depends upon the will; for action, under that character, and this its procession and dependence upon the will, is something in the nature of things, namely a mode of being and liberty itself in exercise, whereby we merit or demerit. But he cannot be the immediate efficient cause of action under that formality, except through physical premotion, whereby he applies the will to acting and makes it to act; for through simultaneous concourse he acts while it acts, he makes it not to act : through moral motions he is only moral cause, not efficient and physical. Confer On the Decrees, a. 2, § 4, the first answer of the adversaries.

Note. Almost everything which I have said against the middle science, for determining decrees and for grace per se efficacious, fights for physical premotion. Therefore they are to be compared.

As to the objections which are drawn from authority, from injury to liberty, from the insufficiency of help, and from affinity with Calvinism, you have them solved in the dissert. cited On the Decrees, a. 3. Those which are drawn from injury to divine sanctity are solved in the same place, § 7.

Whoever desires more, let him go to Sylvius, On the motion of the first mover; to Father Anthony Massoulie, in his work St. Thomas his own interpreter, tom. I, dissert. 1 and 2; but above all to Father Anthony Goudin, in the Metaphysics, disp. II, q. 3, who treated this matter, in my judgment, no less solidly than clearly and within the grasp of all.

I suppose as certain that the proximate final cause of habitual grace is the eternal salvation of him who has it (habitual, I say, because it is of this precisely that we inquire, and only indirectly of actual grace, insofar namely as it is a motion toward habitual grace, as toward its form and term); the remoter cause is Christ; the ultimate, God, according to that, I Cor., III, 22 and 23: All things are yours, and you are Christ's, and Christ is God's. Moreover, the material cause is the essence itself of the soul; there is no formal cause, because grace is a simple form; the instrumental cause is the humanity of Christ together with the sacraments of the Church; angels and men are ministerial causes — angels by supplying the illuminations by which we come to grace, men not only by instructing but also by administering the sacraments; finally, the principal meritorious cause is Christ, and the less principal is just man, who can merit for himself de condigno the increase of grace, and for another de congruo first grace and then the increase of this grace ¹. These things supposed,

You will ask 1° whether God alone is the principal efficient cause of grace.

I answer. affirmatively.

It is proved 1° from Scripture. Job, XIV, 4, it is said: Who can make clean him that is conceived of unclean seed? Is it not thou who alone art? Psal. LXXXIII, 12: The Lord will give grace and glory.

It is proved by reason. 1. Nothing can efficiently produce by its own power anything nobler, more perfect and of a higher order than itself; for the principal efficient cause is of greater or at least equal perfection with its effect. Yet grace is something nobler, more perfect and of a higher order than any created agent, since it is a participation of the divine nature, as was said above. Therefore.

It is confirmed. To produce grace by way of principal efficient cause belongs to him alone whose it is to deify, to give right to the inheritance, and to forgive sins. Yet this is proper to God alone: he only can deify others who is himself God by his own nature; he only can give right to an inheritance who is lord of the inheritance; he only forgives sins whom sin offends. Therefore.

You will ask 2° whether grace is created, or educed from the obediential potency of the soul.

Some hold that grace is created, some co-created, others, and more commonly, that it is educed from the potency of the soul. With these latter

I answer. Grace is not created, nor co-created, but is educed from the obediential potency of the soul.

The first part is proved. To be created is proper to a subsistent thing ². Yet grace is not a subsistent being, but an inhering accident. Therefore. — Prob. maj. To be created is a kind of becoming, and this becoming is ordered to esse, nay is esse begun: whence to become and be created properly belong to those alone to which esse belongs. Yet esse properly belongs to subsistents only, whether they are simple, as separate substances, or composite, as material substances. Ergo. — Prob. min.

³

To those properly belongs esse which has esse and subsists in its esse. Yet accidents are not called beings as if they themselves were, but because something is such by them ⁴, as whiteness is called a being on that ground only because by it the subject is white: whence an accident is more properly said of a being than a being. Ergo.

The second part is also proved, namely that grace is not co-created, and it is evident. For an inhering form is said to be co-created when it is produced by the creative action of the subject itself. Yet the action producing grace in us does not create its subject at the same time, but presupposes it, namely the soul. Ergo.

Hence the third part is proved, namely that grace is educed from the obediential potency of the soul. For creation and eduction are contradictorily opposed: creation consists in a becoming from no presupposed subject; eduction, on the contrary, is a becoming from some subject presupposed. Yet grace is neither created nor co-created, as was proved above. Ergo it is educed.

It is confirmed. To be educed is to come to be dependently upon a subject. Yet grace in its connatural becoming depends upon a subject. Ergo. — Prob. min. From that from which grace depends in its esse, it depends in its coming to be; for the reason of both is the same, if it comes to be connaturally. Yet in its esse grace depends on a subject. Ergo.

You will object: Grace is said in Scripture to be created. Psal. L, 12: Create a clean heart in me, O God. Galat., VI, 15: In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth any thing, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature, namely grace. Ephes., II, 10: We are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus in good works; which can be understood only of grace. Ergo.

I answer. that grace is said to be created quasi morally, because it presupposes no merit ⁵. But it is not created physically; for it presupposes a subject. Whence it is also expressed in Scripture more rarely by creation, but more often by generation, vivification, reformation, resurrection, and similar terms.

You will ask 3° whether some preparation or disposition on the part of man is required for grace.

I answer. 1°. As to actual grace, it is certain that no preparation is required on the part of man as preventing the divine assistance, but rather whatever preparation can exist in man is from that assistance of God moving the soul to good.

I answer. 2°. According to the common course of divine providence, there is required on the part of an adult in possession of himself a certain disposition to grace: which disposition is an act and motion of free will toward God. I said, « of an adult in possession of himself; » for it is agreed that infants do not receive grace through baptism mediated by a disposition of free will, of which they are not capable, as not either perpetual madmen.

Each part of the answer seems decided by faith by the council of Trent, sess. VI, cap. 6, in these words: « Adults however [are disposed] to justice itself, when, excited and assisted by divine grace, conceiving faith from hearing, they are freely moved toward God. » And can. 9: « If anyone shall say, that the impious is justified by faith alone, so as to understand that nothing else is required which cooperates toward obtaining the grace of justification, and that it is in no way necessary that he be prepared and disposed by the motion of his own will; let him be anathema. »

This also Sacred Scripture clearly intimates. I Reg., VII, 3: Prepare your hearts unto the Lord. Zach., I, 3: Turn ye to me, saith the Lord of hosts, and I will turn to you.

The first part is proved by reason ⁶. A perfect and complete form, giving fixed and permanent esse, according to the common course of divine providence is not introduced into a subject unless it be disposed and prepared. Yet habitual grace is a perfect and complete form, giving fixed and permanent supernatural esse. Ergo. — The minor stands. The major also is evident both in natural things and in supernatural. Thus in natural things substantial forms, whether animate or inanimate, are introduced only into disposed matter; in supernatural things, the divine essence, as intelligible form, is not united to the blessed intellect except through the light of glory disposing it.

The second part is likewise proved by reason ⁷. Grace is conferred on an adult man by God moving him. Yet God moves all things according to the mode of each; but man is by nature of free will, and therefore it is proper to him to be moved through free will. Ergo in the adult there is not made by God a motion to grace without a motion of free will.

It is confirmed. According to the common course of divine providence, a form is introduced only into a subject disposed according to its proper mode. Yet the proper mode by which a man in possession of himself disposes himself to good is through the act of free will. Ergo.

I said, « according to the common course of divine providence; » because it must not be denied that God of absolute power can confer grace on one not disposed, as on one sleeping, since in this there is nothing repugnant. But reasoning must be about commonly contingent things only, as constituting rule and law.

Note, that acts of free will moved by God concur to grace not effectively, but dispositively only. For the council of Trent, sess. VI, cap. 7, teaches this: « The causes of this justification are:... efficient, the merciful God;... instrumental, the sacrament of baptism. » And St. Thomas says, q. 28 de Veritate, ad 2: « The sacrament of penance has to confer grace by virtue of the keys, by which the penitent subjects himself. Contrition therefore, if considered in itself, has reference to grace only by way of disposition; but if considered inasmuch as it has the virtue of the keys in vow, thus it operates sacramentally in virtue of the sacrament of penance, as also in virtue of baptism, as appears in the adult who has the sacrament of baptism in vow only. From this therefore it is not had that contrition is the efficient cause of the remission of guilt, speaking per se, but the virtue of the key or baptism. » He teaches the same in IV Sent., dist. 17, q. 2, a. 5, quaestiunc. 1.

You will ask 4° whether grace is greater in one than in another.

I answer. affirmatively ⁸. That Scripture indicates everywhere.

The reason is, because it is common to every subject to receive the form more or less, according as it is more or less disposed to it. The proximate reason therefore of this inequality of grace is the inequality of dispositions on the part of man; the first and remote one is the will of God, which is author not only of grace but also of the disposition to it, dividing to each as he wills, I Cor., XII, 11, and giving to each one grace according to the measure of the donation of Christ, Ephes., IV, 7. Whence, as he bestows unequal grace, so also unequal disposition to it, unto the consummation of the saints, unto the edification of the body of Christ, as is added in the same place, that is, that out of diverse grades the beauty and perfection of the Church may arise, as also in natural things he instituted diverse grades of beings, that the universe might be perfect.

You will ask 5° whether anyone can be certain he is in grace.

I answer.⁹ Special revelation set aside, no one can be certain that he is in grace with absolute certainty, under which falsehood cannot lie, or which at least excludes all dread; but only with certainty secundum quid, moral and conjectural. This is against the Lutherans and Calvinists asserting that each Christian is bound to believe that he was justified, and that men are justified by this faith alone. It is also against certain Catholics, among whom Catharinus contends that a man can be certain he has grace with absolute certainty — indeed not immediately of faith, but through theological discourse; Vega, with moral certainty which excludes all dread, such as is certainty about the existence of the city of Rome.

The first part is proved. 1° From Holy Scripture. Eccles., IX, 1:

There are just men and wise, and their works are in the hand of God; and yet man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred. Eccli., V, 3: Be not without fear about sin forgiven. I Cor., IV, 4: I am not conscious to myself of any thing, but yet I am not hereby justified; but he that judgeth me, is the Lord. Paul says this of himself, who certainly was then just.

2° From the council of Trent, sess. VI, cap. 9: « Although it is necessary to believe that sins neither are remitted nor ever were remitted, except gratuitously by divine mercy for Christ's sake; yet must it not be said that sins are forgiven or have been forgiven to anyone who boasts of his confidence and certainty of the remission of his sins, and rests on that alone... But neither must this be asserted, that they who are truly justified ought to settle within themselves without any doubt whatever that they are justified, and that no one is absolved from sins and justified but he who believes with certainty that he is absolved and justified, and that by this faith alone absolution and justification are perfected: as if he who believes not this doubted of the promises of God and of the efficacy of the death and resurrection of Christ. For, as no pious person ought to doubt of the mercy of God, of the merit of Christ, and of the virtue and efficacy of the sacraments; so each one, while he regards himself and his own weakness and indisposition, may fear and tremble concerning his own grace, since no one can know with the certainty of faith, which cannot be subject to error, that he has obtained the grace of God. » By this decree the aforesaid errors are refuted.

3° By reason from St. Thomas. After demonstrating here q. 112, a. 3, c. that this cannot be certainly known except by revelation, if perchance it be present, he adds in what manner the same cannot be known: « In another way man knows something by himself, and this with certitude. And thus no one can know that he has grace. For certitude cannot be had of anything unless it can be judged by its proper principle; for thus certitude is had of demonstrative conclusions through indemonstrable universal principles. But no one could know that he had knowledge of any conclusion if he were ignorant of the principle. Now the principle and object of grace is God himself, who on account of his excellence is unknown to us... And therefore his presence in us and absence cannot be known with certitude, according to that, Job, IX, 11: If he shall come to me, I shall not see him; if he depart, I shall not understand. And therefore man cannot judge with certitude whether he himself has grace, according to that, I Cor., IV, 3 and 4: But neither do I judge my own self... But he that judgeth me, is the Lord. »

The second part is proved. That a man can know with certainty secundum quid, moral and conjectural, from signs and indications, that he is in grace, no one denies. What these signs and indications are the Angelic Doctor explains in the same place: « In a third way something is known conjecturally through certain signs. And in this way anyone can know that he has grace, insofar namely as he perceives himself to delight in God and to despise worldly things, and insofar as man is not conscious to himself of any mortal sin. According to which mode can be understood what is had Apocal., II, 17: To him that overcometh I will give the hidden manna,... which no man knoweth, but he that receiveth it; namely because he who receives it knows by a certain experience of sweetness, which he experiences not who does not receive it. This knowledge nevertheless is imperfect. Whence the Apostle says, I Cor., IV, 4: I am not conscious to myself of any thing, but yet I am not hereby justified; because, as is said in Psal. XVIII, 13 and 14: Who can understand sins? From secret ones, etc. »

Even the sweet disposition of divine providence persuades that, as man ought not to have all manner of certainty of his own justice, lest he be carried away into pride and presumption; so congruously he ought to have moral and conjectural certainty, lest he be tortured by perpetual disturbance of soul, but between fear and hope work out his salvation.