Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

Augustine teaches this in the passages related in the proofs. Hence innocent nature could act and persevere just as it could with the powers given to it, as a fruitful and healthy woman can beget vigorous offspring, as a strong and armed soldier can conquer a cowardly and unarmed enemy, and as a healthy man can walk and speak; although this being so, it comes about by no means without the motion of God, which our Thomists explain through physical premotion, necessary for all second agents in whatever state. But man in this state, even justified by grace, stands to good and to perseverance as a weak cause, entangled with innumerable impediments : whence it comes about that, if he were provided for only according to the usual course of things and after the manner of his own condition, no one would persevere; and therefore to all those who persevere there is granted, through God's most special help, not only motion and direction according to the usual mode, but also healing, strengthening, and directing in a most special way, and, so to speak, holding man by the hand, so that, though weak amid so many temptations, he may persevere through the power of God.

Therefore, according to these observations, the answer is easy to those things which the adversaries object from Augustine, as may be seen in my former Work.

I. Leaving aside the various acceptances of grace, here it is taken generally for whatever gift or benefit granted gratuitously, that is, out of mere benignity of God, not from justice or from our merits. Under this general acceptance of grace all natural gifts, namely nature itself and all its powers, can be called graces; for gratuitously God bestowed upon us to be, to live, to sense, to understand, to will, etc. These however, although in this wide sense they are called graces, cannot be called aids of grace, because aid supposes him who is helped and active powers which it helps.

II. Grace properly and in the common sense of Scripture and Church is taken for a gratuitous gift, whether habitual or actual, superadded to nature.

III. This grace, both habitual and actual, is of twofold order, natural namely and supernatural: natural, which moves toward good within the sphere of naturals, as if God infuse light of natural science, or move specially to cognition of natural things; supernatural, which helps by habit or motion unto those things which exceed the forces of nature, as while God infuses habit of faith or charity, or moves to the act of either. Between each this aid can still be further distinguished by another, as it were medium, which participates something of both, namely that it be natural as regards substance and supernatural as regards mode, e.g., while Christ illumined the man born blind: for the mode of working this effect was above the forces of nature, although the effect, consequently through grace, is substantially within the order of nature; for that sight was not of another kind than the sight of other men.

IV. Truly, because grace is divided against nature, grace resting precisely in natural good is less properly called grace: whence most properly is called grace either the supernatural habit infused, such as sanctifying grace and infused virtues, or the supernatural motion whereby God moves us as first mover in the order of grace to supernatural acts, or even that operation of God whereby he directs natural things to our salvation.

V. Grace taken for supernatural motion is twofold, moral and physical. Moral comes about by the showing forth of good, sometimes joined with infusion of light for perceiving it: it pertains to final cause. Physical comes about by an influx effectively and intrinsically reducing the faculty to act: it pertains to efficient cause. That God moves the will in both modes the Author teaches Iap., q. 105, a. 4, and elsewhere.

VI. Physical motion is sometimes a mere application of preexisting power and virtue, as when God moves the will of the just to act of charity. Sometimes, although it be application of power, it is nevertheless not application of virtue, because it does not preexist, but brings it with itself by way of passage, as while God moves the will of a sinner to act of attrition or contrition; since indeed that act is supernatural, and in that sinner no supernatural habit yet exists, it is necessary that that motion beginning conversion bring with it some supernatural virtue, not by way of permanent habit, but by way of transient passion.

VII. That physical motion which is a mere application of preexisting power and virtue is again twofold: one general, whereby God as first and universal mover applies faculties according to their exigency and mode to acts proportioned to them; another special, whereby God sometimes applies the mind of man to thinking or willing things which, although they do not exceed his forces, nevertheless, according to the accustomed course and disposition of the subject, man would neither think nor will them, and this both in naturals and in supernaturals.

VIII. General motion, whereby God as first and universal mover, both in order of nature and in order of grace, applies preexisting power and virtue, according to its exigency and the accustomed course of things, to acts proportioned to it, at first aspect seems not to pertain properly to special aid of grace, because it is given gratuitously, but from a certain connatural exigency: for as, collation of natural virtue supposed, there is owed to fire the motion or general concurrence premoving it to its proper act, to fire to burn, to sun to illuminate, so that without miracle it cannot be denied to it; so, although elevating virtue unto supernatural good has been given gratis to the just, that being supposed, there is owed in a certain way, according to common laws of Providence, the general motion applying it to acts proportioned to it.

Nevertheless, if we consider the matter more deeply, this general motion can and ought to be called in some true sense special aid of grace. For the understanding of this it must be observed that this general motion does not stand in the same mode in natural and voluntary agents. Natural agents have natural form whereby they are determined necessarily to one act suiting them, as fire to burn, sun to illuminate, and thus they demand general motion determining to the act proper to them. But voluntary agents have no natural form whereby they be determined necessarily to one act suiting them, but they are turnable to opposites and defectible from good connatural to them. Thus, although object of intellect be truth, of will in itself natural good, of will as instructed with infused virtues supernatural good; nevertheless intellect toward truth and will toward good whether natural or supernatural are borne flexibly and are defectible from it.

Whence, although general motion is owed to these powers whereby they sometimes attain their object, nevertheless not that they attain always and indefectibly. Therefore that this rather than that other be given to this one here and now, is from special grace.

Wherefore, if this general motion be considered respectively to nature in itself or as instructed with infused virtues, it must be called general motion, and not special gratuitous aid; because to general providence pertains moving each agent according to its mode, and since in man there is inclination, attenuated indeed and defectible, yet not wholly corrupted, toward good, there is owed to him motion whereby he be sometimes moved to good act suiting himself, and not always to evil. Whence that he be moved sometimes to good is not aid purely gratuitous, because in a certain way it is owed; nor special, because it is not from special benevolence and providence, but according to laws of common providence whereby he sometimes moves defectible natures to good of their nature, sometimes permits them to fail. Say the same of will informed by charity, in respect of supernatural good. But if this motion be considered respectively to the man to whom it is given before another, then in respect of this man it can and ought to be called special aid of grace; because, although nature, as was said, demands sometimes to be moved into good, nevertheless this man before another demands not that he be moved into good here and now rather than another. Whence that he be moved into good from which another fails and from which he himself could fail, is from special aid of grace, that is, freely conferred.

(This observation, which is open to anyone attending maturely, St. Thomas weighs and hands down, q. 24 de Veritate, a. 14, c, in these words: « Although man can do goods of this kind [namely proportionate to his nature] without grace gratum faciens, nevertheless he cannot do them without God, since nothing can issue into natural operation except by divine power; because secondary cause acts not except by power of first cause. And this is true both in natural agents and in voluntary ones. Yet this necessity stands in another mode in each. For God is cause of natural operation, inasmuch as he gives and conserves that which is principle of natural motion, as gravity in earth, which is principle of downward motion: » Although the Angelic Doctor mentions not general motion here, he nevertheless always supposes it and elsewhere expresses it.

That however this general motion does not suffice man that he act good connatural to himself, but that he needs special motion and direction, he explains thus pursuing: « But human will is not determined to any one operation, but stands indifferently toward many [that is, good and bad], and thus is after a manner in potency, unless moved through something active, either what is outwardly represented to it, as is good apprehended, or what is wrought interiorly in it, as is God himself, as Augustine says lib. de Gratia et libero Arbitrio, cap. 21, showing manifoldly God works in hearts of men. But all exterior motions [he says the same of interior ones] are moderated by divine providence according as he himself judges someone to be excited to good by these or those actions. Whence, if we wish to call grace of God not some habitual gift, but the very mercy of God, whereby he works interiorly the motion of mind and orders exterior things unto salvation of man; thus neither can man do any good without grace of God. » Therefore, according to St. Thomas, man, on account of indifference of human arbitrium, in order that he act good rather than evil, needs divine providence, which moderates motions to good according as it judges fitting, and mercy of God, whereby he works interiorly the motion of mind and orders exterior things to good. But no one can say this aid is owed to this man before another. Therefore it is gratuitous, because it is not given from merit, but from mercy. It is also special, because it is given not to all, however much in respect to nature in itself it be owed and general.

This observation is altogether necessary for untying the difficulties, otherwise most intricate, of this dissertation. For it removes ambiguities and equivocations on account of which many stumble and are deluded, and reconciles the apparently contrary opinions of Thomists, as will appear from what must be said.

I suppose as a certain principle, by which all difficulties concerning the necessity of grace must be removed, what Pope Coelestine defines, or whatever other author of the chapters attributed to him, cap. 12, namely: « From the work and favor of grace nothing at all is to be subtracted. » This principle, founded in Scripture, councils, Fathers and common sense, the Thomists explain with their Doctor ¹

thus, that God not only gave and preserves to man the virtues of acting well, but moves and applies them to act well; for in these two is contained whatsoever there is of being and good in an act.

As to the knowledge of truth, truths are of two kinds, according as they look to the order of nature or to the supernatural order.

Among natural truths some are, for the present state of union of soul with body, proportioned to our intellect, as those deduced from the senses or from principles known per se. Some surpass our capacity, either because they are impenetrable to the senses, or have no necessary connection with principles naturally known, as thoughts of hearts and future contingents, or because they are merely spiritual, as angelic substance. It is agreed that these latter cannot be known without special assistance of God, and of these there is no question, but only of the former.

Again, among natural truths some are merely speculative, which namely nowise look to practice, as: anything is or is not, the whole is greater than its part, there is no effect without cause. Some are practical, as: good is to be done, God is to be worshiped, parents are to be honored. Of natural truths of the first genus I say 1°: Man fallen can, without special grace superadded to nature, but with sole preceding general concourse — which nevertheless in some sense ought to be called special and gratuitous — know certain natural truths ² This is against certain ancients and Vasquez.

The first part is proved. Every form or virtue implanted by God in created things has efficacy with respect to some determinate act into which it can be borne according to its property. Ergo our intellect, even in the present state, having the form cognoscitive of truth, that is, intelligible light, though darkened by sin, yet not extinguished, can from itself know some truth. Add that otherwise the intellective potency, which is the most perfect of all potencies, would be the most imperfect.

The second part is proved. All motions, both corporeal and spiritual, are reduced to the first mover simply, which is God: and therefore, however perfect any corporeal or spiritual nature be posited, it cannot proceed to its act unless moved by God; which motion indeed is according to the reason of his providence, not according to the necessity of nature, as the motion of the heavenly body.

The third part is proved, namely that this motion which we call general ought in some sense to be called special and gratuitous. For since our intellect is defectible and flexible toward assenting to true and false, there is due to it, according to the laws of common providence, that it sometimes be moved to truth and not always to falsehood; and in this sense the motion is general and in a manner owed, and therefore ought not to be called grace. But that he rather be moved to truth than another who falls short of him and by whom he himself could fall short, that is not due to him, but is from special providence and benevolence; and in this sense the motion can and ought to be called motion and special grace. — By this explanation the foundation of Vasquez, sought from the indifference of our intellect to assent to true and false, is overturned.

I say 2°: Fallen man cannot, without special grace superadded, with moral potency at least, know, whether collectively or divisively, all natural truths, both speculative and speculative-practical, much less practical-practical ones.

I said 1° « with moral potency at least. » A twofold potency is distinguished, namely physical, which has of itself due proportion with the object, abstracting from impediments to attaining it; moral, which besides due proportion with the object, is not entangled or retarded by impediments so as not to pass into act.

I said 2° « speculative-practical truths, » which although they look to practice do not move to act, as are the general principles of synderesis, or the habit of the principles of things to be done, and universal propositions which pertain to moral philosophy, as: good is to be done, God is to be worshiped. Practical-practical truths move in particular to act, as: parents are to be honored here and now by such an act. On account of the acts which proceed from them, these latter truths pertain to the following articles, in which will be treated the necessity of grace for operating any good whatsoever. Here therefore must be treated only of truths merely speculative and speculative-practical.

The first part is proved, namely concerning knowledge of all natural truths collectively.

1° A weak and wounded potency cannot produce an act most excellent for a sound and whole potency. Yet to know all natural truths collectively is an act most excellent of a sound and whole intellect; but human intellect is wounded and weakened by sin. Ergo. Whence St. Thomas, IV Contra gentes, cap. 52, speaking of the spiritual punishments of original sin, says: « Among the spiritual ones is the chief weakness of reason, from which it happens that man arrives with difficulty at knowledge of truth and easily slips into error, and cannot altogether overcome bestial appetites, but is often obscured by them. » And here a. 3, ad 3: « Human nature is more corrupted through sin with regard to appetite for good than with regard to knowledge of truth. » Ergo it is corrupted also with regard to knowledge of truth, though less.

2° The intellective faculty in fallen man is entangled by many impediments, lest he be able to attain every truth taken collectively without error. The first is brevity of life, at whose beginning man is little apt for intellectual operations, and the almost infinite multitude of natural truths. Second, weakness of body and imperfection of the senses, upon which cognition depends, which are first less prompt, then are weakened by long and intense study. Third, the duties of civil life, domestic care, necessities of nature, whereby the greatest part of life is spent and the mind is drawn away from study of truth. Fourth, disorder of passions, by which reason is obscured, love of truth grows torpid and delight in contemplation.

Yet these defects must needs be compensated by superior assistance, that man may be able to obtain even knowledge of natural truths collectively. Ergo.

The second part is proved, concerning knowledge of any natural truths whatsoever divisively, by nearly the same reasons.

1° A wounded will cannot do any good moral work without special grace, as will be proved below. Ergo similarly a wounded intellect cannot know any truth without special grace.

2° There are natural truths most difficult, which cannot be understood certainly and integrally without long and intense study, for which are required a constantly upright will, burning love of truth, delight in contemplation, quiet of passions, firmness and good disposition of the senses, and leisure free from cares. Yet all these are not had in the present state, as was said in the proof of the first part. Ergo.

As to supernatural truths,

I say 1°: Fallen man, external preaching or revelation supposed, can, with sole preceding general concourse, without special grace superadded, know and embrace supernatural truths with imperfect assent, from some human motive. This is common opinion.

The first part is proved. That external revelation must be supposed and is necessary the Apostle teaches, Rom., IX, 14, saying: How shall they believe him whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? And it is evident; because we can know nothing in the present state except what falls under the senses per se or through another. Yet supernatural truth, since it has no connection with the works of nature, does not fall under the senses per se nor through another. Ergo it must be learned from another teaching.

The second part is proved, which similarly is evident. Supernatural truth, inasmuch as it stands under a human or natural motive, although it be entitatively supernatural, nevertheless formally in the character of object is not supernatural; because the object is constituted formally in the character of object through the motive or formal reason under which it is attained. Ergo, external revelation supposed, he can believe from a human motive by his own powers. And this appears in heretics, who believe by human faith certain mysteries of faith, not from the supernatural motive of divine revelation — otherwise they would believe everything — but either from their own judgment, or because they esteem such faith honorable or useful to themselves.

I say 2°: Man cannot believe supernatural truths from the motive of divine revelation without special internal grace, both on the part of the intellect and on the part of the will ³ This is against Pelagians, Semi-Pelagians and certain theologians who say that fallen man can assent by his own powers with natural assent to supernatural truths from the motive of divine revelation.

The first part is proved, namely that supernatural grace is required on the part of the intellect, 1° from Scripture. Matth., XI, 27: No one knoweth the Son but the Father; neither doth any one know the Father but the Son, and he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal him. Ibid. XVI, 17, to Peter professing his faith in Christ, Christ himself says: Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jona, because flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee, but my Father who is in heaven. Ephes., II, 8 and 9: For by grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God: not of works, that no man may glory. Ergo.

2° By reason. The act of faith whereby we assent to supernatural truths from the motive of divine revelation is supernatural. Ergo the intellect cannot elicit it unless assisted by supernatural assistance. — Prob. ant. The object of this act or assent is formally and in the character of object supernatural: for the object quod, namely truth itself, is in itself supernatural; the object quo, that is, the motive or formal reason under which it is attained, is also supernatural, namely divine revelation. Yet an object formally supernatural, qua such, cannot be attained except through supernatural act. Ergo. And hence is overturned the foundation of Molina, who says that assent of faith from the motive of divine revelation is as to substance natural, and supernatural only as to mode.

The second part is proved, namely that supernatural grace is required also on the part of the will. To believe supernatural truths from the motive of divine revelation there is required a pious motion of will which efficaciously moves the intellect to such assent. Yet the will cannot efficaciously move to a supernatural act, such as is assent to the truths of faith from the motive of divine revelation, by its own powers, without supernatural assistance. Ergo. — Prob. maj. In this natural truths differ from supernatural, that natural ones can be evident either of themselves or by reason of medium, and thus convince the intellect and extort its assent without motion, at least free, of the will; but revealed supernatural truths are evident neither of themselves nor by reason of revelation, and consequently do not convince the intellect nor obtain its assent, unless the intellect be specially moved to this assent by the will.

(That supernatural good cannot be done without supernatural help is evident from the preceding article and from the terms. For this very fact that it is supernatural, it surpasses the powers of nature; consequently it needs a help superadded to the powers of nature. The question therefore concerns the moral good of the natural order, concerning which there is a threefold difficulty to be discussed here. First: whether without justifying grace and charity any morally good work can be done? Second: whether without faith? Third: whether without special actual grace?

§ I. Whether in this state a morally good work can be done without sanctifying grace and charity?

I say: In this state a morally good work can be done without sanctifying grace and charity, and consequently not all the works of sinners are sins!

The conclusion is decided of faith against the heretics of our time ¹.

It was established 1° in the Council of Constance, session XV, against Wyclif and John Hus, whose article condemned is this: « From the principles of faith it is per se known that whatever man does in mortal sin, he sins mortally. » 2° In the Council of Trent, against Luther and Calvin, session VI, canon 7: « If anyone says that all works done before justification, by whatever reason they are done, are truly sins, or merit the hatred of God, or that the more vehemently anyone strives to dispose himself to grace, the more gravely he sins: let him be anathema. » And canon 8: « If anyone says that the fear of gehenna, through which we take refuge grieving for our sins to the mercy of God, or abstain from sinning, is itself a sin, or makes sinners worse; let him be anathema. » And session XIV on the sacrament of Penance, chapter 4, defines attrition as « not only making a man a hypocrite and more a sinner, but truly a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit, not yet indeed dwelling, but only moving, by which the penitent helped prepares a way for himself to justice... and disposes to obtain the grace of God in the sacrament of Penance. » And canon 5, under anathema it condemns him who shall have said that that contrition « ...is not true and useful sorrow, nor prepares for grace, but makes a man a hypocrite and more a sinner. » 3° By the supreme Pontiffs St. Pius V, Gregory XIII and Urban VIII, who condemned the following propositions of Michael Baius: « Everything that the sinner or servant of sin does is a sin. » It is 35. « Every love of rational creature is either a vicious cupidity by which the world is loved, which John forbids, or that laudable charity by which, diffused through the heart by the Holy Spirit, God is loved. » It is 38. « In all his acts the sinner serves dominating cupidity. » It is 40. Likewise by Clement XI, who condemned the following propositions of Quesnel: « There are only two loves, whence all our volitions and actions are born: the love of God, which does all things for God, and which God rewards, and the love with which we love ourselves and the world, which refers not to God what ought to be referred to him, and by that very fact becomes evil. » It is 44. « The love of God is not granted in the heart of sinners; it is a new judgment upon them. » It is 59. Many other propositions of the same author infected with the same error were fastened with the same condemnation.

Before all these St. Thomas went, especially q. 2 de Malo, a. 5, ad 7, where among other things he resolved authoritatively, « that it is simply false that every act which is not from a will informed by charity is demeritorious. Otherwise those who are in mortal sin would sin in every act of theirs, nor would it be counselled them that meanwhile they do whatever good they can; nor would the works done by them which are of the genus of goods dispose them to grace: all which things are false. »

It is proved by another reason. An evil principle in the agent does not infect his action unless he acts from it, just as a good principle does not dignify his action unless he acts from it. But the sinner does not always act from the evil principle of cupidity, just as the just man does not always act from the good principle of charity, as when he sins venially. Therefore.

From these you will infer that, although no medium is given between charity and cupidity with respect to the person — for man is either just or a sinner — nevertheless with respect to his action a medium is given, inasmuch as it proceeds from the good principle of nature, which is neither charity nor cupidity.

Can any morally good work be done without faith?

I say: Man without the grace of faith can do some morally good work ². Whence not all the works of infidels are sins.

It is against Jansenius, lib. III de Statu naturae lapsae, and against Baius, whose proposition 25 is this: « All the works of infidels are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices. » It was condemned by the supreme Pontiffs St. Pius V, Gregory XIII and Urban VIII.

It is proved 1° by Scripture, which exhorts infidels to good works. Thus Daniel, chapter IV, 24, addressing king Nabuchodonosor, says: My counsel be pleasing to thee, and redeem thou thy sins with alms. But Scripture does not exhort to doing evil, nor are sins redeemed by sins.

Likewise Scripture praises certain deeds of infidels and testifies that they were rewarded by God. Thus Exodi, I, 17-21, praises the kindness of the Egyptian midwives, who refused to kill the children of the Hebrews according to the iniquitous command of Pharao, for which cause, God dealt well with the midwives, and because they feared God, he built them houses, that is, granted them abundant offspring. Josue II and vi, the hospitality of Rahab the harlot, who refused to betray the men sent by Josue, is praised and rewarded. But God neither praises nor rewards sins, but punishes. Therefore.

It is proved 2° from Augustine, whose mind the holy Doctor discusses, de Spiritu et littera, chapter 27, n. 47, says: « Yet certain deeds [of infidels] we either read, or know, or hear, which according to the rule of justice we cannot not only vituperate, but even deservedly and rightly praise: although, if they be examined with what end they are done, scarcely are found such as deserve the due praise and defense of justice. » It is plain that Augustine in these words acknowledges in infidels certain good works, not only from the object, as Jansenius contends, but also with the end considered; for he who says « scarcely are found, » grants that sometimes they are found, albeit rarely. Nor does Augustine only assert this, but even proves it. « Because, he says, the image of God in the human soul is not so far worn away by the defilement of earthly defects that no last lineaments remain in it, whence it could deservedly be said that even in the very impiety of her life she does some things of the law or understands them. »

It is proved 3° by the reasoning of both holy Doctors Augustine and Thomas. He [the infidel] can do something of natural good, in which the good of nature is not fully extinguished. But the good of nature, namely the natural inclination to the good of reason, the principles of synderesis and of natural equity, or, as Augustine says, the image of God, although attenuated and obscured in infidels, is nevertheless not totally destroyed, or utterly swallowed up by consummate malice, as in demons. Therefore.

It is confirmed 1°. A faithful just man, still on the way, not yet confirmed in good, does not always act from the dominant habit of faith and justice, but sometimes sins in lighter matters. Therefore likewise the infidel, still on the way, not yet confirmed in evil, does not always act from the dominant habit of infidelity, but can at times do well in lighter matters. — The consequence is evident; because thus stands the will of the infidel toward evil, as the will of the faithful just man toward good.

It is confirmed 2°. Every sin merits punishment, and thereby man becomes worse. But the infidel who honors his parents from natural piety, or pays his debts from natural equity, does not merit punishment, nor thereby become worse. Therefore.

§ III. Whether fallen man can do some moral good of the natural order without special actual grace?

I say: Fallen man, with the sole general concourse, without any other superadded help of grace, can do some morally good work of the natural order ³. This general concourse however can and ought to be called in some sense a special help of grace.

The first part is proved ⁴. Human nature is not totally corrupted by sin, so as to be deprived of the whole good of nature. Therefore it can, by the virtue remaining to its nature, under the general concourse of God, easily do some morally good work; just as a sick man can by himself have some motion, but cannot be moved perfectly unless healed.

The second part is proved and explained. According to what I said art. 1 of this dissert., n. 8, this concourse or motion of God general can be considered in two ways: 1° respectively to nature in itself; 2° respectively to this or that individual of this nature, to whom it is given before another.

Considered respectively to nature in itself, it ought not to be called a special nor gratuitous help, but general, whereby God moves each one according to its mode. For since the good of reason in nature is not totally corrupted, nor is the will confirmed in evil, as in demons, but only attenuated and convertible to good and evil, it does not require the common influx whereby it is always moved to evil, but sometimes to good conformable to reason. And therefore that it is sometimes moved to good is not a merely gratuitous help, because it is in a manner owed; nor special, because it is not from a special grace and providence, but according to the laws of common providence, which sometimes moves natures defectible and convertible to good and evil to the good of their nature, sometimes permits them to fail.

But considered respectively to the individual to whom it is given before another, it ought to be called a special and gratuitous help; because, although it be owed to nature that it be sometimes moved to good, yet that this man be moved here and now to good before another is not owed to him rather than to the other who is permitted to fail, just as he himself could fail. Whence it is to him gratuitous, because not owed, and special, because from a special benevolence and providence.

This distinction being posited, the discord of the Thomists in this part is reconciled, which can be only about a name.

Likewise various texts of Scripture, of councils, of the holy Fathers, especially apparently contrary ones of St. Thomas, are reconciled, so that it would be superfluous to expound them. And thence we have that it was truly said by councils and Fathers, singularly by Augustine, that whatsoever good things are done, whether by infidels, or by the faithful, or by sinners, or by the just, as great as small, as supernatural as natural, are gifts of God, and are to be referred to his special and gratuitous help; consequently necessity of prayer and thanksgiving has place in all these, and of all can be truly said with the Apostle, I Cor., IV, 7: Who distinguisheth thee? And what hast thou that thou hast not received?

You will ask why this proposition of Baius, n. 27, was condemned: « Free will without the help of the grace of God avails only to sin, » while this other one: « No one has of himself except sin and lying, » was asserted by the second Council of Orange, canon 22, since both seem to have the same meaning.

I answer. I deny that both propositions have the same meaning; for the proposition of the council extends more widely than the proposition of Baius. The sense of the proposition of the council is, that no one has of himself, evidently thus, that in no way has he received from God, not even as first mover, except sin and lying. And this is true; for man is said to have of himself that which is so proper to him and has from himself, that in no way has he from God; and therefore this title was prefixed to the cited canon: « Of those things which are proper to men. » Thus however man has only sin, which is so much from man, but not from God. But the proposition of Baius extends less widely, especially in the sense of Baius, not only because by the name of grace simply and properly so called he understands supernatural grace given through Christ, but especially because Baius by grace understood sanctifying grace. The sense therefore of the Baian proposition is: Free will without grace properly so called, yea without sanctifying grace, avails only to sin. Which is false, as we have seen.

The question is not of natural innate love, which is like a natural weight toward the good proper to each, nor of elicited necessary love, such as is found even in brutes, nor of free inefficacious love, which is only complacence in the goodness of God, not bringing forward means to please God, nor removing impediments of sins; but of free and amicable efficacious natural love: and this is twofold, effective and affective. Love efficacious affectively only is a simple act of the will whereby man refers himself and all things to God as last end, with the resolve of pleasing him in all things and removing all things that displease him; which is to love God above all things appreciatively. Love efficacious effectively is not a single act, but the execution of the said resolve, or actual observance of the natural commandments: if of all, it is called effective simply; if of some only, effective secundum quid.

I say 1°: Fallen man cannot by the sole forces of nature, without repairing grace, love God above all things with affective efficacious love ¹.

It is proved ². A faculty infirm, corrupted and curved toward its own good contrary to the divine, cannot exercise toward God the most excellent act of a sound faculty unless healed. But the will of fallen man is infirm and curved toward its own good contrary to the divine; and to love God above all things with efficacious affective love is the most excellent act of a sound faculty; for it contains virtually the fulfillment of the whole natural law, and makes the will right concerning every appetible thing. Therefore.

I say 2°: Fallen man cannot without repairing grace love God with efficacious effective love, that is, fulfill the whole natural law as to substance ³.

It is proved from the principles laid down. 1° A sick man cannot of himself perform the most excellent work of a sound man unless healed. But to fulfill the whole natural law is the most excellent work of a sound man. Therefore.

2° The will averted from the end cannot be right concerning all the means; for the order of means depends upon the order to the end. But the will of sinful man is averted from the end, namely from God as natural author. Therefore.

3° There are certain precepts which fallen man cannot keep without grace, as the first and greatest commandment of the love of God above all things, as is evident from the preceding conclusion: likewise the confession of faith amid the most atrocious torments.

I say 3°: Fallen man, existing in mortal sin, without a special grace of God superadded, cannot long avoid all mortal sins against the natural law, nor overcome all temptations ⁴.

The Author seems to have held the opposite in II Sentent., dist. 28, q. 1, a. 2, c. Some interpret him of physical power; but, the text attentively inspected, it is said more truly with others that he retracted himself here in his Summa, which, as being his last work, is to be followed.

The conclusion follows from the preceding conclusion; because, as was said, fallen man cannot without grace observe all precepts. Therefore neither avoid all mortal sins; for mortal sin is nothing else than transgression of a precept. But moreover besides.

It is proved ⁵. That man may long avoid all mortal sins and overcome all temptations, he ought to have his heart converted to the last end, namely God, and adhering to him so firmly that he wills to be separated from him for no good to be obtained, or evil to be avoided. But man existing in sin not only has not his heart firmly adhering to God, but is averted from him, and converted to changeable good as to an end. Therefore.

I say 4°: The just man with the ordinary helps of grace, without special privilege, can avoid each venial sin; he cannot however long avoid all ⁶.

The first part is certain ⁷; because, if man could not avoid each venial sin without special privilege, which is neither given nor offered, those sins would not have the account of voluntary, nor of sin, or man would be bound to the impossible.

The second part is proved from the Council of Trent, sess. VI, can. 23: « If anyone says that a man once justified... can throughout the whole life avoid all sins, even venial ones, except by a special privilege of God, as the Church holds concerning the Blessed Virgin: let him be anathema. »

It is proved ⁸ 2°. Although sanctifying grace heals man as to the mind, there remains nevertheless the corruption of the sensitive appetite, whence disordinate motions against reason very frequently arise. But reason, although it can repress individual motions (whence they have, as was said, the account of sin and voluntary), cannot nevertheless repress all, because while it strives to resist one, very often another arises; nor can reason be always vigilant to avoid and curb motions of this kind. Therefore.

If therefore any venial sin whatever be considered severally and in itself, man can avoid it with the ordinary helps of grace; and when thus they occur to be avoided, of them thus to be avoided the precept is given. But, if one after another be considered, and so continued long, and at the same time there be attended to, on the one side, the force, multitude and frequency of temptations, on the other side, the infirmity of the natural powers which are wearied by continual combat, it cannot be done, morally speaking, but that man fail in some indeterminate matter; for this continuation imports the greatest difficulty, to overcome which there is required a most special grace whereby the instability of free choice is confirmed, the infirmity healed, the fatigue refreshed and the distaste mitigated. And because this impotence regards no determinate sin, but something indeterminate and in confusion, it is said that man can avoid all things divisively, that is, each one considered in itself and separately, not all collectively, that is, one after another, continuing unto the last. From these the arguments from reason are solved.

You will say: If man cannot avoid all venial sins without a special privilege, which God is not prepared to give, then he is necessitated to commit some. Therefore, committing it, he does not sin; for no one sins in what he cannot avoid, as Augustine says, lib. III de Lib. arbit., c. 18, n. 50 ⁹.

I answer. I distinguish the first consequent. Therefore to the commission of some venial sin vaguely and indeterminately he is necessitated — I concede; to some particular and determinate one — I deny. Whence likewise I deny the second consequent. For that sin be imputed to man, it suffices that he can avoid each one determinately in itself and as it offers itself here and now, although he be necessitated to some vague and indeterminate one, or, as it is commonly said, although he cannot avoid all collectively. Thus Christ said, Matth., XVIII, 7: It is necessary that scandals come; but, because this necessity is vague, nor affects anyone determinately, deservedly is blamed he who gives scandal ¹⁰.

You will insist 1°: God commands to avoid all venial sins. Therefore man can avoid all.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent. God commands all venial sins to be avoided by a precept indistinct from the precepts of individuals — I concede; by a distinct precept — I deny. For since all do not occur together, nor are all avoided except by avoiding individuals, in vain would the precept of avoiding all be employed, distinct from the precepts of avoiding individuals.

You will ask whether and to whom has been granted a special privilege of immunity from every sin, even venial.

I answer. Certainly it was granted to Blessed Mary the Virgin, and more probably to no other.

The first part is proved 1° from the Council of Trent cited above, where, after it was defined « that a man once justified cannot throughout the whole life avoid all sins, even venial ones, except by a special privilege of God, » there is added: « As the Church holds concerning the Blessed Virgin. » Therefore.

2° From Augustine lib. de Natura et Gratia, chapter 36, n. 42, saying: « Excepting the holy Virgin Mary, concerning whom, on account of the honor of the Lord, I will have no question whatsoever raised when sin is treated of. »

3° By reason. Sin, even venial, arises from the fomes of sin born of original sin. But, since Blessed Mary the Virgin was preserved immune from original sin in her very conception, in her the fomes of sin was altogether extinguished. Therefore.

The second part is at least urged. 1° Because without sufficient foundation no one ought to be excepted from the general rule of Sacred Scripture affirming in many places that there is no man who does not sin. But we have no foundation, neither in the Fathers, nor in councils, nor in Sacred Scripture, for excepting anyone from this general rule, besides the Blessed Virgin. Therefore.

2° Augustine, answering Pelagius asserting that several men and women whom he named had been altogether without sin, among whom he counted Joseph the spouse of Mary, after the words just cited adds: « This Virgin therefore excepted, if we could gather together all those holy men and women while they lived here and interrogate them whether they were without sin, what think we they would have answered? Whether this which he [Pelagius] says, or that which John the apostle? I ask you, of whatsoever excellence of sanctity they were in this body, if this could have been asked, would they not with one voice have cried out, I. Ioann., I, 8: If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us? Or would they perhaps have answered that more humbly than more truly? But this [which he says] now pleases him [Pelagius], and rightly pleases, « to place the praise of humility in part, not falsity. » Therefore, if they said this truly, they would have sin; which because they confessed humbly, truth would be in them. But if they lied about this, nevertheless they would have sin, because truth would not be in them. » Since indeed nothing has been defined concerning this or that saint, e.g., concerning John the Baptist or Joseph spouse of the Blessed Virgin, negatively or affirmatively, as to total immunity from sin, the same Doctor, lib. de Spiritu et littera, after again expounding his opinion, proceeds: « Nay, even if there is no one, or was, or will be, who is perfected in such purity — which rather I believe — and yet that there is, or was, or will be such a one is defended and thought, as far as I can judge, not much error, nor perniciously is anyone deceived with a certain benevolence: provided that he who thinks this, think not himself to be such, unless he has truly and clearly perceived himself to be such. »)

The Pelagians, denying original sin, said that man could by his own powers do good works by which he would merit first grace. The Semi-Pelagians, admitting original sin, said that by his own powers he could do, if not a good work, at least the beginning of a good work, at whose sight, as it were out of occasion, God would confer first grace. Louis Molina, in the Concordia, disp. 10, teaches that God will never deny grace to one who makes good use of his natural faculty, not indeed by merit of the natural work, but by reason of a pact entered into between God and Christ, that to him who does what in him lies from the powers of nature, grace should infallibly be given. Against whom:

I say : Fallen man can do nothing whatever that disposes him in any way to grace, whether actual or habitual, unless he be prevented by the aid of actual grace¹.

It is proved 1° from Scripture. Prov., VIII, it is said : The will is prepared by the Lord² ; which Augustine everywhere urges against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians. To the Apostle asking, Rom., XI, 35 et 36 : Who hath first given to him, and recompense shall be made him? For of him, and by him, and in him are all things, man could answer, according to the opposite opinion: « I have first given him my endeavor and disposition, which is from me, and not from him. » Likewise to him asking, I Cor., IV, 7 : Who distinguisheth thee? he could answer: « My endeavor and my disposition. » What hast thou that thou hast not received? he would say: « My endeavor and my disposition. »

It is proved 2° from the second council of Orange, in which, canons 3, 4, 5, and several following ones, up to 25, the Semi-Pelagians are condemned, who said that the beginning of faith and of the good work is from us, and that at its sight God confers grace, not as being merit of grace, but only disposition, or a condi-

³

tion, or, as Cassianus says, Collatione III, chapter 14, an occasion: « For God, he says, is present, upon an occasion only offered by us of good will, to bestow all these things. »

Concil. Trid., session VI, chapter 6 : « They are disposed, he says, unto justice itself, when, excited and assisted by divine grace, receiving faith from hearing, they are freely moved toward God. »

It is proved 3° from Augustine. The Holy Doctor everywhere urges against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians the following principles: First, which is also that of all the other Fathers, that in the business of salvation nothing whatsoever is to be withheld from the graciousness of grace; something however would be withheld if the disposition to grace were not from grace. Second, that the Church prays God, not only that he assist the willing and trying, but also that from unwilling he make them willing. Third, that the least preparation for grace is a good thought, which man cannot have without preventing grace, according to that, II Cor., II, 5 : We are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves, and many others which it would take long to recount. But no one does not know how sharply the Holy Doctor assailed everywhere the Semi-Pelagians, contending that the beginning of the good work is from us, and that at its sight God confers grace upon us.

It is proved 4º by the authority and reasons of St. Thomas. 1° The Holy Doctor, Quodlib. I, a. 7, c., says: « To the Pelagian error belongs the saying that man can prepare himself for grace without the help of divine grace. » And it is against the Apostle, who says, Philipp., I, 6 : He who hath begun a good work in you, he himself will perfect it. And he proves this by two reasons. 2° Super cap. x ad Rom., lect. 3 : « This very thing, that some do what in them lies, converting themselves namely to God, is from God moving their hearts toward good. Thren., V, 21 : Convert us, O Lord, to thee, and we shall be converted. » He teaches the same in book III Contra gentes, chapter 149, and often elsewhere.

[Lib. III Contra gentes, chapter 149, the Angelic Doctor says: « Not for this is divine aid given us, because we are advanced toward it through good works, but rather therefore do we profit through good works because we are prevented by divine aid... Therefore he is prevented by divine aid unto working well, more than divine aid is prevented by him, as though meriting it, or preparing himself for it. » Which he proves by five reasons.]

The Holy Doctor proves this constant doctrine, in the places assigned, by more than ten reasons. One or two I set down here.

He has the first in the present q. 109, a. 3, ad 1. The principle and end of any effect must be so proportioned that they be of the same order; for according to the order of agents is the order of ends. But the end of the disposition to grace is supernatural, namely the proximate end is grace itself, the remote end God himself, to whom as supernatural author grace is ordered. Therefore.

The second is drawn from q. 112, a. 3 cit. Every disposition, both remote and proximate, must have a certain proportion with the form to which it disposes: otherwise how would it dispose to it? But acts merely natural have no proportion with supernatural grace. Therefore. — It is confirmed. Every disposition approximates the subject to the form to which it disposes, and in a certain way demands it. But natural acts do not approximate the soul to grace, nor demand it at all, since it is of an order superexceeding all the powers of nature. Therefore.

From these things you will gather that the sense of this ancient and common axiom: « To him who does what in him lies, God does not deny grace, » is not that, to him doing what in him lies from natural powers God does not deny grace by reason of the pact entered into between God and Christ, so that to him making good use of his natural faculty God would infallibly confer grace, as Molina contrived. For this sense the arguments hitherto made impugn: since indeed, in that system, the morally good work would be a disposition to grace, if not of itself, at least from the enacted law, and from it would have some proportion and some right to the aids of grace. Add to these the following:

1° The Council of Orange II, canon 6, condemns him who shall say that « mercy is conferred on believers, willing, desiring, without the grace of God. » It would however be conferred, the aforesaid pact supposed.

2° I ask what that good work of nature is, to which that law annexed grace. Is it observance of the whole law? But we have proved that it cannot be rendered without grace. Is it observance of some precepts? But, as Augustine proves in book I de Peccat. merit., c. 22, and experience shows, among unbelievers and sinners there are those who observe many precepts of the law, and there are less evil men, more modest, temperate, merciful, whom nevertheless grace passes over, while it converts the most criminal.

3° According to Augustine, the judgment of God why he draws one and draws not another is inscrutable. But, the said law supposed, this would not be inscrutable, but the reason could easily be rendered, namely because this one does what in him lies from his own powers, not that one.

4º It repugns that Christ merited that a law be made by the Father by which the reason of grace is destroyed, such as that law would be. For it posited, grace is given from works, and thus is not grace; it is prevented by free will, whereas free will ought to be prevented; and prior parts are given to man, posterior to God: things which subvert the whole system of grace defended by Augustine.

5° In this hypothesis run the inconveniences of which above, namely: man would have that whereby he might distinguish himself, in which he might glory, and which he had not received in ordine to salvation, namely this good work of nature, which by the enacted law would conduce to salvation, and to which grace would infallibly be present.

6° Finally this pact has no foundation, neither in Scripture, nor in councils, nor in the Fathers. Therefore it is plainly fictitious. Whence the Clerus Gallicanus, in the year 1700, in its general assemblies condemned it as « a fabrication rash and erroneous, put forth not only with Scripture and the tradition of the Holy Fathers silent, but even opposed. »

Wherefore this axiom cannot be understood otherwise than St. Thomas understands it, namely that to him doing what in him lies from grace, God does not deny further grace.

[You will ask 1º how that defined thing against the Pelagians is to be understood: « Grace is not given according to merits. »

I answer. it is to be understood thus, that no grace of good work pertaining to salvation is given on account of any merit, whether de condigno or de congruo, which we may have from our powers without the grace of God. Nevertheless it must be said, that some grace is given according to our merits which are from grace. Thus to the just, according to merit strictly taken, is given the augmentation of grace and glory. Likewise every grace, after the first actual one to which the will cooperated, is given according to our merit at least de congruo, yet it does not cease to be grace, because in its root it is always gratuitous. And hence true is what Augustine says, Enarrat. in Psal. IXX, n. 15: « When the reward shall come, [God] will crown his own gifts, not your merits. » Again in Psal. cu, n. 7: « Therefore he crowns thee [God], because he crowns his own gifts, not thy merits. » And elsewhere.

You will ask 2º whether man can rise from sin without grace. I answer. negatively⁴. It is defined matter of faith. Conc. Arausicanum II says, canon 14: « No wretch is freed from whatever misery, except he who is prevented by the mercy of God. » And canon 19: « Since human nature cannot guard without the grace of God the health which it received, how without the grace of God shall it repair what it lost ? »

It is proved by reason⁵. To rise from sin is not merely to cease from the act of sinning, as the adversaries will, but it is for man to be repaired to those things which he lost by sinning, consequently to be freed from the evils which he incurred through sin. But man cannot without grace be freed from the evils and detriments which he incurs through sin. Therefore.

Moreover it must be observed, that there is some imperfect vivification, or inchoation of vivification, to which

⁶

although habitual grace is not required, actual nevertheless is required, namely that by which the sinner, before he obtains remission of sin and receives sanctifying grace, grieves for sins on account of God, begins to love him and aspires to reconciliation with him; of which imperfect resurrection that to the Ephes., V, 14 can be understood: « Rise thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall enlighten thee. » Whence deservedly was condemned this proposition of Baius, n. 64: « That distinction of twofold vivification, of the one by which the sinner is vivified while there is breathed into him by the grace of God the purpose and inchoation of penance and new life, of the other by which he is vivified who is truly justified and made a living branch in the vine Christ, is fictitious and in no wise consonant with the Scriptures. »]

In conformity with what we resolved above concerning morally good acts, the present question concerning supernatural acts must be resolved, proportion being preserved. Hence :

I say : To justified man, besides habitual grace and the infused virtues annexed to it, there is necessary, for each act of piety, the general motion of God as supernatural author¹ ; and this motion suffices for certain acts, yet it must be called special and gratuitous in some sense. But that justified man may persevere long in them, there is required a special grace superadded².

The first part is proved from the general principle of the Author³. However perfect any corporeal or spiritual nature be supposed to be, it cannot proceed into its own act unless it is moved by God, as a second mover moved by the first. Therefore, just as the natural powers, namely the will and the intellect, even as informed by the acquired virtues, which give the power to perform morally good acts, need to be applied and moved by the general motion of God as natural author in order actually to perform them; so the same powers, as informed by grace and the infused virtues, which give the power to perform good supernatural acts, need the general motion of God as supernatural author in order actually to perform them.

The second part is proved. Sanctifying grace and the infused virtues annexed to it stand to supernatural actions as nature and the natural powers stand to natural actions. But nature, even corrupted, can perform some good moral work with only the general concurrence of the order of nature, without a special grace superadded, as is clear from art. 2, § 4, of this dissertation. Therefore sanctifying grace and the infused virtues, by its aid, can perform some good supernatural work with only the general supernatural assistance.

The third part is clear from what was said in a. 1 and 3, § 4.

For although the general concurrence of the supernatural order toward some supernatural good is due to a nature informed by grace and the infused virtues, as the general concurrence of the natural order toward some natural good is due to nature considered in itself, because indeed God, according to the common laws of providence, moves each thing according to its own mode and its own disposition; nevertheless, since nature, even as elevated by grace and the supernatural virtues, is borne toward the good variably and can defect from it (for it is not, as I suppose, confirmed in good), hence it comes about that, although there is due to a nature so elevated the general motion by which at times it elicits acts proportioned to itself, it is not however due so that it elicits them always and indefectibly. Therefore that this motion be given to this individual here and now, and not to another, is from special grace.

The fourth part is proved⁴ ; because, on account of the infection of the flesh, as to the flesh, and of ignorance, as to the intellect, which remain in justified man, as was said, it is most difficult for him amid continuous conflicts and temptations, and in such great obscurity, to persevere long in supernatural good, unless he is strengthened and helped by a special grace superadded to the powers he already possesses.

And thus it is drawn from the Council of Arausic. II, can. 10, in which it is thus defined: « The help of God is ever to be implored by those reborn and sanctified, that they may come to a good end, or be able to persevere in good work. » Wherein for both perseverances, the final and the long-lasting, special grace is required. Likewise Trid., sess. VI, can. 22, speaking of perseverance indefinitely, decrees thus: « If anyone shall say that a justified man can persevere in the justice received either without the special help of God, or cannot with it, let him be anathema. »

We do not treat here of perseverance taken for the virtue or habit inclining to choose and propose to persevere, nor of the very proposal of persevering, but of the actual exercise itself of perseverance in good until the end of life, whether that perseverance be of long duration, as usually happens in adults, or brief, as happens in little ones dying immediately after baptism.

I say : For final perseverance, whether long-lasting, or brief and most brief, a special assist is required¹.

It is proved 1° from the councils cited in the preceding article, the Arausican and Tridentine.

2º From the authority of Augustine, who throughout the book de Dono perseverantiae defends this truth against the Semi-Pelagians.

3° He who perseveres even for the briefest time until the end of life has truly and properly the gift of perseverance.

²

But the gift of perseverance, according to the definitions of the councils and Fathers, is from special grace. Therefore. — The minor is evident from the councils cited. Likewise from the same council of Trent, session VI, canon 16, and from Augustine, de Dono perseverant., c. 2, n. 4, by whom perseverance is called « a great gift of God. » And chapter 17, n. 41: « See, he says, how alien it is from truth to deny that perseverance unto the end of this life is a gift of God, since he himself gives an end to this life when he wills; and if he gives it before an imminent fall, he will make man persevere unto the end. But more marvelous and more evident to the faithful is the generosity of the goodness of God, that this grace is given even to little ones... »

4° The conjunction of grace with death is the proper effect of a special providence, namely of predestination; for it belongs to the predestined alone, and to no one else. Therefore it is had through a special assist.

You will ask 1° in what does this special assist consist?

I answer. This assist does not consist in something indivisible, nor is it given in the same manner to all, but includes several things both intrinsic and extrinsic. For since the gift of final perseverance formally consists in the conjunction of grace with the end of life from an efficacious intention of glory imperated, God procures this by singular providence in various ways: some he hastens toward death, lest they fall; others he prolongs in life, that they may repent; others he withdraws from dangers and temptations, or tempers them: all which pertain to extrinsic assists; others, placed in dangers and temptations, he strengthens in their powers, that they may conquer and stand insuperably and unswervingly in good until the end; and these pertain to intrinsic assists.

[You will ask 2º whether the gift of final perseverance is the same as the gift of confirmation in grace.

I answer. Negatively; because the gift of confirmation in grace gives not being able to sin, either mortally or venially, according to the mode which is given. To the gift of final perseverance, the power of sinning remaining, it gives only not to sin mortally until death: hence it is common to all the predestined, who do not all receive the gift of confirmation in grace.]