Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

I say : It was simply possible for God to create man in the state of pure nature, namely without sin and without grace and the gift of integrity, subject to death, ignorance and concupiscence.

The whole conclusion is against Jansenius and his followers; in part against Estius, Herrera and certain other theologians, who admit indeed that God could have created man without sanctifying grace and without the gift of immortality, but not without the gift of integrity which excludes concupiscence.

It is proved 1° from Augustine, who in book III de Lib. arbit., chapter 20, disputing against the Manichees, who admitted two principles, one good, the other evil, and blamed this latter on account of the ignorance and difficulty of living well arising from the concupiscence we suffer, says in chapter 21 that, even if God were to create man subject to ignorance and concupiscence, or to difficulty in doing good, he would not therefore be to be blamed, but rather from this man would have reason to give thanks to his Creator: « For, he says in the aforesaid chapter 20, n. 56, not only is the soul, which by nature precedes every body, no mean good, but also that it has the faculty, with its Creator aiding, of cultivating itself, and can by pious effort acquire and take possession of all the virtues, through which it is freed both from tormenting difficulty and from blinding ignorance. But if this is so, ignorance and difficulty will not be to souls at their birth the punishment of sin, but an admonition to progress and the beginning of perfection. »

He repeats the same, now grown old, book I Retract., c. 9, and near death confirms it again in the book de Dono perseu., c. 11. Whence it is manifest that he never retracted this, as some pretend.

It is proved 2° from St. Thomas, in II Sentent., dist. 31, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3, where he says: « God could have from the beginning, when he created man, formed also another man out of the slime of the earth, whom he would leave in the condition of his nature, so that namely he would be mortal and passible, and feeling in his reason the combat of concupiscence: in which nothing would be derogated from human nature, because this follows from the principles of nature. Yet this defect would have had in him no character of fault or punishment, because this defect would not have been caused by will. »

It is proved 3° by reason. The state of pure nature involves no repugnance, neither on the part of man nor on the part of God. Therefore it is simply possible.

The first part of the antecedent is proved. 1° Neither sanctifying grace nor the gift of integrity are due to human nature considered in itself, but are merely gratuitous and conferred from God's liberality alone. Therefore the state of pure nature involves no repugnance with respect to those gifts on the part of man. — The antecedent is proved. First, as to grace properly so called and supernatural, it is evident both from the very name: for if it were owed, it would no longer be grace; and if of the supernatural order, then above the whole order and debt of nature; and also because by grace man becomes the adopted son of God, Galat., IV, 6, 28; but it belongs to the nature of adoption that he who is adopted be son and heir not by nature nor by any right, but by the liberal will of the adopter. As to the gift of integrity, it is proved: It is not a debt of nature considered in itself, that gift by which it would be exempted from the defects consequent upon the principles of nature itself; but rather it is more due that it be left subject to them, as is evident in the power of sinning, of which presently. But ignorance, concupiscence, passibility, mortality follow from the principles of human nature, as St. Thomas teaches, IV Contra gentes, c. 52, and as we said above in the exposition of the state of pure nature.

It is proved 2° by the same first part of the first antecedent. Man created in pure natural state would have all things that belong to him naturally, or from intrinsic principles, both in physical being and in moral being. Therefore the state of pure nature involves no repugnance on the part of man. — The antecedent is proved. In the physical order, man is constituted of body and rational soul with its properties and powers, both spiritual and sensitive; in the moral order, he requires to have free will, to know his end and the means proportioned to it, and by those means to be able to attain the end. But all these things he would have in the state of pure nature. And indeed concerning the intrinsic constituting principles and natural properties, and free will, no one denies. Of the rest it is proved. The proximate end of man, in the state of pure nature, would be honest good; his last end, God as author of nature; the means for attaining that end, morally good acts through the assists of the natural order. All these things, since they do not transcend nature, he would know, nor would the foresaid assists fail him, whereby, through morally good acts, he could attain this his last end. Therefore.

Thus the first part of the first antecedent being proved, the second part flows spontaneously, namely that the state of pure nature involves no repugnance on the part of God. For if supernatural grace, the gift of integrity and immortality are not owed to human nature, God could deny these gifts to it without injury to his justice, goodness and wisdom, just as he denied, and de facto denied, to innocent Adam the gift of impeccability. Likewise, if man, in the state of pure nature, had all things that belong to him according to his intrinsic principles, both in physical being and in moral being, the order of divine justice is preserved, rendering indeed to each what is owed him by the right of his creation; the order of divine wisdom and goodness is preserved, disposing and ordering all things to their ends. Therefore.

It is proved 4° from the conclusion by several propositions condemned in Baius. The first: « The sublimation and exaltation of human nature into the fellowship of the divine nature was due to the integrity of the first condition, and therefore must be called natural, not supernatural. » This is 21. — The second: « The integrity of the first creation was not an undue exaltation of human nature, but its natural condition. » This is 26. — See besides 55, 78 and 79^[1. Add this one of Quesnel condemned by Clement XI: « The grace of Adam is a sequel of creation, and was due to nature sound and whole. » It is 35.

You will ask by what power God could create man in the state of pure nature: extraordinary, or ordinary?

I answer. That the solution of the question depends upon the diverse acceptation of ordinary and extraordinary power. Therefore

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Some understand ordinary power as that by which God produces only effects proportioned to the nature of things and naturally owed to them; extraordinary power, that by which he produces miraculous effects beyond the strength and exigence of nature. According to this understanding it must be said that the state of pure nature was possible by the ordinary power of God; because in it all things are supposed to be connatural, and nothing miraculous, as we explained.

Others understand extraordinary power as that by which God can do many things which nevertheless he decreed not to do, and which consequently do not fall under the order of present providence, that is, the order which he himself established in leading things to the ends which he set before himself. They call ordinary power that by which God executes what he decreed to do; and thus St. Thomas seems to think, 1ª p., q. [25?] : « This is said of God that he can do it by ordinary power. » « But that which is attributed to divine power according as it executes the command of a just will, this is said of God that he can do by ordinary power. » According to this understanding, it must be said that God could not create man in the state of pure nature by ordinary power, but by extraordinary only; because, supposing the order which God established in things, namely the elevation of rational creature to a supernatural end from singular benevolence, this state does not fall under present providence, but remained in its possibility: provided however that in this opinion it be wholly conceded that God could fully and without any prejudice to his attributes have established another order of things, and according to that have created man in the state of pure nature.

Therefore, according to the diverse assigned acceptation of ordinary and extraordinary power, it is truly said that the state of pure nature was and was not possible by ordinary power. And thus are reconciled the contrary opinions of the Thomists.

From these things maturely weighed and well understood, you will meet many testimonies of Augustine by which the holy Doctor seems to intimate that the rational creature cannot without its own fault lack supernatural gifts; for these testimonies must be understood according to the present state and order of things, not according to another which God could have instituted.

Obj. : It is repugnant that man be created subject to concupiscence. Therefore. — The antecedent is proved. Augustine labors perpetually to prove, against Julian, that concupiscence is not a natural property and perfection of man, but an evil opposed to his nature; and against him he urges everywhere that of I John, II, 16: The concupiscence of the flesh... is not of the Father, and the Apostle, who to the Romans, VII, 8, 20, calls concupiscence sin. Therefore.

For the solution of this and several other objections on the part of concupiscence, it must be observed that concupiscence can be taken two ways, either in act first, for the concupiscible power itself, or in act second, for the motion of that power toward sensible good. Moreover each again can be considered two ways: 1° simply and in itself, or materially, inasmuch as it is precisely an inclination to sensible good; 2° formally and with something added, insofar as it is an inclination to sensible good together with disorder and repugnance to right reason. Taken in the former way, it is a natural faculty and legitimate inclination to good proportioned to the body, and it is from God and by his intention in the creation of man. Taken in the latter way, it is a vicious inclination, which is properly called concupiscence and lust. It is not from God, nor by his intention, but a defect following upon the nature of man by reason of matter and subject, like passibility, mortality and other natural defects. For since man, as we already observed, consists of a twofold appetite, namely sensitive and rational, and each is borne toward its object, the sensitive to sensible good, the rational to honest good, and the sensitive is subjected to the rational not despotically but only politically, it often happens that sensible good desired is contrary to reason, and that the sensitive appetite, from a certain temperament of body, is borne more ardently toward its object. Hence arises the combat between them, which on the part of the sensitive appetite is lust and vicious concupiscence. These things premised,

I answer. I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I deny the consequence. For from this that concupiscence is evil, it follows that it is not from God positively and by his intention, but it does not follow that it is not a defect consequent upon the nature of man, from the condition of matter, apart from God's intention. Thus sin is an evil far worse than concupiscence, and yet man is created subject to sin, because the power of sinning is a defect consequent upon the nature of man from the condition of matter, since namely he is made from nothing.

Rightly therefore does Augustine rebuke Pelagius, who not only praised the substance of the sensitive faculty, but its petulance, whereby it broke forth into disorderly motions, provided only that reason did not consent outside marriage; for in this consent alone he placed its excess, which he condemned. Moreover he said that concupiscence itself and lust, which he dared not name, was good in genus and species, from vital fire, from generative heat, from carnal motion, from delight; and he praised it as a good of nature, though the lowest, and as a gift of the Creator. Even the disorderly motions themselves he called good and laudable little sparks of nature, indicating indeed the defect of nature, but rather its vigor. From this he inferred that the first man, whom he acknowledged created upright, was created by God with that unbridled concupiscence such as now exists. But that Augustine might refute these most shameless encomia of lust, he proves by many arguments that concupiscence is not a gift of the Creator, nor a perfection of the soul, but a defect and an evil; not indeed moral, or sin, but because, as the holy Doctor says, it disturbs the offices of reason, calls away the mind from the delight of wisdom and the will from the operation of justice.

You will ask 1° : Augustine against Julian said thus that concupiscence is evil, as asserting that it is the punishment of sin, and from it he proved original sin; which argument would have fallen, if concupiscence were a natural defect. Therefore.

I answer. Augustine speaks of concupiscence in the present state, in which man had been created upright, as Julian confessed

Julian; in which hypothesis Augustine well proves that the evil and unbridled concupiscence which now prevails presupposes sin, whose punishment and chastisement it is, since the uprightness in which man had been created would not have tolerated it.