Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II
Charles René Billuart (1685–1757)
Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae. Tomus II.
First published 1884
Charles-René Billuart, O.P.'s Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae, Tomus II, treats human acts, passions and virtues, sin, law, and grace in the Thomistic manual tradition. Schola presents the complete Latin Tome II from the Paris Vives edition of 1884.
Tractatus I: De actibus humanis
Dissertatio I: De voluntario et involuntario
Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit voluntarium?
Articulus II: Utrum omissio et effectus ex ea secutus sint voluntaria sine praecepto ponendi actum qui omittitur?
Articulus III: Utrum violentia causet involuntarium?
Articulus IV: Utrum metus causet involuntarium?
Articulus V: Utrum concupiscentia causet involuntarium?
Articulus VI: Utrum ignorantia causet involuntarium?
Dissertatio II: De voluntario libero, sive de libertate creata
Articulus I: Praenotanda
Articulus II: Utrum in homine lapso sit libertas arbitrii seu indifferentiae?
Articulus III: Utrum ad merendum vel demerendum, in hoc statu naturae lapsae, requiratur libertas a necessitate, seu libertas indifferentiae?
Dissertatio III: De actibus humanis speciatim sumptis
Articulus I: Utrum voluntas possit velle malum sub ratione mali?
Articulus II: De motivo voluntatis quoad specificationem
Articulus III: De motivo voluntatis quoad exercitium
Articulus IV: De modo quo movetur voluntas : an libere, an necessario?
Articulus V: De actibus elicitis a voluntate
Articulus VI: De actibus imperatis.** D. Thomas, q. 17
Dissertatio IV: De actibus humanis in esse moris
Articulus I: In quo consistat moralitas in communi actuum humanorum ?
Articulus II: De principiis moralitatis
Articulus III: De concursu multiplicis moralitatis simul in eodem actu
Articulus IV: Utrum dentur actus indifferentes?
Articulus V: Utrum et quomodo voluntas humana, ut sit bona, debeat conformari voluntati divinae?
Articulus VI: Utrum actus exterior addat bonitatem vel malitiam actui interiori?
Articulus VII: Utrum eventus sequens addat ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus exterioris?
Dissertatio V: De conscientia
Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit conscientia?
Articulus II: An et quomodo teneamur conformari conscientiae erranti?
Articulus III: Cujus speciei et gravitatis sit peccatum agere contra conscientiam?
Articulus IV: Quomodo se gerere debeat confessarius cum poenitente quem deprehendit laborare conscientia erronea?
Articulus V: De conscientia scrupulosa, per varias quaestiunculas
Articulus VI: Utrum liceat agere cum conscientia dubia, probabili, aut probabiliori?
Dissertatio VI: De opinionum probabilitate et delectu
Articulus I: Utrum sit licitum sequi opinionem minus probabilem et minus tutam, in concursu probabilioris et tutioris?
Articulus II: Utrum in conflictu duarum opinionum aeque probabilium, de honestate objectiva actus, liceat sequi minus tutam faventem libertati, relicta tutiori favente legi ?
Articulus III: Utrum liceat sequi opinionem probabiliorem minus tutam in concursu minus probabilis tutioris, ubi agitur de sola honestate objectiva actus?
Articulus IV: Varia quaestiunculae circa praesentem materiam breviter resolvuntur
Dissertatio VII: De probabilismo moderato
Articulus I: De natura probabilitatis
Articulus II: Quaenam systemata prodierint circa probabilitatem in practicis?
Articulus III: An liceat sequi opinionem vere et solide probabilem faventem libertati, relicta tutiore aeque probabili, vel etiam probabiliori, ubi de sola liceitate actionis agitur?
Articulus IV: De usu probabilitatis et de regulis specialibus quibus conscientia in dubiis practice formatur
Articulus V: Utrum liceat sequi opinionem probabilem, aut etiam probabiliorem, relicta tutiore, cum adest obligatio certa finem determinatum obtinendi?
Articulus VI: De probabilismo compensativo
Tractatus II: De passionibus et virtutibus
Dissertatio I: De passionibus
Articulus I: De passionibus in particulari
Dissertatio II: De virtutibus
Articulus I: Quid sit virtus, et quotuplicis generis?
Articulus II: De subjecto virtutum
Articulus III: De causa virtutum
Articulus IV: De proprietatibus virtutum
Tractatus III: De peccatis
Dissertatio I: De natura peccati
Articulus I: Quid sit peccatum?
Articulus II: Utrum formale constitutivum peccati commissionis consistat in positivo, an in privativo?
Articulus III: De peccato omissionis
Dissertatio II: De distinctione specifica et numerica peccatorum
Articulus I: Varia peccati divisiones
Articulus II: Unde petatur distinctio specifica peccatorum?
Articulus III: Utrum peccata commissionis et omissionis specie distinguantur?
Articulus IV: Unde petatur distinctio numerica peccatorum?
Dissertatio III: De comparatione peccatorum ad invicem
Articulus I: Utrum omnia peccata sint inter se connexa et paria ?
Articulus II: Unde sumatur inaequalitas peccatorum ?
Dissertatio IV: De subjecto peccati
Articulus I: Quodnam sit peccati subjectum ?
Articulus II: Utrum peccatum saltem veniale possit esse in et a solo appetitu sensitivo, absque omni actuali influxu voluntatis; omnesque motus sensualitatis sint peccata?
Dissertatio V: De causis peccatorum
Articulus I: An et quae ignorantia sit causa peccati, eaque ipsa sit peccatum?
Articulus II: Utrum possit dari ignorantia invincibilis juris divini positivi?
Articulus III: Utrum dari possit ignorantia invincibilis juris naturae?
Articulus IV: Utrum ignorantia invincibilis juris naturae excuset a peccato?
Articulus V: De inadvertentia ad peccatum
Articulus VI: Utrum ignorantia excuset a poenis per leges positivas statutis?
Articulus VII: Utrum Deus sit causa peccati?
Dissertatio VI: De peccato originali
Articulus I: Utrum sit peccatum originale ab Adamo ad posteros transmissum?
Articulus II: Variae quaestiones circa traductionem peccati originalis breviter resolvuntur
Articulus III: Utrum beatissima Virgo Maria peccatum originale in sua Conceptione contraxerit ?
Articulus IV: Utrum S. Thomas negaverit beatam Virginem Deiparam fuisse a peccato originali immunem?
Articulus V: In quo sita sit essentia peccati originalis ?
Dissertatio VII: De effectibus peccati
Articulus I: Utrum ex peccato actuali remaneat in anima macula seu peccatum habituale, et quid sit ?
Articulus II: De reatu poenae
Articulus III: Qualis poenae reatum inducit peccatum?
Articulus IV: DE POENA DEBITA PECCATO ORIGINALI
Dissertatio VIII: De peccato mortali et veniali
Articulus I: Utrum detur peccatum veniale ex natura sua distinctum a mortali ?
Articulus II: In quo et quomodo peccatum mortale et veniale inter se differunt ?
Articulus III: Utrum veniale disponat ad mortale, possitque fieri mortale, et e contra mortale fieri veniale ?
Articulus IV: Quis sit finis ultimus tam peccantis mortaliter quam venialiter?
Articulus V: Utrum peccatum mortale in ratione offensae sit gravitatis simpliciter infinitae?
Articulus VI: Utrum homo in primo instanti morali usus rationis teneatur se convertere ad Deum, possitque esse peccatum veniale cum solo originali?
Tractatus IV: De legibus
Dissertatio I: De lege in communi
Articulus I: Quid sit lex?
Articulus II: Utrum promulgatio sit essentia legis?
Articulus III: Quinam possunt ferre leges?
Dissertatio II: De lege aeterna et naturali
Articulus I: De lege aeterna
Articulus II: De lege naturali
Articulus III: Utrum lex naturalis pati possit dispensationem ?
Dissertatio III: De lege humana
Articulus I: De quidditate, necessitate, qualitatibus et divisionibus legis humanae
Articulus II: Qualis legis humanae promulgatio requiratur ut obliget?
Articulus III: Utrum lex pendeat ab acceptatione populi?
Dissertatio IV: De potestate legis humanae
Articulus I: Utrum lex humana possit praecipere aut prohibere actus internos?
Articulus II: Quomodo debeat poni opus praeceptum, ut legi satisfat?
Articulus III: Utrum leges humanae obligent in conscientia?
Articulus IV: De lege poenali
Articulus V: Quandonam leges humanae obligant sub peccato mortali?
Articulus VI: Quaedam aliae quaestiunculae circa obligationem legum humanarum breviter resolvuntur
Articulus VII: Quinam subjiciantur legibus humanis?
Dissertatio V: De mutatione legum
Articulus I: De mutatione legum per abrogationem et cessationem finis
Articulus II: De consuetudine
Articulus III: De dispensatione
Articulus IV: De interpretatione legum
Articulus V: (APPENDIX) — De privilegiis
Tractatus V: De gratia
Dissertatio I: Praeambula de variis erroribus circa gratiam
St. Thomas, I<sup>a</sup> II<sup>ae</sup>, from q. 109 to q. 114.
[Concerning grace there have come forth errors extremely opposed. Some denied grace, lest they injure liberty. Others rejected free will, that they might establish grace.
Pelagius, a Briton by nation, whether Englishman, or Scotsman, or Irishman, about the year 405 began to spread his errors, of which he had the more celebrated patrons and assertors Coelestius, whose fatherland is unknown, and Julian, by fatherland and episcopate an Eclanensian.
The Pelagians said at first that man has from God only possibility or faculty of good, but from himself alone the use or will and action of this possibility. Nevertheless, pressed by the arguments of Catholics, beyond free will, external law and doctrine, they seem afterwards to have admitted something of interior grace, not only illuminating the intellect, but also adding firmness to the will: and this help they affirmed to be not absolutely necessary, but useful only for operating good, nor gratuitously conferred, but owed to the merits of nature. But upon three principal errors the Pelagians pertinaciously adhered. The first is, that no sin was handed down from Adam unto posterity, but that the first parent harmed us only by his own example, and therefore our nature was nowise vitiated, nor consequently is grace necessary, but it is conferred upon those living well only that they may worship God more easily and more perfectly; yet baptism is profitably conferred on infants, not that they be cleansed from sin, but that the grace bestowed thereon make them heirs of the heavenly kingdom. The second error, flowing thence, is that grace is given us according to our merits. The third is, that men, using well their free will, arrive at such perfection as to be able to avoid every sin, even original, without grace. Unto these errors are reduced others, namely: concupiscence is not evil, because it is a property of nature; the miseries of this life are not penalties of original sin; Adam, even if he had not sinned, would have died just the same; little ones dying without baptism enjoy a certain beatitude, not however that which is proper to the heavenly kingdom, and the same must be said of adult infidels who observed the natural law. All know that concerning actual grace of good will and action necessary for each act of piety, gratuitously conferred and not from the merits of nature, there was a long and bitter contest between Augustine and the Pelagians.
The Socinians, under Faustus Socinus the Sienese leader, born in the year 1539, agree entirely with the Pelagians; following whose footsteps the rationalists have fallen into the same errors. In the system of these men, the man of paradise was nothing but a primitive type of ideal perfection, unto which the posterity of him are summoned to refer themselves, to which is added another type far more excellent in Christ Jesus. For man, by a natural principle of perfectibility, can always proceed further in attaining perfection, so that he can not only refer himself to the type, but even surpass it. The same profess that there is given no supernatural state from which man has fallen, or unto which he ought be recalled: whence man needs no grace, either to avoid evil, or to pursue good.
The Semi-Pelagians, among whom the most celebrated was Joannes Cassianus, were thus called because, departing from Pelagius in some things, in others they adhered to him. They admitted original sin and the necessity of grace for working eternal salvation.
They denied however that predestination, whether to grace or to glory, is gratuitous, but taught that God predestined from eternity unto grace those whom he foresaw would consent to him and use it well, and unto glory those whom he foreknew would persevere in grace of themselves. Hence they denied the necessity of grace, both unto the beginning of salvation, which they placed in the affection of credulity [belief], in petition or desire of salvation, or even in the very consent bestowed to grace offered; both unto perseverance, unto which they asserted grace not required, because it lies in our power. For the beginning of salvation and perseverance, in their sentiment, coincide in this, that when we first begin to consent to God, it is the beginning of salvation, while truly remaining in the consent bestowed even unto the end, it is perseverance. And although they often contradicted themselves, and at one time spoke as Catholics, at another as Pelagians, yet this seems to have been the final station of this heresy, namely that to consent to grace or dissent is so ours that in those who consent the consent is not from the grace of God, but from themselves; and thus they withdrew from grace the beginning of salvation and perseverance and ascribed them to free will.
On the contrary indeed the innovators of the sixteenth century, Luther especially and Calvin, saying that the integrity and supernatural state of the first parent was an essential part of human nature, taught the following: 1° By original sin human nature was so vitiated in its essential part that it retained nothing sound and integral. 2° Man lost free will, so that he was destitute of every act and power, whether in intellect or in will, not only for pious motions, but for eliciting works morally honest themselves. 3° These works done without grace are so many vices and sins. 4° Grace compels man to act, so that it infers upon the human will an ineluctable necessity. Whence, according to that doctrine, man holds himself passively under grace, and does nothing toward assenting to or cooperating with that same grace. With all these things Calvin prepared for himself the way unto his chief dogma, namely that God predestined and reprobated men independently of their foreseen merits and demerits, both in execution and in intention. Predes-