Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

St. Thomas, I^a II^ae, from q. 109 to q. 114.

[Concerning grace there have come forth errors extremely opposed. Some denied grace, lest they injure liberty. Others rejected free will, that they might establish grace.

Pelagius, a Briton by nation, whether Englishman, or Scotsman, or Irishman, about the year 405 began to spread his errors, of which he had the more celebrated patrons and assertors Coelestius, whose fatherland is unknown, and Julian, by fatherland and episcopate an Eclanensian.

The Pelagians said at first that man has from God only possibility or faculty of good, but from himself alone the use or will and action of this possibility. Nevertheless, pressed by the arguments of Catholics, beyond free will, external law and doctrine, they seem afterwards to have admitted something of interior grace, not only illuminating the intellect, but also adding firmness to the will: and this help they affirmed to be not absolutely necessary, but useful only for operating good, nor gratuitously conferred, but owed to the merits of nature. But upon three principal errors the Pelagians pertinaciously adhered. The first is, that no sin was handed down from Adam unto posterity, but that the first parent harmed us only by his own example, and therefore our nature was nowise vitiated, nor consequently is grace necessary, but it is conferred upon those living well only that they may worship God more easily and more perfectly; yet baptism is profitably conferred on infants, not that they be cleansed from sin, but that the grace bestowed thereon make them heirs of the heavenly kingdom. The second error, flowing thence, is that grace is given us according to our merits. The third is, that men, using well their free will, arrive at such perfection as to be able to avoid every sin, even original, without grace. Unto these errors are reduced others, namely: concupiscence is not evil, because it is a property of nature; the miseries of this life are not penalties of original sin; Adam, even if he had not sinned, would have died just the same; little ones dying without baptism enjoy a certain beatitude, not however that which is proper to the heavenly kingdom, and the same must be said of adult infidels who observed the natural law. All know that concerning actual grace of good will and action necessary for each act of piety, gratuitously conferred and not from the merits of nature, there was a long and bitter contest between Augustine and the Pelagians.

The Socinians, under Faustus Socinus the Sienese leader, born in the year 1539, agree entirely with the Pelagians; following whose footsteps the rationalists have fallen into the same errors. In the system of these men, the man of paradise was nothing but a primitive type of ideal perfection, unto which the posterity of him are summoned to refer themselves, to which is added another type far more excellent in Christ Jesus. For man, by a natural principle of perfectibility, can always proceed further in attaining perfection, so that he can not only refer himself to the type, but even surpass it. The same profess that there is given no supernatural state from which man has fallen, or unto which he ought be recalled: whence man needs no grace, either to avoid evil, or to pursue good.

The Semi-Pelagians, among whom the most celebrated was Joannes Cassianus, were thus called because, departing from Pelagius in some things, in others they adhered to him. They admitted original sin and the necessity of grace for working eternal salvation.

They denied however that predestination, whether to grace or to glory, is gratuitous, but taught that God predestined from eternity unto grace those whom he foresaw would consent to him and use it well, and unto glory those whom he foreknew would persevere in grace of themselves. Hence they denied the necessity of grace, both unto the beginning of salvation, which they placed in the affection of credulity [belief], in petition or desire of salvation, or even in the very consent bestowed to grace offered; both unto perseverance, unto which they asserted grace not required, because it lies in our power. For the beginning of salvation and perseverance, in their sentiment, coincide in this, that when we first begin to consent to God, it is the beginning of salvation, while truly remaining in the consent bestowed even unto the end, it is perseverance. And although they often contradicted themselves, and at one time spoke as Catholics, at another as Pelagians, yet this seems to have been the final station of this heresy, namely that to consent to grace or dissent is so ours that in those who consent the consent is not from the grace of God, but from themselves; and thus they withdrew from grace the beginning of salvation and perseverance and ascribed them to free will.

On the contrary indeed the innovators of the sixteenth century, Luther especially and Calvin, saying that the integrity and supernatural state of the first parent was an essential part of human nature, taught the following: 1° By original sin human nature was so vitiated in its essential part that it retained nothing sound and integral. 2° Man lost free will, so that he was destitute of every act and power, whether in intellect or in will, not only for pious motions, but for eliciting works morally honest themselves. 3° These works done without grace are so many vices and sins. 4° Grace compels man to act, so that it infers upon the human will an ineluctable necessity. Whence, according to that doctrine, man holds himself passively under grace, and does nothing toward assenting to or cooperating with that same grace. With all these things Calvin prepared for himself the way unto his chief dogma, namely that God predestined and reprobated men independently of their foreseen merits and demerits, both in execution and in intention. Predes-

A fivefold distinction is made of the states of human nature: the first, the state of pure nature; the second, the state of integral nature; the third, of original justice; the fourth, of fallen nature; the fifth, of repaired nature. There might be added the state of glory and the state of damnation, but there is no question of these here, because we are now considering nature only insofar as it tends, by divine assistance, to its ultimate end. Therefore this dissertation I prefix to the treatise on Grace, because the explanation of those states contributes not a little to the knowledge of the necessity, diversity, and properties of grace, and grave difficulties are moved about them.

The state of pure nature implies precisely nature with its intrinsically constituting principles, and those things which follow from them or are owed to it. Hence:

1° Man created in a state of pure nature would be without sin, without sanctifying grace, without infused virtues and without the assists of grace of the supernatural order; because these are not owed to him from his intrinsic principles.

2° He would be subject to hunger, to tormenting thirst, to labor, to diseases, to altering passions and to death; because since the body, which is the material part of nature, is composed of contraries, which continually fight among themselves, these things follow from its intrinsic principles.

3° He would be subject to ignorance and concupiscence. To ignorance, because since the intellect is born by nature to acquire from the senses knowledge of intelligibles, it can easily deviate from the truth on account of phantasms. To concupiscence, because although the sensitive appetite is naturally subject to reason, yet it is not subject despotically, as the foot or hand is subject to the will, but only politically, as a citizen to the Prince, a wife to her husband; and thus it could rebel. ¹

4° The last end, or objective beatitude of man in this state would be God as natural Author, insofar as by our mode of conceiving he is distinguished from himself as supernatural Author. Formal beatitude would be perfect conjunction with him, knowing him abstractively or through his effects, and sweetly and constantly adhering to him through love.

5° To obtain this end by the observance of all the natural precepts and victory over rebellious concupiscence, there would be given in that state the assists of the natural order, sufficient to all, efficacious for some. Nor would even efficacious assists derogate from this state; for although they would not be owed to every individual of this nature, they would nevertheless be due to the species of nature, and God owes them to his providence, lest he should have created nature in vain for some end if no individual of it were to attain this end: just as to nature elevated to a supernatural end are owed the assists of the supernatural order, sufficient in all its individuals, efficacious in some predestined to this end.

The state of integral nature consists in perfect subjection of the body to the soul and of the sensitive appetite to reason; consequently it imports immunity from ignorance, concupiscence, death, and passions altering nature. Because nature is said to be integral while between its parts there is no division or defection from its perfection, while inferiors are perfectly subjected to superiors; consequently, while the body is perfectly contained under the power of the soul, so that by no alteration or corruption does it fall short of its dominion, and the sensitive appetite holds nothing repugnant to reason. But if only one or other of these subjections existed, either of the body alone to the soul, or of the sensitive appetite alone to reason, the state of integral nature would not be perfect, but its perfection only partial.

2° In that integrity of nature Adam was created: and this integrity arose in him from sanctifying grace; because, as we said from SS. Augustine and Thomas, treating of original sin, so long as the superior reason was subject to God — which subjection was held through sanctifying grace — the body was perfectly subject to the soul and the sensitive appetite to reason; yet it was distinguished from that original grace, because they were of different order; for integrity is a form perfecting nature in the natural order, not elevating it to the supernatural order, nor constituting man adopted son of God, partaker of the divine nature and heir of the heavenly kingdom : all which sanctifying grace bestowed. Whence nothing stood in the way but that God could have created man in the state of integral nature without justice or original grace; yet because these two states were united in Adam, they are often confounded by the Fathers and theologians.

§ III. — The state of original justice.

This most happy state, which by antonomasia is called the state of innocence, St. Thomas elegantly describes, Opusc. II, c. 185, and he constitutes it in the perfect subjection of reason to God, of the sensitive appetite to reason, and of the body to the soul: which two latter followed from the first, as has been said. ¹

Hence it follows 1° that Adam, who, as theologians now commonly hold, as has been said, was created in that state, or at least, according to some, was constituted immediately after creation, had all the infused virtues, both theological and moral, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, because all these follow sanctifying grace as its properties or appurtenances.

It follows 2° that he was immune from hunger and tormenting thirst, from sadness and pains, from the alterative passions, from disease, death and concupiscence, namely from the gift of integrity following upon original justice, as has been said.

It follows 3° that in him there was the fullness of knowledge of natural and supernatural things, as much as the dignity and office of teacher and ruler of posterity required; for Adam was constituted head of the human race, not only as regards grace, but also as regards instruction and governance. Which reason not running for posterity, these would neither be born, as he himself was created, in perfect age, nor have this fullness of knowledge, but would easily acquire it.

You will ask whether this sanctifying grace of the state of innocent nature was of the same rationale and species with the sanctifying grace of this state of fallen nature.

I answer. That it was the same in species as regards substance, because the formal effect of both graces is the same, namely to constitute man pleasing to God, his adopted son, friend and heir of the heavenly kingdom; but the rationale of the form is discerned from its formal effect, since it is itself the very form communicated. It was, however, diverse as regards the mode of communicating itself to the subject, because the grace of original justice communicated to man more secondary effects, as we have explained, which now it does not communicate.

Concerning the state of fallen nature I have said many things when treating of original sin, namely that human nature was stripped by the sin of Adam of sanctifying grace, of the virtues annexed to it and of the gift of integrity, impassibility, immortality and exemption from ignorance and concupiscence; nor was it stripped only of those gratuitous gifts, but was wounded also in its naturals, and that its wounds are four, namely ignorance in the intellect, malice in the will, concupiscence in the concupiscible appetite, infirmity in the irascible. Concerning which again below.

This state is called in the Scriptures redemption and liberation, namely from the captivity of the devil and of sin; it is called resurrection and vivification, healing, reconciliation and renovation. Which expressions suppose a general ruin of human nature. This state agrees with the state of innocence in this, that both tend to the same term, namely supernatural beatitude, and that in both sanctifying grace is the principle of merit, the same as regards substance, as we have said.

But they differ by several other titles. 1° The end of the state of innocence was the manifestation of divine liberality ; but the state of repaired nature, the manifestation of mercy. 2° God was the efficient cause immediately of the state of innocence, mediately through Christ of the state of repaired nature. 3° The subject of the state of innocent nature was innocent nature, having indeed no right to the gratuitous gifts of that state, but having nothing repugnant to them ; but the subject of repaired nature is nature infected by sin, unworthy of whatever grace. Whence in the former state [nature] was only to be adorned with gratuitous gifts ; in the other first healed, then adorned. 4° The grace of the state of innocence conferred the gift of integrity, which the grace of repaired nature does not confer.

Around these states, therefore, there occur three most grave difficulties agitated in the schools with great contention : the first, whether the state of pure nature is possible ; the second, whether man in the state of fallen nature has lesser powers unto good than he would have had in the state of pure nature ; the third, whether man in the state of innocence needed efficacious grace, or grace whereby, to do good and persevere in it. These three questions we shall discuss in the three following articles. Wherefore let there be

I say : It was simply possible for God to create man in the state of pure nature, namely without sin and without grace and the gift of integrity, subject to death, ignorance and concupiscence.

The whole conclusion is against Jansenius and his followers; in part against Estius, Herrera and certain other theologians, who admit indeed that God could have created man without sanctifying grace and without the gift of immortality, but not without the gift of integrity which excludes concupiscence.

It is proved 1° from Augustine, who in book III de Lib. arbit., chapter 20, disputing against the Manichees, who admitted two principles, one good, the other evil, and blamed this latter on account of the ignorance and difficulty of living well arising from the concupiscence we suffer, says in chapter 21 that, even if God were to create man subject to ignorance and concupiscence, or to difficulty in doing good, he would not therefore be to be blamed, but rather from this man would have reason to give thanks to his Creator: « For, he says in the aforesaid chapter 20, n. 56, not only is the soul, which by nature precedes every body, no mean good, but also that it has the faculty, with its Creator aiding, of cultivating itself, and can by pious effort acquire and take possession of all the virtues, through which it is freed both from tormenting difficulty and from blinding ignorance. But if this is so, ignorance and difficulty will not be to souls at their birth the punishment of sin, but an admonition to progress and the beginning of perfection. »

He repeats the same, now grown old, book I Retract., c. 9, and near death confirms it again in the book de Dono perseu., c. 11. Whence it is manifest that he never retracted this, as some pretend.

It is proved 2° from St. Thomas, in II Sentent., dist. 31, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3, where he says: « God could have from the beginning, when he created man, formed also another man out of the slime of the earth, whom he would leave in the condition of his nature, so that namely he would be mortal and passible, and feeling in his reason the combat of concupiscence: in which nothing would be derogated from human nature, because this follows from the principles of nature. Yet this defect would have had in him no character of fault or punishment, because this defect would not have been caused by will. »

It is proved 3° by reason. The state of pure nature involves no repugnance, neither on the part of man nor on the part of God. Therefore it is simply possible.

The first part of the antecedent is proved. 1° Neither sanctifying grace nor the gift of integrity are due to human nature considered in itself, but are merely gratuitous and conferred from God's liberality alone. Therefore the state of pure nature involves no repugnance with respect to those gifts on the part of man. — The antecedent is proved. First, as to grace properly so called and supernatural, it is evident both from the very name: for if it were owed, it would no longer be grace; and if of the supernatural order, then above the whole order and debt of nature; and also because by grace man becomes the adopted son of God, Galat., IV, 6, 28; but it belongs to the nature of adoption that he who is adopted be son and heir not by nature nor by any right, but by the liberal will of the adopter. As to the gift of integrity, it is proved: It is not a debt of nature considered in itself, that gift by which it would be exempted from the defects consequent upon the principles of nature itself; but rather it is more due that it be left subject to them, as is evident in the power of sinning, of which presently. But ignorance, concupiscence, passibility, mortality follow from the principles of human nature, as St. Thomas teaches, IV Contra gentes, c. 52, and as we said above in the exposition of the state of pure nature.

It is proved 2° by the same first part of the first antecedent. Man created in pure natural state would have all things that belong to him naturally, or from intrinsic principles, both in physical being and in moral being. Therefore the state of pure nature involves no repugnance on the part of man. — The antecedent is proved. In the physical order, man is constituted of body and rational soul with its properties and powers, both spiritual and sensitive; in the moral order, he requires to have free will, to know his end and the means proportioned to it, and by those means to be able to attain the end. But all these things he would have in the state of pure nature. And indeed concerning the intrinsic constituting principles and natural properties, and free will, no one denies. Of the rest it is proved. The proximate end of man, in the state of pure nature, would be honest good; his last end, God as author of nature; the means for attaining that end, morally good acts through the assists of the natural order. All these things, since they do not transcend nature, he would know, nor would the foresaid assists fail him, whereby, through morally good acts, he could attain this his last end. Therefore.

Thus the first part of the first antecedent being proved, the second part flows spontaneously, namely that the state of pure nature involves no repugnance on the part of God. For if supernatural grace, the gift of integrity and immortality are not owed to human nature, God could deny these gifts to it without injury to his justice, goodness and wisdom, just as he denied, and de facto denied, to innocent Adam the gift of impeccability. Likewise, if man, in the state of pure nature, had all things that belong to him according to his intrinsic principles, both in physical being and in moral being, the order of divine justice is preserved, rendering indeed to each what is owed him by the right of his creation; the order of divine wisdom and goodness is preserved, disposing and ordering all things to their ends. Therefore.

It is proved 4° from the conclusion by several propositions condemned in Baius. The first: « The sublimation and exaltation of human nature into the fellowship of the divine nature was due to the integrity of the first condition, and therefore must be called natural, not supernatural. » This is 21. — The second: « The integrity of the first creation was not an undue exaltation of human nature, but its natural condition. » This is 26. — See besides 55, 78 and 79^[1. Add this one of Quesnel condemned by Clement XI: « The grace of Adam is a sequel of creation, and was due to nature sound and whole. » It is 35.

You will ask by what power God could create man in the state of pure nature: extraordinary, or ordinary?

I answer. That the solution of the question depends upon the diverse acceptation of ordinary and extraordinary power. Therefore

¹

Some understand ordinary power as that by which God produces only effects proportioned to the nature of things and naturally owed to them; extraordinary power, that by which he produces miraculous effects beyond the strength and exigence of nature. According to this understanding it must be said that the state of pure nature was possible by the ordinary power of God; because in it all things are supposed to be connatural, and nothing miraculous, as we explained.

Others understand extraordinary power as that by which God can do many things which nevertheless he decreed not to do, and which consequently do not fall under the order of present providence, that is, the order which he himself established in leading things to the ends which he set before himself. They call ordinary power that by which God executes what he decreed to do; and thus St. Thomas seems to think, 1ª p., q. [25?] : « This is said of God that he can do it by ordinary power. » « But that which is attributed to divine power according as it executes the command of a just will, this is said of God that he can do by ordinary power. » According to this understanding, it must be said that God could not create man in the state of pure nature by ordinary power, but by extraordinary only; because, supposing the order which God established in things, namely the elevation of rational creature to a supernatural end from singular benevolence, this state does not fall under present providence, but remained in its possibility: provided however that in this opinion it be wholly conceded that God could fully and without any prejudice to his attributes have established another order of things, and according to that have created man in the state of pure nature.

Therefore, according to the diverse assigned acceptation of ordinary and extraordinary power, it is truly said that the state of pure nature was and was not possible by ordinary power. And thus are reconciled the contrary opinions of the Thomists.

From these things maturely weighed and well understood, you will meet many testimonies of Augustine by which the holy Doctor seems to intimate that the rational creature cannot without its own fault lack supernatural gifts; for these testimonies must be understood according to the present state and order of things, not according to another which God could have instituted.

Obj. : It is repugnant that man be created subject to concupiscence. Therefore. — The antecedent is proved. Augustine labors perpetually to prove, against Julian, that concupiscence is not a natural property and perfection of man, but an evil opposed to his nature; and against him he urges everywhere that of I John, II, 16: The concupiscence of the flesh... is not of the Father, and the Apostle, who to the Romans, VII, 8, 20, calls concupiscence sin. Therefore.

For the solution of this and several other objections on the part of concupiscence, it must be observed that concupiscence can be taken two ways, either in act first, for the concupiscible power itself, or in act second, for the motion of that power toward sensible good. Moreover each again can be considered two ways: 1° simply and in itself, or materially, inasmuch as it is precisely an inclination to sensible good; 2° formally and with something added, insofar as it is an inclination to sensible good together with disorder and repugnance to right reason. Taken in the former way, it is a natural faculty and legitimate inclination to good proportioned to the body, and it is from God and by his intention in the creation of man. Taken in the latter way, it is a vicious inclination, which is properly called concupiscence and lust. It is not from God, nor by his intention, but a defect following upon the nature of man by reason of matter and subject, like passibility, mortality and other natural defects. For since man, as we already observed, consists of a twofold appetite, namely sensitive and rational, and each is borne toward its object, the sensitive to sensible good, the rational to honest good, and the sensitive is subjected to the rational not despotically but only politically, it often happens that sensible good desired is contrary to reason, and that the sensitive appetite, from a certain temperament of body, is borne more ardently toward its object. Hence arises the combat between them, which on the part of the sensitive appetite is lust and vicious concupiscence. These things premised,

I answer. I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I deny the consequence. For from this that concupiscence is evil, it follows that it is not from God positively and by his intention, but it does not follow that it is not a defect consequent upon the nature of man, from the condition of matter, apart from God's intention. Thus sin is an evil far worse than concupiscence, and yet man is created subject to sin, because the power of sinning is a defect consequent upon the nature of man from the condition of matter, since namely he is made from nothing.

Rightly therefore does Augustine rebuke Pelagius, who not only praised the substance of the sensitive faculty, but its petulance, whereby it broke forth into disorderly motions, provided only that reason did not consent outside marriage; for in this consent alone he placed its excess, which he condemned. Moreover he said that concupiscence itself and lust, which he dared not name, was good in genus and species, from vital fire, from generative heat, from carnal motion, from delight; and he praised it as a good of nature, though the lowest, and as a gift of the Creator. Even the disorderly motions themselves he called good and laudable little sparks of nature, indicating indeed the defect of nature, but rather its vigor. From this he inferred that the first man, whom he acknowledged created upright, was created by God with that unbridled concupiscence such as now exists. But that Augustine might refute these most shameless encomia of lust, he proves by many arguments that concupiscence is not a gift of the Creator, nor a perfection of the soul, but a defect and an evil; not indeed moral, or sin, but because, as the holy Doctor says, it disturbs the offices of reason, calls away the mind from the delight of wisdom and the will from the operation of justice.

You will ask 1° : Augustine against Julian said thus that concupiscence is evil, as asserting that it is the punishment of sin, and from it he proved original sin; which argument would have fallen, if concupiscence were a natural defect. Therefore.

I answer. Augustine speaks of concupiscence in the present state, in which man had been created upright, as Julian confessed

Julian; in which hypothesis Augustine well proves that the evil and unbridled concupiscence which now prevails presupposes sin, whose punishment and chastisement it is, since the uprightness in which man had been created would not have tolerated it.

From the parable Luc., X, 30, of the man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho who fell among robbers, who stripped him, and having laid on wounds departed, leaving him half dead, the common voice of the Holy Fathers and theologians is that man by original sin was not only stripped of original justice and other gratuitous gifts, but was also wounded in his natural endowments.

We call the wound of nature here the disruption and discontinuation of the union and subordination of reason to God, of the lower part to reason, and of the body to the soul. For just as in the human body there is said to be a wound when some division and disruption is made between its continuous and united parts, so analogically in the soul there is said to be a wound when its natural powers, which were united and subordinated to one another, were divided by the loss of this subordination. Whence, although in pure nature there would not have been greater union and subordination between these powers than there is now, nevertheless it would not be called a wound; because, since those powers would never have been joined and subordinated, the defect of union and subordination would not be through disruption and discontinuation, and therefore could not be called a wound.

Four wounds of nature are enumerated, according to the same number as the powers of the soul. For insofar as reason is deprived of its order to the true, it is the wound of ignorance; insofar as the will is deprived of its order to the good, it is the wound of malice; insofar as the irascible is deprived of its order to the arduous good, it is the wound of infirmity; insofar as the concupiscible is deprived of its order to the delight moderated by reason, it is the wound of concupiscence.

And although that perfect union and subordination of the powers in the state of innocence would not be natural or due to nature, but from a gratuitous gift, yet since it was a good of nature itself and perfected it, even in its natural order, its disruption is called the wound of nature, and by this man is wounded in his natural endowments. But whether man ought not moreover to be called wounded in his natural endowments in some further sense, we shall now explain.

From these things it is clear that man in the state of fallen nature is far weaker toward good and more prone to evil than in the state of integral and innocent nature. And these things are certain among authors. But the difficulty concerns the state of pure nature, whether man in the state of fallen nature, unrepaired, has lesser powers for the moral good of the natural order than he would have had in pure nature.

I say: The natural powers of man for the moral good of the natural order in the state of fallen nature, not yet repaired, are not diminished intrinsically and as to entity; nevertheless it is more probable that he is less apt for the moral good extrinsically and from the addition of an impediment which he would not have had in pure nature, and in this sense can be said to be lesser than he would have been in pure nature.

The first part of the conclusion is proved. The natural powers of man for the moral good of the natural order, namely intellect, will and sensitive appetite, are properties flowing necessarily and uniformly from the essence; consequently, like the essence itself, they admit of no more and less, especially intellect and will, which since they are spiritual are incorruptible and unalterable.

It is confirmed. Original sin consists essentially in the privation of original justice, which contained the powers in right order. But from what removes and prohibits no real and physical change is made in the thing, but it is left to its own nature. Therefore.

The second part of the conclusion is proved. He is less apt for the moral good of the natural order who is averted from God as last natural end than he who is not thus averted. But man, in the state of unrepaired fallen nature, is by original sin averted from God as last natural end, and in the state of pure nature he would not be thus averted. Therefore man in the state of fallen nature, extrinsically and from the addition of an impediment, is less apt for the moral good than in the state of pure nature. — The major seems certain; because the efficacy and powers of the will for choosing means are taken from love and conversion to the end, which stands in things doable as the first principle does in things speculable. Therefore just as he who is not rightly instructed in first principles, but deviates from them, is less apt for drawing true conclusions, so he who is averted from the end is less apt for right operations. — The minor is proved. Adam, by sinning, violated not only the supernatural law but also the natural; for every sin is against reason and the natural law commanding obedience to every legitimate superior commanding: consequently he turned all his posterity away from God as natural author. But in pure nature there would have been no such aversion, because there would have been no sin. Therefore.

Some not improbably posit another impediment, from the captivity and tyranny of the devil. For as it is said II Petr., II, 19, by whom anyone is overcome, of him also he is the slave. And Trident., sess. v, on original sin, canon 1, strikes with anathema him who should say that the first man, by transgressing the commandment of God, did not incur « with death the captivity under his power who thereafter had the empire of death, that is, of the devil. » This captivity, however, since it is an effect of sin, would not have been in the state of pure nature. Moreover the devil exercises his tyranny, inviting and moving his subjects in various ways to all wickedness, proposing external objects, stirring the phantasy, inflaming the passions, altering bodies, etc. And although he could have tempted men in pure nature, seeing that he tempted the first man in integral nature, it is nevertheless far more probable that he exercises his dominion far more powerfully and efficaciously over his captives, God permitting, in vengeance for sin.

Obj.: From what removes and prohibits there does not follow a greater or lesser natural effect than follows from nature itself, as is clear in the example of a stone held up; for it, the impediment removed, is not moved more quickly than if it had been moved by gravity alone. But original sin stands only as removing-prohibiting in ordine to the disordered motions of the will and sensitive appetite, inasmuch as it took away original justice, by which disordered motions were curbed. Therefore.

I answer. I deny the minor. For original sin, besides the privation of original justice, imports aversion from God as natural author, such as pure nature does not import. This aversion however is a moral impediment to doing good. Whence from this argument, which is the principal one of the opposite opinion, just as from various texts of St. Thomas in which he says that through original sin « nature is left to itself, » 1a 2ae, q. 82, a. 4, ad 1, and that the bond of original justice removed, each power of the soul tends into its own proper motion, ibid., q. 87, a. 7, c, and similar passages: from these, I say, only the first part of the conclusion is proved, namely that the natural powers for good are not diminished intrinsically, physically and entitatively, but not that they are not diminished morally and from the addition of an impediment in ordine to pursuing the good.

Here we have a contest with Jansenius and the theologians commonly called Augustinians. These, although in this state they admit the necessity of grace per se efficacious, contend nevertheless, from Augustine, libr. de Corrept. et Grat., cap. 10, 11, 12, that Adam and the angels had no need of it in order to persevere, but only of an indifferent and versatile grace hanging upon the nod of free will, such as the Molinists admit in the present state. The Thomists, on the contrary, uphold the necessity of efficacious grace for both states, with this difference, that in the first state grace would be grace of health, in the second it is medicinal grace, or, as Augustine says, the former is the more joyful, the latter the more powerful. And because the whole contest is about the mind of this holy Doctor,

I say: According to St. Augustine, grace per se efficacious was necessary for Adam and the angels in order to persevere.

It is proved 1° from the most formal testimonies of St. Augustine. the others falling, they themselves stood. Such is the title of the chapter: « Whether the holy angels have him whom they have as creator by nature as the same author of good will, that is, of that volition whereby they persevered, through the Holy Spirit, his charity diffused in them? »

What do the adversaries answer, or what ought they to answer, to this question? That both angels, the good and the bad, had versatile grace; that the good made it efficacious by their consent, the bad made it inefficacious by their dissent, and for that reason the former stood in the justice they had accepted, the latter fell. But how far distant from Augustine: « If the angels, says the holy Doctor, responding to the question proposed, could not make themselves better than he had made them, than which no one makes anything better, certainly they could not have had that good will whereby they would be better, unless the aid of the Creator were operating. And when their will did that good thing, that they should be turned not to themselves, who were less, but to him who supremely is..., what else is shown than that any good will whatsoever was needy, and would have remained in mere desire, unless he who had made good nature out of nothing capable of himself made it better by filling it, first making it by exciting it to be more avid?... But those who, although created good, are nevertheless bad by their own evil will, which nature alone did not make, save when it spontaneously fell away from good — that the good be not the cause of evil, but the defect from good — either received a lesser grace of divine love than those who persevered in the same; or, if both were created equally good, these falling by evil will, those were helped MORE, and attained that fullness of beatitude whereby they became most certain that they would never fall: as also we treated in the book which this one follows. It must be confessed therefore, with the praise due to the Creator, that it pertains not to holy men alone, but can be said also of the holy angels, that the charity of God has been diffused in them by the Holy Spirit who has been given to them. » Although it is most evident that this testimony is for our opinion, yet that its whole force may shine forth the more, I weigh each point.

1° According to Augustine, no creature, not even an angel, can make itself better than God made it. But if the good angels had from God only the aid without which not, or versatile grace whereby they could persevere, while the will and act of persevering were from themselves, no mightier aid received which should work in them that they might will, they would have made themselves better than God had made them: for better is he who does good, than he who can simply; better he who in fact perseveres in the justice once accepted, than he who can simply persevere. Therefore, according to Augustine, efficacious grace was necessary to the angels in order to persevere.

2° What I note above all in the aforesaid testimony is that, whereas Augustine had said compendiously that God made the good angels better « by exciting them to be more avid, » afterwards explaining this more carefully, he sets forth two modes by which the good angels could be made better by God: First, he says, because the angels who fell received in their creation a lesser grace, consequently the good ones a greater; this being supposed, it is manifest that the holy angels were made better by God, not by themselves. But, because it was uncertain to Augustine whether those who fell truly received a lesser grace in their creation, and indeed the opposite is the truer, he adds that, if all were created equally good, those who persevered « were further helped, » that is, received a greater actual aid, whereby they persevered and were made better than the others. Therefore, according to Augustine, the holy angels, over and above the sufficient aid conferred upon all, needed another mightier and more efficacious aid, whereby they might persevere and be made better.

3° And what I weigh last in the aforesaid testimony of Augustine is the very response which the holy Doctor makes to the question proposed. The question was, as the title of the chapter bears: « Whether the holy angels have him whom they have as creator of nature as the same author of their good will [that is, of the good volition whereby they persevered], through the Holy Spirit, charity being diffused in them? » Many things having been premised and touched upon, especially those we have related, concluding at length he thus answers the question: « It must be confessed therefore, with the praise due to the Creator, that it pertains not to holy men alone, but can be said also of the holy angels, that the charity of God has been diffused in them by the Holy Spirit who has been given to them. » You see that God, Augustine defining it, wrought good will in the angels through the effusion of some new actual charity, just as he works in the saints. — I subjoin. But the grace by which God works good will in holy men is not merely sufficient and versatile, but per se efficacious; it is not an aid without which, but whereby, as Jansenius and the Augustinians contend with all their nerves. Therefore.

This celebrated testimony of Augustine set in a good light, I subjoin the following. The holy Doctor, Enarrat. in Psal. xxxi, expounding that word of the Psalmist, 6: By the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and all the virtue of them by the spirit of his mouth, and applying these words allegorically to the angels, says: « By the word of the Lord the heavens [that is, the angels] are made firm. For they were not a firming for themselves, nor did the heavens themselves bestow their own firmness upon themselves... For they had nothing from themselves, and received as it were a supplement from the Lord; for by the spirit of his mouth, not a part, but all their virtue was. » But if they had had nothing but versatile grace suspended upon the nod of free will, they would have had the firming and the firmness from themselves, at least in part, by rendering namely the versatile and indifferent grace efficacious by their consent, and would have added the supplement from themselves, namely their free consent to indifferent grace, as the adversaries say; all which Augustine denies. Therefore.

It is proved 2° by overthrowing the foundation of the adversaries. If motion per se efficacious were not necessary in the state of innocence, this would be, as the adversaries will, because, according to Augustine, its whole necessity is drawn from the infirmity of the fallen nature for supernatural and meritorious acts. But that assumption of the adversaries is false. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. Augustine draws the necessity of efficacious motion not only from the infirmity of the fallen nature, but also from the omnipotence of God, from the subordination and dependence of every creature upon God in acting. Therefore. — Proof of the antecedent. 1° Above all the holy Doctor, lib. I de Trinit., cap. 4, n. 9, lays down as a constant and universal principle that « the divine will is the first and supreme cause of all corporeal and spiritual motions, » which words he utters from Augustine, St. Prosper, sent. 58.

2° Lib. V de Genes. ad litt., c. 20, n. 41: « God, he says, moves by a hidden power his whole creature, and by that motion they turn about, while the angels perform the commands, while the stars make their circuits, while the winds alternate..., while the ages unroll the latent greens and pastures, as it were folded up¹ he had implanted; yet they would not unroll into their courses, if he who created them were to cease to administer them by his provident motion. » And at the end of c. 23, n. 46: « He by whom he made all things together, governing and moving them with an administering act, works without cessation. » Here there is no mention or question of the infirmity of nature for supernatural and meritorious acts, but of the subordination and dependence alone of every created cause, even natural, in acting, upon almighty God as first cause and first mover.

3° Lib. de Corrept. et grat., which the adversaries oppose to us, cap. 14, n. 43, on the election of David as king: « The Lord almighty, he says, brought these men that they might constitute him king. And how did he bring them? Did he perhaps bind them with any bodily chains? He acted within, he held hearts, he moved hearts, and drew them by their wills, which he himself wrought in them. If therefore, when he wishes to establish kings upon earth, he has the wills of men more in his power

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than those very men their own wills, who else makes it that correction be wholesome, and correction take place in the heart of the corrected, that he may be established in the heavenly kingdom? » And lib. I contra duas Epist. Pelagianorum cap. 20, n. 38, speaking of the change of King Assuerus from indignation to mildness, which was also an act of the natural order: « God, he says, by a most hidden and most efficacious power [converts the heart of the king] and translated him from indignation to lenity, that is, from the will of harming to the will of favoring, according to that of the Apostle: God works in us even to will. » In all these there are plainly efficacious motions, whose necessity Augustine nevertheless does not draw from the infirmity of the fallen nature, but from the omnipotence of God and the dependence of creatures upon him, as is clear both from the terms, and because, as I said, those elections and actions were merely civil and of the natural order, to which the infirmity of the fallen nature in respect of supernatural and meritorious acts is irrelevant. Nay, from the necessity of efficacious motion for those civil acts Augustine infers, as from the less to the greater, the necessity of such motion for salutary acts, namely for the correction of heart and morals, as is clear from the words of the second text, and which he repeats more openly lib. de Praedest. sanctorum, cap. 20, n. 42, where, defending this inference of his against the Semi-Pelagians, he says: « Do they think that God inclines the wills of whom he will for making earthly kingdoms, but that God does not incline the wills of whom he will for obtaining the heavenly kingdom?... Consider moreover what it is to believe that for constituting earthly kingdoms God works the wills of men, and for laying hold of the kingdom of heaven men work their own wills. » Therefore Augustine draws the necessity of efficacious motion from the omnipotence of God and the dependence of the creature upon him, both in natural things and in supernatural things.

It is confirmed 1°. If the necessity of grace per se efficacious must be drawn from the sole infirmity of nature wounded by original sin, it follows that, where there is no infirmity from original sin, there is no efficacious grace, but only versatile grace. Thus teach the adversaries. But the consequent is false. Therefore also the antecedent. — Proof of the minor. In Christ the Lord there was no infirmity from original sin, which he did not contract. Likewise in the most blessed Virgin: either there was no original sin, according to the pious opinion¹, or at least, according to all, the fomes was bound in the womb of her mother and fully extinguished at the conception of Christ. Yet nevertheless both Christ and his most blessed mother were endowed not with versatile grace only, but with efficacious and most efficacious grace. Therefore. — The major is of faith, (at least as regards Christ: as regards the most blessed Virgin it would be temerarious to deny it) But the minor I judge cannot be denied by anyone: 1° because it is incredible, indeed it seems to imply a contradiction, that the author and the Mother of grace, who were led, governed and moved toward good more efficaciously and unfailingly than any other by the Holy Spirit, lacked efficacious grace, and that in Christ there was not the grace of Christ, which Augustine defended through so many years and in so many volumes. 2° Because it would follow that the good works of Christ and of his Mother were not foreseen by God in his decree, but in the very use of their free will, through middle knowledge, and that the predestination of Christ to hypostatic union, and of the most blessed Virgin to the dignity of the maternity of God, and of each to glory, was not gratuitous, against the express doctrine of Augustine, de Praedestinat. sanctorum, c. 15, n. 30 and 31.

It is confirmed 2°. If Adam, because he suffered no rebellion in his lower appetite, had no need of efficacious grace for pious works, for instance to love God above all things, but versatile grace sufficed him, it follows that man regenerated in Christ likewise has no need of efficacious grace at that time when he is not assailed by any temptation of the lower appetite, as happens not rarely², according to Augustine, lib. VI contra Julian., c. 19, and as experience proves. For concupiscence which neither stimulates nor tempts is no more an impediment to the act of virtue than if it were not there at all.

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But the consequent is false, even according to the adversaries. Therefore also the antecedent.

The objections are solved.

The adversaries seek from Augustine the single foundation of their opinion from cap. 10, 11, 12 of the book de Corrept. et Grat. When the monks of Adrumetum asked why Adam should be blamed because he did not persevere, if indeed he had not the gift of perseverance, nor could it be said of him what Augustine had said of men in the state of fallen nature, that the gift of perseverance was denied him on account of original sin,

The holy Doctor answers that Adam was nevertheless inexcusable and to be rebuked; because, although he had not efficacious aid for persevering, such as is given now to the predestinate, he nevertheless had sufficient aid, which was permitted to his will and whereby he could persevere if he willed, just as the good angels persevered with him by free will. And he adds the reason why he would not need efficacious aid, such as is given now; because his nature was sound and whole, whereas ours is weak and wounded, and therefore to be helped by mightier aid. Hence he concludes, cap. 12, n. 34: « The assistances themselves must be distinguished. One is the assistance without which something does not come about, and another is the assistance whereby something comes about... Therefore to the first man... was given the assistance of perseverance, not whereby it came about that he persevere, but without which he could not persevere by free will. Now indeed to the saints predestined to the kingdom of God by the grace of God there is given not such an assistance of perseverance, but such that perseverance itself be given to them. »

This is the sum of the doctrine of Augustine in these three famous chapters. From it Jansenius infers that the difference between the present state and the state of innocence lies in this, that the grace proper to the state of innocence is the aid without which not, or sufficient grace only and versatile subjected to free will, nor was any grace per se efficacious necessary in it; but the grace proper to this present state is the aid whereby, or grace per se efficacious, on account of the infirmity of nature, nor is any grace merely sufficient given in it. And this is, as I have already warned, the poisoned root and origin of that heresy. The theologians who are called Augustinians infer the same, except that they acknowledge sufficient graces also for the present state.

For the sound understanding of this doctrine of Augustine, our Thomists observe that not every efficacious aid is of the same condition and virtue: one is only moving and applying the power to act; another is not only moving and applying, but at the same time healing and strengthening. The first, they say, was necessary both to Adam and to the angels, by reason of dependence upon God in acting, not the second; because their nature, being sound and whole, had no need of medicinal and sanative aid, such as our nature, now weak and wounded, needs, and to which therefore an aid is necessary that is not only moving and applying, but also healing and strengthening: whereas Augustine, when he excludes from the state of innocent nature the aid whereby and efficacious, speaks of aid that heals and strengthens, not of aid that simply assists and applies. Which they gather plainly from his words, cap. 11, n. 29, where he says: « He [Adam] had no need of that assistance which these [the saints in this life] implore, when they say¹: I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin that is in my members. Unhappy man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death? The grace of God, through Jesus Christ our Lord... But he, tried and troubled by no such struggle of himself against himself, enjoyed his peace with himself in that place of beatitude. » This distinction being laid down, they easily explain the phrases of Augustine which seem alien to our opinion.

Still more easily, if you observe further that God influences secondary causes in two ways: 1° By ordinary providence moving them, according to the condition of their forces, to effects proportioned to them. 2° By assisting them in a manner somewhat above the accustomed course of things and the condition of their forces, and by a special aid, whereby it comes about that by the power of God

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they effect something exceeding their own strength, and which would never be done by them under the accustomed aid only: as when through a few weak soldiers he routs an immense and strong army; as when to the woman, whose faculty of childbearing is weak and impeded according to the accustomed order of things and the condition of her forces, and who would bear either no offspring or none but a very weak one, he confers by special gift that she bring forth a stronger offspring than any fruitful woman.

Things done by the prior influence, according to the common manner of speaking, are not referred to him, but to the created active powers. Thus, that a sound and fruitful woman bear offspring, that a brave soldier conquer a cowardly enemy, that a sound man walk, speak, till the fields, plant vineyards — although these do not come to pass without the general concurrence of God, we nevertheless do not refer them to him, nor say that they are done by the aid of God, but by the proper powers of nature. But things done by secondary causes through some special power conferred freely by God beyond the condition of their natural powers and moving them, are said properly to be done by the aid of God, and are properly attributed to him as author, and not to the secondary causes. As that Jonathan with his armor-bearer routed so many thousands of men is attributed not to Jonathan himself nor to his valor, but to God specially assisting above the common course of things and the condition of natural powers. Likewise that a barren and unfruitful woman bear vigorous offspring by special gift of God, as happened in Elisabeth, the mother of John the Baptist, is attributed not to her own power, but to God.

Hence plain is the doctrine of St. Augustine concerning the difference of the assistances of the state of innocent and fallen nature, even while saving the necessity of grace per se efficacious in both states. For innocent nature stood as a strong and sound nature, furnished with every faculty for doing good even supernatural: whence, according to the ordinary course of things and the condition of its forces, it could both do good and persevere in it; nay, it came about that the good angels performed this. When this is said, the motion and direction of general divine providence is not excluded, which takes place in every agent, as St. Thomas notes, Ia IIae, the whole q. 109 and elsewhere, and

Augustine teaches this in the passages related in the proofs. Hence innocent nature could act and persevere just as it could with the powers given to it, as a fruitful and healthy woman can beget vigorous offspring, as a strong and armed soldier can conquer a cowardly and unarmed enemy, and as a healthy man can walk and speak; although this being so, it comes about by no means without the motion of God, which our Thomists explain through physical premotion, necessary for all second agents in whatever state. But man in this state, even justified by grace, stands to good and to perseverance as a weak cause, entangled with innumerable impediments : whence it comes about that, if he were provided for only according to the usual course of things and after the manner of his own condition, no one would persevere; and therefore to all those who persevere there is granted, through God's most special help, not only motion and direction according to the usual mode, but also healing, strengthening, and directing in a most special way, and, so to speak, holding man by the hand, so that, though weak amid so many temptations, he may persevere through the power of God.

Therefore, according to these observations, the answer is easy to those things which the adversaries object from Augustine, as may be seen in my former Work.

I. Leaving aside the various acceptances of grace, here it is taken generally for whatever gift or benefit granted gratuitously, that is, out of mere benignity of God, not from justice or from our merits. Under this general acceptance of grace all natural gifts, namely nature itself and all its powers, can be called graces; for gratuitously God bestowed upon us to be, to live, to sense, to understand, to will, etc. These however, although in this wide sense they are called graces, cannot be called aids of grace, because aid supposes him who is helped and active powers which it helps.

II. Grace properly and in the common sense of Scripture and Church is taken for a gratuitous gift, whether habitual or actual, superadded to nature.

III. This grace, both habitual and actual, is of twofold order, natural namely and supernatural: natural, which moves toward good within the sphere of naturals, as if God infuse light of natural science, or move specially to cognition of natural things; supernatural, which helps by habit or motion unto those things which exceed the forces of nature, as while God infuses habit of faith or charity, or moves to the act of either. Between each this aid can still be further distinguished by another, as it were medium, which participates something of both, namely that it be natural as regards substance and supernatural as regards mode, e.g., while Christ illumined the man born blind: for the mode of working this effect was above the forces of nature, although the effect, consequently through grace, is substantially within the order of nature; for that sight was not of another kind than the sight of other men.

IV. Truly, because grace is divided against nature, grace resting precisely in natural good is less properly called grace: whence most properly is called grace either the supernatural habit infused, such as sanctifying grace and infused virtues, or the supernatural motion whereby God moves us as first mover in the order of grace to supernatural acts, or even that operation of God whereby he directs natural things to our salvation.

V. Grace taken for supernatural motion is twofold, moral and physical. Moral comes about by the showing forth of good, sometimes joined with infusion of light for perceiving it: it pertains to final cause. Physical comes about by an influx effectively and intrinsically reducing the faculty to act: it pertains to efficient cause. That God moves the will in both modes the Author teaches Iap., q. 105, a. 4, and elsewhere.

VI. Physical motion is sometimes a mere application of preexisting power and virtue, as when God moves the will of the just to act of charity. Sometimes, although it be application of power, it is nevertheless not application of virtue, because it does not preexist, but brings it with itself by way of passage, as while God moves the will of a sinner to act of attrition or contrition; since indeed that act is supernatural, and in that sinner no supernatural habit yet exists, it is necessary that that motion beginning conversion bring with it some supernatural virtue, not by way of permanent habit, but by way of transient passion.

VII. That physical motion which is a mere application of preexisting power and virtue is again twofold: one general, whereby God as first and universal mover applies faculties according to their exigency and mode to acts proportioned to them; another special, whereby God sometimes applies the mind of man to thinking or willing things which, although they do not exceed his forces, nevertheless, according to the accustomed course and disposition of the subject, man would neither think nor will them, and this both in naturals and in supernaturals.

VIII. General motion, whereby God as first and universal mover, both in order of nature and in order of grace, applies preexisting power and virtue, according to its exigency and the accustomed course of things, to acts proportioned to it, at first aspect seems not to pertain properly to special aid of grace, because it is given gratuitously, but from a certain connatural exigency: for as, collation of natural virtue supposed, there is owed to fire the motion or general concurrence premoving it to its proper act, to fire to burn, to sun to illuminate, so that without miracle it cannot be denied to it; so, although elevating virtue unto supernatural good has been given gratis to the just, that being supposed, there is owed in a certain way, according to common laws of Providence, the general motion applying it to acts proportioned to it.

Nevertheless, if we consider the matter more deeply, this general motion can and ought to be called in some true sense special aid of grace. For the understanding of this it must be observed that this general motion does not stand in the same mode in natural and voluntary agents. Natural agents have natural form whereby they are determined necessarily to one act suiting them, as fire to burn, sun to illuminate, and thus they demand general motion determining to the act proper to them. But voluntary agents have no natural form whereby they be determined necessarily to one act suiting them, but they are turnable to opposites and defectible from good connatural to them. Thus, although object of intellect be truth, of will in itself natural good, of will as instructed with infused virtues supernatural good; nevertheless intellect toward truth and will toward good whether natural or supernatural are borne flexibly and are defectible from it.

Whence, although general motion is owed to these powers whereby they sometimes attain their object, nevertheless not that they attain always and indefectibly. Therefore that this rather than that other be given to this one here and now, is from special grace.

Wherefore, if this general motion be considered respectively to nature in itself or as instructed with infused virtues, it must be called general motion, and not special gratuitous aid; because to general providence pertains moving each agent according to its mode, and since in man there is inclination, attenuated indeed and defectible, yet not wholly corrupted, toward good, there is owed to him motion whereby he be sometimes moved to good act suiting himself, and not always to evil. Whence that he be moved sometimes to good is not aid purely gratuitous, because in a certain way it is owed; nor special, because it is not from special benevolence and providence, but according to laws of common providence whereby he sometimes moves defectible natures to good of their nature, sometimes permits them to fail. Say the same of will informed by charity, in respect of supernatural good. But if this motion be considered respectively to the man to whom it is given before another, then in respect of this man it can and ought to be called special aid of grace; because, although nature, as was said, demands sometimes to be moved into good, nevertheless this man before another demands not that he be moved into good here and now rather than another. Whence that he be moved into good from which another fails and from which he himself could fail, is from special aid of grace, that is, freely conferred.

(This observation, which is open to anyone attending maturely, St. Thomas weighs and hands down, q. 24 de Veritate, a. 14, c, in these words: « Although man can do goods of this kind [namely proportionate to his nature] without grace gratum faciens, nevertheless he cannot do them without God, since nothing can issue into natural operation except by divine power; because secondary cause acts not except by power of first cause. And this is true both in natural agents and in voluntary ones. Yet this necessity stands in another mode in each. For God is cause of natural operation, inasmuch as he gives and conserves that which is principle of natural motion, as gravity in earth, which is principle of downward motion: » Although the Angelic Doctor mentions not general motion here, he nevertheless always supposes it and elsewhere expresses it.

That however this general motion does not suffice man that he act good connatural to himself, but that he needs special motion and direction, he explains thus pursuing: « But human will is not determined to any one operation, but stands indifferently toward many [that is, good and bad], and thus is after a manner in potency, unless moved through something active, either what is outwardly represented to it, as is good apprehended, or what is wrought interiorly in it, as is God himself, as Augustine says lib. de Gratia et libero Arbitrio, cap. 21, showing manifoldly God works in hearts of men. But all exterior motions [he says the same of interior ones] are moderated by divine providence according as he himself judges someone to be excited to good by these or those actions. Whence, if we wish to call grace of God not some habitual gift, but the very mercy of God, whereby he works interiorly the motion of mind and orders exterior things unto salvation of man; thus neither can man do any good without grace of God. » Therefore, according to St. Thomas, man, on account of indifference of human arbitrium, in order that he act good rather than evil, needs divine providence, which moderates motions to good according as it judges fitting, and mercy of God, whereby he works interiorly the motion of mind and orders exterior things to good. But no one can say this aid is owed to this man before another. Therefore it is gratuitous, because it is not given from merit, but from mercy. It is also special, because it is given not to all, however much in respect to nature in itself it be owed and general.

This observation is altogether necessary for untying the difficulties, otherwise most intricate, of this dissertation. For it removes ambiguities and equivocations on account of which many stumble and are deluded, and reconciles the apparently contrary opinions of Thomists, as will appear from what must be said.