Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

I say 1° : For the fulfillment of the law, the work prescribed must be done knowingly and voluntarily¹.

It is evident, because the law commands a human act; for it commands men, and therefore that they act in a human manner, not in the manner of brutes; but an act is not human unless it be done knowingly and voluntarily.

Hence you will infer that he who recites the Hours asleep or drunk, hears Mass, etc., does not satisfy the law, but is bound, after sleep or drunkenness, to recite the Hours again and to hear another Mass.

I say 2° : For the fulfillment of the law it is not required that the work prescribed be done from the habit of virtue, or from charity ².

The reason of the first part is, 1° because no one is punished as a transgressor of the law who restores another's property or honors his parents, although he do this not from the habit of justice or piety ³. 2° Because to act from the habit of virtue is the end of the law; for to this end are works prescribed by the law ordered, that men become virtuous. But the end of the law does not fall under the law. Therefore,

The reason of the second part is, because the precept of charity is affirmative, which does not bind always ⁴.

Hence you will infer 1° that a human law can be fulfilled by a work good from its object, although vitiated by an evil circumstance; as if anyone fasts in order to save expense, or out of vainglory.

You will infer 2° that the law is fulfilled by him who has no intention of satisfying the precept; as if anyone, ignorant of the feast day or not recalling it, hears Mass out of devotion, he satisfies the precept, nor is he bound to hear another Mass, because the law, as is evident from what has been said, prescribes only a work to be done in a human manner, not the reflex intention of obeying, especially since it is something purely internal. For it is not necessary that he who obeys say reflexly and in actu signato: « I wish to obey, » but it suffices that he do the work prescribed.

You will ask 1° whether, if anyone, doing the work prescribed, positively would not will thereby to satisfy the law, he would satisfy it.

I answer. More probably, affirmatively.

The reason is, because, since the obligation of the law depends upon the will of the legislator and not of the subject, the subject cannot postpone this obligation, or prevent the law from being fulfilled by that very work by which the legislator wills it to be fulfilled. But the legislator prescribes only the work prescribed as to its substance, v. g., fasting, hearing Mass, etc. Therefore, this being performed, whatever you may say or will, the law is satisfied and its obligation extinguished.

Hence you will infer, for the scrupulous, that while involuntarily distracted in the recitation of the Hours they hold them as not recited, intending to recite them again and satisfy — which often happens — they have satisfied, nor are they bound to repeat. And so with many other similar cases.

But if the case be supposed in which anyone, performing the work prescribed, positively would not will thereby, nor by any subsequent work, to satisfy the law, such a one indeed in effect fulfills the law, for instance that of hearing Mass, nor is he bound to hear another; provided he performed the work prescribed according to its substance, and by his contrary volition could not bring it about that the precept should not truly and in effect be fulfilled. Nevertheless in affection he sins mortally with the sin of commission, namely formal disobedience and contempt of the law, both against the natural and divine law which forbids unwillingness to obey just laws, and also against the human law itself, which since it commands the act and the will of the act, consequently forbids the affection and will of omitting it, as he who, after fulfilling the law, grieves that he has fulfilled it.

[You will ask 2° whether the same must be said of those things which proceed from the proper will of the agent, as from a vow and an obligation of justice freely contracted.

I answer. Negatively. The reason is, that the obligation both of a vow and of a debt contracted by one's own will, just as it proceeds first from my will, so depends upon my will that it remain; and as at the beginning I voluntarily made myself a debtor, so can I at my pleasure continue in the same obligation. But the obligation of the law is from the will of the legislator, and therefore cannot be extended beyond his intention; wherefore, since it prescribes only that the work be done in a human manner, this being done, whether I will or not, the obligation of the law is extinguished. Moreover, if in a debt of strict justice a gratuitous donation were computed toward payment or restitution, the creditor would be unduly burdened, since by a gratuitous donation he would contract a debt of gratitude toward the donating debtor.]