Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

DISSERTATION IV

ON THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 96.

[Note that there is a twofold power in the Church, one of the internal or conscience forum, the other of the external forum, which St. Thomas in IV Sentent., dist. 18, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3, distinguishes thus, that in the internal forum is treated the cause between God and man, but in the external forum is treated the cause of man with man. The former chiefly concerns internal acts, because by them man is ordered to God above all, and through them salvation, for which it was first given, is promoted most closely. The latter, however, insofar as it is governing of the community of believers as such, has also matter proportioned to itself, namely external acts, looking to conversation and outward direction; and to this order the legislative power of the Church is referred. For although the laws of the Church are ordered to a supernatural end and the spiritual good of souls, they do not work that immediately, but through the honesty of exterior acts. But this legislative power is called spiritual, both by reason of origin, as being immediately from God; and by reason of its mediated end, which is spiritual salvation of souls; and by reason of matter, not because it concerns merely spiritual and internal acts, but because whatever it commands or forbids outwardly, as fasts, feasts, etc., is apt to conduct man to the progress of the soul spiritually; and by all these things it is distinguished from civil power. Therefore]

I SAY 1° : It is more probable that human law cannot command or forbid acts merely internal, which have no connection with externals, such as are, v. g., simple intellection, simple volition, simple act of faith, hope, charity, etc.¹.

It is proved 1° from law. Cap. Tua nos, de simonia, Innocent III says : « To us it is given to judge only of manifest things. » And cap. Sicut tuis, same title : « The Church judges not of hidden things. »

It is proved by reason taken from the Author, places cited. Law cannot command or forbid that to do or avoid which it cannot compel; otherwise it would be useless and inefficacious for attaining the effect, since men, especially the evil, are moved neither by words alone nor by penalties distant in another life, or invisible and insensible, but by things present and sensible. But human law cannot compel to doing or avoiding acts merely internal. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. Man cannot compel to that of which he cannot judge; for coercion is through fear of penalty, and penalty is inflicted only from judgment. But man cannot judge of things merely internal. Therefore.

(Whence the Angelic, here q. 91, a. 4, ad 3 : « Of those things can man make law of which he can judge. But judgment of man cannot be of interior motions which lie hidden, but only of exterior acts which appear; and yet unto perfection of virtue it is required that in both acts man stand upright. And therefore human law could not restrain and order sufficiently interior acts, but divine law needed to supervene for this purpose.»]

It is proved by another reason. Human legislative power is one of jurisdiction and tending per se primo to external and common government. But acts merely internal are not apt matter for government of this kind. Therefore. — Proof of the major. The republic, both ecclesiastical and civil, is a visible and external body. Therefore its legislative power is per se primo directed to external government.

[You will say : The Church ought to have received from Christ power to command whatever conduces to the end for which she was instituted. But acts merely internal of the virtues conduce most of all to eternal salvation, which is the proper and necessary end of the Church. Therefore the Church received from Christ power to command acts merely internal of the virtues.

Answer. I distinguish the major. That whatsoever immediately conduces to her proximate end the Church ought to have received from Christ, I concede; whatsoever conduces to her ultimate end, even those things also of which she cannot judge and whose execution she can urge in no manner, I deny. For the proximate end of ecclesiastical law is not eternal life, but peace and order of the Christian republic, these obtained, virtues are cultivated, merits acquired, and thus eternal salvation is mediately promoted. These goods, since they are external, the Church can provide for immediately through her laws, commanding whatever is born to procure them, forbidding what can impede them, and compelling the disobedient through spiritual and even temporal penalties. As to acts merely internal, however, even though the Church should invite them by her precepts, she cannot imperate them, since efficacious means of obtaining such effects avail not herself. Whence St. Thomas says, IIa 2ae, q. 104, a. 5, ad 3 : « In those things which pertain to the interior motion of the will, man is held to obey not man, but God alone. But man is held to obey man in those things which must be done outwardly through the body. »

You will insist : The Council of Trent, in the proem of session VI, « more strictly forbids that anyone henceforth presume otherwise to believe, preach, or teach than is enacted and declared in the present decree » concerning justification; Clement XI in the constitution Vineam Domini Sabaoth defines everyone bound to reject the sense condemned of the five propositions of Jansenius, not with the mouth only, but with heart and inwardly. Pius IX, at the conclusion of the bull Ineffabilis Deus, pronounces them who presumed otherwise than was defined by him concerning the

Immaculate Conception of B. M. V. to think in heart,... fallen away from the unity of the Church. » But to believe, to reject something in heart, and to think in heart are acts merely internal. Therefore.

Answer. I deny the consequence. For, as to these internal acts, since already forbidden or commanded by divine law, the Church declares this in the name of Christ. As to external profession however, indeed with authority of Christ, but also in her own name she forbids or commands under established penalties.]

I SAY 2° : Human law can command or forbid internal acts which are necessarily required in order that externals be constituted in the genus or a certain species of morality.

It is proved. Whoever has right to command something has right to command everything without which it cannot exist; otherwise it would be a chimerical potency. But human law has right to command several exterior acts which require interior acts for their moral integrity in a certain species. Thus, v. g., the law of the Church commands the recitation of the Hours as prayer, unto which internal attention is necessarily required; it commands confession of sins as sacramental, which does not occur without internal grief; paschal communion as refreshment of soul, which is not had through sacrilegious communion. So likewise civil law commands oath, which does not stand without intention of swearing; contract, which does not subsist without will of binding oneself. Therefore.

Hence Alexander VII deservedly condemned this proposition, n. 14 : « He who makes voluntary confession none satisfies the precept of the Church. » And Innocent XI this one, n. 55 : « The precept of annual communion is sufficiently satisfied by sacrilegious manducation of the Lord. »

I say 3° : It is more probable that human law can command or forbid an internal act joined to the external, as its cause, per accidens only.

It is proved 1° from the first Clementine de statu monach., lib. III, tit. 10. A monk betaking himself to the curia with mind of accusing a prelate is excommunicated. But mind of accusing a prelate is joined, as cause, per accidens only, to access to the curia; for this access could proceed from another cause.

It is proved 2°. An interior act which is cause, albeit per accidens, of the exterior proceeds to the outside, and becomes per se manifest by reason of its effect, with which it constitutes one act in genus of morality, and one sin, although per accidens it be occult, because its influx into the act is unknown; as an exterior act done without witnesses is per se manifest, because done outwardly, although per accidens occult, because it is unknown to have been done outwardly. Therefore, as this latter can be subjected to law on account of the existence it has outwardly, so the former on account of the causality it has outwardly.

[The contrary hold St. Liguori, lib. I, n. 100, and many others.

Proof 1°. That cannot be commanded by the Church without which the end of the law is obtained. But the end of the law is obtained without the interior act joined per accidens only to the exterior being commanded. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. The end of law is attained through that which by reason of itself conduces to this end. But the interior act joined per accidens only to the exterior act pertains not to the character of the act which conduces to the end of law, since it holds no true connection with it, and between both there is mere concomitance only. Therefore,

2° Since the interior act joined per accidens to the exterior act commanded holds no natural connection with it, it could be commanded not by reason of the other act and indirectly, but by reason of itself it would be commanded, that is insofar as it is interior. But this is against the first conclusion demonstrated above. Therefore.

It must be granted that this opinion lacks great probability, and that it is rather consonant with those things said above.

You will ask whether exterior acts altogether occult can be forbidden by human law.

Answer affirmatively. The reason is, because such acts, although per accidens their existence cannot be proved, are from within sensible and manifest, and as such fall under law. St. Thomas teaches this, Quodlib. 4, a. 14.)

I say 1° : For the fulfillment of the law, the work prescribed must be done knowingly and voluntarily¹.

It is evident, because the law commands a human act; for it commands men, and therefore that they act in a human manner, not in the manner of brutes; but an act is not human unless it be done knowingly and voluntarily.

Hence you will infer that he who recites the Hours asleep or drunk, hears Mass, etc., does not satisfy the law, but is bound, after sleep or drunkenness, to recite the Hours again and to hear another Mass.

I say 2° : For the fulfillment of the law it is not required that the work prescribed be done from the habit of virtue, or from charity ².

The reason of the first part is, 1° because no one is punished as a transgressor of the law who restores another's property or honors his parents, although he do this not from the habit of justice or piety ³. 2° Because to act from the habit of virtue is the end of the law; for to this end are works prescribed by the law ordered, that men become virtuous. But the end of the law does not fall under the law. Therefore,

The reason of the second part is, because the precept of charity is affirmative, which does not bind always ⁴.

Hence you will infer 1° that a human law can be fulfilled by a work good from its object, although vitiated by an evil circumstance; as if anyone fasts in order to save expense, or out of vainglory.

You will infer 2° that the law is fulfilled by him who has no intention of satisfying the precept; as if anyone, ignorant of the feast day or not recalling it, hears Mass out of devotion, he satisfies the precept, nor is he bound to hear another Mass, because the law, as is evident from what has been said, prescribes only a work to be done in a human manner, not the reflex intention of obeying, especially since it is something purely internal. For it is not necessary that he who obeys say reflexly and in actu signato: « I wish to obey, » but it suffices that he do the work prescribed.

You will ask 1° whether, if anyone, doing the work prescribed, positively would not will thereby to satisfy the law, he would satisfy it.

I answer. More probably, affirmatively.

The reason is, because, since the obligation of the law depends upon the will of the legislator and not of the subject, the subject cannot postpone this obligation, or prevent the law from being fulfilled by that very work by which the legislator wills it to be fulfilled. But the legislator prescribes only the work prescribed as to its substance, v. g., fasting, hearing Mass, etc. Therefore, this being performed, whatever you may say or will, the law is satisfied and its obligation extinguished.

Hence you will infer, for the scrupulous, that while involuntarily distracted in the recitation of the Hours they hold them as not recited, intending to recite them again and satisfy — which often happens — they have satisfied, nor are they bound to repeat. And so with many other similar cases.

But if the case be supposed in which anyone, performing the work prescribed, positively would not will thereby, nor by any subsequent work, to satisfy the law, such a one indeed in effect fulfills the law, for instance that of hearing Mass, nor is he bound to hear another; provided he performed the work prescribed according to its substance, and by his contrary volition could not bring it about that the precept should not truly and in effect be fulfilled. Nevertheless in affection he sins mortally with the sin of commission, namely formal disobedience and contempt of the law, both against the natural and divine law which forbids unwillingness to obey just laws, and also against the human law itself, which since it commands the act and the will of the act, consequently forbids the affection and will of omitting it, as he who, after fulfilling the law, grieves that he has fulfilled it.

[You will ask 2° whether the same must be said of those things which proceed from the proper will of the agent, as from a vow and an obligation of justice freely contracted.

I answer. Negatively. The reason is, that the obligation both of a vow and of a debt contracted by one's own will, just as it proceeds first from my will, so depends upon my will that it remain; and as at the beginning I voluntarily made myself a debtor, so can I at my pleasure continue in the same obligation. But the obligation of the law is from the will of the legislator, and therefore cannot be extended beyond his intention; wherefore, since it prescribes only that the work be done in a human manner, this being done, whether I will or not, the obligation of the law is extinguished. Moreover, if in a debt of strict justice a gratuitous donation were computed toward payment or restitution, the creditor would be unduly burdened, since by a gratuitous donation he would contract a debt of gratitude toward the donating debtor.]

[The Beghards, Beguines, and Waldenses, also called the Poor Men of Lyons, asserted that sinners indeed were subject to laws, but that the just, that is themselves, were wholly exempt from them. John Hus and Luther afterwards taught that men — by whom they understood ecclesiastical superiors — have not the power to enact obligatory laws, or laws properly so called; so that their ordinances are only directions which anyone may follow of his own accord or reject.]

The question is concerning just laws; for unjust laws are not true laws ¹. But four things are required that a law be just: first, on the part of matter, namely that it command nothing per se evil, nor forbid anything per se good; second, on the part of end, that it be for the common good; third, on the part of author, that it enact no law beyond the power committed to it; fourth, on the part of form, that burdens be imposed upon subjects according to the proportion of the forces and faculties which they have.

I say: Every law, civil as well as ecclesiastical, binds in the forum of conscience ². It is of faith, at least as regards ecclesiastical laws, defined in the Council of Constance against Wycliffe and John Hus, sess. viii and xv, in the bull of Leo X against Luther, and in the Council of Trid., sess. vii, can. 8: « If anyone shall say that the baptized are free from all the precepts of holy Church, whether written or handed down, so that they are not bound to observe them unless they should wish to submit to them of their own accord; let him be anathema. »

It is proved by the authority of Scripture. And 1° as regards ecclesiastical laws, Matth., XVI, 19, Christ said to Peter: Whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth, shall be bound also in heaven. If in heaven, therefore in conscience. Luc., x, 16: He that heareth you, heareth me; and he that despiseth you, despiseth me. But no one doubts that one is bound in conscience to hear Christ and not despise him.

2° As regards civil laws, Paulus, ad Rom., XIII, 1-7. Let every soul be subject to higher powers; for there is no power but from God... Therefore he that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God; and they that resist purchase to themselves damnation... Wherefore be subject of necessity, not only for wrath, but also for conscience; for therefore also you pay tribute, for they are the ministers of God, serving unto this very purpose. Render therefore to all their debts: tribute to whom tribute, custom to whom custom. These things are so plain that an escape is opened to none of the heretics. Likewise ad Tit. III, 1, I Petr., II, 13-15, and elsewhere.

It is proved by reason. 1° Human law, civil as well as ecclesiastical, is derived from the eternal law, from which it has its force and vigor, according to that of Prov., VIII, 15: By me kings reign, and lawmakers decree just things. And as we explained dissert. II. But the eternal law binds in conscience. Therefore.

2° Natural law and right reason command that we obey the just mandates of legitimate superiors promulgated for the common good. Therefore we are bound in conscience to obey them.

It is confirmed. The precept of a father toward his children, of a master toward servants, binds in conscience, as the Apostle teaches, Ephes., VI, 1, 5. Therefore the precept of the prince toward subjects.

[Rightly therefore Alexander VII, on 24 September 1665, condemned this proposition, n. 23: « He who breaks the fast of the Church unto which he is bound does not sin mortally, unless he do this out of contempt or disobedience, for instance because he wills not to submit himself to the precept; » and Innocent XI, on 2 March 1679, the following, n. 52: « The precept of keeping feasts does not bind under mortal sin, scandal set aside, if contempt be absent. »]

Note. Some laws are purely preceptive or prohibitory; some purely penal, some mixed. A purely preceptive or prohibitive law is that which commands or forbids an act, imposing no penalty upon transgressors, as the law on hearing Mass. A purely penal law is that which establishes a penalty upon those who have done or omitted something, commanding or forbidding nothing, at least explicitly, as if a law should say: « Whoever shall carry corn out of the province, let him pay one hundred. » Mixed is that which commands or forbids an act, and at the same time establishes a penalty for transgressors. And this in two ways: either copulatively, as if a law should say: « Let no one carry corn out of the province, and whoever shall carry it out, let him pay one hundred, » which can also be expressed in one proposition thus: « I forbid that anyone carry corn out of the province, under penalty of paying one hundred. » Or disjunctively, as if it should say: « Let no one carry corn out of the province; or, if he has carried it out, let him pay one hundred. »

You will ask 1° whether a mixed law or a purely penal law binds under fault to doing or omitting the act, or at least to the penalty or fine.

I answer. 1°. A copulative mixed law binds under fault to doing or omitting the act, because it truly commands or forbids; nor is the penalty added that it may take away the obligation, but rather that it may more efficaciously move to observance.

I answer. 2° that a disjunctive mixed law does not bind determinately to doing or omitting the act, nor determinately to undergoing the penalty, but to the one or the other; so that he who does not will to fulfill the law, but is prepared to undergo the penalty, is free from fault; but he who neither wills to observe the law nor to undergo the penalty sins, because the law posited under disjunction leaves it to the will of subjects to embrace whichever part they will. Parity is in him who vows disjunctively that he will play no more, or, if he play, that he will give twenty asses to the poor: he does not sin if he plays; he would sin, if playing he gave not twenty asses.

To laws of this kind can in a certain manner be referred the constitutions of various Religious Orders, as of the Order of Preachers, which do not bind unto fault, but unto penalty only, and insofar are laws, inasmuch as they bind unto penalty.

[You will say: Penalty cannot be imposed except for fault. Therefore, if the act prescribed disjunctively be omitted without fault, there is not given an obligation of undergoing the penalty.

I answer. I deny the antecedent. The force of law depends entirely upon the will of the legislator, and as he can prescribe a thing great by its nature under grave or only under light [penalty], so he can leave it to the liberty of each one. Therefore, when this seems sufficient and expedient, it is lawful for him to give his subjects the option between doing or omitting the act and undergoing the penalty, if it please them not to observe the law. And this is confirmed by rule 23 of law in Sexto: « Without fault, unless cause subsist, no one is to be punished. » These words, Unless cause subsist, patently adjudicate to the legislator the faculty of decreeing a penalty although fault has not been admitted through transgression of the law.]

I answer. 3°. It seems more probable that a purely penal law, speaking per se, obliges not only to the penalty, but also to doing or omitting the act for which the penalty is imposed.

The reason is, because, according to the common understanding and common mode of speaking, he who says: « Whoever shall do this, shall be punished with death, » is just as if he said, I forbid that this be done, and whoever shall have done it shall be punished with death: whence he prohibits or commands implicitly, though not explicitly; for he imposes so great a penalty only because he wills it to be done or not done, and the will of the superior so intimated holds the force of law and precept.

I said: Speaking per se, because, if the legislator declared that he did not will to oblige under fault to doing or omitting the act, but only to the penalty, as is declared in the prologue of our constitutions and in the constitutions of certain other Orders, the law would not oblige except to the penalty. Similarly, if from the circumstances could be gathered this to be the mind of the legislator, or if the customs of the people and usage received among the timorous so understand and receive the law; for, as is commonly said, custom is the best interpreter of law. This modification moreover can also have place in mixed copulative laws, in which, as by custom the obligation unto fault and unto penalty can be removed, a fortiori, the penalty remaining, the fault can be taken away. But these are not properly laws except in that part wherein they bind unto penalty under fault, because to obligate is of the reason of law. Whence, if it obliged in no part, it would not be properly a law, but a salutary admonition or exhortation, or counsel concerning what would be expedient in the community.

You will ask 2° whether a penal law binds to undergoing the penalty before the sentence of the judge.

The question concerns a latae sententiae penalty; for it is certain that no one is held to undergoing a ferendae sententiae penalty before the sentence of the judge.

I answer. 1°. No penal law latae sententiae binds in the forum of conscience to undergoing, before the sentence of the judge, an active penalty, or one whose execution requires action.

[It is proved 1° by St. Thomas saying, II II, q. 62, a. 3, c: « As to fault, a remedy is applied through punishment, whose infliction pertains to the judge. And therefore, before he has been condemned by the judge, he is not bound to restore more than he received; but after he has been condemned, he is bound to pay the penalty. »]

It is proved 2°. To that acting or to the action which the execution of the penalty requires, the culprit or the judge is held. Not the culprit, because he is not held by the law except to the penalty; but penalty consists in suffering, not in acting. Therefore the judge is held. Therefore before the sentence of the judge he is not held to undergoing it.

It is confirmed. 1° The action which is required for the execution of the penalty is not penalty, but infliction of penalty; otherwise the judge or his minister inflicting the penalty would suffer the penalty. But penal law obliges the culprit only to penalty. Therefore it does not oblige him to inflict it upon himself.

2° A law obliging the culprit to inflict upon himself an active penalty before the sentence of the judge is not accommodated to the condition and frailty of men, since scarcely one of a thousand would you find who observes it.

I answer. 2°. Penal laws latae sententiae can oblige to undergoing a privative penalty before the sentence of the judge. Few however oblige.

The 1st part is proved. The authority of the legislator is not less than that of the judge, if nothing stands in the way. But the judge immediately after sentence passed obliges the culprit to undergo a privative penalty, nor does anything obstruct the authority of the legislator, as it obstructs for active penalty. Therefore.

It is confirmed. Laws imposing censures ecclesiastical ipso facto oblige immediately from the crime committed and before the sentence of the judge, as all concede. Therefore.

The 2nd part is proved; because, besides ecclesiastical censures, scarcely any law can be assigned, civil as well as ecclesiastical, even latae sententiae, which oblige to undergoing a privative penalty before the sentence of the judge; whether because custom understands and receives such laws in no other way, or because by common or particular law it is so provided unto the penalty.

You will say: If laws latae sententiae do not oblige to undergoing before the sentence of the judge, whether active or privative, vainly and uselessly are these clauses added, ipso facto, ipso jure. Therefore.

I answer. I deny both consequences. 1° For of this clause, ipso facto, ipso facto means by sentence pronounced and declared. The sense of this, ipso jure, is by the very disposition of the law, and not by the arbitrament of the judge; because these laws have certain special effects which ferendae sententiae laws have not: 1° Unto this, that the culprit be held to undergo the penalty incurred lata sententia, a condemnatory sentence unto penalty is not required, as in ferendae sententiae laws, but only a declarative sentence of the crime. 2° Because a latae sententiae law after the declaratory sentence is drawn back to the time of the crime committed, so that, if anyone on account of crime be ipso facto deprived of the fruits of a benefice, the declaration of the judge arriving, he must restore the fruits, even those he received after the commission of the crime and before the sentence. Otherwise in ferendae sententiae laws.

Yet I do not deny that, if a law beyond the clause, ipso facto, ipso jure, added others which altogether signified this to be the will of the legislator, that privative penalties be incurred and undergone before the sentence of the judge, e.g., if it should say: « without any other declaration, before every sentence of the judge, [the guilty] are held before God, or in conscience, nor can they previously be absolved, » and the like, it would be more probable that these are incurred immediately, unless it be certainly established by law or custom to the contrary. But nevertheless true is what I said, that such are few, ecclesiastical censures excepted.

I say: That human law may bind under mortal sin, two things are required together, namely grave matter and in the legislator intention of binding under mortal sin, so that if either be wanting the law does not bind under mortal sin. But when the legislator commands or prohibits matter grave in itself or with circumstances taken into account, not otherwise explaining his intention, the law ordinarily binds under mortal sin.

The 1st part is proved. 1° Human law is derived from eternal and natural law. Ergo also its force of binding. Yet eternal and natural laws do not bind under mortal sin in light matter. Ergo. 2° Light matter is not capable of grave obligation. 3° A human law which would command or prohibit a thing altogether light under penalty of temporal death would be unjust, ridiculous and harmful to the common good. Ergo, a fortiori, if it should command or prohibit under penalty of eternal death.

Understand the thing absolutely and light on every side; because, if it be light in itself but grave from circumstances, it can be matter of a law binding under mortal sin.

The 2ª part is proved, concerning which is the greater difficulty. Law is an act of the legislator, and obligation the effect of that act. Yet, according to the principle commonly received L. Non omnis, ff, Si certum petatur, in moral acts the acts of agents do not transcend their intention. Ergo law does not bind beyond the intention of the legislator. Yet in this matter, though grave, the legislator intends to bind only under venial. Ergo.

The adversaries respond that this principle is true in those things which hang upon free will of agents. But, they say, as binding simply does not depend upon the free will of the legislator willing to enact a true law, but follows from the nature of the law itself; so the quantity of obligation does not depend upon his free will, but by the very fact he wills to enact the law, the quantity of obligation results from the nature of the thing and condition of the matter. This is the chief foundation of the adverse opinion.

But against, and at the same time is confirmed the preceding reason and conclusion. 1° Although binding simply be essential to every law, nevertheless binding so much or only thus much is not essential to law, but merely accidental; nor will the adversaries ever prove the contrary. Ergo, although it be not free for the legislator to will to found a true law which does not bind, yet it is free for him to found such a one as binds more or less, according as he willed. 2° The matter of human law is not necessary, but free. The legislator is free to propose it either under counsel or under obligation to penalty only; for from him is the whole obligation of law. Why should he not also be free to propose it under obligation to venial guilt, especially since nothing can be assigned that compels him to fulfill the whole capacity of the matter.

Finally, either obligation of law under venial in grave matter is possible, or not. If the first, we have our intent; if the second, ergo there is no obligation, no law, since the legislator, on whom obligation depends, does not will to bind otherwise.

You will ask 1° whence gravity of matter and the gravely binding intention of the legislator can be discerned.

I answer. and let it be the first rule: That matter is reckoned grave which conduces much to the grave end of the law. Whence, if the end of the law be light, or if it be grave but the thing commanded conduce not much to it, the matter must be reckoned light.

Second rule. When the legislator in enacting a law uses words gravely minatory, e.g.: « Under threat of divine judgment, under indignation of God or the saints, in virtue of holy obedience, » and the like; likewise, when he commands or prohibits something under grave penalty: the matter is reckoned grave and the intention of the legislator gravely binding.

[But if the legislator use these words: « It behooves, it must be done, let them do, do, beware, abstain, » and the like, the thing is ambiguous; because these formulas of speaking sometimes import true precept, sometimes mere exhortation: whence from the manner of speaking and the circumstances, the quantity of matter weighed, judgment must be made about the mind of the legislator. If thence his mind cannot be drawn out, or there be no certain agreement about gravity of matter, let

Third rule. When, notwithstanding the rules laid down, doubt remains either about gravity of matter or about the mind of the legislator, recourse must be had either to custom, which is the best interpreter of laws, or to the judgment of prudent and wise men, whose office it is to interpret laws in emerging doubts. If their opinions disagree so that the law remain truly and seriously doubtful, it can be held as non-existent and non-binding, as was resolved above in the question on Probabilism.

You will ask 2° whether per accidens one can sin mortally against human law in light matter.

I answer. affirmatively, namely if the law be violated with grave scandal foreseen, or from formal contempt perfected. Formal contempt perfected probably is only when someone refuses entirely to subject himself to a superior.]

You will ask 1° whether a human law binds when there is certain danger of death or of other grave harm.

I answer. 1°. A human law binds with danger of life, when its observance is of greater moment than the life of any particular person: which happens in two cases. The first is, when the observance of the law is necessary for the common good. The second, when its violation would redound to the contempt of religion, or of the Church, or of ecclesiastical power. This is common opinion.

It is proved. Natural reason itself says and commands that the greater good be preferred to the lesser. But the common salvation of the commonwealth, and that religion and the Church be not despised, nor God in them, is a greater good than the life of one private person. Therefore.

I answer. 2°. Outside the twofold case of the first conclusion, a human law does not bind with danger of life or of other grave harm to honor, reputation, health, goods of fortune.

It is proved. 1° Divine law itself does not bind with grave detriment, as is evident in the Apostles who plucked ears of corn on the sabbath, and in the integrity of confession which, although of divine law, does not bind with grave harm. 2° Because otherwise the law would not be accommodated to the frailty of men, nor possible according to the morals and custom of the country. 3º Because the legislator has neither from God nor from the people the power of disposing of the life, reputation and goods of subjects, except where the necessity of the common good and of religion requires it.

You will ask 2º whether a law founded upon a false presumption binds in conscience.

I answer. 1° The legislator does not intend to bind, except when the presumption corresponds to truth. Whence, if a law prescribes something presumed to be licit or useful to the common good, and it is illicit or harmful to the common good, it does not bind.

[2° When a law presumes that that on account of which it is enacted happens in all and singular cases, it does not bind in those cases in which it does not happen, because they remain outside the intention of the legislator. 3º But when the law presumes that that on account of which it is enacted happens not in all and singular cases, but only for the most part, or that there is danger lest it happen; although it do not so happen in a particular case, the law does not therefore cease to bind in conscience, for the legislator certainly intends to bind even in this case. For he enacted the law because he presumed that for the most part it is so, or that there is danger lest it be otherwise; which remains true notwithstanding cases which ought to be held as exceptions.

Since, in the supposition, the presumption is not false, it must be said generally that every law founded upon a false presumption does not bind in conscience.]

You will ask 3° whether several laws can be satisfied by one act, or by several acts exercised at the same time.

I answer. 1°. By one act several laws can be satisfied, if they prescribe the same matter; otherwise, if diverse matters.

The reason of the first part is, because by this very thing that the prescribed matter is performed, whether by one act or by several, there is had the whole which is prescribed by the diverse laws. Thus by a single recitation of the Hours a beneficed priest satisfies the double law by which he is bound, as priest and as beneficed, to recite the Hours.

The reason of the second part is evident from the opposite reason; because by one act there is not had the whole which is prescribed by diverse laws dealing with diverse matters. Thus he to whom a confessor enjoins hearing Mass, beyond that to which he is bound from the precept of the Church, does not satisfy by one Mass; because he does not perform the whole which is prescribed by the diverse laws. Consult our treatise on Religion, dissertation 11, a. 8, § 3.

I answer. 2º That several laws can be satisfied by several acts exercised at the same time, when they are not incompossible, or one does not impede the other; because then there is had the whole which the legislators prescribe. Thus he who makes a pilgrimage by vow can recite the office on the way. Likewise he who hears Mass of precept can at that time recite the Hours, or fulfill his sacramental satisfaction.

Otherwise, if they were incompossible, as if anyone during Mass were performing a prescribed work which would impede the attention required at Mass. Concerning him who confesses sacramentally during Mass, and certain other cases belonging to the present matter, see our treatise on Religion, dissertation VI, a. 5.

You will ask 4° whether he who cannot fulfill the whole law is bound to the possible part.

I answer. Affirmatively, if the law concerns a divisible thing, and the term of ability and inability is not uncertain and ambiguous.

It is evident 1° from this proposition condemned by Innocent XI, n. 54: « He who cannot recite Matins and Lauds, but can recite the remaining Hours, is bound to nothing, because the greater part draws to itself the lesser. » 2º Because precisely for this reason someone is excused from the whole, because the whole is impossible to him. But, as is supposed, the part is not impossible to him. Therefore he is not excused from it.

Understand however a part notable in some manner, v. g., in the recitation of the Hours, entire psalms, or the greater part of them, not altogether slight, such as, in the same matter, one or another psalm or hymn, because in moral matters a little is reputed as nothing.

I said also: « If the term of ability and inability is not uncertain and ambiguous, » as v. g., in the sick, in whom it can scarcely, or hardly, be determined what they are able to do, how far they are able, and no further. Whence, if while unable to fulfill the whole law they were bound to the part, there would be place for most grave scruples and continual perplexity in determining the part to which they would be bound. And therefore by right it is presumed of the mind of an equitable legislator that he would not will to bind to the part in similar cases. So say grave theologians.

You will ask 5° whether it is licit to place, or not to remove, impediments to the observance of a human law before the time for fulfilling the law arrives.

I answered this question in the treatise on Religion, dissertation VI, a. 6, question 2, that this is not licit without legitimate cause, especially with the direct intention of exempting oneself from the law.

There are two offices of law: one to direct human actions, the other to compel the unwilling by penalties to its observance.

I.

Whether the legislator is bound by his own laws?

I say: A regular and absolute legislator, such as the Pope, a bishop, a king or any monarch, is not bound by his own laws as to their coercive force, but well indeed as to their directive force, at least indirectly, if the laws regard equally himself and his subjects.¹

The 1st part is plain; because a prince or legislator can be compelled by no one to observe his own law: not by himself, for no one is compelled by himself; not by another, since he has no superior by whose penalty he could be punished.²

It is proved as to the 2nd part. Natural equity requires 1° that a part conform itself to the whole, especially head to members. Whence Aug. says, lib. III Confess., c. 8, n. 15 : « Every part is base which does not suit its whole. » It requires 2° that the legislator concur in his way toward the common good, consequently toward the observance of the law which is laid down on account of the common good. But example moves far more than words toward this observance. Therefore.

You see that this obligation is not sought in the legislator immediately and directly from the very human law, because no one is inferior or superior to himself so as to be able to command himself; but from the natural law itself, with the human law supposed as condition, and therefore I said in the conclusion, « at least indirectly, » whereby you will solve certain objections that can be raised.

I said also in the conclusion: « If the laws regard equally prince and subjects, » such as, e.g., laws taxing the prices of goods or the value of moneys, indicating fasts, feasts, etc. Otherwise if there be question of laws whose matter is diverse in reason between prince and subject, and which would misbeseem the prince, as if a prince should make a law that no one walk girt with a sword, or be clothed in silks, etc.

For with these and similar laws the prince is not bound even as to their directive force, because they do not beseem him.

You will ask whether the legislator is bound under mortal sin to observe his own law in grave matter.

Resp. that he is bound under mortal sin if from transgression there follow grave scandal or grave injury to a third party; suppose that the supreme Pontiff did not publicly read the Hours, did not fast, did not communicate at Easter, did not keep the price of goods or of moneys taxed by himself, or the conditions imposed by himself upon contracts, etc. In this all agree.

But whether, setting aside scandal and injury to a third party, he would sin mortally in grave matter, is doubtful. Some affirm it; because, they say, he is bound to observe his law by the natural law. But the natural law obliges under mortal sin in grave matter. Therefore. Others will that he sin only venially; because the natural law commands him to observe his law only insofar as it unseemly that the head not conform itself to the members, a part to the whole. Yet this unseemliness, setting aside scandal or other grave circumstance, does not seem so great as to constitute mortal sin. Therefore.

To the opposing reason it can be answered that the matter prescribed by human law is not gravely such formally with respect to the legislator, because he is not bound to it as prescribed, like a subject — for he is not bound by his own law — but as subject to seemliness or unseemliness, his law presupposed: just as, although fasting be grave matter in itself, it is nevertheless not grave matter formally with respect to him to whom it is not prescribed under grave obligation.

[Note that the foregoing answers are to be understood, as said, of the sole singular and absolute legislator. For collective legislators, such are the bodies to whom it pertains to enact laws under democratic government, and the general chapters of religious orders, are altogether subject to the laws they themselves have enacted, because, taken privately, they are inferior to the community from which the laws proceed. The same must be said, for the same reason, of the leader of a republic and of the superior general of a religious order, to whom legislative power does not belong personally and absolutely.]

§ II

Whether clerics are bound by civil laws, and religious by episcopal laws?

I say 1° : Clerics are not bound by civil laws imposing tolls, tributes and burdens of this kind.

Thus it stands established 1° from civil law, L. Sancimus 22, c. de sacrosanctis ecclesiis, and Novella Item nulla, c. de episcopis et clericis. 2º From canon law, can. In qualibet, causa 28, q. 6. Cap. Quamquam de censibus in 6º. Cap. Clericis de immunit. ibid. 3° From the great Lateran council, from the councils of Vienne and Trent, sess. xxv, cap. 20, de reform. This I expounded more fully in the treatise on Justice, dissert. IX, a. 7, § 3.

[Here it helps to recall what the Council of Trent sanctioned in this matter, at the place cited: « Desiring that ecclesiastical discipline be not only restored among the Christian people but also preserved perpetually safe and sound from all impediments whatsoever, besides those things which it has decreed concerning ecclesiastical persons, the holy Synod judged that secular princes also are to be admonished of their duty, confiding in them, as Catholics whom God willed to be protectors of the faith and of the Church, that they will not only grant that their right be restored to the Church, but... nor permit that officials or inferior magistrates violate with any greed or any inconsiderateness the immunity of the Church and of ecclesiastical persons constituted by the ordinance of God and by canonical sanctions... It therefore decrees and commands that the sacred canons and general councils, and likewise other apostolic sanctions issued in favor of ecclesiastical persons, of ecclesiastical liberty, and against violators thereof, all of which it renews by the present decree, must be observed exactly by all. » Among the canonical sanctions here alluded to the principal place is held by the constitutions of Alexander IV and Boniface VIII related in the Sexto Decretal., lib. III, tit. 23, de immunit., cap. 1° Quia nonnulli, and 3º Clericis, wherein are reproved and punished with excommunication « the excesses of laymen who imposed collections, tallages and burdens upon clerics, and the excesses of clerics who consented to such things. » Whence it must be concluded that tributes of whatever kind, wherewith ecclesiastical goods are now burdened by force of civil law, are to be paid out of necessity only, not truly out of conscience, because such laws « resist God's ordinance and the canonical sanctions. »]

You will say: Ambrose, cited in can. Si tributum, causa 11, q. 1, says: « If the emperor demands tribute, we deny not; the fields of the Church pay tribute. If the emperor desires fields, he has power of reclaiming them. » And Pope Urban, can. Tributum, causa 23, q. 8: « Concerning exterior things of the Church, what was constituted of old is to be paid to emperors for the peace and quiet by which they ought to protect and defend us. » Therefore.

Resp. ad primum. St. Ambrose does not acknowledge that fields and tribute are owed to the emperor, but rather denies it; yet because it was perilous in those circumstances to deny them, he answers: « If the emperor demands tribute, we deny not; the fields of the Church pay tribute, » namely not with the law commanding but with fear compelling, lest worse happen. « If the emperor desires fields, he has power of reclaiming them, » of fact namely, not of right, « none of us intervenes. » Whence he subjoins: « Let no envy be made over the fields; let them take them if it pleases. To the emperor I do not give, but I do not refuse. »

To the second, it is to be understood of that which was constituted of old, not by authority of imperial laws, but by free concession of the supreme Pontiffs.

I say 2°: Clerics are bound by civil laws which regard the common government, and which clash neither with sacred canons nor with the state of clerics, as to directive, not coercive force. Such are laws taxing prices of goods and the value of moneys, prescribing the manner of building, of making wills, of contracting, and the like. So commonly.

It is proved as to the first part. Clerics are parts and members of the community. Therefore reason and natural equity require that they render those things which pertain to the common government and quiet of the republic, and conform themselves to the whole, according to the aforesaid dictum of Augustine.

It is confirmed, because otherwise there would be confusion and disturbance in the community, while some kept a certain price of merchandise, a certain value of moneys, a certain manner of contracting, etc., and others did not. Therefore.

True, these reasons prove only that clerics are bound by civil laws not by the force of the laws themselves directly, but by the force of the natural law itself, the laws themselves posited as conditions, as we said in the preceding § concerning the legislator himself.

But whether they are bound also directly by the force of these laws?

Resp. negatively; because, according to the canons, clerics are exempted from all civil jurisdiction.

And hence the second part of the conclusion is clear. For if princes have no authority over clerics, they cannot judge and punish them delinquent against the law, but they are to be referred to the ecclesiastical judge, by whom they can be punished either with the penalty taxed by the law or another arbitrary one.

I say 3º : Exempt religious, such as Mendicants, are subjected as to directive, not coercive force, to the laws of bishops regarding common observance and the devotion of the whole people, except in a few cases excepted.

The conclusion is plain from what was said about clerics with respect to civil laws; because, as clerics are exempted from civil jurisdiction, so privileged religious from episcopal jurisdiction. Whence, as clerics are bound by natural equity, that there be conformity in the members and disturbances avoided, by civil laws regarding the common government of the republic, with directive, not coercive force; so exempt religious are bound directive, not coactive, by episcopal laws regarding common observance and the devotion of the whole people.

I said: « Except in a few cases excepted, » on account of the decree of the council of Trent, sess. xxv, de reform. regul., cap. 12, of this tenor: « Censures and interdicts, not only emanating from the Apostolic See but also promulgated by Ordinaries at the mandate of the bishop, are to be published and observed by regulars in their churches. Also the feast days which the same bishop shall have commanded to be observed in his diocese are to be observed by all exempt persons, even regulars. »

§ III

Are those private in use of reason bound by human laws, and infidels and heretics by ecclesiastical laws?

I say 1° : Those constantly private in use of reason, such as infants and perpetual madmen, are not bound by human laws; because, since human law is a rational precept, they are not capable of this bond through defect of reason and liberty. Whence laws are not held to be laid upon them, nor do legislators comprehend them.

But those who are private in use of reason only for a time, such as the drunk, sleepers, madmen having lucid intervals, are bound by human laws; because although they lack the actual exercise of reason and liberty, this is per accidens, and they have both in habit, since reason in them is not extinguished but asleep, and therefore they are proximately capable of acknowledging and keeping the law. Nevertheless, through defect of actual cognition and liberty, so long as they lack them, they are excused from sin in transgressing the law.

Hence you will infer that infants and perpetual madmen can eat flesh on forbidden days, and that others may give it to them to eat; because, since they are not bound by the law, it is to cooperate in a licit thing. Otherwise of the drunk and the temporarily mad; because since these are bound by the law, it would be to cooperate in its material transgression, which is not lawful.

I say 2º : Children, when they have reached the years of discretion, since then they are capable of precept, are bound by all human laws both civil and ecclesiastical; provided however they suit their age. For there are certain laws from which they are exempted by reason of age, such as the law of fasting, by which they are not bound before the completion of the third septennium, on account of the necessity of nourishment for growth; and the law of paschal communion, on account of the reverence owed to the sacrament, which requires a more mature age, namely about the twelfth year. But a child is held to have reached the years of discretion after the completion of the seventh year.

I say 3° : Infidels are not bound by ecclesiastical laws, because they are not subjects of the Church. But heretics are bound, because through baptism they are subjects of the Church. Nor can it be presumed that the Church exempts from the obligation of her laws sons rebellious against their mother, since this would both foster their insolence and afford Catholics occasion of perversion.

IV

By what laws are wayfarers and pilgrims bound?

I say 1° : Wayfarers and pilgrims, as a rule, are not bound by the particular laws of their own territory while they are elsewhere, whether passing through or staying permanently, provided they do not absent themselves in passing through with this precise mind that they be exempted from the law, otherwise intending to remain.

It is proved 1° from canon law: Cap. Ut animarum de constit., in 6°, Boniface VIII says: « Upon the statute of a bishop whereby sentence of excommunication is promulgated upon all who commit theft, his subjects committing theft outside his diocese are known to be nowise bound. » And he subjoins the reason: « Since outside the territory of him who pronounces judgment, obedience is not paid with impunity. »

It is proved 2º By reason. 1° Because the jurisdiction of a prince or bishop is limited within his own territory, nor is it extended beyond. 2º The particular laws of some territory are properly local. Yet a local law affects the place immediately, and persons mediately through the place. Therefore those absent from the place are exempted from them. And herein these laws differ from those which are called personal, such as, e.g., the law of reciting the Hours, which affects the cleric independently of any determinate place.

I said 1º « as a rule; » because there are certain laws regarding a thing or the advantage or disadvantage of a territory, whose transgressions are consummated even by those absent within their own territory, such as the law obliging clerics to appear at a certain time at synod or chapter; likewise laws regarding benefices, fields, buildings, by which even those absent are bound.

I said 2°: « Unless they pass through absently, with this precise mind that they be exempted from the law, otherwise intending to remain; » because there intervenes fraud there, « but fraud and deceit patronize no one, » as all admit and as is enacted by law.

[You will ask 1º whether all who leave their own territory with the mind of withdrawing themselves from the obligation of the law are held to act in fraud of the law.

Resp. It is controverted. Concina, Collet, Antoine and certain others affirm. The reason is that, as said above, no one's fraud ought to patronize himself. But it is denied more commonly and probably, because one leaving his own territory acts not in fraud of the law but uses his right, as say St. Alphonsus, lib. I, n. 157, Elbel, n. 370, Lacroix, n. 683, and others. For one may always add exempting causes, and more probably even directly and proximately. The reason is that the law does not of itself make anyone its subject, but is borne toward him who already is subject; and therefore, at least speaking per se, it obliges no one so that he be or remain its subject, but obliges him who is and remains subject. Therefore if anyone withdraw himself from the dominion of the law by an action licit from elsewhere, he does not act in fraud of the law but uses his right.

Therefore acting in fraud of the law seems to occur in only two cases, whether the law be local or personal: 1° When by fiction of law one absent is held to transgress the law in his own territory. Which happens when the law deals with things situated in its own territory, such as fields, buildings, payment of real tributes, etc.; or commands or forbids actions to be done or omitted in the same territory, such as residence imposed upon beneficed clerics and presence at the diocesan synod for those who must belong to this assembly by law; or the introduction of certain merchandise, from which not only those present but also those absent are bound to abstain. 2° When it is expressly forbidden by some law. Thus the sacred Congregation of the council declared illicit and invalid the marriage of those who pass from the place where the Tridentine decree on clandestinity was promulgated into a place where the promulgation of this decree was not made, with this precise mind that they contract clandestinely there; which decision was confirmed by the constitution of Urban VIII.

You will ask 2° whether he who passes from his domicile, where a law is in force, e.g., for the keeping of some feast or fast, into a place where such law does not exist, is bound to observe it before departure.

Resp. It is controverted. Some affirm. Their reason is that a law which actually obliges ought actually to be fulfilled. Whence he who departs in the morning ought to hear Mass on the feast day, unless grave necessity urge, and it is not lawful for him to breakfast. Others deny, for this reason, that a law need not be actually fulfilled if afterwards it be not necessary that it be fulfilled. If therefore in your territory there is a local feast, and you are about to depart to another place where that feast is not observed, you are not bound to hear Mass before departure, provided you are about to arrive outside the place where the precept is in force before the time of obligation ceases. The reason is that the precept does not oblige you to wait. So Gury, n. 95, 4°, with St. Alphonsus, lib. 1, n. 157, and Salmanticenses, n. 66. Likewise, if someone is about to leave a place where there is a fast, and knows with certainty that he will arrive in the evening at a place where there is no fast, then, although he cannot eat flesh there whence he departs, since that abstinence is divisible, he can nevertheless breakfast there and dine at midday — against some, as teach Lessius, cap. 2, dist. 8, and Sanchez, lib. I, cap. 12. So St. Alphonsus, ubi supra. The reason is that fasting is an individual thing. From which it follows also that he who leaves his territory where there is no fast and passes into another where fasting is observed can sup in the evening. This latter opinion is probable enough to be safely carried into practice. Nevertheless, with St. Alphonsus, ibid., we say that the contrary opinion can be urged as more pious, unless something stand in the way.

I say 2° : Not only those who have domicile or quasi-domicile in a foreign territory, but also those who are there in passing through, such as wayfarers, pilgrims and wanderers, are more probably bound by the particular laws of that territory, if they draw out there a stay proportioned to the observance of the law.

Of those who have domicile in foreign territory there is no difficulty: all agree that they are bound by the laws of that territory. He is said to have domicile in some territory who dwells or begins to dwell with the mind of dwelling there always; quasi-domicile, who dwells in it during a notable part of the year. Some say a greater, others a lesser [part], provided it be notable, such as students in academies, merchants in emporiums, princes at courts, etc. These therefore, by this very fact that they have fixed domicile or quasi-domicile elsewhere, are certainly bound by all the laws of that place, and acquire its forum, civil as well as ecclesiastical, and acquire a parish, no otherwise than other inhabitants, so that they can be summoned before its judge, contract marriage there, be dispensed by the Ordinary in votis, etc. Except the sacred Orders, which they cannot receive except from the bishop of the place of birth, on account of the contrary disposition of law or custom.

Therefore as to wayfarers, pilgrims and wanderers: It is proved 1° from Ambrose, in Augustine, Epist. 55³ , and related in cap. Illa, dist. 10, where Augustine asking him on behalf of his mother whether she might licitly not fast on Saturday at Milan, Ambrose answers: « When I come to Rome, I fast on Saturday; when I am at Milan, I do not fast. So do thou also, to whatever church thou chancest to come, observe its custom, if thou wouldst not give scandal to anyone, nor receive scandal from anyone. » Whence the common saying: « If you be at Rome, live in the Roman manner; if you be elsewhere, live as there. »

It is proved 2° By reason. 1° By the law of nations, with the consent of legislators, by usage and the common sense of peoples it has been established, to safeguard peaceful intercourse with and conformity to each place and avoid scandals, that everyone keep the laws of the territory in which he is; open indication of which is that superiors of that territory can compel newcomers to the observance of their laws and take notice of delinquents.

2° A brief absence suffices that pilgrims be exempted from the laws proper to their own territory, as we said. Therefore a brief presence suffices that they be subjected to the laws proper to the territory in which they are; for he who perceives the advantage ought also to perceive the disadvantage.

You will say: Wayfarers and pilgrims cannot contract marriage in the territory in which they are passing through, nor be dispensed in votis by its Ordinary. Therefore.

Resp. I deny the consequence, both because these things are not required for the peaceful government of the community like the observance of municipal laws; and because these things are excepted by the common law.

I said: « If he draws out there a stay proportioned to the observance of the law, » because no one is held morally to exist in a place with respect to the obligation and observance of the law if he exists in it no time accommodated to its observance. And hence authors commonly infer that he who passes through a place where there is a feast day, and tarries there only one or two hours, even before midday, is not bound to Mass; otherwise if he remained the whole morning.

[It must be enacted: 1° Pilgrims are bound by all the common laws in force in the place where they actually are, even if in their own territory these were abrogated, or would not bind here and now by dispensation. The reason is that they are under the common legislator, and leaving their own territory even for a time, they no longer enjoy the local privilege. Thus a Frenchman outside his country is bound to hear Mass on the feasts of Epiphany, Corpus Christi, etc., in places where these feasts have not been suppressed.

2° Whenever there is question both of contracts to be celebrated and of delicts, the pilgrim is subject to the laws of the place; because in the former case, as bears the adage of law, « locus regit actum; »

and in the latter, public order requires that crimes not remain unpunished.

3° Local statutes which regard the community are to be observed by all, even by foreigners. For these statutes affect the territory, and all persons actually existing there through the mediation of the territory. However this some understand, with Suarez, of those who have arrived at the term of the journey, not truly of those passing through the territory, who are bound only to observe negative laws.

4° Personal statutes bind citizens and inhabitants only, because they affect persons, not truly properly the territory. Whence they cannot be extended to foreigners. Indeed it can happen that pilgrims, in certain cases, ought to observe them to avoid scandal; but then the obligation is only indirect and does not proceed from the law itself.

You will ask whether he who has already satisfied the law in his own territory is again bound to subject himself to it if afterward he arrives where that law urges later, e.g., when some feast having a vigil with fasting is transferred there to the following day.

Resp. If anyone has already satisfied a common law in his own territory, he does not seem bound to observe the same law again in the place where it urges later. The reason is that there is not given an obligation of fulfilling the same precept twice, when it was already fulfilled at the time commonly appointed. For where a determinate debt has already been paid, it is not to be paid again, and then the adage can rightly be invoked: « Non bis in idem. » Whence, in the case supposed, he who has already fasted on the vigil of the day on which the feast falls everywhere will not be bound to fast on the other.]