Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II
Charles René Billuart (1685–1757)
Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae. Tomus II.
First published 1884
Charles-René Billuart, O.P.'s Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae, Tomus II, treats human acts, passions and virtues, sin, law, and grace in the Thomistic manual tradition. Schola presents the complete Latin Tome II from the Paris Vives edition of 1884.
Tractatus I: De actibus humanis
Dissertatio I: De voluntario et involuntario
Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit voluntarium?
Articulus II: Utrum omissio et effectus ex ea secutus sint voluntaria sine praecepto ponendi actum qui omittitur?
Articulus III: Utrum violentia causet involuntarium?
Articulus IV: Utrum metus causet involuntarium?
Articulus V: Utrum concupiscentia causet involuntarium?
Articulus VI: Utrum ignorantia causet involuntarium?
Dissertatio II: De voluntario libero, sive de libertate creata
Articulus I: Praenotanda
Articulus II: Utrum in homine lapso sit libertas arbitrii seu indifferentiae?
Articulus III: Utrum ad merendum vel demerendum, in hoc statu naturae lapsae, requiratur libertas a necessitate, seu libertas indifferentiae?
Dissertatio III: De actibus humanis speciatim sumptis
Articulus I: Utrum voluntas possit velle malum sub ratione mali?
Articulus II: De motivo voluntatis quoad specificationem
Articulus III: De motivo voluntatis quoad exercitium
Articulus IV: De modo quo movetur voluntas : an libere, an necessario?
Articulus V: De actibus elicitis a voluntate
Articulus VI: De actibus imperatis.** D. Thomas, q. 17
Dissertatio IV: De actibus humanis in esse moris
Articulus I: In quo consistat moralitas in communi actuum humanorum ?
Articulus II: De principiis moralitatis
Articulus III: De concursu multiplicis moralitatis simul in eodem actu
Articulus IV: Utrum dentur actus indifferentes?
Articulus V: Utrum et quomodo voluntas humana, ut sit bona, debeat conformari voluntati divinae?
Articulus VI: Utrum actus exterior addat bonitatem vel malitiam actui interiori?
Articulus VII: Utrum eventus sequens addat ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus exterioris?
Dissertatio V: De conscientia
Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit conscientia?
Articulus II: An et quomodo teneamur conformari conscientiae erranti?
Articulus III: Cujus speciei et gravitatis sit peccatum agere contra conscientiam?
Articulus IV: Quomodo se gerere debeat confessarius cum poenitente quem deprehendit laborare conscientia erronea?
Articulus V: De conscientia scrupulosa, per varias quaestiunculas
Articulus VI: Utrum liceat agere cum conscientia dubia, probabili, aut probabiliori?
Dissertatio VI: De opinionum probabilitate et delectu
Articulus I: Utrum sit licitum sequi opinionem minus probabilem et minus tutam, in concursu probabilioris et tutioris?
Articulus II: Utrum in conflictu duarum opinionum aeque probabilium, de honestate objectiva actus, liceat sequi minus tutam faventem libertati, relicta tutiori favente legi ?
Articulus III: Utrum liceat sequi opinionem probabiliorem minus tutam in concursu minus probabilis tutioris, ubi agitur de sola honestate objectiva actus?
Articulus IV: Varia quaestiunculae circa praesentem materiam breviter resolvuntur
Dissertatio VII: De probabilismo moderato
Articulus I: De natura probabilitatis
Articulus II: Quaenam systemata prodierint circa probabilitatem in practicis?
Articulus III: An liceat sequi opinionem vere et solide probabilem faventem libertati, relicta tutiore aeque probabili, vel etiam probabiliori, ubi de sola liceitate actionis agitur?
Articulus IV: De usu probabilitatis et de regulis specialibus quibus conscientia in dubiis practice formatur
Articulus V: Utrum liceat sequi opinionem probabilem, aut etiam probabiliorem, relicta tutiore, cum adest obligatio certa finem determinatum obtinendi?
Articulus VI: De probabilismo compensativo
Tractatus II: De passionibus et virtutibus
Dissertatio I: De passionibus
Articulus I: De passionibus in particulari
Dissertatio II: De virtutibus
Articulus I: Quid sit virtus, et quotuplicis generis?
Articulus II: De subjecto virtutum
Articulus III: De causa virtutum
Articulus IV: De proprietatibus virtutum
Tractatus III: De peccatis
Dissertatio I: De natura peccati
Articulus I: Quid sit peccatum?
Articulus II: Utrum formale constitutivum peccati commissionis consistat in positivo, an in privativo?
Articulus III: De peccato omissionis
Dissertatio II: De distinctione specifica et numerica peccatorum
Articulus I: Varia peccati divisiones
Articulus II: Unde petatur distinctio specifica peccatorum?
Articulus III: Utrum peccata commissionis et omissionis specie distinguantur?
Articulus IV: Unde petatur distinctio numerica peccatorum?
Dissertatio III: De comparatione peccatorum ad invicem
Articulus I: Utrum omnia peccata sint inter se connexa et paria ?
Articulus II: Unde sumatur inaequalitas peccatorum ?
Dissertatio IV: De subjecto peccati
Articulus I: Quodnam sit peccati subjectum ?
Articulus II: Utrum peccatum saltem veniale possit esse in et a solo appetitu sensitivo, absque omni actuali influxu voluntatis; omnesque motus sensualitatis sint peccata?
Dissertatio V: De causis peccatorum
Articulus I: An et quae ignorantia sit causa peccati, eaque ipsa sit peccatum?
Articulus II: Utrum possit dari ignorantia invincibilis juris divini positivi?
Articulus III: Utrum dari possit ignorantia invincibilis juris naturae?
Articulus IV: Utrum ignorantia invincibilis juris naturae excuset a peccato?
Articulus V: De inadvertentia ad peccatum
Articulus VI: Utrum ignorantia excuset a poenis per leges positivas statutis?
Articulus VII: Utrum Deus sit causa peccati?
Dissertatio VI: De peccato originali
Articulus I: Utrum sit peccatum originale ab Adamo ad posteros transmissum?
Articulus II: Variae quaestiones circa traductionem peccati originalis breviter resolvuntur
Articulus III: Utrum beatissima Virgo Maria peccatum originale in sua Conceptione contraxerit ?
Articulus IV: Utrum S. Thomas negaverit beatam Virginem Deiparam fuisse a peccato originali immunem?
Articulus V: In quo sita sit essentia peccati originalis ?
Dissertatio VII: De effectibus peccati
Articulus I: Utrum ex peccato actuali remaneat in anima macula seu peccatum habituale, et quid sit ?
Articulus II: De reatu poenae
Articulus III: Qualis poenae reatum inducit peccatum?
Articulus IV: DE POENA DEBITA PECCATO ORIGINALI
Dissertatio VIII: De peccato mortali et veniali
Articulus I: Utrum detur peccatum veniale ex natura sua distinctum a mortali ?
Articulus II: In quo et quomodo peccatum mortale et veniale inter se differunt ?
Articulus III: Utrum veniale disponat ad mortale, possitque fieri mortale, et e contra mortale fieri veniale ?
Articulus IV: Quis sit finis ultimus tam peccantis mortaliter quam venialiter?
Articulus V: Utrum peccatum mortale in ratione offensae sit gravitatis simpliciter infinitae?
Articulus VI: Utrum homo in primo instanti morali usus rationis teneatur se convertere ad Deum, possitque esse peccatum veniale cum solo originali?
Tractatus IV: De legibus
Dissertatio I: De lege in communi
Articulus I: Quid sit lex?
Articulus II: Utrum promulgatio sit essentia legis?
Articulus III: Quinam possunt ferre leges?
Dissertatio II: De lege aeterna et naturali
Articulus I: De lege aeterna
Articulus II: De lege naturali
D. Thomas, q. 94.
[You will ask 1° whether natural law be given in us.
I answer. in the affirmative.
It is proved. 1° from the Apostle, Rom., II, 14 and 15: The nations who have not the law, namely the Mosaic or Evangelical law, naturally do those things that are of the law. Such as have not the law are a law to themselves, who show the work of the law written in their hearts. From St. Ambrose, lib. IX, epist. 71: « That law is not written but innate, nor is it perceived by any reading, but is expressed in each one by a flowing fountain of nature; » from St. Augustine, lib. II Confess., c. 4, n. 9: « Thy law, O Lord, law written in the hearts of men, which not even iniquity itself erases, » and lib. II de Sermone Domini in monte, c. 9, n. 32: « Who wrote in the hearts of men the natural law, save God? »
It is proved. 2° by reason1. « Law, says St. Thomas, since it be a rule and measure, can be in someone in a twofold way: in one mode, as in the ruler and measurer; in another mode, as in the ruled and measured, because insofar as it participates something of rule or measure, so is it ruled or measured. Whence, since all things which are subject to divine providence are regulated and measured by the eternal law, it is manifest that all things participate after a manner in the eternal law, namely insofar as from its impression they have inclinations into their proper acts and ends. — But among other things the rational creature is subject to divine providence in an excellent manner, insofar as it itself becomes a partaker of providence, providing for itself and for others. Whence also in it is participated eternal reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its due act and end. And such participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called natural law. »
It is confirmed by the intimate sense and testimony of everyone. For there is no one who does not experience in himself some dictate intimating and commanding that good must be done, evil avoided, God adored, parents honored, lying not committed, stealing not done, etc., in all of which, as the Apostle says, Rom., II, 15, their conscience rendering testimony to them. But this dictate is called natural law.]
You will ask 2° what natural law is.
I answer. Among various opinions, it seems truer that natural law is nothing else than the natural light as impressed upon and participated from reason or the eternal law2; because thus are had all things which are wont to be attributed to natural law. 1° It is inborn in us, and found in children and the insane. 2° It is not only demonstrative of good, but also preceptive, because it is impression and participation of the eternal law, consequently empire of superior over inferior. 3° It binds by divine right, because it is immediately from God.
You will ask 3° whether natural law contain more precepts, or only one.
I answer. that it contains more precepts, which nevertheless are founded upon this one: « Good must be done, evil must be avoided »3.
[Precepts of a triple kind are natural, according as there is in man a triple grade of inclination: 1° According to common nature with all beings, there is in him inclination toward conservation of his being, according to which the law of nature commands that sleep, food be taken, destructive things resisted. 2° According to common nature with all animals, there is in him inclination toward conservation of species, according to which there pertain to the law of nature the precepts of temperance concerning acts tending to this end and the education of offspring. 3° According to the nature of reason, which is proper to man, there is in him inclination to truth about God to be known, to immortality, to communication with other intellectual beings: and to this respond the precepts of adoring God, honoring parents, and similar things of religion and justice.]
They are distinguished. again, the precepts of the law of nature into those per se known to all, such as are the first and universal ones: « Good must be done, evil avoided; what thou wilt not have done to thyself, do thou not to another, etc.; » and into those which are more determined and are drawn immediately from the first, such as the precepts of the Decalogue; at length into remoter ones, which are drawn from the first only mediately, such as many which concern contracts4.
[Precepts of the law of nature can moreover be distinguished by order to the persons about whom they are concerned; for some are about God, some about neighbor, some about ourselves.
Therefore the law of nature can be said to be manifold and one: manifold, because it contains many and diverse precepts; one, because all precepts are founded on one, as was said, and are ordered to one last end.]
You will ask 4° whether natural law bind all men, even children and the insane.
I answer. in the affirmative. Yet it binds children and the insane only imperfectly and in first act, not perfectly and in second act.
The reason of the first part, because natural law is innate in all, even children and the insane, from nature itself, as was said, so that what children and the insane do against the law of nature is base and unseemly, as if they blaspheme, defile themselves, or do anything like, and no one may induce them to these; which is an open sign that they are comprehended under natural law and bound by it at least in first act.
The reason of the second part is, that children and the insane are not so bound by natural law that, if they transgress it, they sin and incur guilt of punishment, but are excused from sin and punishment, inasmuch as that law is not promulgated to them; for it is promulgated through actual dictate or discourse, whereof they are not capable: consequently it does not bind them perfectly and in second act.
You will ask 5° whether every obligation be an effect of natural law.
I answer. that not every obligation is a proximate effect of natural law, yet that it is a remote effect.
The reason of the first part is, that positive laws, divine as well as human, bind per se immediately, nor will anyone say that the obligation of fasting in Lent, confessing annually, communicating at Easter, believing, hoping, etc., arise proximately and per se from natural law.
The reason of the second part is: Positive law binds therefore, because natural law dictates and prescribes that obedience be rendered to one legitimately commanding, and hence theologians teach that no one turns away from God as supernatural author without turning away from him as natural author; which cannot be verified except because, transgressing the supernatural law, he at once transgresses natural law.
Whether and how natural right is distinguished from the right of nations, you have in the tract. on Right, dissert. I, art. 3.
Again, whether invincible ignorance of natural right could occur? The affirmative solution and ample proof seek in the preceding tract. dissert. V, art. 4.
There remains one question alone, likewise celebrated, although perhaps more of name than of thing is treated in it, namely whether natural law admit dispensation. Whence