Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

[ You will ask 1º whether there is given in God an eternal law.

Resp. affirmatively, and I prove it¹ . Law is nothing else than the dictate of practical reason in the ruler who governs some perfect community. Yet such a dictate is from eternity in God, as in the ruler governing the whole

²

community of the universe. Therefore. — Prob. min. The whole community of the universe is governed by divine providence, as stands established 1ª p., q. 22, a. 1 and 2. Yet providence concerning singulars supposes the dictate of practical reason concerning universals, and is inferred from it as conclusion from principles. Moreover the divine reason conceives nothing in time but has an eternal concept, as said of Wisdom, Prov., VIII, 22 and 23 : The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, before he made any thing from the beginning. From eternity I was ordained. Therefore there is given in God from eternity a dictate, etc. ]

You will ask 2° what eternal law is.

Resp³ . Eternal law is nothing else than the reason of the divine wisdom, according as it is directive of the actions and motions of creatures toward the common good of the whole universe.

It is proved ⁴ . As in any artisan there preexists the reason of those things constituted by art, so in any governor there preexists the reason of the order of things to be done through those subjected to his governance: and as the reason of things made through art is called art or exemplar of the things crafted, so the reason of the governor governing the acts of subjects obtains the notion of law, other things being preserved which we said above belong to the notion of law. Yet God is not only through his power creator of all things, to which he is compared as artisan to the thing crafted, as said 1ª p., q. 14, a. 8, c. But he is also governor of all acts and motions found in creatures, as had ibidem, q. 103, a. 5, c. Therefore, as the reason of the divine wisdom whereby all things are created has the notion of art or exemplar, or idea; so the reason of the divine wisdom moving and directing all things to their due end obtains the notion of law.

[ The eternal law therefore differs from the divine idea, insofar

⁵

the divine idea is the exemplar of things to be made, while the eternal law is the order of things to be governed, either inferring necessity upon them, as in natural things, or inducing moral obligation, as in intellectual creatures. They differ with respect to law as conclusion with respect to universal principle; and as in us law hands down rules in general according to which prudence dictates what is to be done here and now, so in God the eternal law hands down rules in general for the government of the whole world, according to which providence, which is part of prudence, disposes in particular concerning the motions of creatures. From which it follows that the eternal law has truly and properly the notion of law, at least with respect to intellectual creatures, since it is an ordination of reason toward the common good by him who has care of the community. With respect however to irrational creatures it does not seem to have properly and strictly the notion of law, because these beings are not capable of instruction and moral obligation, which law strictly taken imports. It has therefore respect to them imperfectly and improperly the notion of law, inasmuch as it directs them in their motions through instinct or natural necessity.

Note that positive divine law, as it is in God the legislator, is the very eternal law inadequately taken, both because it does not extend to so many [things] nor under so diverse a connotate, and because it connotes existing creatures to whom it is intimated. As considered truly in those who direct themselves according to it or publish it, it is a participation of the eternal law and derived from it.]

You will ask 3° whether all other laws are derived from the eternal law.

Resp. affirmatively⁶ .

It is proved 1°. Prov., VII, 15: eternal Wisdom, whose reason is the eternal law, says: By me kings reign and lawmakers decree just things. Rom., XIII, 1 : There is no power but from God.

It is proved 2°. In all subordinate movers it is necessary that the virtue of the second mover be derived from the virtue of the first mover, because the second mover moves not unless insofar as it is moved by the first ⁷ . Yet to govern is a certain moving. Therefore in governors it is necessary that the reason of governing be derived from the first governor to the second ones. And thus we see that the reason of things done in a city is derived from the prince to inferior administrators, and in artificial things the reason of artificial acts is derived from the architect to inferior artisans. — I subsume. Yet the eternal law is the reason of government in the first and supreme governor. Therefore all reasons of government, consequently all laws which are in inferior governors, are derived from the eternal law.

It is confirmed. The eternal law is law by essence, but all other laws are laws by participation. Yet what is such by participation is derived from what is such by essence, as heat in water derived from fire. Therefore.

Laws can be understood to be derived from the eternal law in a threefold manner: 1° As from an exemplar; because all laws, that they be just, must be conformable to the eternal law. 2° As from an efficient cause; because every inferior legislative power is from God, inasmuch as God, instituting human nature as social, conferred upon it governing and legislative power, without which society or community would not subsist, according to that word Prov., XI, 14 : Where there is no governor, the people shall fall. But the community, since it could not easily exercise this power through itself, conferred it upon few or one, as I said in the preceding dissertation. Whence every power is efficiently from God mediately or immediately. 3° Inasmuch as the eternal law, through the mediation of the light of reason or faith, dictates and approves which and when laws are to be instituted on account of the diversity of circumstances, persons, places and times.

[Note, for the solution of objections regarding the natural law, that it can be considered in two ways: 1° Taken materially on account of its foundation, which is the relation of convenience or inconvenience of extremes among themselves, precisely as from the nature of the thing, abstracting from existence: as that to worship God is good and convenient, to lie evil and inconvenient. In this sense the natural law is not derived from the eternal law; for even if per impossibile God willed or understood nothing, to worship God would be good in itself, to lie indeed evil; which is called fundamentally good and evil. 2° The natural law can be taken formally for the dictate of reason judging of that honesty and turpitude of objects in themselves, and at the same time deciding conformably to the eternal law that God is to be worshiped, mendacity however avoided. And in this sense the natural law is derived from the eternal law, because it is a dictate impressed by God, conformable to the eternal dictate as to exemplar.]