DISSERTATION II

ON THE ETERNAL AND NATURAL LAW

St. Thomas, qq. 93 and 94.

[ You will ask 1º whether there is given in God an eternal law.

Resp. affirmatively, and I prove it¹ . Law is nothing else than the dictate of practical reason in the ruler who governs some perfect community. Yet such a dictate is from eternity in God, as in the ruler governing the whole

²

community of the universe. Therefore. — Prob. min. The whole community of the universe is governed by divine providence, as stands established 1ª p., q. 22, a. 1 and 2. Yet providence concerning singulars supposes the dictate of practical reason concerning universals, and is inferred from it as conclusion from principles. Moreover the divine reason conceives nothing in time but has an eternal concept, as said of Wisdom, Prov., VIII, 22 and 23 : The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, before he made any thing from the beginning. From eternity I was ordained. Therefore there is given in God from eternity a dictate, etc. ]

You will ask 2° what eternal law is.

Resp³ . Eternal law is nothing else than the reason of the divine wisdom, according as it is directive of the actions and motions of creatures toward the common good of the whole universe.

It is proved ⁴ . As in any artisan there preexists the reason of those things constituted by art, so in any governor there preexists the reason of the order of things to be done through those subjected to his governance: and as the reason of things made through art is called art or exemplar of the things crafted, so the reason of the governor governing the acts of subjects obtains the notion of law, other things being preserved which we said above belong to the notion of law. Yet God is not only through his power creator of all things, to which he is compared as artisan to the thing crafted, as said 1ª p., q. 14, a. 8, c. But he is also governor of all acts and motions found in creatures, as had ibidem, q. 103, a. 5, c. Therefore, as the reason of the divine wisdom whereby all things are created has the notion of art or exemplar, or idea; so the reason of the divine wisdom moving and directing all things to their due end obtains the notion of law.

[ The eternal law therefore differs from the divine idea, insofar

⁵

the divine idea is the exemplar of things to be made, while the eternal law is the order of things to be governed, either inferring necessity upon them, as in natural things, or inducing moral obligation, as in intellectual creatures. They differ with respect to law as conclusion with respect to universal principle; and as in us law hands down rules in general according to which prudence dictates what is to be done here and now, so in God the eternal law hands down rules in general for the government of the whole world, according to which providence, which is part of prudence, disposes in particular concerning the motions of creatures. From which it follows that the eternal law has truly and properly the notion of law, at least with respect to intellectual creatures, since it is an ordination of reason toward the common good by him who has care of the community. With respect however to irrational creatures it does not seem to have properly and strictly the notion of law, because these beings are not capable of instruction and moral obligation, which law strictly taken imports. It has therefore respect to them imperfectly and improperly the notion of law, inasmuch as it directs them in their motions through instinct or natural necessity.

Note that positive divine law, as it is in God the legislator, is the very eternal law inadequately taken, both because it does not extend to so many [things] nor under so diverse a connotate, and because it connotes existing creatures to whom it is intimated. As considered truly in those who direct themselves according to it or publish it, it is a participation of the eternal law and derived from it.]

You will ask 3° whether all other laws are derived from the eternal law.

Resp. affirmatively⁶ .

It is proved 1°. Prov., VII, 15: eternal Wisdom, whose reason is the eternal law, says: By me kings reign and lawmakers decree just things. Rom., XIII, 1 : There is no power but from God.

It is proved 2°. In all subordinate movers it is necessary that the virtue of the second mover be derived from the virtue of the first mover, because the second mover moves not unless insofar as it is moved by the first ⁷ . Yet to govern is a certain moving. Therefore in governors it is necessary that the reason of governing be derived from the first governor to the second ones. And thus we see that the reason of things done in a city is derived from the prince to inferior administrators, and in artificial things the reason of artificial acts is derived from the architect to inferior artisans. — I subsume. Yet the eternal law is the reason of government in the first and supreme governor. Therefore all reasons of government, consequently all laws which are in inferior governors, are derived from the eternal law.

It is confirmed. The eternal law is law by essence, but all other laws are laws by participation. Yet what is such by participation is derived from what is such by essence, as heat in water derived from fire. Therefore.

Laws can be understood to be derived from the eternal law in a threefold manner: 1° As from an exemplar; because all laws, that they be just, must be conformable to the eternal law. 2° As from an efficient cause; because every inferior legislative power is from God, inasmuch as God, instituting human nature as social, conferred upon it governing and legislative power, without which society or community would not subsist, according to that word Prov., XI, 14 : Where there is no governor, the people shall fall. But the community, since it could not easily exercise this power through itself, conferred it upon few or one, as I said in the preceding dissertation. Whence every power is efficiently from God mediately or immediately. 3° Inasmuch as the eternal law, through the mediation of the light of reason or faith, dictates and approves which and when laws are to be instituted on account of the diversity of circumstances, persons, places and times.

[Note, for the solution of objections regarding the natural law, that it can be considered in two ways: 1° Taken materially on account of its foundation, which is the relation of convenience or inconvenience of extremes among themselves, precisely as from the nature of the thing, abstracting from existence: as that to worship God is good and convenient, to lie evil and inconvenient. In this sense the natural law is not derived from the eternal law; for even if per impossibile God willed or understood nothing, to worship God would be good in itself, to lie indeed evil; which is called fundamentally good and evil. 2° The natural law can be taken formally for the dictate of reason judging of that honesty and turpitude of objects in themselves, and at the same time deciding conformably to the eternal law that God is to be worshiped, mendacity however avoided. And in this sense the natural law is derived from the eternal law, because it is a dictate impressed by God, conformable to the eternal dictate as to exemplar.]

D. Thomas, q. 94.

[You will ask 1° whether natural law be given in us.

I answer. in the affirmative.

It is proved. 1° from the Apostle, Rom., II, 14 and 15: The nations who have not the law, namely the Mosaic or Evangelical law, naturally do those things that are of the law. Such as have not the law are a law to themselves, who show the work of the law written in their hearts. From St. Ambrose, lib. IX, epist. 71: « That law is not written but innate, nor is it perceived by any reading, but is expressed in each one by a flowing fountain of nature; » from St. Augustine, lib. II Confess., c. 4, n. 9: « Thy law, O Lord, law written in the hearts of men, which not even iniquity itself erases, » and lib. II de Sermone Domini in monte, c. 9, n. 32: « Who wrote in the hearts of men the natural law, save God? »

It is proved. 2° by reason¹. « Law, says St. Thomas, since it be a rule and measure, can be in someone in a twofold way: in one mode, as in the ruler and measurer; in another mode, as in the ruled and measured, because insofar as it participates something of rule or measure, so is it ruled or measured. Whence, since all things which are subject to divine providence are regulated and measured by the eternal law, it is manifest that all things participate after a manner in the eternal law, namely insofar as from its impression they have inclinations into their proper acts and ends. — But among other things the rational creature is subject to divine providence in an excellent manner, insofar as it itself becomes a partaker of providence, providing for itself and for others. Whence also in it is participated eternal reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its due act and end. And such participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called natural law. »

It is confirmed by the intimate sense and testimony of everyone. For there is no one who does not experience in himself some dictate intimating and commanding that good must be done, evil avoided, God adored, parents honored, lying not committed, stealing not done, etc., in all of which, as the Apostle says, Rom., II, 15, their conscience rendering testimony to them. But this dictate is called natural law.]

You will ask 2° what natural law is.

I answer. Among various opinions, it seems truer that natural law is nothing else than the natural light as impressed upon and participated from reason or the eternal law²; because thus are had all things which are wont to be attributed to natural law. 1° It is inborn in us, and found in children and the insane. 2° It is not only demonstrative of good, but also preceptive, because it is impression and participation of the eternal law, consequently empire of superior over inferior. 3° It binds by divine right, because it is immediately from God.

You will ask 3° whether natural law contain more precepts, or only one.

I answer. that it contains more precepts, which nevertheless are founded upon this one: « Good must be done, evil must be avoided »³.

[Precepts of a triple kind are natural, according as there is in man a triple grade of inclination: 1° According to common nature with all beings, there is in him inclination toward conservation of his being, according to which the law of nature commands that sleep, food be taken, destructive things resisted. 2° According to common nature with all animals, there is in him inclination toward conservation of species, according to which there pertain to the law of nature the precepts of temperance concerning acts tending to this end and the education of offspring. 3° According to the nature of reason, which is proper to man, there is in him inclination to truth about God to be known, to immortality, to communication with other intellectual beings: and to this respond the precepts of adoring God, honoring parents, and similar things of religion and justice.]

They are distinguished. again, the precepts of the law of nature into those per se known to all, such as are the first and universal ones: « Good must be done, evil avoided; what thou wilt not have done to thyself, do thou not to another, etc.; » and into those which are more determined and are drawn immediately from the first, such as the precepts of the Decalogue; at length into remoter ones, which are drawn from the first only mediately, such as many which concern contracts⁴.

[Precepts of the law of nature can moreover be distinguished by order to the persons about whom they are concerned; for some are about God, some about neighbor, some about ourselves.

Therefore the law of nature can be said to be manifold and one: manifold, because it contains many and diverse precepts; one, because all precepts are founded on one, as was said, and are ordered to one last end.]

You will ask 4° whether natural law bind all men, even children and the insane.

I answer. in the affirmative. Yet it binds children and the insane only imperfectly and in first act, not perfectly and in second act.

The reason of the first part, because natural law is innate in all, even children and the insane, from nature itself, as was said, so that what children and the insane do against the law of nature is base and unseemly, as if they blaspheme, defile themselves, or do anything like, and no one may induce them to these; which is an open sign that they are comprehended under natural law and bound by it at least in first act.

The reason of the second part is, that children and the insane are not so bound by natural law that, if they transgress it, they sin and incur guilt of punishment, but are excused from sin and punishment, inasmuch as that law is not promulgated to them; for it is promulgated through actual dictate or discourse, whereof they are not capable: consequently it does not bind them perfectly and in second act.

You will ask 5° whether every obligation be an effect of natural law.

I answer. that not every obligation is a proximate effect of natural law, yet that it is a remote effect.

The reason of the first part is, that positive laws, divine as well as human, bind per se immediately, nor will anyone say that the obligation of fasting in Lent, confessing annually, communicating at Easter, believing, hoping, etc., arise proximately and per se from natural law.

The reason of the second part is: Positive law binds therefore, because natural law dictates and prescribes that obedience be rendered to one legitimately commanding, and hence theologians teach that no one turns away from God as supernatural author without turning away from him as natural author; which cannot be verified except because, transgressing the supernatural law, he at once transgresses natural law.

Whether and how natural right is distinguished from the right of nations, you have in the tract. on Right, dissert. I, art. 3.

Again, whether invincible ignorance of natural right could occur? The affirmative solution and ample proof seek in the preceding tract. dissert. V, art. 4.

There remains one question alone, likewise celebrated, although perhaps more of name than of thing is treated in it, namely whether natural law admit dispensation. Whence

Note. Dispensation is twofold, properly and improperly so called. Dispensation properly so called is a relaxation of the law or of its obligation in some particular, made by one having the power, the matter of the law remaining so unchanged that its obligation would remain if the authority of the dispenser did not intervene. Whence, although dispensation supposes some interpretation of the law, it differs from it, in that for interpretation authority is not required, but prudence and knowledge suffice.

Dispensation improperly so called is when the legislator or another so changes the matter of the law that it ceases to be comprehended under the law.

Hence dispensation properly belongs to the legislator or superior; but improper dispensation belongs to the lord of the matter, whether he be legislator and superior or not: thus God, granting the spoils of the Egyptians to the Israelites, acted as lord, not as legislator; thus a private person who remits to me a debt of one hundred florins acts as lord of that debt, not as superior. On the contrary, if God or the Pope exempted someone from the law of fasting or of the sanctification of the Sabbath, he would act as superior and legislator. And thence follows another distinction, that proper dispensation falls directly upon the law, but improper directly upon the matter or debt: so that he who is dispensed properly, e.g., from fasting, is no longer bound by the law of fasting, as others are bound; but he who is dispensed improperly, e.g., in the repayment of a debt which is remitted, or in the taking of another's property which is granted to him by its owner, is always bound, like all others, by the natural law against stealing, or of paying debts; and if here and now he licitly takes another's property or does not pay a debt, it is not because he is exempted from those laws, but because there no longer remains what is another's or a debt, nor consequently the matter of the law. These things, if well weighed, remove the equivocations by which many are deceived in this matter.

I say : Neither can God himself dispensate properly in the natural law absolutely speaking, but well improperly¹.

This is the more common opinion with the Author [St. Thomas], against the Scotists, who hold with their master that God can dispense in the precepts of the second table alone, excepting the precept against lying.

It is proved 1°. God cannot bring it about that things prohibited by natural right, e.g., hatred of God, perjury, homicide, theft, adultery, pollution, sodomy, bestiality, etc., should be licit, honest and not discordant from reason, nor that things commanded, such as the duties of religion, justice, etc., should not be honest and due in their place and time, the matter of the law remaining unchanged. Therefore he cannot dispense properly in the natural law. The consequence is evident from the given notion of dispensation properly so called, which is a relaxation of the obligation of the law, its matter remaining unchanged, so that what before was prohibited, dishonest and illicit, without change of its matter becomes by dispensation honest and licit. — Prob. ant. These enumerated acts and similar ones prohibited by the natural law are intrinsically and by their nature, independently of the will of God, base, evil and discordant from reason. Acts commanded by the natural law are likewise by their nature intrinsically, independently of the will of God, honest and due in their place and time. But God cannot bring it about that what is such of itself, remaining unaltered, should not be such, just as he cannot bring it about that man, remaining man, should not be a rational animal; that fire, remaining fire, should not have heat fitting to it; for he cannot change the natures of things. Therefore.

It is proved 2° from concessions made by the adversaries. 1° They concede that God cannot dispense in the negative precepts of the first table, nor in lying; because, says Franc. de Victoria « ... to dispense, he could do this...; for he could bring it about that someone licitly hate God, commit perjury, blaspheme, worship idols, which are so evil from their intrinsic nature that, whether God wills or not, they always remain evil, inasmuch as they are such independently of his will. » So the praised theologian, disp. I on Law, q. 5, a. 1, concl. 2. — I subsume. But that whole argumentation of theirs is ours for the precepts of the second table, and proves equally for them as for the precepts of the first table; for those, just as these, are so evil from their intrinsic nature that, whether God wills or not, they always remain evil, "inasmuch as [note] they are such independently of his will;" for they are prohibited because evil, and not evil because prohibited. Therefore.