Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

Note 1°. Sin is an evil of God, not indeed physically damaging, for it takes nothing real away from God, but dishonoring and offensive by way of contempt — not only by reason of disobedience but chiefly by reason of violation of the strict right which he has to be the last end of all human actions, as he is their first principle, from which last end the sinner mortally turns away, constituting it in a creature, as was said in the preceding article. Now this injury consists in some morality and denomination whereby the person is said to be injured and offended, not effectively and entitatively, but morally and according to right estimation.

Note 2º. This dishonoring or offense can be considered in two ways: on the part of the act or of its object and circumstances, and on the part of the subject, namely God whom it affects and in whom it is morally subjected; for as, it is commonly said, honor is in the one honoring, so offense is in the one offended.

I say: It is more probable that mortal sin, in the character of offense considered on the part of God whom it affects, is of gravity simply infinite.

It is proved 1° from St. Thomas, 3ª parte, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2: « Sin, he says, committed against God has a certain infinity from the infinity of divine majesty; for the offense is so much graver, as greater is he against whom offense is given. Whence there was need, for condign satisfaction, that the act of the satisfier have infinite efficacy, as being that of God and man. »

Nor let it move you that he said, « a certain infinity. » For he said thus because it is not infinite in every way, neither on the part of the act nor in the physical genus, but morally only; not however because it is not infinite absolutely and without diminution. It appears because otherwise he would badly infer from it the necessity of infinite satisfaction.

It is proved 2º by reason taken from the principle laid down by the holy Doctor. Gravity of offense grows according to the dignity of the person upon whom it is inflicted: thus injury inflicted on a general is greater than on a soldier; greater inflicted on a king than on a general. And the reason is, because offense morally is in the one offended, as honor is in the one honoring, according to the common adage; and truly the offended one is the sufferer of injury, but the sufferer is the subject receiving; whence, as honor grows according to the dignity of the person honoring, so grows offense according to the dignity of the person offended. Yet the dignity of the person offended, namely God, is simply infinite. Ergo.

Neither say that offense grows according to the dignity of the person offended, not arithmetically and according to equality, but geometrically and only according to proportion: from which only follows that the offense of God be of higher order than offense of creatures. — Against is the fact that God himself confers upon the offense committed against himself that it be of higher order. Yet he is not only of higher order, but infinite. Ergo he also confers upon the offense committed against himself that it be infinite; for he is not less powerful to confer infinity than superiority of order.

If you reply, that communicating infinity is impeded by the limitation of the sinner's effort — I answer. this limitation is in the physical genus, and the infinity of offense in the moral genus. But this physical limitation does not impede moral infinity; just as, although the actions of Christ theandric were physically finite, nevertheless by reason of the divine supposit they were infinite morally and in being of value. — It is confirmed. The effort of the sinner is not only finite, but also of lower order than God offended. Yet, notwithstanding this inferiority, God communicates to him gravity of higher order, as the adversaries say. Ergo, though it be finite, he can communicate to it infinity.