Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II
Charles René Billuart (1685–1757)
Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae. Tomus II.
First published 1884
Charles-René Billuart, O.P.'s Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae, Tomus II, treats human acts, passions and virtues, sin, law, and grace in the Thomistic manual tradition. Schola presents the complete Latin Tome II from the Paris Vives edition of 1884.
Tractatus I: De actibus humanis
Dissertatio I: De voluntario et involuntario
Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit voluntarium?
Articulus II: Utrum omissio et effectus ex ea secutus sint voluntaria sine praecepto ponendi actum qui omittitur?
Articulus III: Utrum violentia causet involuntarium?
Articulus IV: Utrum metus causet involuntarium?
Articulus V: Utrum concupiscentia causet involuntarium?
Articulus VI: Utrum ignorantia causet involuntarium?
Dissertatio II: De voluntario libero, sive de libertate creata
Articulus I: Praenotanda
Articulus II: Utrum in homine lapso sit libertas arbitrii seu indifferentiae?
Articulus III: Utrum ad merendum vel demerendum, in hoc statu naturae lapsae, requiratur libertas a necessitate, seu libertas indifferentiae?
Dissertatio III: De actibus humanis speciatim sumptis
Articulus I: Utrum voluntas possit velle malum sub ratione mali?
Articulus II: De motivo voluntatis quoad specificationem
Articulus III: De motivo voluntatis quoad exercitium
Articulus IV: De modo quo movetur voluntas : an libere, an necessario?
Articulus V: De actibus elicitis a voluntate
Articulus VI: De actibus imperatis.** D. Thomas, q. 17
Dissertatio IV: De actibus humanis in esse moris
Articulus I: In quo consistat moralitas in communi actuum humanorum ?
Articulus II: De principiis moralitatis
Articulus III: De concursu multiplicis moralitatis simul in eodem actu
Articulus IV: Utrum dentur actus indifferentes?
Articulus V: Utrum et quomodo voluntas humana, ut sit bona, debeat conformari voluntati divinae?
Articulus VI: Utrum actus exterior addat bonitatem vel malitiam actui interiori?
Articulus VII: Utrum eventus sequens addat ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus exterioris?
Dissertatio V: De conscientia
Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit conscientia?
Articulus II: An et quomodo teneamur conformari conscientiae erranti?
Articulus III: Cujus speciei et gravitatis sit peccatum agere contra conscientiam?
Articulus IV: Quomodo se gerere debeat confessarius cum poenitente quem deprehendit laborare conscientia erronea?
Articulus V: De conscientia scrupulosa, per varias quaestiunculas
Articulus VI: Utrum liceat agere cum conscientia dubia, probabili, aut probabiliori?
Dissertatio VI: De opinionum probabilitate et delectu
Articulus I: Utrum sit licitum sequi opinionem minus probabilem et minus tutam, in concursu probabilioris et tutioris?
Articulus II: Utrum in conflictu duarum opinionum aeque probabilium, de honestate objectiva actus, liceat sequi minus tutam faventem libertati, relicta tutiori favente legi ?
Articulus III: Utrum liceat sequi opinionem probabiliorem minus tutam in concursu minus probabilis tutioris, ubi agitur de sola honestate objectiva actus?
Articulus IV: Varia quaestiunculae circa praesentem materiam breviter resolvuntur
Dissertatio VII: De probabilismo moderato
Articulus I: De natura probabilitatis
Articulus II: Quaenam systemata prodierint circa probabilitatem in practicis?
Articulus III: An liceat sequi opinionem vere et solide probabilem faventem libertati, relicta tutiore aeque probabili, vel etiam probabiliori, ubi de sola liceitate actionis agitur?
Articulus IV: De usu probabilitatis et de regulis specialibus quibus conscientia in dubiis practice formatur
Articulus V: Utrum liceat sequi opinionem probabilem, aut etiam probabiliorem, relicta tutiore, cum adest obligatio certa finem determinatum obtinendi?
Articulus VI: De probabilismo compensativo
Tractatus II: De passionibus et virtutibus
Dissertatio I: De passionibus
Articulus I: De passionibus in particulari
Dissertatio II: De virtutibus
Articulus I: Quid sit virtus, et quotuplicis generis?
Articulus II: De subjecto virtutum
Articulus III: De causa virtutum
Articulus IV: De proprietatibus virtutum
Tractatus III: De peccatis
Dissertatio I: De natura peccati
Articulus I: Quid sit peccatum?
Articulus II: Utrum formale constitutivum peccati commissionis consistat in positivo, an in privativo?
Articulus III: De peccato omissionis
Dissertatio II: De distinctione specifica et numerica peccatorum
Articulus I: Varia peccati divisiones
Articulus II: Unde petatur distinctio specifica peccatorum?
Articulus III: Utrum peccata commissionis et omissionis specie distinguantur?
Articulus IV: Unde petatur distinctio numerica peccatorum?
Dissertatio III: De comparatione peccatorum ad invicem
Articulus I: Utrum omnia peccata sint inter se connexa et paria ?
Articulus II: Unde sumatur inaequalitas peccatorum ?
Dissertatio IV: De subjecto peccati
Articulus I: Quodnam sit peccati subjectum ?
Articulus II: Utrum peccatum saltem veniale possit esse in et a solo appetitu sensitivo, absque omni actuali influxu voluntatis; omnesque motus sensualitatis sint peccata?
Dissertatio V: De causis peccatorum
Articulus I: An et quae ignorantia sit causa peccati, eaque ipsa sit peccatum?
Articulus II: Utrum possit dari ignorantia invincibilis juris divini positivi?
Articulus III: Utrum dari possit ignorantia invincibilis juris naturae?
Articulus IV: Utrum ignorantia invincibilis juris naturae excuset a peccato?
Articulus V: De inadvertentia ad peccatum
Articulus VI: Utrum ignorantia excuset a poenis per leges positivas statutis?
Articulus VII: Utrum Deus sit causa peccati?
Dissertatio VI: De peccato originali
Articulus I: Utrum sit peccatum originale ab Adamo ad posteros transmissum?
Articulus II: Variae quaestiones circa traductionem peccati originalis breviter resolvuntur
Articulus III: Utrum beatissima Virgo Maria peccatum originale in sua Conceptione contraxerit ?
Articulus IV: Utrum S. Thomas negaverit beatam Virginem Deiparam fuisse a peccato originali immunem?
Articulus V: In quo sita sit essentia peccati originalis ?
Dissertatio VII: De effectibus peccati
Articulus I: Utrum ex peccato actuali remaneat in anima macula seu peccatum habituale, et quid sit ?
Articulus II: De reatu poenae
Articulus III: Qualis poenae reatum inducit peccatum?
Articulus IV: DE POENA DEBITA PECCATO ORIGINALI
Dissertatio VIII: De peccato mortali et veniali
Articulus I: Utrum detur peccatum veniale ex natura sua distinctum a mortali ?
St. Thomas, qq. 88 and 89.
Mortal sin is called that which brings death to the soul, depriving it of grace, and it is worthy of eternal punishment. Venial sin, strictly taken, is called that which does not exclude from the subject the principle of pardon, which is grace.
The heretics of later times, Wiclef, Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, etc., taught that all sins are mortal by their nature and are of themselves onto death of the soul and eternal punishment; but in fact do not inflict these upon the predestined and the faithful, from the mercy of God; and thus venial sin is not distinguished from mortal sin by its nature, but either from a law or mercy enacted by God, or from the condition of the sinning person.
I say: There are given venial sins distinct from mortals by their own nature, not only from the condition of the sinner or from the mercy of God1.
It is proved 1° from Scripture. In various places of Scripture, some sins, without any respect to persons, are compared to most light things, others to most grave things: thus Matth., XXIII, 24, some are compared to a gnat, others to a camel; Luc., VI, 41, some to a mote, others to a beam; I Cor., III, 12, some to hay and stubble built upon the foundation which is Christ. But, if all sins were of themselves mortal, some would be ill compared to those minute things, while others are compared to most grave things; for that ought not to be called minute and light which inflicts of itself death of the soul and eternal hell. Therefore, as neither can a mote of itself blind, nor a gnat suffocate, nor hay or straw overthrow the foundation; so neither do sins compared to those minute things kill by their nature, and constitute the guilty one in eternal death.
It is proved 2°. The council of Trent defined the same truth session VI, chapter 11, canons 7, 23 and 25, and session XIV, chapter 5: read2. And finally the Sovereign Pontiffs St. Pius V and Greg. XIII condemned this proposition: « There is no sin venial by its nature, but every sin merits eternal punishment. » It is the 20th among the Baianists.
It is proved by a manifold reason. The first is founded in Scripture. According to Scripture, God does not impute nor punish sins otherwise than they deserve of themselves, as is clear from that Psal., LXI, 13: For thou wilt render to every man according to his works. And II Cor., V, 10: That every one may receive the proper things of the body, according as he hath done. Therefore, if there are sins which God does not punish with eternal punishment, they do not merit it of themselves.
The second. Sin is a certain infirmity of the soul, according to that Psal., VI, 3: Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak. Therefore, as there are certain infirmities of the body mortal of themselves, others not, so also infirmities of the soul.
The third. Among friends there are light offenses which by their nature, and not only from the favor of the friend, do not dissolve friendship. Therefore similarly toward God. Will anyone believe that a just man and friend of God, by the nature of an idle word or superfluous laughter, incurs the hatred of God and liability to eternal gehenna?
The fourth, special against the heretics. Adam, David and St. Peter were faithful and predestined. Yet nevertheless certain of their sins were truly mortal, and reckoned and imputed as such, namely the eating of the forbidden fruit in Adam, adultery in David, denial of Christ in St. Peter. Nor indeed do I think anyone denies that Adam, David and St. Peter lost by these sins the friendship of God and incurred liability to eternal punishment, until they were expiated by penance. Of the sin of Adam so understand Ambros., book de Paradiso, c. 9, and Aug., book XIII de Civit., c. 12. Of the adultery of David so judges the same Aug., in Psal. L. Of the sin of St. Peter similarly understands the same Aug., tract. 66 in Ioann., n. 2, where of St. Peter he says: « He died denying, and rose again weeping. » Therefore venial sins are not distinguished from mortals by the sole condition of the sinner.
It is confirmed. Dignity of person does not diminish, but augments sin, as St. Thomas proves above q. 73, a. 10, c, and we from him in the same place. Therefore sin is not venial because it is committed by a faithful man or one predestined.