Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

St. Thomas, qq. 88 and 89.

Mortal sin is called that which brings death to the soul, depriving it of grace, and it is worthy of eternal punishment. Venial sin, strictly taken, is called that which does not exclude from the subject the principle of pardon, which is grace.

The heretics of later times, Wiclef, Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, etc., taught that all sins are mortal by their nature and are of themselves onto death of the soul and eternal punishment; but in fact do not inflict these upon the predestined and the faithful, from the mercy of God; and thus venial sin is not distinguished from mortal sin by its nature, but either from a law or mercy enacted by God, or from the condition of the sinning person.

I say: There are given venial sins distinct from mortals by their own nature, not only from the condition of the sinner or from the mercy of God¹.

It is proved 1° from Scripture. In various places of Scripture, some sins, without any respect to persons, are compared to most light things, others to most grave things: thus Matth., XXIII, 24, some are compared to a gnat, others to a camel; Luc., VI, 41, some to a mote, others to a beam; I Cor., III, 12, some to hay and stubble built upon the foundation which is Christ. But, if all sins were of themselves mortal, some would be ill compared to those minute things, while others are compared to most grave things; for that ought not to be called minute and light which inflicts of itself death of the soul and eternal hell. Therefore, as neither can a mote of itself blind, nor a gnat suffocate, nor hay or straw overthrow the foundation; so neither do sins compared to those minute things kill by their nature, and constitute the guilty one in eternal death.

It is proved 2°. The council of Trent defined the same truth session VI, chapter 11, canons 7, 23 and 25, and session XIV, chapter 5: read². And finally the Sovereign Pontiffs St. Pius V and Greg. XIII condemned this proposition: « There is no sin venial by its nature, but every sin merits eternal punishment. » It is the 20th among the Baianists.

It is proved by a manifold reason. The first is founded in Scripture. According to Scripture, God does not impute nor punish sins otherwise than they deserve of themselves, as is clear from that Psal., LXI, 13: For thou wilt render to every man according to his works. And II Cor., V, 10: That every one may receive the proper things of the body, according as he hath done. Therefore, if there are sins which God does not punish with eternal punishment, they do not merit it of themselves.

The second. Sin is a certain infirmity of the soul, according to that Psal., VI, 3: Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak. Therefore, as there are certain infirmities of the body mortal of themselves, others not, so also infirmities of the soul.

The third. Among friends there are light offenses which by their nature, and not only from the favor of the friend, do not dissolve friendship. Therefore similarly toward God. Will anyone believe that a just man and friend of God, by the nature of an idle word or superfluous laughter, incurs the hatred of God and liability to eternal gehenna?

The fourth, special against the heretics. Adam, David and St. Peter were faithful and predestined. Yet nevertheless certain of their sins were truly mortal, and reckoned and imputed as such, namely the eating of the forbidden fruit in Adam, adultery in David, denial of Christ in St. Peter. Nor indeed do I think anyone denies that Adam, David and St. Peter lost by these sins the friendship of God and incurred liability to eternal punishment, until they were expiated by penance. Of the sin of Adam so understand Ambros., book de Paradiso, c. 9, and Aug., book XIII de Civit., c. 12. Of the adultery of David so judges the same Aug., in Psal. L. Of the sin of St. Peter similarly understands the same Aug., tract. 66 in Ioann., n. 2, where of St. Peter he says: « He died denying, and rose again weeping. » Therefore venial sins are not distinguished from mortals by the sole condition of the sinner.

It is confirmed. Dignity of person does not diminish, but augments sin, as St. Thomas proves above q. 73, a. 10, c, and we from him in the same place. Therefore sin is not venial because it is committed by a faithful man or one predestined.

You will ask 1° by what formally and primarily mortal sin and venial sin are constituted and differ.

I answer. Mortal sin and venial sin are formally and primarily constituted and differentiated by this, that mortal sin is simply against the law, inasmuch as it is against the end of the law, which it overturns; not so venial sin. But the end of the law is the charity of God and neighbor, I Tim., I, 5; for all laws aim at this, that we love God with our whole heart, and our neighbor as ourselves. Or, which is the same thing, they formally and primarily differ in that mortal sin turns one away from God as last end, and constitutes the ultimate end in a creature; but venial sin, the order to the last end remaining, makes an inordinateness regarding means. The reason is because, a perfect transgression of the law being posited, or aversion from God as last end, all apprehend mortal sin, and thence follow the exclusion of sanctifying grace and charity, the dissolution of the friendship of God, the death of the soul irreparable of itself, guilt of eternal punishment, and all other things which are attributed to mortal sin and do not befit venial sin.

You will ask 2° whether mortal sin and venial sin differ essentially from each other.

I answer. Affirmatively. Because the malice of mortal sin, as appears from what has been said, consists in a relation of disproportion to the last end; but the malice of venial sin rests in a relation of disproportion to means not absolutely necessary for the end. But these two relations differ specifically. Therefore.

You will ask 3° whether and how mortal sins can be discerned from venial.

I answer. To wish to define certainly each and every one — this is mortal, this venial — is rash, since it surpasses human industry; and Augustine, the Eagle of Doctors, confesses, book XXI de Civit., last chapter, n. 5, notwithstanding his study¹, that he could not attain to this; and in the Enchirid., c. 78, n. 21, he says it must be weighed rather by divine than by human judgment. Nevertheless concerning some things it can be defined certainly, concerning many probabilistically; wherefore three rules are commonly assigned by theologians, the first from Scripture, the second from tradition, the third from natural reason.

The first rule from Scripture. Sins which in the Scriptures are said to exclude from the kingdom of God, to be abominable, detestable, execrable, worthy of death, or have some other grave malediction attached to them, or to which is said Woe! are mortal; those, however, which are expressed in milder terms are venial. Of the former you have examples in Levit., XXIV, 15-21; Prov., VI, 16-19; Isa., I throughout; Rom., I, 18 seqq.; I Cor., VI, 9 et 10; Galat., V, 19-21; Ephes., V, 3 seqq., and elsewhere; of the latter, Prov., X, 19; Matth., XII, 36 et 37, and elsewhere.

The second rule from tradition. Those things which from the common sense of the Fathers, bishops and doctors are held in the Church as mortal must be reckoned mortal; those held as venial must be reckoned venial: because it is justly presumed that God does not desert his Church in a matter of such moment, nor permit her to be deceived by common error, to the ruin of souls.

The third rule from natural reason. Sins which, according to right reason, gravely injure the charity of God and neighbor are mortal; those which injure it lightly, venial. But to discern whether they injure the charity of God and neighbor gravely or lightly, many things must be considered: 1° the nature of the act, whether it admit or not lightness of matter, of which in the following article;

2° the gravity or lightness of the matter, both on the part of the object and on the part of the end and circumstances, in those things which admit it; 3° whether the sin be of its genus mortal or not; 4° the tenor of the words of the law, whether it commands severely and under grave penalty; 5° what was the intention of the legislator in this case; 6° whether the sin was committed with perfect or imperfect deliberation, whether from malice, or from weakness or ignorance. But when consent perfectly or imperfectly deliberated must be reckoned so, I will say in the following article.

Note. Venial sins are of a threefold kind. 1° Some are venial from genus or from object, as an idle word, immodest laughter. 2° Some are venial from lightness of matter, as slight theft. 3° Some are venial from imperfection of the act which is not fully deliberate, as motions second of first, concerning an object mortally evil.

I say 1°: Venial sin from genus disposes indirectly to mortal from genus, not directly; but to mortal on the part of the agent it disposes directly ¹.

The first part is proved. 1° From that Eccli., XIX, 1 : He that despiseth small things shall fall by little and little ². 2° Indirect disposition is by way of one removing and preventing. But venial sin from genus diminishes the subjection of the will under God and the fervor of charity, and at the same time places an obstacle to divine helps, whereby man is contained and preserved from mortal sin. Therefore.

The second part is proved. Direct disposition is toward the form of the same species, or is per se subordinated to it. But venial sin from genus is of different species from mortal sin from genus, nor is it per se subordinated to it, as is evident, e.g., in an idle word with respect to homicide. Therefore.

The third part is proved ³. From venial sins frequently committed in some genus, e.g., from habit of playing, the love of play can grow so much that finally on account of it one sins mortally, e.g., Mass be omitted on a feast day. Therefore.

I say 2°: Venial sin from imperfection of act, or from lightness of matter, disposes directly to mortal. Thus, e.g., small theft disposes directly to great theft; semi-plenary consent to homicide disposes directly to it; because, although they are of different formal species, they are nevertheless of the same material species, since they turn about the same material object.

I say 3°: An act remaining the same in number in natural being can become from venial mortal. Thus consent imperfectly deliberated concerning a mortal object is venial sin; if it continue physically with full deliberation, it becomes mortal ⁴. But an act remaining the same in number in moral being cannot become from venial mortal; because sin principally consists in the act of the will, as every moral act: whence an act is not called one in number morally, if the will is morally changed, even though the action in natural being be continuous. But, while the act which was before venial becomes mortal, the will is morally changed; for if it were not changed, it would not become from venial mortal. Therefore.

It is confirmed. What is of a lower order, however much it be increased within its order, cannot attain to what is of a higher order: thus, however much silver be perfected in its order, it cannot attain the grade of gold. But venial act is of a lower order in moral being than mortal sin; for this is aversive from the last end, not that. Therefore the same in number remaining in moral being cannot become mortal.

I say 4°: Sin which would be venial from its genus can become mortal in several ways on the part of the agent and circumstances:

1° By reason of mortal end: as if anyone should tell an officious lie with the intention of fornicating. Yet since that lie draws its mortal malice from the deadly intention, it suffices to accuse that intention, or the fornication, if it followed, saying: « I had the intention of fornicating, » or: « I have fornicated ».

2° By reason of erroneous conscience: as if you think that to which you set your hand is mortal when it is venial.

3° By reason of grave detriment, whether spiritual (which is scandal) or temporal, which is foreseen or can easily be foreseen as about to follow.

4° By reason of proximate danger of sinning morally.

5° If the last end be constituted in venial sin; which happens when the sinner, by a sin venial of itself, is actually disposed in mind to transgress a precept binding under mortal sin rather than abstain from his venial sin.

6° By reason of formal contempt. Formal contempt is twofold: one perfect, when anyone refuses in all things to submit to a superior. Any sin whatever, even in a light matter, from such contempt is mortal; for to contemn the whole superiority is a grave thing: The other is imperfect, when anyone refuses to submit to a superior in some matter only, whether grave or light, being ready to obey him in other things; and such contempt in a grave matter is mortal, in a light matter venial; unless perhaps the contempt were of God himself or his precept, because then it would be blasphemous. So distinguish Cajetan and Sylvius.

You will ask whether he would sin mortally who had the resolve of committing all venial sins.

I answer. Sanchez and others affirm it, with this reason, that, as St. Thomas teaches, venial sins of themselves dispose to mortal. More probably however it is denied with the Salmanticenses and St. Alphonsus, contempt or proximate danger of falling into mortal being set aside, regard being had to past experience. The reason is because such a resolve leads only remotely to mortal.

I say 5°: However much venial sins be multiplied, they can never effect one mortal sin, nor be equivalent to it ⁵. It is common doctrine against the gloss in cap. Tres sunt, de Poenit., dist. 1, which was deleted by pontifical authority as erroneous.

The reason is, because however much venial sins be multiplied, they cannot turn away from the last end; for neither does the first turn away, nor yet the second, which is of the same account, and so of the rest. Nor can they inflict guilt of eternal punishment, which infinitely differs from temporal punishment, which venial sin merits.

It is confirmed. The Church teaches that all mortal sins must necessarily be confessed, not venial ones, even multiplied: otherwise, since it is not known how far they must be multiplied so as to effect one mortal sin, as soon as anyone had committed more, he would be bound to confess in doubt; which is false and against the practice of the Church.

I say 6°: Sin which of itself would be mortal can become venial from two heads ⁶ : 1° from imperfection of act, which may not be fully deliberate; 2° from lightness of matter.

The reason of the first part is, because for mortal sin, whereby man is turned away from God and incurs guilt of eternal punishment, there is required no less an act perfectly voluntary and free than is the meritorious act of eternal life. Such however it is not without perfect deliberation on the part of the intellect, and without full consent on the part of the will.

The reason of the second part is, because laws regularly bind according to the condition of matter, gravely where matter is grave, lightly where it is light. Consequently transgression in a light matter is a light offense.

To be specially observed for practice.

You will ask 1° what is perfect, what imperfect deliberation.

I answer. Perfect deliberation is when the intellect without disturbance or impediment fully and distinctly apprehends and adverts, or can and ought to advert, to the act and its malice. To this perfect deliberation on the part of the intellect follows, on the part of the will, full consent, if it be given. I say: If it be given; because while the intellect perfectly deliberates and adverts to the evil act, not rarely the will denies consent: which regularly happens in fearful men.

Imperfect deliberation is when someone half asleep or half drunk, or almost half asleep, distracted by various thoughts, or assailed by vehement passion, apprehends or can apprehend the evil act not fully and distinctly, but only confusedly, and the obligation of avoiding it. And then the consent of the will following is necessarily imperfect and semiplenary.

The signs of imperfect consent are: 1° If, as already said, it follows from imperfect deliberation. 2° If anyone, fully adverting to the temptation, immediately repels it, or is so disposed in mind that, if he could easily execute the sin, he would not will to, or would rather choose death than offend God lethally, it is more probable that he did not fully consent; because full and firm affection is not easily changed, and when it is changed, it is easily adverted to. 3° He who is of fearful conscience, and is wont to resist temptation while he fully adverts to it, can prudently judge in doubt that he did not fully consent. Otherwise, if he be of freer conscience, and is wont to consent, because judgment is prudent from commonly occurring circumstances. 4° He who doubts whether in sleep or waking he suffered disordinate motions, can judge that he did not consent fully and deliberately; because, if deliberation had been full, he would know himself to have been perfectly aroused from sleep. 5° Long duration of temptation is not sufficient argument of perfect, nay not even of imperfect consent; for temptation can long endure, the will resisting.

You will ask 2° in what sins lightness of matter excusing from mortal is given or not given.

I answer. Lightness of matter excusing from mortal is not given in sins in which, notwithstanding the apparent lightness of matter, there is found entire irreverence of the divine Majesty and grave violation of the charity of God and neighbor; because gravity of sin is drawn from the gravity of irreverence of divine Majesty, or of violation of charity. Therefore, where grave irreverence or violation of charity is found in small as in great quantity of matter, the gravity of sin remains.

But in those sins in which from diminution of matter the gravity of irreverence toward God or of violation of charity is diminished, lightness of matter excusing from mortal is given; because matter can be so diminished and decreased that it suffice only for light irreverence or light violation of charity.

Hence you will infer 1° that parvity of matter excusing from mortal is not given in sins which are committed directly against God, as are all sins against the theological virtues; because, although in a most light matter you deny faith to God, or despair of him, or hold him in hatred or contempt, or formally blaspheme him, you gravely offend his truth, power, goodness, majesty.

You will infer 2° In sins which are against Religion, sometimes parvity of matter excusing from mortal is given, sometimes not. It is not given in superstition of worshipping false deity, as idolatry, divination and vain observance. I say the same of magic and maleficium; because to worship false deity in even the smallest thing, or to hold society, whether explicitly or implicitly, with the devil, is the gravest injury offered to true deity.

There can however be given in divination and vain observance lightness, not of matter, but of act, excusing from mortal: as if anyone attempt divination without express invocation of the demon, out of jest or levity, not believing it useful, but altogether vain and useless, or knowing not that there is any invocation of the demon therein, he does not sin mortally. Let the same judgment be, if from a dream, augury and similar things he conceive some fear of things future, but nevertheless do not believe it; or if once and again he do or omit something free to him from such fear, yet do not direct his life and actions according to the norm of such divinations. I say the same of vain observance of healths or events: as if anyone out of simplicity or non-culpable ignorance, or out of excessive timidity, leave the table because thirteen sit there, fearing thence someone's death; or if because in going out of the house in the morning he strike his foot, or a hare run across him, he fears an unlucky journey, and therefore returns home; or if he promise himself certainly and infallibly a good death, if he honor such a saint, recite daily such a prayer.

But in superstition of undue worship, especially superfluous, of true deity, lightness of matter excusing from mortal seems able to be given: as if anyone pray before sunset, or with a certain number, position, color of candles, or will to hear Mass from a priest called John, or repeat Alleluia, or make more crosses than is ordained by the Church, or abstain from certain servile work, put sewing, on Saturdays, in honor of the Blessed Virgin, while he indulges in other servile works. For in these and similar things, contempt and scandal set aside, no grave injury seems to be done.

In simony parvity of matter excusing from mortal is not given; because, however little the thing be in degree of spirituality, it is always a great injury to value it at an earthly price; and the less price is paid for a spiritual thing, the less it seems to be valued. Nor is it given in assertory oath; because it is always grave irreverence and injury to will God to be witness of a falsehood, as if he could be deceived or deceive, even in the smallest matter. Otherwise, according to the opinion more probable to us, of promissory oath, in which God is invoked not as witness of truth or falsehood, but is taken as quasi-sponsor of the obligation of the swearer, which obligation does not consist in an indivisible, but is greater or lesser, according to the account of matter of greater or lesser moment, of which I spoke at length in tract. de Religione, dissert. V, a. 6, § 1.

Likewise lightness of matter is given in vow, whether it be total matter or part of the total matter of the vow, concerning which see also ibid., dissert. IV, a. 3, concl. 3. In sacrilege which is done from direct intention of dishonoring sacred things, lightness of matter is not given, on account of formal contempt of the sacred thing, which is reduced to God. But done for another end, it admits lightness of matter excusing from mortal: thus slight theft in a sacred place is venial sin.

You will infer 3° that lightness of matter excusing from mortal is given in sins which are against the precepts of the second table, or which are against neighbor and self and against ecclesiastical precepts, as in theft, beating, wounding, detraction, insult, cursing, anger, vengeance, avarice, ambition, gluttony, ecclesiastical fast, etc.; because in these the less the matter, the less the injury done to self or neighbor.

You will ask 3° whence is to be estimated the gravity or levity of matter in those sins which admit it.

I answer. That it is to be estimated from this, that, according to the judgment of prudent men and doctors, it conduces gravely or lightly to the grave end of the law; so that matter is grave which conduces gravely to the end of the law; light, which lightly, whether it be a third part, or a fourth, or a twentieth, or a hundredth part of the whole. I said, according to the judgment of prudent men and doctors, because upon it chiefly depends discerning what matter conduces gravely or lightly to the end of the law.

It must be noted however, concerning the time at which the law begins or ceases to bind, e.g., of fast, that lightness of matter is not given: so that, if immediately after hearing the twelfth hour of the night of Friday, or immediately before the twelfth of Sunday, you eat meat, the matter is grave and the sin mortal; because that negative precept binds the whole day of the fast, always and forever, excluding every part of that day from eating meat. The same seems to be said of the time required by law for receiving sacred Orders, making profession, contracting marriage, etc. Nor stands in the way what is commonly said: « That what differs little seems to differ nothing; » for this axiom does not hold in things fixed by law, which consist in an indivisible, and thus the common sense apprehends.

I say 1°: The creature is the ultimate end of one sinning mortally¹, according to that word of the Apostle, Philip., I, 19, of the gluttonous: Whose God is their belly.

It is proved 1° from Aug., who in many places places the whole perversity of human life in this, that he enjoys things to be used and uses things to be enjoyed²; but to enjoy, according to the same Aug., lib. XI de Civit., c. 25, and elsewhere, is to adhere to something as to an ultimate end. But he who sins mortally enjoys things to be used; for he does not use them on account of God, since on their account he forsakes God. Therefore.

It is proved 2º by reason. What man perversely loves by sinning mortally, he does not love as a means, or as an intermediate end subordinated to God, otherwise he would not sin; and moreover it is clear because, according to Scripture, Isa., I, 2, by sinning mortally he spurns³ God, and I Reg., XII, 10, forsakes⁴ God. Therefore he loves it as an ultimate end, or as a mean or intermediate end subordinated to another creature, and that other creature will be for him the ultimate end.

But there remains the question: what creature is the ultimate end of one sinning mortally. Concerning which

I say 2º: The ultimate end of one sinning mortally is his own and private good, not in itself, but inordinately loved even to contempt of God and exclusion of grace and charity.

The first part is proved. That is the ultimate end of one sinning mortally which he loves for its own sake, and under whose reason he loves other things. But one sinning mortally loves his own and private good for its own sake, and the other particular goods which he pursues he loves by reason of his own and private good. Therefore. — The major is the definition of the ultimate end. — Proof of the minor. In every mortal sin the sinner loves a changeable good, because in it he finds, or apprehends, or imagines some convenience and advantage for himself. For either he apprehends this good as serving him, and thus apprehends it as good for himself; or he apprehends that he ought to serve that good, as idolaters worshipped idols for gods, and thus he apprehends its serving him as convenient and advantageous, just as a friend apprehends serving his friend as convenient and good for himself. Therefore whatever particular goods one sinning mortally pursues, those he loves under the reason of his own and private good.

The second part is proved. The ultimate end of one sinning mortally is opposed to God and irreferable to him. But one's own and private good in itself is not opposed to God and irreferable to him, but only cuts itself off from him; but as inordinately loved even to contempt of God and exclusion of grace, it is opposed to God and irreferable to him. Therefore.

From this you will infer that not everything the sinner does is mortal sin; nay rather, sometimes it is morally good, as honoring parents, paying debts⁵, etc. For although these are not actually and explicitly referred to God in the sinner, they are nevertheless not irreferable of themselves; nay they are referred virtually and implicitly, as I shall say elsewhere. Hence also you have the solution of objections that can be made.

I say 3º: The ultimate end of one sinning venially, whether sinner or just man, is beatitude as such, or to be well and happy. For thus the ultimate end is had positively, and it is easily conceived how it does not exclude charity; because this most common end, since it is necessarily loved and indifferent of itself so as to be applied to a good or evil object, gives no honesty or malice to the act of itself, but abstracts from both. Consult dissert. I de Ultimo fine, a. 4 and 5.

Hence you will understand in what sense St. Thomas says in many places that venial sin is habitually referred to God. For the holy Doctor means nothing else than that venial sin in the just man is compatible with charity, and does not exclude it; because habitual relation, as I said in dissert. I de Ultimo fine, a. 5, signifies pure concomitance of some habit with an act, without any influx, whether actual or virtual. Whence, just as if a just man while sleeping were reciting prayers, he would be said to refer them habitually to God, on account of the concomitance of the habit of charity; so, while he sins venially, his sin is said to be referred habitually to God, on account of the charity concomitant, which he does not expel.

Note 1°. Sin is an evil of God, not indeed physically damaging, for it takes nothing real away from God, but dishonoring and offensive by way of contempt — not only by reason of disobedience but chiefly by reason of violation of the strict right which he has to be the last end of all human actions, as he is their first principle, from which last end the sinner mortally turns away, constituting it in a creature, as was said in the preceding article. Now this injury consists in some morality and denomination whereby the person is said to be injured and offended, not effectively and entitatively, but morally and according to right estimation.

Note 2º. This dishonoring or offense can be considered in two ways: on the part of the act or of its object and circumstances, and on the part of the subject, namely God whom it affects and in whom it is morally subjected; for as, it is commonly said, honor is in the one honoring, so offense is in the one offended.

I say: It is more probable that mortal sin, in the character of offense considered on the part of God whom it affects, is of gravity simply infinite.

It is proved 1° from St. Thomas, 3ª parte, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2: « Sin, he says, committed against God has a certain infinity from the infinity of divine majesty; for the offense is so much graver, as greater is he against whom offense is given. Whence there was need, for condign satisfaction, that the act of the satisfier have infinite efficacy, as being that of God and man. »

Nor let it move you that he said, « a certain infinity. » For he said thus because it is not infinite in every way, neither on the part of the act nor in the physical genus, but morally only; not however because it is not infinite absolutely and without diminution. It appears because otherwise he would badly infer from it the necessity of infinite satisfaction.

It is proved 2º by reason taken from the principle laid down by the holy Doctor. Gravity of offense grows according to the dignity of the person upon whom it is inflicted: thus injury inflicted on a general is greater than on a soldier; greater inflicted on a king than on a general. And the reason is, because offense morally is in the one offended, as honor is in the one honoring, according to the common adage; and truly the offended one is the sufferer of injury, but the sufferer is the subject receiving; whence, as honor grows according to the dignity of the person honoring, so grows offense according to the dignity of the person offended. Yet the dignity of the person offended, namely God, is simply infinite. Ergo.

Neither say that offense grows according to the dignity of the person offended, not arithmetically and according to equality, but geometrically and only according to proportion: from which only follows that the offense of God be of higher order than offense of creatures. — Against is the fact that God himself confers upon the offense committed against himself that it be of higher order. Yet he is not only of higher order, but infinite. Ergo he also confers upon the offense committed against himself that it be infinite; for he is not less powerful to confer infinity than superiority of order.

If you reply, that communicating infinity is impeded by the limitation of the sinner's effort — I answer. this limitation is in the physical genus, and the infinity of offense in the moral genus. But this physical limitation does not impede moral infinity; just as, although the actions of Christ theandric were physically finite, nevertheless by reason of the divine supposit they were infinite morally and in being of value. — It is confirmed. The effort of the sinner is not only finite, but also of lower order than God offended. Yet, notwithstanding this inferiority, God communicates to him gravity of higher order, as the adversaries say. Ergo, though it be finite, he can communicate to it infinity.

The question is of the perfect use of reason, which suffices for deliberating about things most weighty, to which a child arrives gradually and successively, some more quickly, some more slowly.

A conversion to God is distinguished two ways: one explicit and formal toward God distinctly and explicitly known, whether through faith, or through natural light; the other virtual and implicit, whereby one proposes to live according to reason, or loves the honest good, in which God, as author and end of this good, implicitly is contained. The instant in which the child who has reached the perfect use of reason deliberates about the last end, setting it before himself, is not physical but moral, comprising several physical instants; because however it takes place in the briefest time, it is called an instant.

I say: In the first moral instant of perfect use of reason man is bound under mortal sin to convert himself to God, either explicitly, in that manner in which he can and knows him, or, as the holy Doctor says, Hebr., V, 14, he who has his senses exercised to discern the good and evil that is of others ¹.

It is proved 1°. That which first occurs to man upon arriving at the perfect use of reason is to think and deliberate about himself, namely toward what end he is about to order himself and his actions. Therefore he is bound then to constitute God as his end, if he know him explicitly, or the good suitable to his nature, namely the honest good consonant with reason, in which God implicitly is contained. — Proof of the antecedent: Man is the end of all desirable things, but man himself is means with respect to God, who is his [man's] end. But the end is prior in intention. Therefore what first occurs to man arriving at the perfect use of reason is to think and deliberate about himself, toward what end he should order himself and his actions.

It is confirmed. To arrive at the perfect use of reason is to discern between moral good and evil; and thus at that instant the natural law, through synderesis dictating that the honest good is to be done and evil shunned, is intimated to him. Therefore man is bound then to accept that law and subject himself to it, proposing to act according to it; just as, while the evangelical law is sufficiently promulgated to anyone, he is bound straightway to accept it and subject himself to it, proposing to live and act according to it. Therefore.

It is proved 2°. There is a natural precept of converting oneself to God and loving him above all things, which, since it is affirmative, binds not always but for a determinate time. But there is no time more fitting, and in which it binds the more, than the first moral instant of use of reason. Therefore. — Proof of the minor in many ways: 1° From the reason already made, that what first occurs to man in this instant is to deliberate about himself in order to the end. 2° When man first arrives at the use of reason, he enters the world as a moral agent, and begins the way of the life of reason. Therefore then above all is he bound to set before himself the legitimate end, namely God, or the honest good, unto which direct all his actions: otherwise he is exposed forthwith to danger of going astray and losing salvation; as he who prudently begins a great journey ought to set before himself the term toward which he tends. 3° Because the other times assigned by theologians for the fulfillment of this precept are not so fitting.

I say 2°: It is probable that venial sin cannot be in anyone together with original alone ²

It is proved. If venial could be found in man together with original alone, this would happen either before the first instant of reason, or in that very instant, or immediately after. Not before the first instant of reason, because then man lacks the use of reason and liberty, and thus is incapable of venial sin; not in the very instant of the use of reason, because either he converts himself to God, and is justified from original sin, or converts himself not, and thus sins mortally, as has been said; consequently neither immediately after the first instant can there be venial together with original alone.