Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

Charles René Billuart

Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

Charles René Billuart (1685–1757)

Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae. Tomus II.

First published 1884

Charles-René Billuart, O.P.'s Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae, Tomus II, treats human acts, passions and virtues, sin, law, and grace in the Thomistic manual tradition. Schola presents the complete Latin Tome II from the Paris Vives edition of 1884.


Tractatus I: De actibus humanis

Dissertatio I: De voluntario et involuntario

Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit voluntarium?

Articulus II: Utrum omissio et effectus ex ea secutus sint voluntaria sine praecepto ponendi actum qui omittitur?

Articulus III: Utrum violentia causet involuntarium?

Articulus IV: Utrum metus causet involuntarium?

Articulus V: Utrum concupiscentia causet involuntarium?

Articulus VI: Utrum ignorantia causet involuntarium?

Dissertatio II: De voluntario libero, sive de libertate creata

Articulus I: Praenotanda

Articulus II: Utrum in homine lapso sit libertas arbitrii seu indifferentiae?

Articulus III: Utrum ad merendum vel demerendum, in hoc statu naturae lapsae, requiratur libertas a necessitate, seu libertas indifferentiae?

Dissertatio III: De actibus humanis speciatim sumptis

Articulus I: Utrum voluntas possit velle malum sub ratione mali?

Articulus II: De motivo voluntatis quoad specificationem

Articulus III: De motivo voluntatis quoad exercitium

Articulus IV: De modo quo movetur voluntas : an libere, an necessario?

Articulus V: De actibus elicitis a voluntate

Articulus VI: De actibus imperatis.** D. Thomas, q. 17

Dissertatio IV: De actibus humanis in esse moris

Articulus I: In quo consistat moralitas in communi actuum humanorum ?

Articulus II: De principiis moralitatis

Articulus III: De concursu multiplicis moralitatis simul in eodem actu

Articulus IV: Utrum dentur actus indifferentes?

Articulus V: Utrum et quomodo voluntas humana, ut sit bona, debeat conformari voluntati divinae?

Articulus VI: Utrum actus exterior addat bonitatem vel malitiam actui interiori?

Articulus VII: Utrum eventus sequens addat ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus exterioris?

Dissertatio V: De conscientia

Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit conscientia?

Articulus II: An et quomodo teneamur conformari conscientiae erranti?

Articulus III: Cujus speciei et gravitatis sit peccatum agere contra conscientiam?

Articulus IV: Quomodo se gerere debeat confessarius cum poenitente quem deprehendit laborare conscientia erronea?

Articulus V: De conscientia scrupulosa, per varias quaestiunculas

Articulus VI: Utrum liceat agere cum conscientia dubia, probabili, aut probabiliori?

Dissertatio VI: De opinionum probabilitate et delectu

Articulus I: Utrum sit licitum sequi opinionem minus probabilem et minus tutam, in concursu probabilioris et tutioris?

Articulus II: Utrum in conflictu duarum opinionum aeque probabilium, de honestate objectiva actus, liceat sequi minus tutam faventem libertati, relicta tutiori favente legi ?

Articulus III: Utrum liceat sequi opinionem probabiliorem minus tutam in concursu minus probabilis tutioris, ubi agitur de sola honestate objectiva actus?

Articulus IV: Varia quaestiunculae circa praesentem materiam breviter resolvuntur

Dissertatio VII: De probabilismo moderato

Articulus I: De natura probabilitatis

Articulus II: Quaenam systemata prodierint circa probabilitatem in practicis?

Articulus III: An liceat sequi opinionem vere et solide probabilem faventem libertati, relicta tutiore aeque probabili, vel etiam probabiliori, ubi de sola liceitate actionis agitur?

Articulus IV: De usu probabilitatis et de regulis specialibus quibus conscientia in dubiis practice formatur

Articulus V: Utrum liceat sequi opinionem probabilem, aut etiam probabiliorem, relicta tutiore, cum adest obligatio certa finem determinatum obtinendi?

Articulus VI: De probabilismo compensativo

Tractatus II: De passionibus et virtutibus

Dissertatio I: De passionibus

Articulus I: De passionibus in particulari

Dissertatio II: De virtutibus

Articulus I: Quid sit virtus, et quotuplicis generis?

Articulus II: De subjecto virtutum

Articulus III: De causa virtutum

Articulus IV: De proprietatibus virtutum

Tractatus III: De peccatis

Dissertatio I: De natura peccati

Articulus I: Quid sit peccatum?

Articulus II: Utrum formale constitutivum peccati commissionis consistat in positivo, an in privativo?

Articulus III: De peccato omissionis

Dissertatio II: De distinctione specifica et numerica peccatorum

Articulus I: Varia peccati divisiones

Articulus II: Unde petatur distinctio specifica peccatorum?

Articulus III: Utrum peccata commissionis et omissionis specie distinguantur?

Articulus IV: Unde petatur distinctio numerica peccatorum?

Dissertatio III: De comparatione peccatorum ad invicem

Articulus I: Utrum omnia peccata sint inter se connexa et paria ?

Articulus II: Unde sumatur inaequalitas peccatorum ?

Dissertatio IV: De subjecto peccati

Articulus I: Quodnam sit peccati subjectum ?

Articulus II: Utrum peccatum saltem veniale possit esse in et a solo appetitu sensitivo, absque omni actuali influxu voluntatis; omnesque motus sensualitatis sint peccata?

Dissertatio V: De causis peccatorum

Articulus I: An et quae ignorantia sit causa peccati, eaque ipsa sit peccatum?

Articulus II: Utrum possit dari ignorantia invincibilis juris divini positivi?

Articulus III: Utrum dari possit ignorantia invincibilis juris naturae?

Articulus IV: Utrum ignorantia invincibilis juris naturae excuset a peccato?

Articulus V: De inadvertentia ad peccatum

Articulus VI: Utrum ignorantia excuset a poenis per leges positivas statutis?

Articulus VII: Utrum Deus sit causa peccati?

Dissertatio VI: De peccato originali

Articulus I: Utrum sit peccatum originale ab Adamo ad posteros transmissum?

Articulus II: Variae quaestiones circa traductionem peccati originalis breviter resolvuntur

Articulus III: Utrum beatissima Virgo Maria peccatum originale in sua Conceptione contraxerit ?

Articulus IV: Utrum S. Thomas negaverit beatam Virginem Deiparam fuisse a peccato originali immunem?

Articulus V: In quo sita sit essentia peccati originalis ?

Dissertatio VII: De effectibus peccati

Articulus I: Utrum ex peccato actuali remaneat in anima macula seu peccatum habituale, et quid sit ?

Articulus II: De reatu poenae

Articulus III: Qualis poenae reatum inducit peccatum?

Articulus IV: DE POENA DEBITA PECCATO ORIGINALI

§ I

Whether infants dying with original sin alone suffer the pain of sense?

I suppose as certain of faith that infants dying with original sin suffer the pain of loss, because no one can attain eternal life, which is seated in the clear vision of God, without grace, which infants dying without baptism lack. Whence that, Joann., III, 5: Unless one be born again of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. And it was defined by the Council of Trent, sess. V, can. 4. But as to the pain of sense, concerning which is the dispute,

I say: Infants dying with original sin itself do not suffer the pain of sense .

It is proved 1° from the Fathers. Greg. Nazianz., whose authority was so great, Augustine testifying, that he was held the mouth of the Church, orat. XL in lavacrum, distinguishes three kinds of men departing without baptism, of which some contemned baptism, others omitted it by their own negligence, others, namely infants, lacked it through the negligence of others; and concerning the punishment after death of all these he pronounces thus: « I judge that it will be that the first indeed, together with the crimes of others, shall also pay punishments for the contempt of baptism; but the others shall hang punishments indeed, yet lighter, as those who have erred from baptism not so much by perversity of soul as by folly; finally the last, let them be neither visited with heavenly glory nor with punishments by the just judge, seeing that, although they were not signed with baptism, they nevertheless lack wickedness, and have rather suffered than done this loss. For not everyone who is unworthy of punishment straightway merits honor also: even as not everyone who is unworthy of honor straightway merits punishment. »

But this testimony is so open that it cannot be eluded by any tergiversation.

Next Greg. Nyss., in the oration on infants taken away by immature death: « The immature death of infants, he says, shows that those who thus ceased to live will be neither in pains and sadness. »

It is proved 2° by reason. Punishment ought to be proportionate and due to fault; this is per se known. Whence that, Isa., XXVII, 8: In measure against measure: when it shall be cast off, you shall judge it. But the pain of sense is not proportionate nor due to original fault. Therefore.

Proof of minor, in which lies the difficulty, in several ways: 1° Original sin is not through the will of the person, but through the will of nature . Therefore it ought to be punished with the punishment of nature, and not the punishment of person. — I subjoin. But the pain of sense happens through the proper passion of the person; the pain of loss truly is the punishment of nature, and although in the person, is nevertheless not by reason of the person or supposit, but by reason of nature, which is found deprived of grace or original justice, without which the vision of God is not due to them, as a good not owed to the principles of nature. Therefore.

Proof 2° of the same minor. The pain of sense is never due to habitual disposition ; for anyone is not punished, whether by God or by men, because he is apt to steal, but because he actually steals. But to habitual privation without every act some damage is due; put the case of one who has not the knowledge of letters, who by this very fact is unworthy of promotion to episcopal dignity. But in the infant there is habitual privation, namely of grace and original justice. Likewise there is only habitual disposition, without every act, namely concupiscence, which makes the infant apt to concupiscence, as Augustine says, while the adult concupisces actually. Therefore to an infant dying with original sin the pain of sense is not proportionate nor due, but only the pain of loss, because evidently he is not fit to be led to the divine vision, on account of privation of original justice.

It is proved 3° of the same minor. The Church in imposing punishments and satisfactions imitates the order and mode of divine justice punishing sins. But the Church imposes no sensible punishment or satisfaction for original sin, nor commands adults who receive baptism to conceive sorrow or sadness about it. Therefore she judges that no sensible punishment is due to this sin or answering to it in the future world.

The conclusion is proved from inconveniences. Since the pain of sense is eternal and most bitter, and children enduring it would be destitute of grace, it could not fail to generate in them grave motions of impatience, anger, despair, hatred and blasphemy against God. But this can neither be admitted nor ought to be admitted in those infants, and it is condemned in Baius, proposition 49 . Therefore.

Nor say that the same follows from the pain of loss. For we shall prove below that children will perceive no pain or sadness from it. Nor does it avail should you say that not all who are afflicted by miseries and afflictions are carried away by motions of impatience, anger, despair, hatred and blasphemy against God. That indeed is true in this life, where miseries, compared with the miseries of the other life, scarcely merit the name of miseries, and those afflicted with them are helped by helps of grace to bear them patiently; which does not happen in hell.

The objections are solved.

Obj. 1°: Matth., XXV, 41, at the last judgment it will be said to all who will be on the left: Depart into everlasting fire. But infants will be on the left. For there will be only two orders of the judged, of which some will be placed on the right, others on the left. Infants will not be on the right. Therefore on the left.

I answer. There are three expositions of this celebrated text, upon which the adverse opinion chiefly relies, which I leave to the judgment of the reader, that he may choose that one which will seem more probable to himself.

1° I distinguish the major. At the last judgment it will be said to all adults who will be on the left: Go into everlasting fire — I concede; to absolutely all — I deny. Therefore there is not described in that place the form of judgment to be observed respectively toward absolutely all, but only the form of the discussion of judgment to be observed respectively toward adults who have reason: I was hungry, and you gave me to eat, etc. I thirsted, and you gave, etc. Under which are understood all personal works good and evil. For these suit adults alone, by no means infants. If thence you infer: Therefore neither do these words: Come blessed, etc., regard baptized infants — I concede. Yet it does not thence follow that they are not to be called into the kingdom by another sentence, just as the unbaptized are not to be excluded by another sentence. And although Aug., serm. 294, cap. 3, n° 3, understands this text also of infants, as I shall say below, nevertheless lib. de octo Quaestionibus Dulcitii, q. 1, he understands it of adults only .

2° Suppose this place of Matth. to be understood also of infants: under the name of fire (whose bitterness in punishments is supreme) all the pains of hell are comprehended, which for their deserts are of the greatest variety, just as under the name of kingdom, in the prior opinion, is comprehended all the variety of joys in the heavenly kingdom; although, as there the clear vision of God will be common to all, so to all the damned will be common the privation of the divine vision. So Estius on this place, according to which interpretation, under the name of fire is understood indeed the very pain and combustion of fire, but it is not alone, but also other pains, put the privation of vision of God, the remorse of conscience, binding, incarceration, stench, etc.; otherwise, resting precisely in the words, the damned would undergo only the pain of loss and of fire, and no other. It seems certain therefore that Christ under the name of fire comprehended all the pains of hell, not all to be inflicted on all, but fittingly and proportionately to each according to the exigency of his deserts, this to one, that to another.

3° Under the name of fire can be understood, not the punishment of fire specifically, nor any other determinate punishment, but whatsoever punishment in genus and indeterminately. That is frequent enough in the Scriptures. Thus Psal., IXV, 12: We have passed through fire and water. Ibidem, 10: Thou hast proved us by fire, as silver is proved. Deut., IV, 20: The Lord brought you out of the iron furnace of Egypt; in which places by fire is understood whatsoever tribulation. And Josue, VII, 15, when the Lord had decreed Achan to be burned with fire, Josue understood stoning, ibid., 25.

Obj. 2° from Aug. the holy Doctor, serm. 294 , c. 3, n. 3: « The Lord, he says, about to come and to judge the living and the dead, as the Gospel speaks, will make two parts, right and left; to the left he will say: Go into everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels; to the right he will say: Come, blessed of my Father, possess the kingdom prepared for you from the beginning of the world. This he calls kingdom, that damnation with the devil. No middle place is left where you may place infants. Of the living and the dead judgment will be: some will be on the right, others on the left; I know no other. You who introduce a middle, depart from the middle; let him not offend you who seeks the right hand. And I admonish yourself, depart from the middle, but do not go to the left. » Idem Enchirid., c. 26 ; lib. I de Peccat. meritis, c. 26, and in answer to the words of St. Thomas, q. 5 de Malo, a. 2, ad 1: « It must be said, he says, that under the name of torment, torture, gehenna and cruciatus, or if anything similar be found in the sayings of the saints, is to be largely accepted for punishment, so that species is put for genus. But the saints used such a manner of speaking that they might render detestable the error of the Pelagians, who asserted that in infants there is no sin, nor is any punishment due to them. » In the same manner the sayings of Augustine and of the holy Fathers are interpreted by St. Bonaventure, Scotus, Dionysius Carthusianus, and others.

§ II. — Whether infants dying with original sin alone perceive any sadness or pain from the privation of the beatific vision?

I say: Infants dying with original sin alone perceive no sadness and no pain from the privation of the beatific vision; they are however not blessed with natural beatitude .

St. Thomas proves the first part of the conclusion with a twofold medium. The first is, quaest. 5 cit.: because infants do not know supernatural beatitude. The second, dist. cit.: because, granted that they recognize supernatural beatitude, it nevertheless would not be intrinsically proportionate to them.

The first reason is proposed thus : No one grieves over the loss of a good which he does not know; for of the unknown there is no desire. But infants dying with original sin do not know supernatural beatitude, namely the clear vision of God of which they are deprived; because they had not, nor have faith. Therefore.

The second reason of St. Thomas is proposed thus . From the fact that someone lacks what exceeds his proportion, he is not afflicted, if he be of right reason, but only from this that he lacks that to which he is in some way proportioned: thus no wise man is afflicted that he cannot fly like a bird, or that he is not king or emperor, since it is not owed to him; he would however be afflicted if he were deprived of that to hold which he had in some way aptitude. But, although man having the use of free choice is proportioned to obtaining eternal life, inasmuch as by proper acts from grace he can merit it, and therefore, if he fall short of this, greatest will be his pain, because he loses what possibly could have been his own; infants nevertheless were never proportioned to having eternal life: because neither was it owed them from the principles of nature, since it exceeds every faculty of nature, nor could they have proper acts whereby they would obtain so great a good. And besides they are of right reason; for they are oblique by no passion, by no personal sin, but such are they as they were before death, since they are not changed through death; before death moreover they had no disordinate act. Therefore they will grieve nothing at all of that lack of divine vision; yea more they will rejoice in this that they will participate much of the divine goodness and natural perfections.

Nor can it be said that they were proportioned to obtaining eternal life , if not through their own operation, at least through the action of others about them; because they could be baptized by others, as many children of the same condition baptized attained eternal life. For this belongs to grace superexceeding, that anyone be rewarded without his own act. Whence the defect of such grace causes no more sadness in children dying unbaptized than in wise men this, that many graces are not made to them which were made in other similar ones.

It is confirmed. No reason seems to be why exterior punishment of sense is withdrawn from children if interior affliction is attributed to them, which is much more penal .

Proof of the second part of the conclusion. Natural beatitude cannot stand with aversion from God as author of nature; for natural beatitude consists in free amicable conversion and union with God as author of nature. But infants, by reason of original sin, are averted from God, even as author of nature. Therefore. — Proof of minor. Adam, by sinning, was averted from God, not only as supernatural author, but even as natural author, because whoever sins against God as supernatural author sins against him as natural author, since the natural law commands obedience to every superior legitimately commanding. But such in children is the habitual aversion, such as was actual in Adam, in whom they sinned. Therefore.

Dissertatio VIII: De peccato mortali et veniali

Articulus I: Utrum detur peccatum veniale ex natura sua distinctum a mortali ?

Articulus II: In quo et quomodo peccatum mortale et veniale inter se differunt ?

Articulus III: Utrum veniale disponat ad mortale, possitque fieri mortale, et e contra mortale fieri veniale ?

Articulus IV: Quis sit finis ultimus tam peccantis mortaliter quam venialiter?

Articulus V: Utrum peccatum mortale in ratione offensae sit gravitatis simpliciter infinitae?

Articulus VI: Utrum homo in primo instanti morali usus rationis teneatur se convertere ad Deum, possitque esse peccatum veniale cum solo originali?

Tractatus IV: De legibus

Dissertatio I: De lege in communi

Articulus I: Quid sit lex?

Articulus II: Utrum promulgatio sit essentia legis?

Articulus III: Quinam possunt ferre leges?

Dissertatio II: De lege aeterna et naturali

Articulus I: De lege aeterna

Articulus II: De lege naturali

Articulus III: Utrum lex naturalis pati possit dispensationem ?

Dissertatio III: De lege humana

Articulus I: De quidditate, necessitate, qualitatibus et divisionibus legis humanae

Articulus II: Qualis legis humanae promulgatio requiratur ut obliget?

Articulus III: Utrum lex pendeat ab acceptatione populi?

Dissertatio IV: De potestate legis humanae

Articulus I: Utrum lex humana possit praecipere aut prohibere actus internos?

Articulus II: Quomodo debeat poni opus praeceptum, ut legi satisfat?

Articulus III: Utrum leges humanae obligent in conscientia?

Articulus IV: De lege poenali

Articulus V: Quandonam leges humanae obligant sub peccato mortali?

Articulus VI: Quaedam aliae quaestiunculae circa obligationem legum humanarum breviter resolvuntur

Articulus VII: Quinam subjiciantur legibus humanis?

Dissertatio V: De mutatione legum

Articulus I: De mutatione legum per abrogationem et cessationem finis

Articulus II: De consuetudine

Articulus III: De dispensatione

Articulus IV: De interpretatione legum

Articulus V: (APPENDIX) — De privilegiis

Tractatus V: De gratia

Dissertatio I: Praeambula de variis erroribus circa gratiam

Dissertatio II: Praeambula de variis naturae humanae statibus

Articulus I: Explicantur quinque status naturae humanae

§ I: Status naturae purae

§ II: Status naturae integrae

§ III: Status justitiae originalis, naturae lapsae, et naturae reparatae

Articulus II: Utrum status naturae purae fuerit possibilis ?

Articulus III: Utrum homo in statu naturae lapsae nondum reparatae minores vires habeat ad bonum morale, quam habuisset in statu naturae purae?

Articulus IV: Utrum tam Adamo quam angelis fuerit necessaria gratia per se efficax ad perseverandum?

Dissertatio III: De necessitate gratiae

Articulus I: Quid intelligatur nomine gratiae?

Articulus II: Utrum homo sine gratia possit aliquod verum cognoscere?

Articulus III: Utrum homo lapsus possit facere vel velle aliquod bonum absque gratia?

Articulus IV: De necessitate gratiae ad amorem Dei naturalem super omnia tam affectivum quam effectivum, et ad vitanda peccata

Articulus V: Utrum homo possit se praeparare ad gratiam sine gratia?

Articulus VI: Utrum homini justificato necessaria sit gratia actualis ad singulos pietatis actus?

Articulus VII: Utrum homo in gratia constitutus indigeat speciali auxilio gratiae ad finaliter perseverandum?

Dissertatio IV: De essentia et divisione gratiae

Articulus I: De essentia gratiae

Articulus II: Variae divisiones gratiae

Articulus III: De gratia gratis data speciatim

Articulus IV: Utrum detur in hoc statu naturae lapsae gratia sufficiens?

Articulus V: Quo sensu admittenda sit gratia sufficiens ?

Articulus VI: Quid et quotuplex sit auxilium gratiae sufficientis ?

Articulus VII: DE GRATIA EFFICACI

Articulus VIII: Expenduntur varii modi explicandi efficaciam et causalitatem gratiae per se efficacis

Articulus IX: De causa gratiae

Dissertatio V: De justificatione peccatoris

Articulus I: Utrum in justificatione impii peccata vere deleantur et auferantur, et non solum tegantur ?

Articulus II: Utrum ad remissionem peccati, qua est justificatio impii, requiratur gratiae infusio ?

Articulus III: De actibus ad justificationem peccatoris adulti requisitis

Articulus IV

Articulus V: Quaedam questiunculae ad complementum questionis D. Thomae breviter resolvuntur

Dissertatio VI: De merito justi

Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit meritum ? quas conditiones requirat ?

Articulus II: Utrum homo possit aliquid mereri a Deo ?

Articulus III: Utrum opera justorum quae fiunt ex gratia, sint meritoria de condigno vitae aeternae ?

Articulus IV: De his quae cadunt sub merito

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