Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

Punishment strictly taken is penal and afflicting evil, inflicted against the inclination at least natural of the one suffering it, in vengeance for his own sin. And since evil is twofold, positive and privative, punishment is twofold : One positive, which is called the pain of sense, because, since it torments by inflicting something disconvenient and noxious either to the soul or to the body, and the positive afflictive hurt is perceived chiefly by the senses, therefore this punishment, whether it regard the mind or the body, is called pain of sense. The other is privative, and is called the pain of loss, by which is understood the loss of those goods which are owed to men from the promise of God; among which, since the beatific and intuitive vision of God stands forth eminent, its privation is called antonomastically the pain of loss.

§ I

How manyfold is the punishment of sin?

I say : Every personal mortal sin induces the guilt of twofold punishment, namely of loss and of sense¹. Of original sin I shall speak below.

The conclusion on both parts is of faith, expressed in the sentence to be pronounced by Christ at the last judgment, in these words Matth., XXV, 41 : Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire. Depart from me expresses the pain of loss; into everlasting fire, the pain of sense. Various other texts prove the same, whereby we are taught that men, on account of sin, are both deprived of the kingdom of heaven, as I Cor., VI, 9 ; Matth., III, 2, etc., and delivered over to the torment of fire, Isa., LXVI, 16 ; Apoc., XIV, 10, and elsewhere.

Reason congruent². Punishment is proportioned to sin. Now in sin there are two things, namely aversion from the unchangeable good and conversion to changeable good, according to that word Jerem., II, 13 : Two evils has my people done. They have forsaken me, the fountain of living water, and have digged to themselves broken cisterns. That therefore punishment be proportioned to sin, there must be something answering to aversion, and that is the pain of loss; and something answering to conversion, and that is the pain of sense. For it is equitable that he who voluntarily turns himself away from God remain separated from him, and that he who converts himself to a creature, seeking from it glory or delight, be afflicted through it; so that even in this sense that word is true Sap., XI, 17 : By what things a man sinneth, by these also he is tormented.

You will ask 1° whether the grief arising from lost beatitude be pain of sense, or of loss.

Answer that it is not properly punishment, but supposes the punishment from which it is caused; reductively, however, it pertains to the pain of loss, from which it results, as joy is reduced to beatitude, from which it springs up.

You will ask 2° which punishment is graver : that of loss, or that of sense?

Answer that the pain of loss is graver, because it is quasi-essential, and is opposed to the beatific vision, which holds the first place in beatitude; but the pain of sense is quasi-accidental, and is opposed to accidental beatitude.

You will ask 3º whether the pain of loss be equal in all the damned.

Answer negatively : 1° because the pain of loss stands under the character of torment toward the damned, as the beatific vision, of which it is the privation, stands under the character of reward toward the blessed. But this is not equal in all the blessed. Therefore neither is that in all the damned. 2° One damned man grieves more for lost beatitude than another. Therefore the loss of beatitude is a greater evil to him than to the other.

You will say : According to St. Thomas, above q. 73, a. 2, c., total privation and in facto esse admits neither greater nor lesser. But the pain of loss is total privation and in facto esse. Therefore.

Answer. I distinguish the major. Total privation and in facto esse admits neither greater nor lesser extensively, I concede, because it takes away not more nor less of the form; intensively, I deny, because, greater obstacles being set against the form, it becomes more deeply rooted and fixed in the subject.

§ II

Whether any sin induces the guilt of eternal punishment?

I say 1° : It is of faith, against Origen, that the punishments of all the damned, both men and demons, will be eternal of common law; and thus mortal sin, unremitted in this life, must be chastised in hell with eternal punishment.

Thus everywhere Scripture. Isa., LXVI, 24, of the damned it is said : Their worm shall not die, and their fire shall not be extinguished. Matth., XXV, 41 : Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire; and 46 : These shall go into everlasting punishment, or, as Aug. reads, into everlasting combustion. II Thess., I, 9 : They shall suffer eternal punishment in destruction from the face of the Lord. Apoc., XIV, 10 and 11 : They shall be tormented with fire and brimstone... for ever and ever. And elsewhere.

If you say that Scripture often signifies by the name of eternity, not perfect eternity, but long duration, I answer that indeed it is so; but I deny that it can be thus understood where it speaks of the punishments of the damned : both because the holy Fathers unanimously understand perfect eternity, and this is the common sense of the faithful; and from the context, for Scripture speaks of the punishments of the damned in the same manner as of the life of the blessed : These shall go into everlasting punishment, but the just into life everlasting. But it certainly stands established that the life of the blessed will be properly eternal. Therefore likewise the punishments of the damned properly eternal. And so it was defined in the fourth Lateran Council, chapter Firmiter, On the Holy Trinity³, and in the Council of Trent, session VI, canons 25 and 26⁴

I said, of common law, because there is no doubt but that God can, of absolute power, absolve all the damned from their punishments, and evacuate hell.

But, the dogma of faith supposed, a subtler question is raised among theologians : whether any sin of itself and its intrinsic malice induces the guilt of eternal punishment; or whether that character befit it only per accidens, whether by reason of the law laid down by God, whereby he forbids it under eternal punishment, or by reason of the subject, which remains perpetually deprived of grace. For the resolution of which,

I say 2º : Mortal sin, of itself and its intrinsic malice, induces the guilt of eternal punishment; venial sin, the guilt of temporal punishment only⁵.

Proof of both parts together. That sin induces of itself and its intrinsic malice the guilt of eternal punishment which imports an inordination of itself irreparable. For sin induces the guilt of punishment by reason of inordination, as was said; but the cause remaining, the effect remains. But mortal sin, of itself and its intrinsic malice, says an inordination of itself irreparable; venial sin does not.

Therefore. — Proof of the minor by a twofold argument : 1° Mortal sin averts and disorders from the ultimate end, as we shall say below; but venial sin disorders only about means to the end. But disorder from the ultimate end is of its own nature irreparable, not disorder about means. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. The ultimate end stands in moral and practical matters as the first principle stands in speculative matters. But error concerning the first principle in speculative matters is irreparable of itself; for by whom would it be repaired? Otherwise error concerning conclusions, which can be repaired from right understanding of the principle. Therefore disorder concerning the ultimate end is irreparable of itself, not disorder about means.

Proof 2° of the first minor. Mortal sin takes away grace, which is the principle of spiritual life, and so stands as death of the soul; but venial sin takes not away grace, but only lessens its fervor, and so stands as sickness and languor of the soul. But death is not repairable except by miracle; sickness and languor are repairable by the forces of nature. Therefore.

You will say against the first part : Just punishment is equaled to fault; for justice is equality. Whence Isa., XXVII, 8 : Measure against measure : when it shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it. But sin is temporal and often momentary. Therefore eternal punishment is not owed to it.

Answer. I distinguish the major.⁶ Just punishment, as to quantity or acerbity, is equaled to fault, I concede; as to duration, I deny. For, as Aug. says book XXI de Civit., c. 11, in much judgment, even human, it is required that punishment be equaled to fault as to duration. For not because adultery or homicide is committed in a moment is momentary punishment inflicted for that reason, but sometimes perpetual imprisonment or exile, sometimes even death; wherein is considered not the brief delay of the killing, but rather that he be taken away in perpetuity from the fellowship of the living, and thus it represents after its manner the eternity of the punishment inflicted divinely.

I say 3° : Although to venial sin there is owed of itself temporal punishment only, as was said, nevertheless, if it be not remitted as to fault in this life, and be joined to mortal sin, it is punished per accidens in hell with eternal punishment⁷. So with the Author judge St. Bonaventure, Richard, Abulensis, and several others, both ancients and more recent, against Scotus and the Scotists.

Proof For punishment is not remitted while the guilt of punishment remains; otherwise the guilty would not suffer punishment, which is against justice. But in the damned there always remains the guilt of punishment due to venial sin unremitted in this life as to fault. Therefore punishment always remains. — Proof of the minor. As long as fault remains, remains the guilt of punishment due to the fault. But venial fault here unremitted will never be remitted in hell. Therefore. — Proof of the minor manifoldly : 1° because the damned are simply in termino; but to him who exists simply in termino remission of no fault is given. I said, simply in termino, to forestall the instance which might be made of souls in Purgatory, which are not simply, but secundum quid, in termino. 2° Venial fault is never remitted except through voluntary and condign retraction made by him who sinned; which voluntary and condign retraction cannot occur without act of charity and penance, of which the damned are not capable, being obstinate in evil. 3° No fault can be remitted except through application of the merits of Christ; for every remission of sin is an effect of the merits of Christ. But no application of the merits of Christ is made to the damned, since they are not his members, as the Author teaches 3a p., q. 8, a. 3, c., nor did he die for them existing in this state, as I said in the first part. And therefore the common sense of the faithful and of the Church is, that in hell there is no redemption. Therefore.

I say 4° : Mortal or venial sin dismissed in this life as to fault will probably not be punished in the damned with eternal punishment.

I confess that St. Thomas in IV Sentent., dist. 21, q. 1, a. 2, quaestiunc. 3, holds the contrary opinion; but in the following distinction 22, q. 1, a. 1, ad 5, the matter more attentively examined, he abandons that opinion and embraces ours. For after saying that some hold that mortal sin dismissed as to fault will be punished eternally in hell, like venial sin not dismissed — which is the opinion he had held in the preceding distinction — he subjoins : « But this seems not alike, because venial [unremitted] will be punished eternally in hell for this reason, that it always remains, since there is not there anything that can blot out the fault; but the punishment, from the fact that it is paid, is expiated. And therefore others say that the punishment of which someone is debtor after fault dismissed will be punished temporally in hell. Nor is it incongruous that as regards something accidental the punishment of hell be diminished until the day of judgment, even as it is also increased. » Which words the holy Doctor not only asserts our conclusion, but proves it and solves the arguments to the contrary.