Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

DISSERTATION VII

ON THE EFFECTS OF SIN

St. Thomas, Ia IIae, qq. 85, 86 and 87.

St. Thomas, q. 86.

What we call habitual sin the ancients called stain; for, as authors note, this complex term, habitual sin, is not found among the ancients, but only stain. That habitual sin and stain are one and the same is manifest; because to be stained and unclean before God is to be defiled with sins, injurious and offensive to God, which is the proper and formal effect of habitual sin.

I say 1°: From actual sin there follows in the soul a stain which is called habitual sin¹.

The Scriptures prove this effect of sin, calling sin by its proper name stain, as Josue, XXII, 17: Is it a small thing unto you that you sinned against Beelphegor, and that even to this day the stain of that crime remaineth in you? Likewise Jerem., II, 22, Psal., XIV, 2, and elsewhere. Also those which call sins filthinesses, uncleannesses, defilements, as Isa., IV, 4: If the Lord shall wash away the filth of the daughters of Sion.

Reason also supports it. Stain in spiritual things is said after the manner of stain in bodily things². Therefore just as a clean body is said properly to be stained when from contact with another body it loses its brightness, as when a garment is infected with oil; so the soul is said metaphorically to be stained, when through disordered affection toward creatures, which is a certain touch of hers, she loses the brightness she had from the refulgence of the light both of reason and of grace. For each thing, as it is perfected by union with nobler things, so is it disfigured and made vile by admixture with inferiors: thus silver by admixture of gold becomes better, by admixture of tin deteriorates and becomes impure.

I say 2°: The stain remains in the soul after the act of sin³.

It is proved 1° from the places cited in the first conclusion, and because man, according to Scripture, after the act of sin is called and remains a sinner. Matth., IX, 10: Sinners and publicans coming sat down with Jesus. Therefore something remains in him whereby he be so denominated; otherwise he would be denominated sinner by merely extrinsic denomination, which we shall impugn presently.

2° By reason. Man incurs the stain of sin by recession from the light of reason and of divine law⁴. Therefore, as long as man remains outside such light, he remains under the stain of sin. — I subjoin. Yet although the act of sin whereby man departed from the light of reason and divine law ceases, he does not at once return to that in which he had been, but some motion of will contrary to the first motion is required; as if one be distant from something through some motion, he does not at once, the motion ceasing, become near to it, but he must approach, returning through a contrary motion. Therefore.

I say 3°: The stain of mortal sin is the privation of the brightness of grace, or, what is the same, of grace itself, connoting the preceding actual sin from which it is caused.

The first part is proved. 1° The stain of sin, or habitual sin, consists in that which is first expelled per se by justification; for justification is remission of sins. But the privation of sanctifying grace is that which is first expelled by justification. « [For] remission of guilt cannot be understood if infusion of grace were not present, » as the Author teaches infra q. 113, a. 2, c, and as Trid. says, sess. VI, cap. 7: Grace, or « the justice of God, is the one formal cause of our justification. » Therefore.

2° By that man is constituted habitually a sinner and unjust, by whose opposite he is constituted habitually just. But man is constituted habitually just by sanctifying grace. Therefore by its privation he is constituted habitually unjust and a sinner.

The second part is proved. 1° That that stain have the reason of guilt, it must be moral and voluntary. Therefore it must connote the act of will from which it is caused.

2° If the stain consisted in privation of sanctifying grace without respect to the actual sin from which it is caused, since the privation of such grace is unique, indivisible, and of the same species in all, it cannot be explained how stains are many, diverse and unequal⁵.

I say 4°: The stain of venial sin is the privation of the fervor of charity from actual venial sins.

St. Thomas expounds and explains this conclusion in IV Sentent., dist. 16, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1, in these words: « It must be said that stain can be in a twofold way: in one mode, through privation of beauty; and thus in venial sin no stain remains, because it does not take away grace, which is the adornment of the soul: in another mode, through this, that the beauty, which is of grace, is hindered from appearing outwardly, as by dust the beauty of the face is befouled; and such stain is in venial sin, because the adornment of grace is hindered from being shown outwardly in acts. »

Whence the stain of venial sin is not a stain properly and simply, but only secundum quid; because it does not take away the form whereby beauty inheres in the soul, namely grace, but only obscures and covers it, that it shine less in acts; as a comely face by dust becomes somewhat uncleanly, yet its beauty is not destroyed⁶.

St. Thomas, q. 87.

You will ask 1° whether sin entails liability to punishment.

I answer. Affirmatively. Thus Scripture expressly in various places. Exod., XXXII, 35: The Lord struck the people for the guilt of the calf. Psal. XXXI, 10: Many are the scourges of the sinner. Matth., XXV, 41: Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire. Matth., V, 22: Whosoever shall say (to his brother), fool, shall be guilty of the fire of gehenna. Rom., II, 9: Tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that worketh evil. And elsewhere.

It is proved by reason. Right reason demands that he who has violated the order and equality of justice restore and re-establish it by a kind of compensation of punishment¹; which is observed in those very injuries done to men. But he who sins violates the order and equality of divine justice, indulging his will more than he ought, acting against the commandment of God. Therefore.

You will ask 2° what liability to punishment is.

I answer. Liability to punishment is not an ordination, whether active or passive, to punishment, but it is the condignity or due of punishment to be undergone on account of sin: both because sin is first worthy of punishment before it is ordained to it; nay, it is not ordained to it except because it is worthy of it, as an act of virtue is first worthy of reward before it is ordained to it, nor is it ordained to the reward except because it is worthy of it: and because, even if God did not ordain the sinner to punishment, nevertheless the sinner would be worthy of punishment: and finally because ordination to punishment is good and from God, but God makes no one liable to punishment.

You will ask 3° whether liability to punishment remains after sin remitted.

I answer. Sin being remitted, there can remain the liability to some temporal punishment². This is against the Lutherans and Calvinists dogmatizing that with guilt the whole punishment is always remitted, and thence doing away with indulgences, satisfactions and Purgatory.

I say. God indeed can remit all things; but ordinarily, in remitting guilt and constituting man by grace heir of glory, he remits only eternal punishment, and changes it into temporal satisfactory punishment.

That this is so Scripture openly testifies. For Adam himself, whose guilt, it is agreed, was remitted, Sap., X, 2, yet underwent various punishments, not as medicinal against future sins, as the heretics will, but in vindication of past guilt. For it is said Genes., III, 17: Because thou hast hearkened to the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat, cursed is the earth in thy work; with labor and toil shalt thou eat thereof, etc. Moreover death and the miseries of this life are punishments of original sin, yet they are incurred also by those to whom it has been remitted. Likewise David, II Reg., XII, 14, after obtaining pardon for his adultery, was punished by the death of his son, not as a safeguard against the future, but in vengeance for the past; for Nathan said to him: Because thou hast made the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme, for this thing, the child that is born to thee shall surely die. So in many other places; and thus it was defined by the council of Trent, session VI, chapter 14 and canon 30; session XIV, chapter 8 and canon 12. Of which more in the third part of the Summa, at q. 86.

Punishment strictly taken is penal and afflicting evil, inflicted against the inclination at least natural of the one suffering it, in vengeance for his own sin. And since evil is twofold, positive and privative, punishment is twofold : One positive, which is called the pain of sense, because, since it torments by inflicting something disconvenient and noxious either to the soul or to the body, and the positive afflictive hurt is perceived chiefly by the senses, therefore this punishment, whether it regard the mind or the body, is called pain of sense. The other is privative, and is called the pain of loss, by which is understood the loss of those goods which are owed to men from the promise of God; among which, since the beatific and intuitive vision of God stands forth eminent, its privation is called antonomastically the pain of loss.

§ I

How manyfold is the punishment of sin?

I say : Every personal mortal sin induces the guilt of twofold punishment, namely of loss and of sense¹. Of original sin I shall speak below.

The conclusion on both parts is of faith, expressed in the sentence to be pronounced by Christ at the last judgment, in these words Matth., XXV, 41 : Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire. Depart from me expresses the pain of loss; into everlasting fire, the pain of sense. Various other texts prove the same, whereby we are taught that men, on account of sin, are both deprived of the kingdom of heaven, as I Cor., VI, 9 ; Matth., III, 2, etc., and delivered over to the torment of fire, Isa., LXVI, 16 ; Apoc., XIV, 10, and elsewhere.

Reason congruent². Punishment is proportioned to sin. Now in sin there are two things, namely aversion from the unchangeable good and conversion to changeable good, according to that word Jerem., II, 13 : Two evils has my people done. They have forsaken me, the fountain of living water, and have digged to themselves broken cisterns. That therefore punishment be proportioned to sin, there must be something answering to aversion, and that is the pain of loss; and something answering to conversion, and that is the pain of sense. For it is equitable that he who voluntarily turns himself away from God remain separated from him, and that he who converts himself to a creature, seeking from it glory or delight, be afflicted through it; so that even in this sense that word is true Sap., XI, 17 : By what things a man sinneth, by these also he is tormented.

You will ask 1° whether the grief arising from lost beatitude be pain of sense, or of loss.

Answer that it is not properly punishment, but supposes the punishment from which it is caused; reductively, however, it pertains to the pain of loss, from which it results, as joy is reduced to beatitude, from which it springs up.

You will ask 2° which punishment is graver : that of loss, or that of sense?

Answer that the pain of loss is graver, because it is quasi-essential, and is opposed to the beatific vision, which holds the first place in beatitude; but the pain of sense is quasi-accidental, and is opposed to accidental beatitude.

You will ask 3º whether the pain of loss be equal in all the damned.

Answer negatively : 1° because the pain of loss stands under the character of torment toward the damned, as the beatific vision, of which it is the privation, stands under the character of reward toward the blessed. But this is not equal in all the blessed. Therefore neither is that in all the damned. 2° One damned man grieves more for lost beatitude than another. Therefore the loss of beatitude is a greater evil to him than to the other.

You will say : According to St. Thomas, above q. 73, a. 2, c., total privation and in facto esse admits neither greater nor lesser. But the pain of loss is total privation and in facto esse. Therefore.

Answer. I distinguish the major. Total privation and in facto esse admits neither greater nor lesser extensively, I concede, because it takes away not more nor less of the form; intensively, I deny, because, greater obstacles being set against the form, it becomes more deeply rooted and fixed in the subject.

§ II

Whether any sin induces the guilt of eternal punishment?

I say 1° : It is of faith, against Origen, that the punishments of all the damned, both men and demons, will be eternal of common law; and thus mortal sin, unremitted in this life, must be chastised in hell with eternal punishment.

Thus everywhere Scripture. Isa., LXVI, 24, of the damned it is said : Their worm shall not die, and their fire shall not be extinguished. Matth., XXV, 41 : Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire; and 46 : These shall go into everlasting punishment, or, as Aug. reads, into everlasting combustion. II Thess., I, 9 : They shall suffer eternal punishment in destruction from the face of the Lord. Apoc., XIV, 10 and 11 : They shall be tormented with fire and brimstone... for ever and ever. And elsewhere.

If you say that Scripture often signifies by the name of eternity, not perfect eternity, but long duration, I answer that indeed it is so; but I deny that it can be thus understood where it speaks of the punishments of the damned : both because the holy Fathers unanimously understand perfect eternity, and this is the common sense of the faithful; and from the context, for Scripture speaks of the punishments of the damned in the same manner as of the life of the blessed : These shall go into everlasting punishment, but the just into life everlasting. But it certainly stands established that the life of the blessed will be properly eternal. Therefore likewise the punishments of the damned properly eternal. And so it was defined in the fourth Lateran Council, chapter Firmiter, On the Holy Trinity³, and in the Council of Trent, session VI, canons 25 and 26⁴

I said, of common law, because there is no doubt but that God can, of absolute power, absolve all the damned from their punishments, and evacuate hell.

But, the dogma of faith supposed, a subtler question is raised among theologians : whether any sin of itself and its intrinsic malice induces the guilt of eternal punishment; or whether that character befit it only per accidens, whether by reason of the law laid down by God, whereby he forbids it under eternal punishment, or by reason of the subject, which remains perpetually deprived of grace. For the resolution of which,

I say 2º : Mortal sin, of itself and its intrinsic malice, induces the guilt of eternal punishment; venial sin, the guilt of temporal punishment only⁵.

Proof of both parts together. That sin induces of itself and its intrinsic malice the guilt of eternal punishment which imports an inordination of itself irreparable. For sin induces the guilt of punishment by reason of inordination, as was said; but the cause remaining, the effect remains. But mortal sin, of itself and its intrinsic malice, says an inordination of itself irreparable; venial sin does not.

Therefore. — Proof of the minor by a twofold argument : 1° Mortal sin averts and disorders from the ultimate end, as we shall say below; but venial sin disorders only about means to the end. But disorder from the ultimate end is of its own nature irreparable, not disorder about means. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. The ultimate end stands in moral and practical matters as the first principle stands in speculative matters. But error concerning the first principle in speculative matters is irreparable of itself; for by whom would it be repaired? Otherwise error concerning conclusions, which can be repaired from right understanding of the principle. Therefore disorder concerning the ultimate end is irreparable of itself, not disorder about means.

Proof 2° of the first minor. Mortal sin takes away grace, which is the principle of spiritual life, and so stands as death of the soul; but venial sin takes not away grace, but only lessens its fervor, and so stands as sickness and languor of the soul. But death is not repairable except by miracle; sickness and languor are repairable by the forces of nature. Therefore.

You will say against the first part : Just punishment is equaled to fault; for justice is equality. Whence Isa., XXVII, 8 : Measure against measure : when it shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it. But sin is temporal and often momentary. Therefore eternal punishment is not owed to it.

Answer. I distinguish the major.⁶ Just punishment, as to quantity or acerbity, is equaled to fault, I concede; as to duration, I deny. For, as Aug. says book XXI de Civit., c. 11, in much judgment, even human, it is required that punishment be equaled to fault as to duration. For not because adultery or homicide is committed in a moment is momentary punishment inflicted for that reason, but sometimes perpetual imprisonment or exile, sometimes even death; wherein is considered not the brief delay of the killing, but rather that he be taken away in perpetuity from the fellowship of the living, and thus it represents after its manner the eternity of the punishment inflicted divinely.

I say 3° : Although to venial sin there is owed of itself temporal punishment only, as was said, nevertheless, if it be not remitted as to fault in this life, and be joined to mortal sin, it is punished per accidens in hell with eternal punishment⁷. So with the Author judge St. Bonaventure, Richard, Abulensis, and several others, both ancients and more recent, against Scotus and the Scotists.

Proof For punishment is not remitted while the guilt of punishment remains; otherwise the guilty would not suffer punishment, which is against justice. But in the damned there always remains the guilt of punishment due to venial sin unremitted in this life as to fault. Therefore punishment always remains. — Proof of the minor. As long as fault remains, remains the guilt of punishment due to the fault. But venial fault here unremitted will never be remitted in hell. Therefore. — Proof of the minor manifoldly : 1° because the damned are simply in termino; but to him who exists simply in termino remission of no fault is given. I said, simply in termino, to forestall the instance which might be made of souls in Purgatory, which are not simply, but secundum quid, in termino. 2° Venial fault is never remitted except through voluntary and condign retraction made by him who sinned; which voluntary and condign retraction cannot occur without act of charity and penance, of which the damned are not capable, being obstinate in evil. 3° No fault can be remitted except through application of the merits of Christ; for every remission of sin is an effect of the merits of Christ. But no application of the merits of Christ is made to the damned, since they are not his members, as the Author teaches 3a p., q. 8, a. 3, c., nor did he die for them existing in this state, as I said in the first part. And therefore the common sense of the faithful and of the Church is, that in hell there is no redemption. Therefore.

I say 4° : Mortal or venial sin dismissed in this life as to fault will probably not be punished in the damned with eternal punishment.

I confess that St. Thomas in IV Sentent., dist. 21, q. 1, a. 2, quaestiunc. 3, holds the contrary opinion; but in the following distinction 22, q. 1, a. 1, ad 5, the matter more attentively examined, he abandons that opinion and embraces ours. For after saying that some hold that mortal sin dismissed as to fault will be punished eternally in hell, like venial sin not dismissed — which is the opinion he had held in the preceding distinction — he subjoins : « But this seems not alike, because venial [unremitted] will be punished eternally in hell for this reason, that it always remains, since there is not there anything that can blot out the fault; but the punishment, from the fact that it is paid, is expiated. And therefore others say that the punishment of which someone is debtor after fault dismissed will be punished temporally in hell. Nor is it incongruous that as regards something accidental the punishment of hell be diminished until the day of judgment, even as it is also increased. » Which words the holy Doctor not only asserts our conclusion, but proves it and solves the arguments to the contrary.

§ I

Whether infants dying with original sin alone suffer the pain of sense?

I suppose as certain of faith that infants dying with original sin suffer the pain of loss, because no one can attain eternal life, which is seated in the clear vision of God, without grace, which infants dying without baptism lack. Whence that, Joann., III, 5: Unless one be born again of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. And it was defined by the Council of Trent, sess. V, can. 4. But as to the pain of sense, concerning which is the dispute,

I say: Infants dying with original sin itself do not suffer the pain of sense ¹.

It is proved 1° from the Fathers. Greg. Nazianz., whose authority was so great, Augustine testifying, that he was held the mouth of the Church, orat. XL in lavacrum, distinguishes three kinds of men departing without baptism, of which some contemned baptism, others omitted it by their own negligence, others, namely infants, lacked it through the negligence of others; and concerning the punishment after death of all these he pronounces thus: « I judge that it will be that the first indeed, together with the crimes of others, shall also pay punishments for the contempt of baptism; but the others shall hang punishments indeed, yet lighter, as those who have erred from baptism not so much by perversity of soul as by folly; finally the last, let them be neither visited with heavenly glory nor with punishments by the just judge, seeing that, although they were not signed with baptism, they nevertheless lack wickedness, and have rather suffered than done this loss. For not everyone who is unworthy of punishment straightway merits honor also: even as not everyone who is unworthy of honor straightway merits punishment. »

But this testimony is so open that it cannot be eluded by any tergiversation.

Next Greg. Nyss., in the oration on infants taken away by immature death: « The immature death of infants, he says, shows that those who thus ceased to live will be neither in pains and sadness. »

It is proved 2° by reason. Punishment ought to be proportionate and due to fault; this is per se known. Whence that, Isa., XXVII, 8: In measure against measure: when it shall be cast off, you shall judge it. But the pain of sense is not proportionate nor due to original fault. Therefore.

Proof of minor, in which lies the difficulty, in several ways: 1° Original sin is not through the will of the person, but through the will of nature ². Therefore it ought to be punished with the punishment of nature, and not the punishment of person. — I subjoin. But the pain of sense happens through the proper passion of the person; the pain of loss truly is the punishment of nature, and although in the person, is nevertheless not by reason of the person or supposit, but by reason of nature, which is found deprived of grace or original justice, without which the vision of God is not due to them, as a good not owed to the principles of nature. Therefore.

Proof 2° of the same minor. The pain of sense is never due to habitual disposition ³ ; for anyone is not punished, whether by God or by men, because he is apt to steal, but because he actually steals. But to habitual privation without every act some damage is due; put the case of one who has not the knowledge of letters, who by this very fact is unworthy of promotion to episcopal dignity. But in the infant there is habitual privation, namely of grace and original justice. Likewise there is only habitual disposition, without every act, namely concupiscence, which makes the infant apt to concupiscence, as Augustine says, while the adult concupisces actually. Therefore to an infant dying with original sin the pain of sense is not proportionate nor due, but only the pain of loss, because evidently he is not fit to be led to the divine vision, on account of privation of original justice.

It is proved 3° of the same minor. The Church in imposing punishments and satisfactions imitates the order and mode of divine justice punishing sins. But the Church imposes no sensible punishment or satisfaction for original sin, nor commands adults who receive baptism to conceive sorrow or sadness about it. Therefore she judges that no sensible punishment is due to this sin or answering to it in the future world.

The conclusion is proved from inconveniences. Since the pain of sense is eternal and most bitter, and children enduring it would be destitute of grace, it could not fail to generate in them grave motions of impatience, anger, despair, hatred and blasphemy against God. But this can neither be admitted nor ought to be admitted in those infants, and it is condemned in Baius, proposition 49 ⁴. Therefore.

Nor say that the same follows from the pain of loss. For we shall prove below that children will perceive no pain or sadness from it. Nor does it avail should you say that not all who are afflicted by miseries and afflictions are carried away by motions of impatience, anger, despair, hatred and blasphemy against God. That indeed is true in this life, where miseries, compared with the miseries of the other life, scarcely merit the name of miseries, and those afflicted with them are helped by helps of grace to bear them patiently; which does not happen in hell.

The objections are solved.

Obj. 1°: Matth., XXV, 41, at the last judgment it will be said to all who will be on the left: Depart into everlasting fire. But infants will be on the left. For there will be only two orders of the judged, of which some will be placed on the right, others on the left. Infants will not be on the right. Therefore on the left.

I answer. There are three expositions of this celebrated text, upon which the adverse opinion chiefly relies, which I leave to the judgment of the reader, that he may choose that one which will seem more probable to himself.

1° I distinguish the major. At the last judgment it will be said to all adults who will be on the left: Go into everlasting fire — I concede; to absolutely all — I deny. Therefore there is not described in that place the form of judgment to be observed respectively toward absolutely all, but only the form of the discussion of judgment to be observed respectively toward adults who have reason: I was hungry, and you gave me to eat, etc. I thirsted, and you gave, etc. Under which are understood all personal works good and evil. For these suit adults alone, by no means infants. If thence you infer: Therefore neither do these words: Come blessed, etc., regard baptized infants — I concede. Yet it does not thence follow that they are not to be called into the kingdom by another sentence, just as the unbaptized are not to be excluded by another sentence. And although Aug., serm. 294, cap. 3, n° 3, understands this text also of infants, as I shall say below, nevertheless lib. de octo Quaestionibus Dulcitii, q. 1, he understands it of adults only ⁵.

2° Suppose this place of Matth. to be understood also of infants: under the name of fire (whose bitterness in punishments is supreme) all the pains of hell are comprehended, which for their deserts are of the greatest variety, just as under the name of kingdom, in the prior opinion, is comprehended all the variety of joys in the heavenly kingdom; although, as there the clear vision of God will be common to all, so to all the damned will be common the privation of the divine vision. So Estius on this place, according to which interpretation, under the name of fire is understood indeed the very pain and combustion of fire, but it is not alone, but also other pains, put the privation of vision of God, the remorse of conscience, binding, incarceration, stench, etc.; otherwise, resting precisely in the words, the damned would undergo only the pain of loss and of fire, and no other. It seems certain therefore that Christ under the name of fire comprehended all the pains of hell, not all to be inflicted on all, but fittingly and proportionately to each according to the exigency of his deserts, this to one, that to another.

3° Under the name of fire can be understood, not the punishment of fire specifically, nor any other determinate punishment, but whatsoever punishment in genus and indeterminately. That is frequent enough in the Scriptures. Thus Psal., IXV, 12: We have passed through fire and water. Ibidem, 10: Thou hast proved us by fire, as silver is proved. Deut., IV, 20: The Lord brought you out of the iron furnace of Egypt; in which places by fire is understood whatsoever tribulation. And Josue, VII, 15, when the Lord had decreed Achan to be burned with fire, Josue understood stoning, ibid., 25.

Obj. 2° from Aug. the holy Doctor, serm. 294 ⁶, c. 3, n. 3: « The Lord, he says, about to come and to judge the living and the dead, as the Gospel speaks, will make two parts, right and left; to the left he will say: Go into everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels; to the right he will say: Come, blessed of my Father, possess the kingdom prepared for you from the beginning of the world. This he calls kingdom, that damnation with the devil. No middle place is left where you may place infants. Of the living and the dead judgment will be: some will be on the right, others on the left; I know no other. You who introduce a middle, depart from the middle; let him not offend you who seeks the right hand. And I admonish yourself, depart from the middle, but do not go to the left. » Idem Enchirid., c. 26 ; lib. I de Peccat. meritis, c. 26, and in answer to the words of St. Thomas, q. 5 de Malo, a. 2, ad 1: « It must be said, he says, that under the name of torment, torture, gehenna and cruciatus, or if anything similar be found in the sayings of the saints, is to be largely accepted for punishment, so that species is put for genus. But the saints used such a manner of speaking that they might render detestable the error of the Pelagians, who asserted that in infants there is no sin, nor is any punishment due to them. » In the same manner the sayings of Augustine and of the holy Fathers are interpreted by St. Bonaventure, Scotus, Dionysius Carthusianus, and others.

§ II. — Whether infants dying with original sin alone perceive any sadness or pain from the privation of the beatific vision?

I say: Infants dying with original sin alone perceive no sadness and no pain from the privation of the beatific vision; they are however not blessed with natural beatitude ⁷.

St. Thomas proves the first part of the conclusion with a twofold medium. The first is, quaest. 5 cit.: because infants do not know supernatural beatitude. The second, dist. cit.: because, granted that they recognize supernatural beatitude, it nevertheless would not be intrinsically proportionate to them.

The first reason is proposed thus ⁸ : No one grieves over the loss of a good which he does not know; for of the unknown there is no desire. But infants dying with original sin do not know supernatural beatitude, namely the clear vision of God of which they are deprived; because they had not, nor have faith. Therefore.

The second reason of St. Thomas is proposed thus ⁹. From the fact that someone lacks what exceeds his proportion, he is not afflicted, if he be of right reason, but only from this that he lacks that to which he is in some way proportioned: thus no wise man is afflicted that he cannot fly like a bird, or that he is not king or emperor, since it is not owed to him; he would however be afflicted if he were deprived of that to hold which he had in some way aptitude. But, although man having the use of free choice is proportioned to obtaining eternal life, inasmuch as by proper acts from grace he can merit it, and therefore, if he fall short of this, greatest will be his pain, because he loses what possibly could have been his own; infants nevertheless were never proportioned to having eternal life: because neither was it owed them from the principles of nature, since it exceeds every faculty of nature, nor could they have proper acts whereby they would obtain so great a good. And besides they are of right reason; for they are oblique by no passion, by no personal sin, but such are they as they were before death, since they are not changed through death; before death moreover they had no disordinate act. Therefore they will grieve nothing at all of that lack of divine vision; yea more they will rejoice in this that they will participate much of the divine goodness and natural perfections.

Nor can it be said that they were proportioned to obtaining eternal life ¹⁰, if not through their own operation, at least through the action of others about them; because they could be baptized by others, as many children of the same condition baptized attained eternal life. For this belongs to grace superexceeding, that anyone be rewarded without his own act. Whence the defect of such grace causes no more sadness in children dying unbaptized than in wise men this, that many graces are not made to them which were made in other similar ones.

It is confirmed. No reason seems to be why exterior punishment of sense is withdrawn from children if interior affliction is attributed to them, which is much more penal ¹¹.

Proof of the second part of the conclusion. Natural beatitude cannot stand with aversion from God as author of nature; for natural beatitude consists in free amicable conversion and union with God as author of nature. But infants, by reason of original sin, are averted from God, even as author of nature. Therefore. — Proof of minor. Adam, by sinning, was averted from God, not only as supernatural author, but even as natural author, because whoever sins against God as supernatural author sins against him as natural author, since the natural law commands obedience to every superior legitimately commanding. But such in children is the habitual aversion, such as was actual in Adam, in whom they sinned. Therefore.