Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II
Charles René Billuart (1685–1757)
Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae. Tomus II.
First published 1884
Charles-René Billuart, O.P.'s Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae, Tomus II, treats human acts, passions and virtues, sin, law, and grace in the Thomistic manual tradition. Schola presents the complete Latin Tome II from the Paris Vives edition of 1884.
Tractatus I: De actibus humanis
Dissertatio I: De voluntario et involuntario
Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit voluntarium?
Articulus II: Utrum omissio et effectus ex ea secutus sint voluntaria sine praecepto ponendi actum qui omittitur?
Articulus III: Utrum violentia causet involuntarium?
Articulus IV: Utrum metus causet involuntarium?
Articulus V: Utrum concupiscentia causet involuntarium?
Articulus VI: Utrum ignorantia causet involuntarium?
Dissertatio II: De voluntario libero, sive de libertate creata
Articulus I: Praenotanda
Articulus II: Utrum in homine lapso sit libertas arbitrii seu indifferentiae?
Articulus III: Utrum ad merendum vel demerendum, in hoc statu naturae lapsae, requiratur libertas a necessitate, seu libertas indifferentiae?
Dissertatio III: De actibus humanis speciatim sumptis
Articulus I: Utrum voluntas possit velle malum sub ratione mali?
Articulus II: De motivo voluntatis quoad specificationem
Articulus III: De motivo voluntatis quoad exercitium
Articulus IV: De modo quo movetur voluntas : an libere, an necessario?
Articulus V: De actibus elicitis a voluntate
Articulus VI: De actibus imperatis.** D. Thomas, q. 17
Dissertatio IV: De actibus humanis in esse moris
Articulus I: In quo consistat moralitas in communi actuum humanorum ?
Articulus II: De principiis moralitatis
Articulus III: De concursu multiplicis moralitatis simul in eodem actu
Articulus IV: Utrum dentur actus indifferentes?
Articulus V: Utrum et quomodo voluntas humana, ut sit bona, debeat conformari voluntati divinae?
Articulus VI: Utrum actus exterior addat bonitatem vel malitiam actui interiori?
Articulus VII: Utrum eventus sequens addat ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus exterioris?
Dissertatio V: De conscientia
Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit conscientia?
Articulus II: An et quomodo teneamur conformari conscientiae erranti?
Articulus III: Cujus speciei et gravitatis sit peccatum agere contra conscientiam?
Articulus IV: Quomodo se gerere debeat confessarius cum poenitente quem deprehendit laborare conscientia erronea?
Articulus V: De conscientia scrupulosa, per varias quaestiunculas
Articulus VI: Utrum liceat agere cum conscientia dubia, probabili, aut probabiliori?
Dissertatio VI: De opinionum probabilitate et delectu
Articulus I: Utrum sit licitum sequi opinionem minus probabilem et minus tutam, in concursu probabilioris et tutioris?
Articulus II: Utrum in conflictu duarum opinionum aeque probabilium, de honestate objectiva actus, liceat sequi minus tutam faventem libertati, relicta tutiori favente legi ?
Articulus III: Utrum liceat sequi opinionem probabiliorem minus tutam in concursu minus probabilis tutioris, ubi agitur de sola honestate objectiva actus?
Articulus IV: Varia quaestiunculae circa praesentem materiam breviter resolvuntur
Dissertatio VII: De probabilismo moderato
Articulus I: De natura probabilitatis
Articulus II: Quaenam systemata prodierint circa probabilitatem in practicis?
Articulus III: An liceat sequi opinionem vere et solide probabilem faventem libertati, relicta tutiore aeque probabili, vel etiam probabiliori, ubi de sola liceitate actionis agitur?
Articulus IV: De usu probabilitatis et de regulis specialibus quibus conscientia in dubiis practice formatur
Articulus V: Utrum liceat sequi opinionem probabilem, aut etiam probabiliorem, relicta tutiore, cum adest obligatio certa finem determinatum obtinendi?
Articulus VI: De probabilismo compensativo
Tractatus II: De passionibus et virtutibus
Dissertatio I: De passionibus
Articulus I: De passionibus in particulari
Dissertatio II: De virtutibus
Articulus I: Quid sit virtus, et quotuplicis generis?
Articulus II: De subjecto virtutum
Articulus III: De causa virtutum
Articulus IV: De proprietatibus virtutum
Tractatus III: De peccatis
Dissertatio I: De natura peccati
Articulus I: Quid sit peccatum?
Articulus II: Utrum formale constitutivum peccati commissionis consistat in positivo, an in privativo?
Articulus III: De peccato omissionis
Dissertatio II: De distinctione specifica et numerica peccatorum
Articulus I: Varia peccati divisiones
Articulus II: Unde petatur distinctio specifica peccatorum?
Articulus III: Utrum peccata commissionis et omissionis specie distinguantur?
Articulus IV: Unde petatur distinctio numerica peccatorum?
Dissertatio III: De comparatione peccatorum ad invicem
Articulus I: Utrum omnia peccata sint inter se connexa et paria ?
Articulus II: Unde sumatur inaequalitas peccatorum ?
Dissertatio IV: De subjecto peccati
Articulus I: Quodnam sit peccati subjectum ?
Articulus II: Utrum peccatum saltem veniale possit esse in et a solo appetitu sensitivo, absque omni actuali influxu voluntatis; omnesque motus sensualitatis sint peccata?
Dissertatio V: De causis peccatorum
Articulus I: An et quae ignorantia sit causa peccati, eaque ipsa sit peccatum?
Articulus II: Utrum possit dari ignorantia invincibilis juris divini positivi?
Articulus III: Utrum dari possit ignorantia invincibilis juris naturae?
Articulus IV: Utrum ignorantia invincibilis juris naturae excuset a peccato?
Articulus V: De inadvertentia ad peccatum
Articulus VI: Utrum ignorantia excuset a poenis per leges positivas statutis?
Articulus VII: Utrum Deus sit causa peccati?
Dissertatio VI: De peccato originali
Articulus I: Utrum sit peccatum originale ab Adamo ad posteros transmissum?
Articulus II: Variae quaestiones circa traductionem peccati originalis breviter resolvuntur
Articulus III: Utrum beatissima Virgo Maria peccatum originale in sua Conceptione contraxerit ?
Articulus IV: Utrum S. Thomas negaverit beatam Virginem Deiparam fuisse a peccato originali immunem?
Articulus V: In quo sita sit essentia peccati originalis ?
The various antiquated opinions concerning the essence of original sin being set aside, I say 1°: Concupiscence is not the formal element of original sin, but only the material. This is against the Lutherans and Calvinists.
By concupiscence is here understood proneness or propensity to evil, from the privation of original justice. By another name it is called fomes peccati.
It is proved first part of the conclusion 1° from the Apostle, to the Rom., VIII, 1: There is no condemnation in those who are in Christ. But concupiscence remains in those reborn in Christ. Therefore.
It is proved 2°. The council of Trent, session V, canon 5, anathematizes him who « asserts that by baptism there is not taken away the whole that has the true and proper nature of sin. » But concupiscence is not taken away by baptism, as is known from experience, and as Trent declares ibid. Therefore. Further, if in those reborn concupiscence is not formally sin, neither is it in those not reborn, since it is the same in both.
It is proved 3°. Concupiscence is not that which is first had and conceived in original sin, but something consequent upon the privation of original justice, as I shall say presently. Therefore it is not the formal constitutive element of original sin.
You will say: The Apostle, to the Rom., VII, 23 and 25, calls concupiscence sin. Therefore.
I answer. With the council of Trent, session V, canon 5, that the Apostle calls concupiscence sin, « not because truly and properly it is sin in the reborn, but because it comes from sin and inclines to sin. »
But that concupiscence is material in original sin, which is the second part of the conclusion, St. Thomas expressly teaches here q. 82, a. 3, c. But probably he is not to be understood of the material properly so called, as, e. g., the entity of the act is the material of deformity in actual sin, because the material properly so called is presupposed to the formal. But concupiscence is not presupposed to the privation of original justice, in which we place the formal element of original sin, but follows upon it as its effect. It must therefore be understood of the material improperly and widely, inasmuch as an effect is wont to be compared to its cause, or a secondary effect to the primary, as material to formal. For that which stands consequentially toward some form can and is wont to be called in some way its matter. So at least more commonly the Thomists, against Gonet and the Salmanticenses.
I say 2°: The essence or formal constitutive element of original sin consists in the privation of original justice, as regards its primary effect, namely that it is voluntary to us by the will of our head1. This is the common doctrine of the Thomists and of many extraneous authors.
For the understanding of this it must be observed that original justice is nothing else than the perfect rectitude of the whole man. Whence it imported three things : the first, foundation and cause of the others, was the subjection of reason or will to God ; the second, the subjection of the inferior powers to reason ; the third, the subjection of the body to the soul. Man therefore was so instituted that unless his reason were withdrawn from God by sinning, neither could his body be withdrawn from the nod of the soul (whence he was impassible and immortal), nor the sensible powers from the rectitude of reason. He could sin truly, his will not yet confirmed in good through the attainment of the last end. Adam therefore sinned, and by sinning lost for himself and for us original justice as regards all its effects. We say therefore that the essential element of original sin consists in the privation of original justice as regards its primary effect.
It is proved. 1° By authority. Original sin is called by Scripture and the Fathers, by the council of Arausica, can. 2, and by Trent, sess. V, can. 2, death of the soul and enmity of God. Therefore it consists in the privation of that gift whereby we live spiritually and are friends of God. — I subjoin. But this gift is sanctifying grace, which is the first effect of original justice. Therefore in the privation of that is placed the essence of original sin.
It is proved. By a manifold reason. 1° In that is placed the essence of original sin which is taken away by baptism ; for baptism was principally instituted as a remedy for original sin. But by baptism is taken away the privation of original justice as regards its primary effect ; for there is conferred sanctifying grace, joining the mind to God and subjecting it. Therefore.
2° That is the essence or formal constitutive element of a thing which is first conceived in it as the root of the other things that pertain to that thing. But the privation of original justice, as regards its primary effect, namely conjunction with God, is what is first conceived in original sin as the root of the inordination of the inferior powers and of the corporal penalties that pertain to original sin. Therefore. — The min. is proved. By this very fact that the soul, by sinning, was deprived of the grace and charity whereby it was subjected and joined to God, as it were the barrier removed, there was made the subversion and rebellion of the inferior powers against reason, and there followed the liability to death, both temporal and eternal, and to the other penalties and miseries which fallen man suffers. Therefore.
3° Personal habitual sin consists in the privation of sanctifying grace, as voluntary by the proper will of the person. But original sin, as I have already often said, is of the genus of sin not actual, but habitual, differing in this alone from personal habitual sin, that it connotes the actual sin of Adam as head, from which it follows ; but personal habitual sin connotes the actual sin of the person sinning.
You will say 1°: The privation of original justice is the punishment of original sin. But punishment does not constitute guilt, but supposes it. Therefore. — The major St. Thomas expressly teaches here q. 85, a. 5, c, and q. 4 de Malo, a. 1. And it is the common sense, that we are deprived of original justice in punishment of original sin.
I answer. I distinguish the major. The privation of original justice physically taken for the subtraction of the aid conserving it, is the punishment of original sin, I concede; because thus it is from God, who is not the author of guilt. Morally taken, as it is the lack of the due form, and as it is voluntary by the force of the actual sin of Adam, I deny; for thus it is essentially guilt, namely habitual. The parity is in personal habitual sin.
You will say 2°: If original sin be essentially the privation of original justice, as regards its primary effect, namely the conjunction of the mind with God through grace, it follows 1° that by baptism original justice is restored; because grace is restored, joining the mind to God. It follows 2° that one sinning after baptism contracts original sin again; because by sinning he is deprived of the grace joining the soul with God. Both absurd. Therefore.
I answer. To the first. I distinguish the consequence. It follows that by baptism original justice is restored inadequately, I concede; adequately, I deny. For original justice not only joined the soul to God as to the last end, but moreover perfectly subjected the inferior powers to reason, and the body to the soul; which secondary effects are not restored by baptism. To the second, I deny the consequence. For original sin is not by whatever privation of sanctifying grace, but by that only which was voluntary in the head, and which we contract through seminal propagation.
From what has been said you will gather : 1° that original sin, as regards its formal element, is equal in all2 ; because thus taken it imports the privation of original justice and respect to the sin of Adam from which it originates. But this privation is equal in all, since all are totally deprived of original justice. Similarly this respect is equal in all, because all are equally sons of Adam.
2° As regards its material element, original sin is not equal in all3. For the bond of original justice being loosed, under which in a certain order all the powers of the soul were contained, each power by nature tends into its own proper motion, and the more vehemently the stronger it is. But it happens that some powers are stronger in one than in another, on account of the diverse complexions of the body. That therefore one man is more prone to concupiscence than another is not by reason of original sin formally taken, since in all equally is the bond of original justice loosed, and equally in all the inferior parts of the soul are left to themselves. But this happens from the diverse disposition of the powers : as, the bridle being equally loosed whereby many horses were held, one carries his rider more violently than another, on account of the greater natural ferocity in one than in the other.