Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II
Charles René Billuart (1685–1757)
Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae. Tomus II.
First published 1884
Charles-René Billuart, O.P.'s Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae, Tomus II, treats human acts, passions and virtues, sin, law, and grace in the Thomistic manual tradition. Schola presents the complete Latin Tome II from the Paris Vives edition of 1884.
Tractatus I: De actibus humanis
Dissertatio I: De voluntario et involuntario
Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit voluntarium?
Articulus II: Utrum omissio et effectus ex ea secutus sint voluntaria sine praecepto ponendi actum qui omittitur?
Articulus III: Utrum violentia causet involuntarium?
Articulus IV: Utrum metus causet involuntarium?
Articulus V: Utrum concupiscentia causet involuntarium?
Articulus VI: Utrum ignorantia causet involuntarium?
Dissertatio II: De voluntario libero, sive de libertate creata
Articulus I: Praenotanda
Articulus II: Utrum in homine lapso sit libertas arbitrii seu indifferentiae?
Articulus III: Utrum ad merendum vel demerendum, in hoc statu naturae lapsae, requiratur libertas a necessitate, seu libertas indifferentiae?
Dissertatio III: De actibus humanis speciatim sumptis
Articulus I: Utrum voluntas possit velle malum sub ratione mali?
Articulus II: De motivo voluntatis quoad specificationem
Articulus III: De motivo voluntatis quoad exercitium
Articulus IV: De modo quo movetur voluntas : an libere, an necessario?
Articulus V: De actibus elicitis a voluntate
Articulus VI: De actibus imperatis.** D. Thomas, q. 17
Dissertatio IV: De actibus humanis in esse moris
Articulus I: In quo consistat moralitas in communi actuum humanorum ?
Articulus II: De principiis moralitatis
Articulus III: De concursu multiplicis moralitatis simul in eodem actu
Articulus IV: Utrum dentur actus indifferentes?
Articulus V: Utrum et quomodo voluntas humana, ut sit bona, debeat conformari voluntati divinae?
Articulus VI: Utrum actus exterior addat bonitatem vel malitiam actui interiori?
Articulus VII: Utrum eventus sequens addat ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus exterioris?
Dissertatio V: De conscientia
Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit conscientia?
Articulus II: An et quomodo teneamur conformari conscientiae erranti?
Articulus III: Cujus speciei et gravitatis sit peccatum agere contra conscientiam?
Articulus IV: Quomodo se gerere debeat confessarius cum poenitente quem deprehendit laborare conscientia erronea?
Articulus V: De conscientia scrupulosa, per varias quaestiunculas
Articulus VI: Utrum liceat agere cum conscientia dubia, probabili, aut probabiliori?
Dissertatio VI: De opinionum probabilitate et delectu
Articulus I: Utrum sit licitum sequi opinionem minus probabilem et minus tutam, in concursu probabilioris et tutioris?
Articulus II: Utrum in conflictu duarum opinionum aeque probabilium, de honestate objectiva actus, liceat sequi minus tutam faventem libertati, relicta tutiori favente legi ?
Articulus III: Utrum liceat sequi opinionem probabiliorem minus tutam in concursu minus probabilis tutioris, ubi agitur de sola honestate objectiva actus?
Articulus IV: Varia quaestiunculae circa praesentem materiam breviter resolvuntur
Dissertatio VII: De probabilismo moderato
Articulus I: De natura probabilitatis
Articulus II: Quaenam systemata prodierint circa probabilitatem in practicis?
Articulus III: An liceat sequi opinionem vere et solide probabilem faventem libertati, relicta tutiore aeque probabili, vel etiam probabiliori, ubi de sola liceitate actionis agitur?
Articulus IV: De usu probabilitatis et de regulis specialibus quibus conscientia in dubiis practice formatur
Articulus V: Utrum liceat sequi opinionem probabilem, aut etiam probabiliorem, relicta tutiore, cum adest obligatio certa finem determinatum obtinendi?
Articulus VI: De probabilismo compensativo
Tractatus II: De passionibus et virtutibus
Dissertatio I: De passionibus
Articulus I: De passionibus in particulari
Dissertatio II: De virtutibus
Articulus I: Quid sit virtus, et quotuplicis generis?
Articulus II: De subjecto virtutum
Articulus III: De causa virtutum
Articulus IV: De proprietatibus virtutum
Tractatus III: De peccatis
Dissertatio I: De natura peccati
Articulus I: Quid sit peccatum?
Articulus II: Utrum formale constitutivum peccati commissionis consistat in positivo, an in privativo?
Articulus III: De peccato omissionis
Dissertatio II: De distinctione specifica et numerica peccatorum
Articulus I: Varia peccati divisiones
Articulus II: Unde petatur distinctio specifica peccatorum?
Articulus III: Utrum peccata commissionis et omissionis specie distinguantur?
Articulus IV: Unde petatur distinctio numerica peccatorum?
Dissertatio III: De comparatione peccatorum ad invicem
Articulus I: Utrum omnia peccata sint inter se connexa et paria ?
Articulus II: Unde sumatur inaequalitas peccatorum ?
Dissertatio IV: De subjecto peccati
Articulus I: Quodnam sit peccati subjectum ?
Articulus II: Utrum peccatum saltem veniale possit esse in et a solo appetitu sensitivo, absque omni actuali influxu voluntatis; omnesque motus sensualitatis sint peccata?
Dissertatio V: De causis peccatorum
Articulus I: An et quae ignorantia sit causa peccati, eaque ipsa sit peccatum?
Articulus II: Utrum possit dari ignorantia invincibilis juris divini positivi?
Articulus III: Utrum dari possit ignorantia invincibilis juris naturae?
Articulus IV: Utrum ignorantia invincibilis juris naturae excuset a peccato?
Articulus V: De inadvertentia ad peccatum
Articulus VI: Utrum ignorantia excuset a poenis per leges positivas statutis?
Articulus VII: Utrum Deus sit causa peccati?
Dissertatio VI: De peccato originali
Articulus I: Utrum sit peccatum originale ab Adamo ad posteros transmissum?
Articulus II: Variae quaestiones circa traductionem peccati originalis breviter resolvuntur
You will ask 1° what sin of Adam was the cause of the traduction of original sin.
I answer. More probably, with the Author1, that it was the first, not because it was such, but because it was first: because that sin of Adam was the cause of the traduction of original sin through which he lost original justice to be transfused into posterity. But whatever sin had been first, whether of deed or of will, by it he would have lost original justice, namely by losing sanctifying grace, which was the root of original justice, or at least was contained in it. Therefore.
You will ask 2° whether other sins of the first parent or of proximate parents are traduced into posterity.
I answer. Negatively2, because the first sin of Adam is traduced into posterity insofar as he was constituted by God the moral head of all posterity, as to the conservation or loss of original justice. But proximate parents are not thus constituted moral head of their stock, and Adam himself by the first sin had fallen from the dignity of headship. Therefore.
Hence this proposition is condemned: « Every crime is of such condition that it can infect its author and all posterity in the manner in which the first transgression infected them. » It is number 52 among the Baians condemned by St. Pius V, October 1, 1567.
You will ask 3° whether, if Adam had not sinned and Eve had sinned, posterity would have contracted original sin.
I answer. Negatively3.
It is proved 1°. The Apostle, Rom., v, 12, says: By one man sin entered into this world. But if a woman were to transmit original sin to offspring, it ought rather to have been said, by two men, since both sinned, or rather by the woman, who sinned first4. Therefore.
It is confirmed. In the same place, verses 18 and 19, the Apostle says that through the offense of one, through the disobedience of one, sin entered into the world; and there he always compares one with one, namely Adam with Christ. Therefore the same as before.
2° Adam alone, and not Eve, was constituted moral head of posterity, as to the conservation or loss of original justice. Consequently the sin of Adam was capital, but the sin of Eve personal. Therefore.
You will ask 4° whether, if Adam had not sinned, and some one of his posterity, for instance Cain, had sinned, the posterity of Cain would have contracted original sin.
It is commonly answered negatively, for the same reason, because namely Adam alone, and not Cain or another of Adam's posterity, was constituted moral head of all men, as to the conservation or loss of original justice.
You will ask 5° whether, if Adam alone had sinned after his son was born, that son and his posterity would have contracted original sin.
I answer. More probably negatively: because neither that son nor his posterity would have been in the loins of Adam when he sinned, nor consequently would they be propagated seminally from sinful Adam. But those alone contract original sin who were in the loins of Adam while he sinned, and are propagated seminally from him as sinner. Add that this son would already have been just; but justice once possessed is not lost except by one's own will.
You will ask 6° whether all men contract original sin.
I answer. 1. It is of faith that all men whatsoever, propagated seminally from Adam, special privilege set aside, contract original sin.
It is proved 1° from that Rom., V, 12: In whom all have sinned. 2° Because otherwise not all would need the redemption which is through Christ; which is erroneous. 3° Because human nature deprived of original justice is traduced into all, in which deprivation, as voluntary in the head, original sin consists, as we shall say presently. 4° It is evident from the perpetual practice of the Church, which is wont, and is most solicitous, that infants of all, both of the faithful and of the just, be baptized, lest they be damned forever. Finally all that we have brought forward in proof of the existence of original sin proves this.
I said 1° : « Into all propagated seminally from Adam, » that Christ might be excepted, who was conceived not of virile seed, but by mystical breathing, and thus, since he was not contained in the loins of sinning Adam, did not sin in him.
I said 2° : « Special privilege set aside, » because many piously hold that blessed Mary was immune, not indeed from the obligation of contracting, but from the actual contraction of original sin. But in this matter Mother Church has defined nothing5, but leaves each free to embrace whichever opinion he wills, forbidding under pain of excommunication either party to presume to note the other with error or heresy.
And although Paul V, by decree of the universal Inquisition in 1617, to avoid scandals, quarrels and dissensions, forbade that the party affirming blessed Mary to have been conceived in original sin should be defended in public sermons, lectures and public acts, and Gregory XV by a decree likewise of the universal Inquisition in 1622 extended this to private conversations and writings, nevertheless from this silence the same Gregory XV, by the constitution Eximii given July 28, 1622, excepts the Friars Preachers, and grants them that they may freely and lawfully treat among themselves of this matter and expound their own opinion, in these words: « Of our own motion and from certain knowledge and mature deliberation, to all and singular the Friars of the said ORDER OF PREACHERS we grant and impart, by apostolic authority, by the tenor of these presents, license that henceforth in whatsoever their private conversations or conferences, among themselves only, and not among others or with others, they may freely and lawfully be able to discuss and treat of the matter of the same Conception of blessed Mary ever Virgin, without incurrence of any of the penalties contained in the said decrees: decreeing that the aforesaid Friars can and ought by no means to be molested, disturbed or disquieted by anyone, by whatever authority concerning this matter. » This constitution is found in the Bullarium of the Order of Friars Preachers, tom. vi, pag. 13.
You will ask 7° whether, if someone were formed miraculously from human flesh, he would contract original sin.
I answer. Negatively: because those alone contract original sin who descend originally from Adam according to seminal reason, or drawn originally from Adam by virtue of seed, and not merely according to bodily substance. But this man would not descend from Adam according to seminal reason, but only according to bodily substance; for he would not be made by the active virtue of seed, but by divine virtue. Therefore.
The major is proved. The sin of Adam is traduced into posterity insofar as they are his sons, or insofar as they are moved from him by generation, that is, insofar as he moves them so as to be generated. But to move by generation is proper to the active virtue which is in the seed. Therefore. Whence the council of Trent, session VI, chapter 3, says: « Unless men were born propagated from the seed of Adam, they would not be born unjust. »
Nevertheless this man ought to be baptized, not that he might be cleansed from original sin, but that he might obtain sanctifying grace, become a member of Christ, and have a right to the kingdom of heaven, according to that of John, III, 5 : Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.