Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

By original sin we understand that which we contract by birth from Adam, who, having been constituted by God head, not only natural but also moral, of all men to be propagated from him seminally, supposed for us and contained in his will

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our wills, so that, when he sinned, at the same time we sinned in him. Wherein the essence of this sin consists, we shall say below; but meanwhile, whatsoever it be, that it is true sin by which we are infected and are born children of wrath is a Catholic dogma, which we here undertake to prove against heretics.

That original sin exists in the posterity of Adam was first denied of all by Pelagius, then by his disciples Julian and Caelestius, contending that Adam harmed himself alone, not his posterity, except by example.

I say: According to the Catholic faith it must be held that original sin is transmitted to the posterity of Adam ².

It is proved 1°. The Apostle, to the Rom., V, 12, says: By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death; and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned. Ergo, according to the Apostle, some sin entered into this world, which constituted all men sinners and liable to death. — I subjoin. Yet that sin is not actual personal sin, since infants, who are liable to death, are not capable of it. Ergo original.

This proof is confirmed from the same Apostle, II ad Cor., v, 14 and 15: If one, he says, died for all, therefore all were dead; and Christ died for all. « Deny, says Aug. to Julian, lib. VI against him, cap. 9, n. 24, that Christ died even for little ones, in order to remove them from the number of the dead, that is, from the contagion of sins. If he died for them also, ergo they also were dead. » There is ergo some sin whereby newborn infants are said to be dead: and what is that but original? Likewise to the Ephes., II, 3: We were by nature, that is, from birth and origin, children of wrath.

It is proved 2° from the councils. The Council of Palestine, which Aug. mentions, Epist. 186 ³; that of Milevis in Africa, in the year 416; Innocent I confirming the council of Milevis; Zosimus, Epist. to the bishops of the whole world, which Aug. mentions, Epist. 190 ⁴;

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the conc. of Florence, in the letters of union; finally Trent, sess. v, decree on original sin 1, can. 2, defined under anathema the Catholic dogma of the transmission of original sin to the posterity of Adam ⁸.

It is proved by theological reasons ⁹. Since this truth hangs on the will of God alone, it cannot be proved except by reasons deduced from revealed principles. The first reason, and that a peremptory one, which the holy Fathers chiefly urged, is sought from baptism conferred on infants, and is thus proposed. It is apostolic tradition, and that confirmed by perpetual and constant usage of the Church, that newborn infants, especially if their life be endangered, are to be baptized. Thus teach St. Dionysius, de coelest. Hierarchia, last chapter; Origen, Hom. vi in Levit.; Cyprian, lib. III, Epist. 8; Jerome, lib. III against the Pelagians; Aug., lib. IV contra Donat., c. 24. Nor did the Pelagians deny it, nor Zwinglius and Erasmus. This tradition, however, kept and confirmed with such solicitude of the Church, is founded on the words of Christ, Joann., III, 5: Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. Yet baptism is conferred for the remission of some sin. Ergo infants are defiled with sin from birth.

The Pelagians deny the minor, saying that baptism is conferred on infants, not for the remission of sin, nor to obtain eternal life, but that they might have right to the kingdom, according to the words of Christ praised before. For they distinguished eternal beatitude from the kingdom. Therefore

The min. is proved. First reason. 1° It is the express sentence of Scripture, Act., II, 38: Let every one of you be baptized in the name of Jesus Christ, for the remission of sins.

2° Those who are baptized are cleansed and washed. It appears both from the form of baptism, I baptize thee, that is, I wash thee; and from the Scriptures, Ephes., V, 26: Cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life; to Titus, III, 5: By the laver of regeneration and renovation; Act., XXII, 16: Be baptized and wash away thy sins, invoking his name. Yet no one is cleansed or washed who has not filth and stains. Ergo.

The second reason is sought from the ceremonies of baptism, namely from exorcism and exsufflation, by which the unclean spirit is driven away. Ergo before baptism that spirit held the infant captive through sin. The use of these ceremonies however has always been practiced in the Church, and from it Aug. argues everywhere against the Pelagians.

Third reason. Christ, according to the Scriptures, and especially according to the Apostle, is Redeemer of all, even of little ones. Yet redemption presupposes captivity and damnation, damnation sin; and little ones can be held captive by no other sin than original. Ergo.

Fourth reason. Death is the penalty of sin, according to that Rom., VI, 23: The wages of sin is death, and that Genes., II, 17: In what day soever thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt die the death. Yet all die, even infants who have not sinned by their own will. Ergo.

This reason is confirmed. Man is born subject, not only to the necessity of dying, but to various troubles and miseries, cares, pains, infirmities, sorrows, ignorances, hunger, thirst, cold and concupiscences, worse than brutes. Yet nature, as soon as it was created by God and before it fell, was not subject to all these miseries and troubles; for God, as is said Sap., II, 23 and 24: Overlaid the incorruptible man... But by the envy of the devil death came into the world. And Eccles., VII, 30: This have I found, that God made man right, and he hath entangled himself with an infinity of questions. Ergo all these miseries and troubles are effects of sin common to all; for common punishment shows that common guilt preceded.

A twofold difficult objection is solved.

First objection. If original sin be truly and properly sin, it ought to be voluntary. Yet original sin is not voluntary. Ergo.

Before the answer, I suppose 1° that original sin is truly and properly sin, whereby we are by nature children of wrath, Ephes., II, 3, and enemies, Rom., v, 10. And so it was defined in conc. Arausicanum II, can. 2, and in Trent, sess. v, can. 2 and 5 ¹⁰.

I suppose 2° that original sin is not of the genus of actual sins, but habitual, consisting in the privation of original justice, as I shall say below. Now habitual sin is not voluntary formally, but terminatively or virtually and in cause, inasmuch as it is the term and effect of actual sin.

As to the actual sin of Adam, indeed it is transmitted into us, according to that of the Apostle, Rom., v, 12: In whom all have sinned, but morally only and extrinsically denominatively, because a second act denominates intrinsically only him from whom it is and in whom it inheres; although we were in Adam when he sinned, nevertheless we were not in him actually, but only in potency. Whence, just as the denomination of the future is only extrinsic, so we are denominated extrinsically to have sinned in Adam. But original sin is formally and intrinsically in us, or, as Trent says, sess. v, can. 3, « it is proper to each one and inherent in him. »

I suppose 3° that Adam was constituted by God head, not only natural but also moral, of all men, with regard to the conservation or loss of original justice; so that Adam himself and all his posterity should be reckoned as one body, of which Adam himself is head, and bears the person of all, in that wherein he is head, and the will of himself as head should be the will of all posterity, and thus whatever he willed in the character of head they too willed, not by proper and personal will, but by the common will of their head.

I suppose 4° that God could thus decree and dispose without any injustice: 1° Because, since he is supreme Lord of all, and, as Aug. says, lib. de Corrept. et Gratia, c. 14, n. 45, « has more in his power our wills than we ourselves, » as we can transfer our will to another, so God by his right could, our consent not required, since then we were not actual, transfer our wills into the will of Adam: not insofar as we are singular persons, for thus each one has his own will and is arbiter of himself; but insofar as we are parts and members of the whole nature to be propagated from Adam. Something similar happens in human affairs, while a prince includes the will of the ward in the will of the tutor, as regards civil acts, or while a magistrate acts in the name of the whole community with the king, exhibiting to him the oath of fidelity to him. 2° Because that decree was for our good and benefit; for if God had bound us by his precepts in Adam, he had also loaded us in him with his gratuitous gifts, so that, if Adam had persevered, together with nature we should have received from him original justice and all goods annexed to it. But God had adorned Adam with so many graces, fortified him with so many assists, so walled him against temptations, that perseverance and the advantages to follow were more to be hoped than prevarication and the evils to follow feared. Whence, if such a condition were proposed to us today, no one would prudently refuse it.

Nor does it follow therefore that God can now thus include my will in the will of another adult, so that, he sinning, I sin: because in this case it could happen that mortal sin would be committed in the same case against someone against whom it did not hold place when the will of the non-existent posterity of Adam was included in his will. Besides, God wills adults actually existing to be arbiters of themselves. These things supposed, to the objection

I answer. that original sin is voluntary for us, not formally by way of exercise, because it is not actual sin, but terminatively, virtually and in cause, because it is of the genus of habitual sin: not physically and by the will of the person, because we were not actual when Adam sinned; but morally by the will of the head, which by institution of God supposed for our wills.

Second objection. It cannot be said nor conceived how original sin is transmitted from Adam to posterity; for original sin is in the soul, the soul is not from Adam nor from parents through generation, but is created by God, as decided in the council Lateran V under Leo X ¹¹, sess. 8. But God does not vitiate it; for he is not author of sin, and hates nothing of the things he makes. Flesh, into which the soul is received, and seed, by which flesh is generated, since they are bodies, cannot act upon the soul and infect it, because it is spirit. How ergo is that soul found infected and stained with sin in its origin?

This difficulty seemed so great to Augustine that he doubted long whether the soul were not traduced from parents to offspring, like the body (which opinion nevertheless he afterwards rejected, Epist. 190°, to Optatus, n. 2), and in Epist. 167°, to Jerome, n. 2, he says it suffices for a Christian to know how he may be freed from original sin, though he know not how he incurred it. Concerning which he himself always remained hesitating in doubt.

I answer.¹² that original sin is transmitted through generation, not because through it the soul is transmitted; for this is created by God, nor does God infect it, as the objection well says, nor because flesh or seed acts efficiently upon the soul, as the objection again proves; but inasmuch as seed moves dispositively toward the soul and toward its conjunction with the body, from which conjunction this man is made, this human nature; for generation terminates not at the production of form alone or matter, but of the whole composite. Through generation therefore, by virtue of seed, nature propagated seminally from Adam is had and transmitted. Consequently, by concomitance or resultant transmission, guilt also is transmitted, because there is transmitted nature deprived of original justice, by a privation voluntary in us in Adam, in which privation original sin consists essentially, as we shall say below.

From these you will gather that the moral efficient cause of original sin is the sin of Adam, but the quasi instrumental cause is the seed whereby nature is produced.