Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II
Charles René Billuart (1685–1757)
Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae. Tomus II.
First published 1884
Charles-René Billuart, O.P.'s Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae, Tomus II, treats human acts, passions and virtues, sin, law, and grace in the Thomistic manual tradition. Schola presents the complete Latin Tome II from the Paris Vives edition of 1884.
Tractatus I: De actibus humanis
Dissertatio I: De voluntario et involuntario
Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit voluntarium?
Articulus II: Utrum omissio et effectus ex ea secutus sint voluntaria sine praecepto ponendi actum qui omittitur?
Articulus III: Utrum violentia causet involuntarium?
Articulus IV: Utrum metus causet involuntarium?
Articulus V: Utrum concupiscentia causet involuntarium?
Articulus VI: Utrum ignorantia causet involuntarium?
Dissertatio II: De voluntario libero, sive de libertate creata
Articulus I: Praenotanda
Articulus II: Utrum in homine lapso sit libertas arbitrii seu indifferentiae?
Articulus III: Utrum ad merendum vel demerendum, in hoc statu naturae lapsae, requiratur libertas a necessitate, seu libertas indifferentiae?
Dissertatio III: De actibus humanis speciatim sumptis
Articulus I: Utrum voluntas possit velle malum sub ratione mali?
Articulus II: De motivo voluntatis quoad specificationem
Articulus III: De motivo voluntatis quoad exercitium
Articulus IV: De modo quo movetur voluntas : an libere, an necessario?
Articulus V: De actibus elicitis a voluntate
Articulus VI: De actibus imperatis.** D. Thomas, q. 17
Dissertatio IV: De actibus humanis in esse moris
Articulus I: In quo consistat moralitas in communi actuum humanorum ?
Articulus II: De principiis moralitatis
Articulus III: De concursu multiplicis moralitatis simul in eodem actu
Articulus IV: Utrum dentur actus indifferentes?
Articulus V: Utrum et quomodo voluntas humana, ut sit bona, debeat conformari voluntati divinae?
Articulus VI: Utrum actus exterior addat bonitatem vel malitiam actui interiori?
Articulus VII: Utrum eventus sequens addat ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus exterioris?
Dissertatio V: De conscientia
Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit conscientia?
Articulus II: An et quomodo teneamur conformari conscientiae erranti?
Articulus III: Cujus speciei et gravitatis sit peccatum agere contra conscientiam?
Articulus IV: Quomodo se gerere debeat confessarius cum poenitente quem deprehendit laborare conscientia erronea?
Articulus V: De conscientia scrupulosa, per varias quaestiunculas
Articulus VI: Utrum liceat agere cum conscientia dubia, probabili, aut probabiliori?
Dissertatio VI: De opinionum probabilitate et delectu
Articulus I: Utrum sit licitum sequi opinionem minus probabilem et minus tutam, in concursu probabilioris et tutioris?
Articulus II: Utrum in conflictu duarum opinionum aeque probabilium, de honestate objectiva actus, liceat sequi minus tutam faventem libertati, relicta tutiori favente legi ?
Articulus III: Utrum liceat sequi opinionem probabiliorem minus tutam in concursu minus probabilis tutioris, ubi agitur de sola honestate objectiva actus?
Articulus IV: Varia quaestiunculae circa praesentem materiam breviter resolvuntur
Dissertatio VII: De probabilismo moderato
Articulus I: De natura probabilitatis
Articulus II: Quaenam systemata prodierint circa probabilitatem in practicis?
Articulus III: An liceat sequi opinionem vere et solide probabilem faventem libertati, relicta tutiore aeque probabili, vel etiam probabiliori, ubi de sola liceitate actionis agitur?
Articulus IV: De usu probabilitatis et de regulis specialibus quibus conscientia in dubiis practice formatur
Articulus V: Utrum liceat sequi opinionem probabilem, aut etiam probabiliorem, relicta tutiore, cum adest obligatio certa finem determinatum obtinendi?
Articulus VI: De probabilismo compensativo
Tractatus II: De passionibus et virtutibus
Dissertatio I: De passionibus
Articulus I: De passionibus in particulari
Dissertatio II: De virtutibus
Articulus I: Quid sit virtus, et quotuplicis generis?
Articulus II: De subjecto virtutum
Articulus III: De causa virtutum
Articulus IV: De proprietatibus virtutum
Tractatus III: De peccatis
Dissertatio I: De natura peccati
Articulus I: Quid sit peccatum?
Articulus II: Utrum formale constitutivum peccati commissionis consistat in positivo, an in privativo?
Articulus III: De peccato omissionis
Dissertatio II: De distinctione specifica et numerica peccatorum
Articulus I: Varia peccati divisiones
Articulus II: Unde petatur distinctio specifica peccatorum?
Articulus III: Utrum peccata commissionis et omissionis specie distinguantur?
Articulus IV: Unde petatur distinctio numerica peccatorum?
Dissertatio III: De comparatione peccatorum ad invicem
Articulus I: Utrum omnia peccata sint inter se connexa et paria ?
Articulus II: Unde sumatur inaequalitas peccatorum ?
Dissertatio IV: De subjecto peccati
Articulus I: Quodnam sit peccati subjectum ?
Articulus II: Utrum peccatum saltem veniale possit esse in et a solo appetitu sensitivo, absque omni actuali influxu voluntatis; omnesque motus sensualitatis sint peccata?
Dissertatio V: De causis peccatorum
Articulus I: An et quae ignorantia sit causa peccati, eaque ipsa sit peccatum?
Articulus II: Utrum possit dari ignorantia invincibilis juris divini positivi?
Articulus III: Utrum dari possit ignorantia invincibilis juris naturae?
Articulus IV: Utrum ignorantia invincibilis juris naturae excuset a peccato?
Articulus V: De inadvertentia ad peccatum
Articulus VI: Utrum ignorantia excuset a poenis per leges positivas statutis?
Articulus VII: Utrum Deus sit causa peccati?
Note 1°. Sin, as a concrete accident, imports two things, material and formal. The material is the act or entity; the formal is the malice or deformity. When we ask whether God be the cause of sin, the question is not of the material, but of the formal; as when I ask who made this statue, I ask not who made the wood, but who made the form or figure.
Note 2°. A twofold cause of sin can be distinguished: one per se and directly, as when someone impels to sin, concurs positively in it or flows into it; another per accidens and indirectly, as removing a prohibition, as when one does not hinder a sin which he can and ought to hinder. These things noted, I say 1°: God neither is nor can be the per se and direct cause of sin1; that is, God does not impel, move, instigate to sin, does not command it, does not do it, neither per se, nor through Satan or the impious as his instruments, as Calvin, Zwinglius and other here-
It is proved 1° from the Scriptures. Deut., XXXII, 4, it is said: The works of God are perfect, and all his ways judgments: God faithful and without any iniquity, just and right. Rom., IX, 14: Is there injustice with God? Far be it! Psal., V, 5: Not thou willing iniquity art God. Eccli., XV, 12: Say not: He hath caused me to err, that is, deceived me and led me into sin. And afterwards, 21: He commanded no man to do wickedly. Jacob., I, 13: Let no man when he is tempted say that he is tempted of God; for God is not the tempter of evils. I Joann., III, 8: He who committeth sin is of the devil. Sap., XI, 25: Thou hatest none of the things which thou hast made. And yet Sap., XIV, 9: To God the ungodly and his ungodliness are hateful. And elsewhere often.
It is proved from the Fathers, who unanimously teach the conclusion. Whence Trid., sess. VI, can. 6: « If anyone shall say that it is not within the power of man to make his ways evil, but that evil works, as well as good ones, God works, not permissively only, but properly and per se, so that his own work is no less the treason of Judas than the calling of Paul; let him be anathema. »
It is proved by reason. Every sin is by recession from order which has God as its end4. But it is impossible that God be cause, to himself or to others, of departing from the order which is unto himself. Therefore. — Proof. of the minor. God is the last end of all things, and consequently inclines and converts all things to himself as last end, according to that of Prov., XVI, 4: The Lord made all things for himself. Therefore.
It is confirmed. A just will, as St. Anselm says, lib. de Lib. arbit., c. 8, is that which wills what God wills it to will. Therefore, if God will it to sin, by sinning it wills what God wills it to will, and at once God wills it not to will, and on account of which he punishes it; which is manifestly contradictory.
2° No just reason can be assigned why God should will and make men to sin. Therefore. — Proof. of the antecedent. The heretics assign no other reason, nor can they assign any, but this, namely
that God have those whom he may pity and whom he may punish, and thus mercy and justice shine forth. But from this, that God wills and makes men to sin, pities some, punishes others, mercy and justice by no means shine forth therefrom, but rather injustice and cruelty appear. Therefore. — Proof. of the minor. Although in punishing an unjust man justice appears, nevertheless to make an unjust man, that he be punished, is not justice, but supreme injustice; for this is not to intend punishment on account of guilt, but guilt on account of punishment, which is wholly disordered and unjust. Nor is it mercy, but rather cruelty, to make a man impious, that he be freed from impiety; as it would be cruel to wound a man that he be healed. Therefore.
I say 2°: Neither per accidens and indirectly is God the cause of sin; because then alone is anyone said to be the per accidens and indirect cause of sin, namely as removing a prohibition, when he can and ought to hinder sin and hinders it not; as a pilot is not said to be the cause of the sinking of a ship from this, that he does not steer the ship, unless he withdraw his steering, able and bound to steer. But God, according to the laws of his wisdom and universal providence, is not bound to hinder the sins which he permits. Therefore.
You will ask 1°, about q. 80 of St. Thomas, whether and how the devil is the cause of men's sins.
I answer. 1° It is certain that the devil is in some way the cause of men's sins6. It is manifest because he led Eve into sin, tempted Job, and daily tempts men: whence that of I Petr., V, 8: Your adversary the devil goeth about like a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour.
2° The devil cannot be the direct and sufficient cause of sin7; because he cannot be the cause of sin, except either by acting interiorly upon the will and moving it to sin, or by proposing the object and persuading its appetibility. But the first he cannot do; for to move the will interiorly by acting upon it belongs to God alone.