Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II
Charles René Billuart (1685–1757)
Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae. Tomus II.
First published 1884
Charles-René Billuart, O.P.'s Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae, Tomus II, treats human acts, passions and virtues, sin, law, and grace in the Thomistic manual tradition. Schola presents the complete Latin Tome II from the Paris Vives edition of 1884.
Tractatus I: De actibus humanis
Dissertatio I: De voluntario et involuntario
Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit voluntarium?
Articulus II: Utrum omissio et effectus ex ea secutus sint voluntaria sine praecepto ponendi actum qui omittitur?
Articulus III: Utrum violentia causet involuntarium?
Articulus IV: Utrum metus causet involuntarium?
Articulus V: Utrum concupiscentia causet involuntarium?
Articulus VI: Utrum ignorantia causet involuntarium?
Dissertatio II: De voluntario libero, sive de libertate creata
Articulus I: Praenotanda
Articulus II: Utrum in homine lapso sit libertas arbitrii seu indifferentiae?
Articulus III: Utrum ad merendum vel demerendum, in hoc statu naturae lapsae, requiratur libertas a necessitate, seu libertas indifferentiae?
Dissertatio III: De actibus humanis speciatim sumptis
Articulus I: Utrum voluntas possit velle malum sub ratione mali?
Articulus II: De motivo voluntatis quoad specificationem
Articulus III: De motivo voluntatis quoad exercitium
Articulus IV: De modo quo movetur voluntas : an libere, an necessario?
Articulus V: De actibus elicitis a voluntate
Articulus VI: De actibus imperatis.** D. Thomas, q. 17
Dissertatio IV: De actibus humanis in esse moris
Articulus I: In quo consistat moralitas in communi actuum humanorum ?
Articulus II: De principiis moralitatis
Articulus III: De concursu multiplicis moralitatis simul in eodem actu
Articulus IV: Utrum dentur actus indifferentes?
Articulus V: Utrum et quomodo voluntas humana, ut sit bona, debeat conformari voluntati divinae?
Articulus VI: Utrum actus exterior addat bonitatem vel malitiam actui interiori?
Articulus VII: Utrum eventus sequens addat ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus exterioris?
Dissertatio V: De conscientia
Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit conscientia?
Articulus II: An et quomodo teneamur conformari conscientiae erranti?
Articulus III: Cujus speciei et gravitatis sit peccatum agere contra conscientiam?
Articulus IV: Quomodo se gerere debeat confessarius cum poenitente quem deprehendit laborare conscientia erronea?
Articulus V: De conscientia scrupulosa, per varias quaestiunculas
Articulus VI: Utrum liceat agere cum conscientia dubia, probabili, aut probabiliori?
Dissertatio VI: De opinionum probabilitate et delectu
Articulus I: Utrum sit licitum sequi opinionem minus probabilem et minus tutam, in concursu probabilioris et tutioris?
Articulus II: Utrum in conflictu duarum opinionum aeque probabilium, de honestate objectiva actus, liceat sequi minus tutam faventem libertati, relicta tutiori favente legi ?
Articulus III: Utrum liceat sequi opinionem probabiliorem minus tutam in concursu minus probabilis tutioris, ubi agitur de sola honestate objectiva actus?
Articulus IV: Varia quaestiunculae circa praesentem materiam breviter resolvuntur
Dissertatio VII: De probabilismo moderato
Articulus I: De natura probabilitatis
Articulus II: Quaenam systemata prodierint circa probabilitatem in practicis?
Articulus III: An liceat sequi opinionem vere et solide probabilem faventem libertati, relicta tutiore aeque probabili, vel etiam probabiliori, ubi de sola liceitate actionis agitur?
Articulus IV: De usu probabilitatis et de regulis specialibus quibus conscientia in dubiis practice formatur
Articulus V: Utrum liceat sequi opinionem probabilem, aut etiam probabiliorem, relicta tutiore, cum adest obligatio certa finem determinatum obtinendi?
Articulus VI: De probabilismo compensativo
Tractatus II: De passionibus et virtutibus
Dissertatio I: De passionibus
Articulus I: De passionibus in particulari
Dissertatio II: De virtutibus
Articulus I: Quid sit virtus, et quotuplicis generis?
Articulus II: De subjecto virtutum
Articulus III: De causa virtutum
Articulus IV: De proprietatibus virtutum
Tractatus III: De peccatis
Dissertatio I: De natura peccati
Articulus I: Quid sit peccatum?
Articulus II: Utrum formale constitutivum peccati commissionis consistat in positivo, an in privativo?
Articulus III: De peccato omissionis
Dissertatio II: De distinctione specifica et numerica peccatorum
Articulus I: Varia peccati divisiones
Articulus II: Unde petatur distinctio specifica peccatorum?
Articulus III: Utrum peccata commissionis et omissionis specie distinguantur?
Articulus IV: Unde petatur distinctio numerica peccatorum?
Dissertatio III: De comparatione peccatorum ad invicem
Articulus I: Utrum omnia peccata sint inter se connexa et paria ?
Articulus II: Unde sumatur inaequalitas peccatorum ?
Dissertatio IV: De subjecto peccati
Articulus I: Quodnam sit peccati subjectum ?
Articulus II: Utrum peccatum saltem veniale possit esse in et a solo appetitu sensitivo, absque omni actuali influxu voluntatis; omnesque motus sensualitatis sint peccata?
Dissertatio V: De causis peccatorum
Articulus I: An et quae ignorantia sit causa peccati, eaque ipsa sit peccatum?
Articulus II: Utrum possit dari ignorantia invincibilis juris divini positivi?
I say : Invincible ignorance of divine positive law can be given, not only among infidels, to whom the Gospel has not been announced, but also among the faithful, to whom it has been announced1.
The first part is certain and is admitted by all the orthodox, especially after the condemnation of this proposition : « Negative infidelity, in those among whom Christ has not been preached, is sin. » It is number 68 among the Baians condemned by St. Pius V.
It is proved 2°. According to ordinary law of God, the unique medium of knowing the mysteries of faith is the preaching of the Gospel, according to that word Rom., X, 14 : How shall they believe him whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? Whence Christ, Joann., XV, 22, says of the Jews : If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin — namely of infidelity, as Aug. interprets it, Tract. 89 in Joann.
And thence flows the second part, which one or another denies, being herein singular against the unanimous sense of the others. For if, because the Gospel is announced in no manner to infidels, invincible and blameless ignorance of all the mysteries and precepts of faith can exist in them, therefore those also among the faithful to whom it is not sufficiently announced, or as regards certain precepts, can invincibly and blamelessly ignore them : because what the defect of promulgation of the whole law effects with respect to infidels, that does the defect of promulgation of this precept effect with respect to a particular person; especially since from one precept known, another cannot be deduced with which it holds no connection.
It is confirmed. Divine positive law thrusts knowledge of itself upon us no more than human law. But invincible ignorance of human law can be given. Therefore.
You will say against the first part : Every ignorance of divine positive law at least necessary to salvation is culpable. Therefore vincible. — Proof of the antecedent. It arises from fault; for if man were to convert himself to God as he ought and can by the help of grace, which God denies to no one, as we said in the first part, God would instruct him concerning those things necessary to salvation, either through internal inspiration, or through a preacher, as St. Thomas teaches, Lect. 3 on chapter X Rom., and elsewhere. But ignorance which follows from fault is culpable. Therefore.
Answer. I deny the antecedent. In proof whereof I distinguish the minor. Ignorance which follows from fault is culpable, if it was foreseen in the fault, or could humanly have been foreseen, I concede; if it was neither foreseen nor could have been foreseen, I deny. For, that an effect following per accidens upon some voluntary cause be voluntary and imputable, it must, as I said so often already, be foreseen, or morally able to be foreseen, as about to follow from that cause. But they of whom the question treats neither apprehend, nor can morally apprehend, their conversion to God to be an ordered and suitable medium for driving away the ignorance of faith, concerning which they do not even think, or ever thought. Confer what I said in my great Work, tract on God, dissert. VII, art. 8, obj. 5.
You will insist Every adult can attain salvation, as is plain from what was said art. 8 cited. Therefore he can drive away the ignorance of those things at least necessary unto salvation.
Answer. I distinguish the consequence. Therefore he can physically drive away ignorance etc., insofar as he can be instructed by God, and would in fact be instructed, were he to convert himself to him, I concede the consequence; morally, so that it be imputed to him as fault, if he drive it not away, I deny, since he knows not that he can, nor that necessary knowledge would follow from his conversion. But there is no implication [contradiction] that someone can morally attain the end which he knows, and be able to attain the means only physically, when he knows them not.