Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

Again. No sin, even venial, exists which is not voluntary. But the primo primi motions, which anticipate every advertence of reason, and those which we suffer unwillingly, are in no way voluntary. Therefore.

Again. No one is bound to the impossible. But it is impossible for man to prevent the motions of concupiscence from arising, whether from the unlooked-for apprehension of an object present or absent, or from the natural disposition of the body, or from the devil procuring them : since all these causes are not within the power of man.

As to the things objected especially from Sts. Augustine and Thomas, it must be answered that they take sin or fault improperly, either for that which is from sin and inclines to sin, or for any disorder of nature, even though not imputable; or else that they speak of the motions of concupiscence that are secundo primi, which do not proceed from perfect deliberation. Moreover, that the holy Doctors think Catholicly with us is evident from their testimonies cited in the first conclusion. Likewise, as regards Augustine, from lib. V cont. Julian., c. 3; ib. IV cont. eumd., c. 15; lib. I de Civit., c. 26, and lib. II de Peccatorum meritis et remis., c. 4. As to St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 154, a. 5, o, and q. 7 de Malo, a. 6, ad 6.

I suppose, from the tract. on Human Acts, dissert. I, the division of ignorance into antecedent, concomitant and consequent. Re-read.

I say 1°: Ignorance can be a cause of sin ¹, not per se, because since it is privation and not a being, it cannot of itself influence an act; but per accidens, as removing what prohibits, inasmuch as it removes knowledge which, if present, sin would not be committed.

I say 2°: Concomitant ignorance is not a cause of sin ², because it does not remove knowledge which, if present, would impede sin, but with it present sin is committed equally. Antecedent and consequent ignorance are causes of sin, because they take away knowledge by which, if present, sin would be prohibited: yet with this difference, that antecedent ignorance is only a cause of the act of sin, or of sin taken not formally but materially, because the act following from it, as regards the circumstance of sin, is involuntary, since that circumstance is invincibly ignored; but consequent ignorance is a cause of sin formally, because the act following from it, even as regards the character of formal sin, is voluntary, since this character is voluntarily and vincibly ignored. Concerning antecedent or invincible ignorance of divine and natural law, whether it exists and whether it excuses from sin, we shall speak more fully in what follows.

I say 3°: Invincible ignorance is not sin; vincible ignorance of things one is bound to know is formally in itself sin, not however on account of its own self, but on account of negligence in learning ³. But all are bound commonly to know: 1° the things that are of faith, 2º the universal precepts of law, 3° each one, those things which pertain to his state and office.

The Reason of the first part: because invincible ignorance, since it is not in our power to overcome it — for it is called invincible because it cannot morally be overcome — is not voluntary. It will appear more clearly from what must be said below.

The Reason of the second part is: because voluntary omission of a due act is formally in itself sin. Yet vincible ignorance of things one is bound to know is voluntary omission, at least indirectly, of a due act, namely due cognition, in negligence of learning. Ergo.

[You will ask 1° what things are causes of vincible ignorance.

I answer. Four are counted, namely: negligence, passion, wicked habit, thoughtlessness.

1° Negligence. « When anyone, says St. Thomas, 1a 2ae, q. 76, a. 3, c, neglects to learn, on account of labor or other occupations, that whereby he would be withheld from sin, such negligence makes ignorance itself voluntary, and sinful, provided it be of things one is bound and able to know. » But that ignorance be sin, there is required 1° that it be of things one is bound to know, e.g., things that are of faith and the universal precepts of law, or those which concern one's own state or office; 2° that negligence in learning be voluntary and culpable, that is, that man advert to the obligation imposed upon him and to the means proposed to him for acquiring competent knowledge, and refuse to employ them; for, as the Angelic Doctor says, q. 3 de Malo, a. 7, c, negligence from which culpable ignorance is born is nothing else than « not applying the mind to knowing what one ought to know. »

2° Passion. For ignorance becomes voluntary through passion when someone deliberately wills to follow it, foreseeing at least confusedly and in general the evil effects naturally about to arise from such passion, though he perceive them not in particular; for then he wills them at least in their cause. Whence St. Thomas says, q. 3 de Malo, a. 10, c: « Posited that reason be bound by passion, it is necessary that perverse choice follow. But it is in the power of the will to repel this bond of reason. For reason is bound from this, that the intention of the soul is applied vehemently to the act of sensitive appetite, whence it turns away from considering in particular what it knows habitually in universal. To apply intention to something or not to apply it exists in the power of the will. Whence it is in the power of the will that it exclude that bond of reason. The act therefore committed which proceeds from such a bond is voluntary: whence it is not excused from guilt, even mortal. But if the binding of reason through passion proceeded so far that it were not in the power of the will to remove a bond of this kind, suppose that through some passion of soul one should fall into insanity, whatsoever he might commit would not be imputed to him as guilt, as neither to another madman, except perhaps as regards the principle of such passion, which was voluntary; for the will could have impeded from the beginning that passion proceed so far. »

3° Wicked habit. Ignorance becomes voluntary by reason of a wicked habit, when namely someone does not care efficaciously to amend a wicked habit. For those acts are sins formally which are sufficiently voluntary in themselves or in their cause. Yet acts which proceed from a wicked habit are sufficiently voluntary in themselves or in their cause, namely in the bad custom which was voluntarily contracted. They are also sufficiently deliberate; for, as St. Liguori says, lib. II, de Peccatis, n. 4, « sinners of this kind ill habituated, although they have cognition less prompt than others, nevertheless always have some actual cognition of their crimes sufficient for rendering acts deliberate and mortal. For since they make little account of sin, there is not made in their souls that sensible and memorable impression which is made in another having conscience less depraved: and hence it happens that in their memory there remains no vestige of that actual cognition which they had sufficiently before concerning the sin, or a vestige so light, that being questioned they easily answer that they did not advert. » Ergo.

4° Thoughtlessness. To prudence pertains to regulate all actions of man; and since nothing right or rightly done can be done without her guidance, and thoughtlessness is opposed to her, whatever acts are done together with ignorance arisen from thoughtlessness become sins, because such ignorance can easily be overcome. Thus St. Thomas proves, 2a 2ae, q. 53, a. 4, c, that thoughtlessness is a special sin contained under imprudence: « Consideration chiefly pertains to judgment. Whence also defect of right judgment pertains to the vice of thoughtlessness, insofar namely as someone fails in judging rightly from this, that he will not consider the things he can consider. »

You will ask 2° whether culpable ignorance of things one is bound to know is a special sin distinct from the sins of which it is the cause.

I answer. 1° Ignorance of things which man is bound to know not on account of themselves but on account of the work here and now to be done or avoided, is not a special sin distinct from the sin which follows from it, because by no other title is one bound to know those things than by reason of the work here and now to be done or omitted; and thus it takes its whole malice from that work, no otherwise than an act good or indifferent from elsewhere which is the cause of culpable omission takes its whole malice from the omission, and constitutes one sin only with it. Hence he who approaches one not his own, vincibly ignoring that she is married ⁴, commits one sin only of adultery; likewise he who does not fast on the vigil of St. Matthew, vincibly ignoring it to be the vigil ⁵ : and it suffices to say in confession: « I committed adultery, I did not fast on the vigil of St. Matthew, » without his accusing his vincibile ignorance.

2° But ignorance of things which man is bound to know on account of themselves is a special sin distinct from the sin of which it is the cause, opposed to studiousness. For then ignorance does not take its malice from the effect or consequent sin, but has it according to itself, inasmuch as it is against the precept of knowing these things on account of themselves and not on account of a work here and now to be done or omitted. Hence he who from vincible ignorance of the Incarnation blasphemed against Christ would sin with twofold sin: of ignorance against infused studiousness, and of blasphemy against religion; likewise he who from ignorance that adultery is sin would commit it; also a confessor, judge, physician who vincibly ignores the things of his office or state, by this very fact sins with a special sin of ignorance, and if thence he act badly, or there be proximate danger of acting badly, he commits another distinct sin; for he is not bound to know these precisely by reason of a work here and now to be done or omitted, as in the first answer, where such obligation is transient with the work, but by reason of state, and therefore it is permanent.

You will ask 3° what ignorance is reckoned invincible.

I answer. that ignorance to be invincible which cannot be overcome with moral diligence employed. I say moral, not supreme, but such as prudent and God-fearing men are wont to employ in similar business.

I say : Invincible ignorance of divine positive law can be given, not only among infidels, to whom the Gospel has not been announced, but also among the faithful, to whom it has been announced¹.

The first part is certain and is admitted by all the orthodox, especially after the condemnation of this proposition : « Negative infidelity, in those among whom Christ has not been preached, is sin. » It is number 68 among the Baians condemned by St. Pius V.

It is proved 2°. According to ordinary law of God, the unique medium of knowing the mysteries of faith is the preaching of the Gospel, according to that word Rom., X, 14 : How shall they believe him whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? Whence Christ, Joann., XV, 22, says of the Jews : If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin — namely of infidelity, as Aug. interprets it, Tract. 89 in Joann.

And thence flows the second part, which one or another denies, being herein singular against the unanimous sense of the others. For if, because the Gospel is announced in no manner to infidels, invincible and blameless ignorance of all the mysteries and precepts of faith can exist in them, therefore those also among the faithful to whom it is not sufficiently announced, or as regards certain precepts, can invincibly and blamelessly ignore them : because what the defect of promulgation of the whole law effects with respect to infidels, that does the defect of promulgation of this precept effect with respect to a particular person; especially since from one precept known, another cannot be deduced with which it holds no connection.

It is confirmed. Divine positive law thrusts knowledge of itself upon us no more than human law. But invincible ignorance of human law can be given. Therefore.

You will say against the first part : Every ignorance of divine positive law at least necessary to salvation is culpable. Therefore vincible. — Proof of the antecedent. It arises from fault; for if man were to convert himself to God as he ought and can by the help of grace, which God denies to no one, as we said in the first part, God would instruct him concerning those things necessary to salvation, either through internal inspiration, or through a preacher, as St. Thomas teaches, Lect. 3 on chapter X Rom., and elsewhere. But ignorance which follows from fault is culpable. Therefore.

Answer. I deny the antecedent. In proof whereof I distinguish the minor. Ignorance which follows from fault is culpable, if it was foreseen in the fault, or could humanly have been foreseen, I concede; if it was neither foreseen nor could have been foreseen, I deny. For, that an effect following per accidens upon some voluntary cause be voluntary and imputable, it must, as I said so often already, be foreseen, or morally able to be foreseen, as about to follow from that cause. But they of whom the question treats neither apprehend, nor can morally apprehend, their conversion to God to be an ordered and suitable medium for driving away the ignorance of faith, concerning which they do not even think, or ever thought. Confer what I said in my great Work, tract on God, dissert. VII, art. 8, obj. 5.

You will insist Every adult can attain salvation, as is plain from what was said art. 8 cited. Therefore he can drive away the ignorance of those things at least necessary unto salvation.

Answer. I distinguish the consequence. Therefore he can physically drive away ignorance etc., insofar as he can be instructed by God, and would in fact be instructed, were he to convert himself to him, I concede the consequence; morally, so that it be imputed to him as fault, if he drive it not away, I deny, since he knows not that he can, nor that necessary knowledge would follow from his conversion. But there is no implication [contradiction] that someone can morally attain the end which he knows, and be able to attain the means only physically, when he knows them not.

Note that the precepts of natural law are commonly distinguished, with the Author¹, into three classes: Some are first and most universal, which are rather principles of other precepts than precepts, such as : « Good must be done, evil avoided. What you do not wish done to yourself, do not to another. » Secondary are more determinate, which are deduced from the first immediately and by easy discourse, such as the precepts of the Decalogue. Tertiary are those contained obscurely in both, and deduced from these mediately and with difficult discourse, such as the precepts which prohibit certain contracts, as usurious or simoniacal, and many others.

It is agreed among theologians that there cannot be invincible ignorance of the first precepts, nor of the secondary considered in themselves, in adults having perfect use of reason; because the first are per se known and are understood from the mere apprehension of the terms; the secondary are deduced from the first immediately by an easy and obvious discourse, of which even ruder men are capable.

I said: « Of secondary precepts considered in themselves; » because, if they be considered as clothed with circumstances good and apparently excusing from sin, as to tell a slight lie to save the life of an innocent man, to steal to relieve one gravely needy, etc., it is more probable, with Sylvius, the Salmanticenses and several others, that they can be invincibly ignored, at least by ruder men and for some time; because on account of this circumstance they become obscure and are reduced to the third class. The question is therefore concerning the more remote and more obscure precepts of the third class. Wherefore

I say : There can be in adults having perfect use of reason invincible ignorance of natural law regarding the more remote and more obscure precepts, which are said to be of the third class. This is most common opinion against certain Louvanists and a few others.

It is proved by the authority and reasoning of St. Thomas, below, q. 100, a. 1, c, where he says: « Certain [precepts of the natural law] there are for whose judgment much consideration of diverse circumstances is required, which to consider diligently does not belong to everyone, but to wise men; just as to consider the particular conclusions of sciences belongs not to all, but to philosophers alone. » And further: « Certain things there are which by subtler consideration of reason are judged by wise men to be observed; and these are so of the law of nature, that however they need instruction whereby the lesser may be taught by the wise. » And a. 11, c, of the same question: « Certain things there are whose reason is not so manifest to everyone, but only to the wise; and these are the moral precepts superadded to the Decalogue. » — I subjoin. But not all are or can be wise; not all are capable of subtler consideration or more difficult discourse; nor is it granted to all to be instructed by the wise. Therefore, according to St. Thomas and the truth of the matter, the more obscure precepts of natural law, which are remote conclusions from the first, can be invincibly ignored, no otherwise than the remote conclusions of the sciences.

The adversaries answer 1º that the remote precepts of natural law can be invincibly ignored speculatively, but not practically; and that St. Thomas must be understood of speculative ignorance.

Sed contra : 1° Therefore, according to St. Thomas, as it pleases the adversaries, the remote precepts of natural law can be invincibly ignored speculatively, because they are difficult, obscure and of subtler consideration. But they are not less difficult and obscure, indeed more so, in practice than in speculation, on account of the diverse circumstances which practice involves. Therefore. 2° St. Thomas wrote this part with respect to ignorance in practice, since thence they take their argument against us. If thus in this place, why not in another? Therefore the answer is gratuitously invented, nay false.

They insist : If men, as far as in them lies, purged away depraved affections and habits, and prayed as they ought, God would enlighten them, or remove from them the occasion of acting against natural law; which since they neglect, their ignorance is voluntary and culpable.

I answer. I deny the consequence, which the adversaries feign quite gratuitously. For where has God promised this? That it may be more evident, the 2° conclusion is proved by overturning this principal foundation of the adverse opinion. According to the adversaries, that ignorance of natural law must be held vincible which could be conquered 1° by study and human inquiry, 2° by purging depraved affections and habits, 3° by assiduity in prayer, 4° by right use of what is already known. For these are the four modes by which Steyaert and other Louvanists say ignorance of natural law is vincible, so that, if these being in place it is not conquered, it will be invincible. But ignorance of natural law is given which, all these means being employed, could not be conquered. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. Jerome, Epist. XI, quoted by Augustine, taught that simulation was licit, and erred. Cassian, Collat. 17, and others taught that the officious lie, for instance for the liberation of one's country, is licit, and erred.

St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 67, a. 2, c, teaches that a judge is bound to condemn as guilty one juridically proved innocent; St. Bonaventure teaches the contrary: one or other erred concerning natural law. For many centuries Catholic and most pious doctors dispute about this case and several others pertaining to natural law, for instance about certain contracts, whether they are usurious, whether simoniacal, etc. But all these employed the above-named means. It would be impious to deny this of the holy Doctors of the Church St. Jerome, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, rash to deny it of others. Therefore.

The adversaries respond that these holy Doctors and others erred speculatively only, and not practically.

Sed contra. To be silent about others, St. Thomas composed his second and third parts of the Summa with a view to forming morals, avoiding sins, exercising virtues, administering and receiving sacraments, and singularly this article about which there is question, for duly exercising the office of judge; all which pertain to practical doctrine. Therefore, if he erred, he erred practically, and not speculatively only, as a Thomist doctor would now err if consulted by a judge he answered according to the opinion of St. Thomas: for it is not only practice to act, but also to teach and counsel in acting; nor is he alone culpable practically who does the evil work, but also he who cooperates with it by teaching and consenting. Nor say that St. Thomas gave no assurance; for he is held to give assurance who teaches something absolutely as true and obligatory, as St. Thomas does in the present case and in many others. And even if he gave no assurance to others, nevertheless he himself erred with a view to practice, since by thus teaching he did not know but that many would follow his doctrine.

Therefore when we read in Scripture : Ask, and you shall receive, John, XVI, 24. If any of you want wisdom, let him ask of God who giveth to all men abundantly, and upbraideth not, James, I, 5. Thou hast given a warning to them that fear thee, that they may flee from before the bow, Psal. LIX, 6 : these and similar texts are understood to mean that God, of his grace, will enlighten him who prays and does what in him lies regarding those things necessary with necessity of means, and for avoiding formal sins.

It is confirmed 2°. God does not always enlighten him who does what in him lies, of grace, according to the aforesaid modes, regarding those things which are of positive divine law, as the adversaries commonly admit. Therefore neither regarding those things which are of natural law.

Obj. 1° from St. Thomas : The Angelic Doctor, Quodlib. XIII, a. 13, says : « In two ways someone is bound to sin: one way, by acting against the law, as when someone fornicates; another way, by acting against conscience, even if it be not against the law... But that which is done against the law is always evil, nor is it excused by being according to conscience. » But he who acts against the more remote precepts of natural law acts against the law. Therefore his ignorance is not invincible; otherwise he would not sin.

I answer. This celebrated text of St. Thomas, which the adversaries at once urge, and which they boast never solved, never to be solved, does not fight even against us. For of our own accord we confess with the holy Doctor that everything done against the law formally is sin; because sin is defined : « A word, deed or desire against the law. » Whence to be formally against the law and to be sin are convertible. But that something be against the law formally, this law must be known, or morally able to be known, to exist; otherwise through defect of sufficient promulgation it will not be actually obliging, and what is done will not be formally against it, but materially only. Truly therefore says St. Thomas that everything done against the law formally, namely against the law virtually known, or invincibly unknown (for otherwise it is not done formally against the law), such as fornication, is always sin, and is not excused by its being according to conscience erring by vincible error dictating that to be licit. Moreover see more about this text, Dissert. on Probabilism, art. 3, obj. 3.

Obj. 2° : Concupiscence and ignorance are two wounds of human nature inflicted by original sin. But every concupiscence is vincible. Therefore every ignorance is vincible. This is almost the sole foundation of the Louvanists from reason.

I answer. I distinguish the minor. Every concupiscence is vincible as to its motions and stimuli, I deny. Experience shows it, and the Apostle thrice asked this of the Lord and obtained it not, II Cor., XIII, 8. As to consent, I concede. And to this same Apostle it was said, ibid., 9: My grace is sufficient for thee. So likewise every ignorance is vincible as to consent; for man can not consent to any ignorance whatever, doing morally what in him lies to conquer it, and thus make himself immune from all culpable ignorance. But, just as he cannot arrest all involuntary motions of concupiscence, so neither all involuntary errors of ignorance.

But if perhaps the question be not of concupiscence and ignorance themselves, but of those things to which concupiscence does not impel, v. g., fornication, adultery, etc., and of things done out of ignorance, I grant that the former we can conquer and avoid, not the latter. The reason of the disparity is evident, because, if those things to which concupiscence impels us, for instance fornication, adultery, etc., we could not conquer and avoid, since they are elsewhere supposed known, nothing would be wanting to formal sin, and thus we should be necessitated to sin formally; which cannot be admitted. But supposing invincible ignorance, the things we do through it are unknown to us, and therefore material sins only, and not formal.

I say : Invincible ignorance of the law of nature excuses from formal sin the one acting from it. This is against Luther, Calvin, Jansenius and the Jansenists, defined by Alexander VIII, 7 December 1690, in the condemnation of this proposition: « Even if invincible ignorance of the law of nature be granted, in the state of fallen nature it does not excuse from formal sin the one acting from it. » It is the second among 31.

It is proved 1° from Sts. Augustine and Thomas. Aug., lib. III, de lib. Arbit., cap. 18, n. 50: « Is there so great a deceit [of ignorance] that it can by no means be guarded against? If it is so, there are no sins. » St. Thomas, here q. 76, a. 3, c, speaking of invincible ignorance in general, expressly says: « But if it be such ignorance as is altogether involuntary, either because it is invincible, or because it concerns what one is not bound to know, such ignorance altogether excuses from sin. »

It is proved 2° by this fundamental reasoning of St. Thomas. That which takes away from the act the character of the voluntary, and renders it involuntary, excuses from formal sin; for sin is a moral act, consequently free and voluntary. But this is what invincible ignorance of the law of nature effects; for the voluntary is defined as « that which is from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end ». Therefore.

They answer that invincible ignorance of the law of nature, and the things done from it, are voluntary in us in Adam, since they are effects of that sin.

On the contrary : 1° For personal sin there does not suffice the voluntary of nature, or in the head, but there is required the voluntary of the person, as Alexander VIII defined in the condemnation of this proposition: « In the state of fallen nature, for mortal sin and demerit there suffices that liberty by which it was free and voluntary in its cause, original sin and the will of Adam sinning. » It is the first among the condemned propositions (7 December 1690). 2° Because otherwise it would follow that the indeliberate motions of concupiscence which we suffer unwillingly, all the defects and miseries of this life, folly, frenzy, blindness, etc., and all the things that arise from these, would be formal sins; because they too are effects of original sin and voluntary in Adam.

It is confirmed. Invincible ignorance of positive law, even divine law, excuses from formal sin the one acting from it, the adversaries themselves confessing. Therefore also invincible ignorance of the law of nature. — Proof from consequence. Invincible ignorance of positive law excuses from formal sin because it itself is involuntary, and what is done from it is involuntary. But likewise invincible ignorance of the law of nature itself is involuntary, and what is done from it is involuntary. Therefore.

For the solution of the objections from Augustine, whom the Jansenists press most of all, it must be observed that in all the things objected from him the holy Doctor never speaks of ignorance of the natural law, but either determinately of ignorance of positive law, or generally of ignorance of whatever kind of law; whence these are to be solved by them, as by us. It must therefore be said that, when St. Augustine says that ignorance of the law does not excuse from sin, he speaks either of vincible and indirectly voluntary ignorance through negligence in learning, or of sin taken in a wide sense, for that which is from sin and leads on to sin, as it is taken by the Apostle and by the council of Trid., sess. V, can. 2. « Not only that do we call sin, he says, lib. III de libero Arbit., c. 19, n. 54, which is properly called sin, for it is committed by free will and knowingly; but also that which now follows necessarily from the punishment of this. »

Note 1°. Inadvertence differs from ignorance, in that ignorance is the privation of habitual knowledge or cognition, inadvertence the privation of actual cognition. Whence, wherever there is ignorance, there is inadvertence, but not conversely; for he who knows habitually may not actually advert, from natural distraction, or from elsewhere.

Note 2°. There can be inadvertence both to the act and to the malice, as in a drunkard or one sleeping. There can also be inadvertence to the act and

¹

inadvertence to the act without inadvertence to the malice, as in one who knowing that today is a fast day, eats meat, adverting indeed to the eating of meat, but not adverting to the fast day or prohibition; and of this inadvertence is the present question.

Note 3°. As whatever invincible ignorance excuses from sin, because it makes the involuntary; so, for the same reason, whatever invincible inadvertence excuses from sin.

All these things rest on what has been said of ignorance, and in this all theologians agree, that for sinning formally it is required that one be able and ought to advert to the malice, consequently that the inadvertence be vincible; but the difficulty is, when someone is held to be able thus to advert, that his inadvertence be called vincible and not excusing from sin. A question made celebrated from the rise of philosophical sin. Some require an actual thought, at least confused, of the malice of the act, situated in some doubt, or scruple or suspicion of malice. Others will that it suffice if he advert to the act; because thence, they say, he can advert to the malice. We judge both opinions, generally understood, less true, and between these extremes we hold the middle way which we held above, when treating of the notion of invincible ignorance; for the same reason seems to us to hold of invincible inadvertence. Whence I say 1°: That inadvertence to the malice of the act be held vincible and not excusing from formal sin, an actual scruple is not always required, whether doubt or suspicion of the malice of the act.

It is clear 1° in those who sin from vincibly ignorant; these certainly have no actual scruple, doubt or suspicion of the malice of their act, since they are ignorant of it, and yet their inadvertence is vincible, like the very ignorance from which it proceeds. And under this head sins of ignorance are often so called in Scripture and the Fathers.

It is clear 2° in those who, although perhaps they know habitually, yet voluntarily place elsewhere the cause of inadvertence, namely through depraved habits which they foster, through passions to which they give themselves wholly, through supine carelessness of salvation, and similar ways, whereby it comes about that they have sins as it were innate, and are blind about their malice, and do not advert to it at all; for that these impious, worldly, hardened, blinded men, and such like, whenever they are carried away by the motions of the passions, are always struck by an actual scruple, doubt, suspicion of the malice of their acts, or by some pious thought, is utterly alien from experience and reason. For who would believe this of Tiberius, Nero, Caligula, Heliogabalus and similar monsters of men? Yet nevertheless their inadvertence is vincible and voluntary, not excusing from formal sin. Therefore. — The minor is proved. 1° Because otherwise the crimes and abominations of most lost men would have to be excused, which no one grants. 2° Because an evil effect following upon a voluntarily posited cause in which it was foreseen, or could easily have been foreseen, is voluntary and culpable, as we have more than once said elsewhere. But those of whom here is the question voluntarily place the causes of inadvertence and blindness concerning the malice of their acts, and either foresee that this inadvertence and blindness will follow from these causes, or can easily foresee it. Therefore.

I say 2°: Outside these cases of the first conclusion, that is, as to those who do not voluntarily place the cause from which they foresee, or can easily foresee, that inadvertence will follow concerning the malice of their acts, but suffer such inadvertence either from oblivion or natural distraction, or from another inculpable cause: that this inadvertence be held vincible and voluntary and not excusing from sin, there is required, if not a determinate actual scruple, doubt or suspicion of malice, at least some thought or cognition, whether of danger, or of the obligation to inquire, or any other whatsoever, which, were it not neglected, would of itself lead to the knowledge of the malice.

It is proved, because, outside the cases of the first conclusion, nothing assignable exists besides cognition of this kind in which anyone could be said to be able to advert, and with this posited he can advert. — This latter is clear. — The former is proved: 1° Because, since on the one hand our intellect is a necessary power, it does not determine itself to considering or knowing something, but is determined by the object or by other powers, especially by the will. The will, on the other hand, cannot determine the intellect to consider except from some previous cognition which is not voluntary, because it precedes the first volition; for the will is not borne toward the unknown, whether in itself or in its cause; whence that saying: « Of the unknown there is no desire. » Therefore in those who do not voluntarily place the cause of inadvertence, but suffer it either from oblivion or natural distraction, or from another inculpable cause, and do not advert to the malice, nothing is assignable in which they are said to be able to advert besides the said thought. 2° If our intellect were of itself proximately and morally apt for inquiring into and driving away inadvertence, there would never be any invincible and involuntary inadvertence, as is clear. But the consequence is false, as experience shows and all confess. For the upright man who, knowing well that he is bound today to fast, eats meat from natural oblivion, is excused by all on account of invincible inadvertence. Compare what I said of invincible ignorance.

You will say: By the very fact that one adverts to the act, he can advert to the malice. Therefore, if he does not advert, his is the fault, and the inadvertence is vincible.

I answer. First, that the falsity of the antecedent, generally understood, appears in the example soon brought forward. I distinguish therefore this antecedent. By the very fact that one adverts to the act, he can advert to the malice in external sins which are against the primary and secondary precepts of the natural law, I concede the antecedent; because they of themselves and easily impress their malice, and therefore, just as there is no invincible ignorance of them, so neither invincible inadvertence. In sins which are against positive precepts, or even remote natural ones of the third class, I deny the antecedent; because these, since they are obscure and of more difficult consideration, do not of themselves impress knowledge of their malice: whence, just as invincible ignorance of them is given, so also invincible inadvertence.

I said: « In external sins against the primary and secondary precepts of the natural law, » such as thefts, homicides, adulteries, etc.; because as to internal motions about the same, it seems altogether to be conceded that invincible and involuntary inadvertence can be given, because far less than external acts do they impress their malice. Whence often those who are of timid conscience are obstinately vexed by motions of concupiscence, vengeance, rash judgment, etc., which indeed they feel [should read sentiant?] and advert to, without reflecting upon the malice; which as soon as they advert to it, they reject with horror and detest.

You will ask: Aug., book I of the Retract., c. 15, n. 3, teaches that for sin there is not required « the will of sinning, » but that « the will of the deed » suffices. But he who adverts to the act, even if he does not advert to the malice, has the will of the deed. Therefore.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent. Augustine teaches that for material sin the will of the deed suffices, I concede; for formal sin, I deny.

I suppose 1° that invincible ignorance of law or fact, which excuses from all sin, excuses from penalty, because just penalty is decreed only on account of guilt, otherwise it would be

I said: « Which excuse from all sin; » because, if ignorance should excuse from sin against one law only, suppose a human law which is ignored, and not excuse from sin against another law, suppose divine or natural which is not ignored, I judge it more probable that the sinner be not exempted from penalty by human laws enacted, if there be no ecclesiastical censure; because the human legislator intends not only to urge by penalties observance of his own law, but also of natural or divine law, of which he ought to be guardian and protector. Whence a thief who, conscious of natural law, ignores theft to be prohibited by human law, nevertheless incurs the penalty of hanging.

I suppose 2° that vincible ignorance of law or fact which excuses from mortal also excuses from penalty at least so great, because positive laws are not reckoned to decree grave penalties for venial sins. But that vincible ignorance is reckoned as excusing from mortal which is not gross and supine; for thus it is reckoned light.

I suppose 3° that vincible ignorance, even gross and supine, of a law bearing penalty under these or similar formulas: « Whoever knowingly, rashly, with rash daring shall act against, or shall have dared to act against, or presumed, » excuses from penalty; because, as Cajetan says, 2ª 2ae, q. 53, a. 3, « the words of law are not appended in vain nor to be taken improperly; » in vain would they be appended, nor would they be taken with restrictive propriety, if delinquents through ignorance even gross incurred the penalty. Otherwise, more probably, must be said if ignorance be affected; because, according to the laws, affected ignorance is equated with knowledge, and it is not likely that legislators wish to exempt from their laws and penalties those who affect to ignore them, that they may transgress them more freely.

The question therefore remains whether ignorance of penalty excuses from it him who sins gravely against a law he knows, or ignores through gross and supine ignorance. For whose resolution

I say 1°: Ignorance even invincible of penalty does not exempt from it him who sins gravely against a law which either he knows, or ignores through gross and supine ignorance, unless it be an ecclesiastical censure.

It is proved. Laws establish penalties condign to guilts. Ergo whoever commits guilt is liable to penalty, even though invincibly ignorant of it; for it is not of the nature of penalty that it be known or willed, since it has of itself that it be violent and against the will.

I said: « Unless it be an ecclesiastical censure. » For which I say 2°: Invincible ignorance of an ecclesiastical censure exempts from it one sinning knowingly against the law by which it is decreed. This is common opinion.

It is proved. That is special and proper to ecclesiastical censure, that it be not incurred except on account of contumacy against the Church — not in whatsoever manner, but against the Church commanding or prohibiting under censure, whose sign is that no one incur censure unless there precede warning of law or judge, not any whatsoever, but with threat of censure. Yet he who invincibly ignores the censure is not contumacious against the Church in this manner. Ergo.

It is confirmed. Ecclesiastical censure is not so much vindicative punishment in vengeance for crime as medicinal punishment deterring from crime. Yet unknown punishment does not deter. Ergo.

I say 3°: It seems more probable that ignorance even vincibile, provided it be not gross and supine, exempts from an ecclesiastical censure one sinning knowingly against the law by which it was established. So Sylvester, under Excommunicatio I, q. 3, Navarrus, Covarruvias, and many others.

It is gathered from Cap. Ut animarum, de Constitutionibus in Sexto, lib. I, tit. 2, c. 2, where we have this: « Lest perils of souls be encountered, we do not will that those ignorant be bound by sentences issued through statutes of whatever Ordinaries, provided however their ignorance be not gross and supine. »

The Reason supports it. He who ignores the censure, even though vincibly, but with lightly culpable ignorance not gross and supine, is not properly called disobedient and contumacious against the Church commanding or prohibiting under censure. Yet contumacy of this kind is required for incurring censure, as was said. Ergo. Otherwise, we judge, must be said of irregularity, even from delict, which we do not reckon a censure, as we shall say elsewhere.

You will ask whether, as often as the will sins, some practical error precedes in the will.

I answer. affirmatively ¹. Because insofar the will sins, insofar it prefers useful or delightful good, as

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fitting itself, to honest good. Yet the will, since it is a blind potency, born to follow the guidance of intellect, cannot prefer delightful good, as fitting itself, to honest good, unless the intellect judge here and now delightful good to be fitting itself and preferable to honest good: wherein practically it errs. Ergo. And in this sense is verified that Prov., XIV, 22: They err that work evil. And this common saying taken from the Philosopher, I Ethic., c. 3: « Every sinner is ignorant, » namely practically and in particular, not speculatively and in common; otherwise every sinner would be heretic.

Note 1°. Sin, as a concrete accident, imports two things, material and formal. The material is the act or entity; the formal is the malice or deformity. When we ask whether God be the cause of sin, the question is not of the material, but of the formal; as when I ask who made this statue, I ask not who made the wood, but who made the form or figure.

Note 2°. A twofold cause of sin can be distinguished: one per se and directly, as when someone impels to sin, concurs positively in it or flows into it; another per accidens and indirectly, as removing a prohibition, as when one does not hinder a sin which he can and ought to hinder. These things noted, I say 1°: God neither is nor can be the per se and direct cause of sin¹; that is, God does not impel, move, instigate to sin, does not command it, does not do it, neither per se, nor through Satan or the impious as his instruments, as Calvin, Zwinglius and other here-

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It is proved 1° from the Scriptures. Deut., XXXII, 4, it is said: The works of God are perfect, and all his ways judgments: God faithful and without any iniquity, just and right. Rom., IX, 14: Is there injustice with God? Far be it! Psal., V, 5: Not thou willing iniquity art God. Eccli., XV, 12: Say not: He hath caused me to err, that is, deceived me and led me into sin. And afterwards, 21: He commanded no man to do wickedly. Jacob., I, 13: Let no man when he is tempted say that he is tempted of God; for God is not the tempter of evils. I Joann., III, 8: He who committeth sin is of the devil. Sap., XI, 25: Thou hatest none of the things which thou hast made. And yet Sap., XIV, 9: To God the ungodly and his ungodliness are hateful. And elsewhere often.

It is proved from the Fathers, who unanimously teach the conclusion. Whence Trid., sess. VI, can. 6: « If anyone shall say that it is not within the power of man to make his ways evil, but that evil works, as well as good ones, God works, not permissively only, but properly and per se, so that his own work is no less the treason of Judas than the calling of Paul; let him be anathema. »

It is proved by reason. Every sin is by recession from order which has God as its end⁴. But it is impossible that God be cause, to himself or to others, of departing from the order which is unto himself. Therefore. — Proof. of the minor. God is the last end of all things, and consequently inclines and converts all things to himself as last end, according to that of Prov., XVI, 4: The Lord made all things for himself. Therefore.

It is confirmed. A just will, as St. Anselm says, lib. de Lib. arbit., c. 8, is that which wills what God wills it to will. Therefore, if God will it to sin, by sinning it wills what God wills it to will, and at once God wills it not to will, and on account of which he punishes it; which is manifestly contradictory.

2° No just reason can be assigned why God should will and make men to sin. Therefore. — Proof. of the antecedent. The heretics assign no other reason, nor can they assign any, but this, namely

⁵

that God have those whom he may pity and whom he may punish, and thus mercy and justice shine forth. But from this, that God wills and makes men to sin, pities some, punishes others, mercy and justice by no means shine forth therefrom, but rather injustice and cruelty appear. Therefore. — Proof. of the minor. Although in punishing an unjust man justice appears, nevertheless to make an unjust man, that he be punished, is not justice, but supreme injustice; for this is not to intend punishment on account of guilt, but guilt on account of punishment, which is wholly disordered and unjust. Nor is it mercy, but rather cruelty, to make a man impious, that he be freed from impiety; as it would be cruel to wound a man that he be healed. Therefore.

I say 2°: Neither per accidens and indirectly is God the cause of sin; because then alone is anyone said to be the per accidens and indirect cause of sin, namely as removing a prohibition, when he can and ought to hinder sin and hinders it not; as a pilot is not said to be the cause of the sinking of a ship from this, that he does not steer the ship, unless he withdraw his steering, able and bound to steer. But God, according to the laws of his wisdom and universal providence, is not bound to hinder the sins which he permits. Therefore.

You will ask 1°, about q. 80 of St. Thomas, whether and how the devil is the cause of men's sins.

I answer. 1° It is certain that the devil is in some way the cause of men's sins⁶. It is manifest because he led Eve into sin, tempted Job, and daily tempts men: whence that of I Petr., V, 8: Your adversary the devil goeth about like a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour.

2° The devil cannot be the direct and sufficient cause of sin⁷; because he cannot be the cause of sin, except either by acting interiorly upon the will and moving it to sin, or by proposing the object and persuading its appetibility. But the first he cannot do; for to move the will interiorly by acting upon it belongs to God alone.

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