Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II
Charles René Billuart (1685–1757)
Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae. Tomus II.
First published 1884
Charles-René Billuart, O.P.'s Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae, Tomus II, treats human acts, passions and virtues, sin, law, and grace in the Thomistic manual tradition. Schola presents the complete Latin Tome II from the Paris Vives edition of 1884.
Tractatus I: De actibus humanis
Dissertatio I: De voluntario et involuntario
Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit voluntarium?
Articulus II: Utrum omissio et effectus ex ea secutus sint voluntaria sine praecepto ponendi actum qui omittitur?
Articulus III: Utrum violentia causet involuntarium?
Articulus IV: Utrum metus causet involuntarium?
Articulus V: Utrum concupiscentia causet involuntarium?
Articulus VI: Utrum ignorantia causet involuntarium?
Dissertatio II: De voluntario libero, sive de libertate creata
Articulus I: Praenotanda
Articulus II: Utrum in homine lapso sit libertas arbitrii seu indifferentiae?
Articulus III: Utrum ad merendum vel demerendum, in hoc statu naturae lapsae, requiratur libertas a necessitate, seu libertas indifferentiae?
Dissertatio III: De actibus humanis speciatim sumptis
Articulus I: Utrum voluntas possit velle malum sub ratione mali?
Articulus II: De motivo voluntatis quoad specificationem
Articulus III: De motivo voluntatis quoad exercitium
Articulus IV: De modo quo movetur voluntas : an libere, an necessario?
Articulus V: De actibus elicitis a voluntate
Articulus VI: De actibus imperatis.** D. Thomas, q. 17
Dissertatio IV: De actibus humanis in esse moris
Articulus I: In quo consistat moralitas in communi actuum humanorum ?
Articulus II: De principiis moralitatis
Articulus III: De concursu multiplicis moralitatis simul in eodem actu
Articulus IV: Utrum dentur actus indifferentes?
Articulus V: Utrum et quomodo voluntas humana, ut sit bona, debeat conformari voluntati divinae?
Articulus VI: Utrum actus exterior addat bonitatem vel malitiam actui interiori?
Articulus VII: Utrum eventus sequens addat ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus exterioris?
Dissertatio V: De conscientia
Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit conscientia?
Articulus II: An et quomodo teneamur conformari conscientiae erranti?
Articulus III: Cujus speciei et gravitatis sit peccatum agere contra conscientiam?
Articulus IV: Quomodo se gerere debeat confessarius cum poenitente quem deprehendit laborare conscientia erronea?
Articulus V: De conscientia scrupulosa, per varias quaestiunculas
Articulus VI: Utrum liceat agere cum conscientia dubia, probabili, aut probabiliori?
Dissertatio VI: De opinionum probabilitate et delectu
Articulus I: Utrum sit licitum sequi opinionem minus probabilem et minus tutam, in concursu probabilioris et tutioris?
Articulus II: Utrum in conflictu duarum opinionum aeque probabilium, de honestate objectiva actus, liceat sequi minus tutam faventem libertati, relicta tutiori favente legi ?
Articulus III: Utrum liceat sequi opinionem probabiliorem minus tutam in concursu minus probabilis tutioris, ubi agitur de sola honestate objectiva actus?
Articulus IV: Varia quaestiunculae circa praesentem materiam breviter resolvuntur
Dissertatio VII: De probabilismo moderato
Articulus I: De natura probabilitatis
Articulus II: Quaenam systemata prodierint circa probabilitatem in practicis?
Articulus III: An liceat sequi opinionem vere et solide probabilem faventem libertati, relicta tutiore aeque probabili, vel etiam probabiliori, ubi de sola liceitate actionis agitur?
Articulus IV: De usu probabilitatis et de regulis specialibus quibus conscientia in dubiis practice formatur
Articulus V: Utrum liceat sequi opinionem probabilem, aut etiam probabiliorem, relicta tutiore, cum adest obligatio certa finem determinatum obtinendi?
Articulus VI: De probabilismo compensativo
Tractatus II: De passionibus et virtutibus
Dissertatio I: De passionibus
Articulus I: De passionibus in particulari
Dissertatio II: De virtutibus
Articulus I: Quid sit virtus, et quotuplicis generis?
Articulus II: De subjecto virtutum
Articulus III: De causa virtutum
Articulus IV: De proprietatibus virtutum
Tractatus III: De peccatis
Dissertatio I: De natura peccati
Articulus I: Quid sit peccatum?
Articulus II: Utrum formale constitutivum peccati commissionis consistat in positivo, an in privativo?
Articulus III: De peccato omissionis
Dissertatio II: De distinctione specifica et numerica peccatorum
Articulus I: Varia peccati divisiones
Articulus II: Unde petatur distinctio specifica peccatorum?
Articulus III: Utrum peccata commissionis et omissionis specie distinguantur?
Articulus IV: Unde petatur distinctio numerica peccatorum?
Dissertatio III: De comparatione peccatorum ad invicem
Articulus I: Utrum omnia peccata sint inter se connexa et paria ?
Articulus II: Unde sumatur inaequalitas peccatorum ?
I say 1°: The quantity or essential inequality of sins is derived from the object in point of gravity1.
It is proved. Thence is sought the essential quantity or gravity of sin, whence its species is sought2. But the species of sin is derived from the object, as we said in the places soon to be cited. Therefore.
I say 2°: The essential inequality of sins is also sought per se and caeteris paribus from the virtues to which they are opposed3; so that that sin is the more grave which is directly and principally opposed to the nobler virtue.
This conclusion follows from the preceding; because, the nobler the virtue against which a sin is opposed, the more excellent is the object about which it is concerned. But it was said in the preceding conclusion that the essential gravity of sins is derived from the object. Therefore.
Understand both these conclusions 1º per se, because per accidens a sin whose object is more grave and is opposed to a nobler virtue can, by reason of the imperfection of the act or the lightness of the matter, be venial; and another whose object is less grave and is opposed to a lesser virtue, mortal. 2º Understand it caeteris paribus, so that the vices between which the comparison is made are concerned with the primary object of the virtue to which they are opposed; so that, if a supreme vice is opposed on one side to the supreme virtue, so also on the other: for want of which, hatred of one's neighbor, for example, although opposed to charity, the most noble of virtues, is nevertheless not the most grave of sins, because it is not opposed to the primary object of charity, which is God.
I say 3°: The gravity of sin is also sought from the circumstances4; because each thing is apt to be increased by that from which