Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

DISSERTATION II

ON THE SPECIFIC AND NUMERICAL DISTINCTION OF SINS

St. Thomas, q. 72.

Sin taken most generally is divided into original sin, which is derived from Adam to posterity through seminal propagation, and personal sin, which is committed by one's own will. Personal sin is subdivided into actual and habitual. Actual sin is an act or omission disconformable to the rules of morals; habitual sin is the stain left in the soul from actual sin. Of original and habitual sin specially below. Now of actual sin.

Actual sin is divided: 1° into mortal and venial ¹. Mortal is said of that which inflicts death upon the soul, depriving it of sanctifying grace, which is the life of the soul in the supernatural order, and turning it simply away from the last end; whence it is, by its very nature, irreparable, and it induces the guilt of eternal punishment. Venial is said of that which, since it does not deprive one of grace and charity, but only diminishes their fervor, nor turns one simply away from the last end, but only retards its attainment, leaves the principle of life and grace; whence it is not irreparable by its nature, nor does it induce the guilt of eternal punishment, but of temporal punishment only. Of both also we shall treat specially below.

2º Actual sin is divided into sin of commission and omission ², of which we have already spoken. Sin of commission is an act disconformable to the rules of morals; it fights against a negative precept. Sin of omission is the privation of an act owed; it fights against an affirmative precept.

3º Actual sin is divided into sin of heart, of mouth, and of deed ³. Yet this division is not always into diverse sins, but sometimes into diverse degrees of the same sin.

4° It is divided into sin of weakness, which arises from vehement passion; sin of ignorance, which arises from vincible ignorance; and sin of malice, which is committed with full liberty and as it were deliberately, without passion or ignorance.

5° Actual sin is one thing simply such, another against the Holy Spirit, which is sin from malice, whereby the special gifts of grace are repelled or assailed, which are effects of divine love, which is attributed to the Holy Spirit. Six are counted, namely: despair, presumption, impenitence, obstinacy, impugning of the truth known, and envy of fraternal grace.

6° Others are capital sins, others arise from them. The capital sins are counted seven, from St. Greg., book XXXI Moral., chapter 31, namely vainglory (some place pride), envy, avarice, anger, lust, gluttony, and sloth.

7° Finally sin is one thing material, another formal, and this in a twofold sense: 1º Material sin is the evil act itself in itself and considered entitatively; formal, the very malice or deformity of that act or omission. 2º Formal sin is said to be the free transgression of the law imputable to the will; material, a transgression of the law not free, and therefore not imputable to the will, such as are transgressions of the law from invincible ignorance.

As regards the sin of omission, since it is in itself a mere privation of the act due, it is certain that it is specifically distinguished by the acts themselves omitted specifically distinct in moral being; as all other privations are specifically distinguished by the opposite forms by which they deprive; namely in that manner in which privations can be distinguished. The question is therefore of the sin of commission.

I say: Sins are specifically distinguished by their order to objects specifically distinct in moral being ¹; because every act is specified by its object. Therefore an act morally evil is specified by an object morally evil.

It is confirmed. Every motion is specifically distinguished by order to the term to which. But, in sinful motion, the object is the term to which. Therefore.

This conclusion all Thomists hold with the Author, and many outsiders, even those among the Thomists who place the formal element of sin in the privative; because, they say, with diverse order to formally diverse objects standing, there follows diverse privation.

I said in the conclusion: « By order to objects specifically distinct in moral being; » because the specific distinction of objects in the order of being contributes nothing to the specific distinction of sins; for whether one steals a sheep or a horse, he commits a sin of the same species, namely of injustice. But

The question is whence the object has that it be specifically distinguished in moral being.

I answer. Generally speaking, objects are specifically distinguished in moral being when they have a special and distinct repugnance with the eternal law and right reason. Now they have a special and distinct repugnance or disconformity with the eternal law and right reason from a multiple head: 1° when they are opposed to different virtues; 2° when they are opposed to the same virtue, but in a different way, as is evident in theft and robbery, which although they are opposed to the same virtue of justice, are nevertheless specifically distinguished, because they are opposed to it in a different way; 3° when they are opposed to different precepts, not materially and on the part of the principle or commander, but formally on the part of the thing commanded or intrinsic motive. Whence it can be said that sins are also distinguished specifically, namely radically and mediately, by the virtues and precepts to which they are opposed.

Conclusions

From what has been said you will infer 1° that one who omits Mass on a feast day falling on Sunday, or does not fast on an ember Wednesday falling on the vigil of St. Matthew, commits in each case one sin specifically and numerically, in the first case against religion, in the second against temperance, because both the precept of hearing Mass on Sunday and on a feast day, and both of fasting on ember days and on the vigil of St. Matthew, are of the same account on the part of end and intrinsic motive. For the end and intrinsic motive of hearing Mass on Sunday and a feast day is the honesty of religion, and of the precept of fasting on the ember days and the vigil of St. Matthew, the honesty of temperance. Nor does it matter that perhaps the legislator, in commanding Mass on the day of St. Matthew, or fasting on his vigil, intended to honor the saint; for that end or motive is extrinsic and of the agent, just as if in commanding a fast he intended rain, fair weather, or peace, which ends or extrinsic motives do not constitute precepts of different account. Say the same of one who violates the same vow or oath repeated several times, of omitting the canonical hours to which he is bound by title of benefice and sacred order.

You will infer 2° on the contrary, that one who is bound by vow and the precept of his confessor to fast on the Friday of the ember days, if he does not fast, commits three sins specifically distinct: first, against temperance, by force of the ecclesiastical precept; second, against religion, by force of the vow; third, against the virtue of penance, by force of the precept of the confessor. For these three obligations are from different intrinsic motives, and thus of distinct account; for the intrinsic motive of the ecclesiastical precept is temperance, of the vow is religion, of the precept of the confessor imposing a fast after sins heard, with attention to the nature of the work and the circumstances, is punishment and satisfaction for sins.

It is certain 1° that these sins, considered materially and in physical being, differ not only in species, but in genus ¹. For the sin of commission, materially considered, is a positive act deprived of rectitude; the sin of omission is the lack or privation of an act owed. But of act and non-act, of being and non-being, there is no univocal genus, that is, expressed by one and the same name in the same sense.

It is certain 2° that sins of commission and omission, even considered formally and in moral being, can be distinguished in species, if they are exercised about diverse matters; for it is evident that omission of hearing Mass is distinguished in moral species from theft.

But the question is whether, if they are referred to the same object and proceed from the same motive, they are distinguished in species, as theft and non-restoration of a theft. Wherefore

I say: Sins of omission and commission, considered in moral being, if they proceed about the same object from the same motive, are of the same species ².

It is proved. 1º. Sins, like other human acts, have their species from the end. Therefore, if the sin of commission and of omission are ordered to the same end, or proceed from the same motive, they will be of the same species: namely, if they are ordered to the same end of the work, they will be of the same essential species, as to seize another's goods and not restore them; if to the same end of the agent, they will be of the same accidental species, as to omit Mass and steal in order to commit adultery.

It is proved. 2º. To do good and, from the same motive, to omit the opposite evil do not constitute distinct moral species, but are integral parts of the same justice, as St. Thomas teaches, II II°, q. 79, a. 1, c, according to that of Psalm XXXI, 15: Decline from evil and do good, « because both, says the holy Doctor, are required for the perfect act of justice. » But proportionally they stand thus: in the genus of evil, to do evil and, from the same motive, to omit the opposite good, stand as, in the genus of good, to do good and to omit evil. Therefore.

It is confirmed by the example of motion. Although in motion recession from the term from which and access to the term to which involve two changes, namely from being to non-being, and from non-being to being, they nevertheless do not constitute diverse species of motion, but one, which is adequately constituted from both as from integral parts. But in the motion of sin, recession from good takes place through omission, access to evil through commission. Therefore.

From these you will rightly observe, according to the mind of St. Thomas, that sins of commission and omission are not said to be of the same species as two individuals, e.g., two men contracting the same human species, but because they stand as integral parts from which one species in the genus of morals is adequately constituted, in that proportional manner in which the integral parts of penance constitute one sacrament.

From what has been said you will infer that an act which is borne directly upon an omission, e.g.: « I will not hear Mass, » although it be a commission, belongs nevertheless to the sin of omission, and is of the same moral species with it.

You will ask which sin is the graver, whether of commission or of omission.

I answer. Speaking per se and other things being equal, the sin of commission is the graver. For it is graver to hate God than, under pressure of a precept, not to love him; graver to afflict parents with insult than not to reverence them at the proper time.

I say 1°: The numerical distinction of sins is sought from the moral interruption of the acts of the will; because human acts have that they are sins from the act of the will. Whence St. Thomas, in II Sentent., dist. 42, a. 1, says: « According to the unity of the will must be taken the judgment concerning the unity of what is said in the genus of morals. » Therefore, where the act of the will is diverse and morally interrupted, there is a distinct sin.

The act of the will is then held to be morally interrupted when it perseveres neither formally nor virtually. Now it is held not to persevere formally or virtually from three headings: 1° When it is expressly revoked by a contrary act: as if anyone revoke his prior will of stealing, and immediately after it take it up again, there will be two sins numerically distinct; because these two volitions, although interpolated within the briefest time, are in no way connected with each other, nor can the second be called a continuation of the former formally and expressly revoked.

2° By voluntary cessation from the act of the will: as if anyone, seeing a woman, take morose delight, and spontaneously abandon that delight by turning himself to other things, but immediately, seeing the same or another woman, again take morose delight, he sins twice, for the reason already given; because these two voluntary delights are in no way connected with each other, nor can the second be called a continuation of the first voluntarily interrupted and interpretatively revoked. In these two theologians sufficiently agree, but about the third they dispute. Therefore

A third mode, according to which the same act of the will perseveres neither formally nor virtually, is assigned by several as involuntary cessation from the internal act of the will, for instance through natural distraction or forgetfulness, through sleep or drunkenness: because, say they, the act repeated after such an involuntary interruption is not continuous with the preceding, but diverse; but where acts are diverse, there are diverse sins.

I judge this true of sins merely internal, that is, which are consummated in the will itself, and do not tend efficaciously to external acts, such as heresy, hatred, envy, velleities, complacency, morose delights, etc.; for as often as they are repeated after cessation, even involuntary, so often are they perfectly consummated; nor does the prior act imply order to the second, nor are they in any way connected, continued, or dependent upon one another.

It is otherwise with internal acts tending efficaciously to an external work, at least when these reiterated acts of the will are connected with some external effect of the prior act: as if, from the purpose of killing your enemy, you hold a dagger ready, or lay snares, or set out on the way to seek him, etc. These or similar effects standing, although you often repeat the bad will, now thinking of it, now voluntarily thinking of other things or doing them, you commit not several sins but continue the first; because the prior act morally perseveres in the external effect placed by its force, and in it as in a bond all the following are connected with the prior.

I said: « At least when these reiterated acts of the will are connected with some external effect; » because many, not improbably, hold the same even if they are not connected with any external effect, as if you now firmly propose to kill your enemy, or to fornicate tomorrow, and waking in the morning renew this proposal, and as often as you reflect upon it you persist in it — they hold it one sin; because the prior act has been neither consummated nor voluntarily revoked, but perseveres, and by its force the second and following are elicited, which are held a continuation of the prior.

I say 2° : The will remaining the same, indeed also the same external act, sins are multiplied numerically from objects numerically distinct in moral being. But objects are held to be numerically distinguished in moral being when they do not stand toward each other morally after the manner of one thing, either because one is not part of the other, or because they are not parts integrating some one whole, or because they are not ordered to the same end and the same work to be consummated; for then, although there be one act physically, it is nevertheless held in the genus of morals virtually multiple, and to have as many malices numerically distinct as there are objects of this kind.

The reason is, because, as sins are multiplied and distinguished in species by objects distinct in species, so are they multiplied and distinguished in number by objects numerically distinct. Hence he who with one and the same bad will wills to kill, or de facto kills, three men, whether by one act or by several immediately succeeding, commits three sins numerically distinct; because since three men do not stand morally after the manner of one thing, they are three objects numerically distinct.

You will say : He who steals in one act a flock of sheep commits one sin, not as many as there are sheep. Therefore also he who kills many men in one act.

I answer. I deny the consequence. The disparity is that all the sheep of the flock stand after the manner of one thing, since they have no distinct rights which are violated, nor therefore are capable of distinct and peculiar injury. But three men, even if of the same family, do not stand after the manner of one thing, but each has his own distinct right which is violated, and thence is capable of particular and distinct injury. Nor does it matter that a family is reputed one person by a fiction of law. It is indeed so feigned, but so it is not, especially with respect to injury.

By which reason I judge it more probable that, if the flock belonged to three men, there would be three sins: although not a few deny this; because, say they, all the sheep are morally one whole, which is the proximate object of theft.

Consequences

From what has been said you will gather 1° that he who sets out from home with the will of stealing carries the ladder, climbs up, opens the chest, takes away the money, whether all at once or successively by portions; likewise he who with mind of fornicating seeks the girl, kisses her, looks at her, touches her impudently, and at last fornicates; likewise he who from the purpose of killing his enemy prepares dagger or gun, meets his enemy, provokes him, strikes, wounds, kills him: these men, I say, and others in similar cases, even if amid these preliminaries they repeat their evil will of stealing, fornicating, killing a hundred times, commit only one sin; because these reiterated wills are connected with the first in the effects, and those preceding effects are ordered to the theft, fornication, homicide, as to one end, and therefore are had after the manner of one thing, and are understood in the accusation of the completed work, so that it suffices to say in confession : « I have committed fornication, I have committed murder, etc. » Otherwise however, if means were employed toward those ends which would have special malice, as if one used magic arts to steal, love philters to fornicate, etc. It must be observed too that, if the impudicities preceding copula be done without intention of copula, although afterwards, the intention being changed, copula follow, they are distinct sins and to be accused separately, since then they are not united after the manner of one thing in the intended end; for the intention of copula set aside, they do not of themselves tend more toward fornication than toward pollution or sodomitical copula. Say the same, if they were done indeed from intention of copula, but which, some cause intervening, would not be perfected.

But whether the same must be said of impudicities, namely complacency, morose delight, touches, looks and kisses immediately following copula, and of the dispositions toward it, is doubtful. Some affirm, because they say they are appendages of copula which connaturally and regularly follow it. Others deny, because they hold they are dispositions toward another copula. Moreover, as to practice, if it be true, as the first opinion says, that those impudicities regularly follow toward copula, I do not see why it should be necessary to confess them distinctly, since on this hypothesis they are sufficiently understood by the confessor in the accusation of the copula.

You will gather 2º that he who, the same bad will remaining, during the same motion of concupiscence or hatred, pollutes himself thrice, fornicates thrice with the same woman or with several, kills three men successively, commits three sins; because three pollutions, three fornications, three homicides do not stand morally after the manner of one thing, but are three total actions complete in themselves, nor unifiable by their nature in some third in which they would be perfected and consummated.

Nor does the unity of the will stand in the way; for although it be one physically, it is morally multiple numerically, just as it would be multiple in species if in these acts there were objects specifically distinct, for instance if he fornicated once with his mother, afterwards with a married woman, then with a nun; or if among the slain were counted a father or a cleric. In all cases, notwithstanding its physical unity, it is morally multiple in species; so in our case it is morally multiple in number.

For the same reason, he who with one continued intention of stealing, twenty times with moral interruption, should filch twenty thousand florins, would sin mortally twenty times; because the individual thefts do not stand morally after the manner of one thing, since of themselves they are not ordered to each other, but each separately is a consummation of the internal will. So at least common sense apprehends.

Likewise a priest existing in mortal sin commits, more probably, as many sins as he absolves penitents without interruption; because each absolution is a total action and complete judgment, joined by no nexus with other absolutions and judgments. Say the same of him who baptizes several successively, for the same reason: otherwise, at least more probably to us, if with the same continued action he administer communion to several; because it seems to be the administration of one banquet, and therefore morally one action. Likewise a priest celebrating in mortal sin seems to commit only one sin; because, although the oblation, consecration and communion are actions physically distinct, they nevertheless constitute one mystery in which they are united.

You will gather 3° that he who with one continued motion of concupiscence acts impudently with a girl, often, though with some interruption, kissing her, touching her, etc., commits one sin; likewise he who with one rush of anger strikes his enemy several times, blasphemies several times, hurls several insults of the same kind at him, for instance calling him three or four times a thief, commits even so one sin, so that it suffices to say in confession : « Once I acted impudently by touches and kisses with a girl, once I blasphemed, once I quarreled with my companion, when I called him thief, when I struck him; » because these acts, notwithstanding physical interruption, are held, according to the common sense of men, one action, one conversation, one quarrel, one speech, as one eating is held while one successively eats several courses. Nor is the reason the same of these as of several fornications, pollutions, or killings, of which in the preceding corollary; for the disparity is that several killings, several fornications or pollutions are total actions complete in themselves, having a definite term in which they are consummated, so that they cannot be unified in some third in which they are consummated, and consequently neither among themselves. But those several acts here in question, namely several touches, several blows, etc., are not total and consummated actions, but apt of themselves to make one with one consummated external act, in which they are unifiable, and therefore unifiable among themselves, like the eatings of several dishes. So at least the common sense of men apprehends, which ought especially to be attended to as regards the multiplication or numerical unity of sins.

But whether, if one quarreling assail another with injuries of distinct kind, calling him now thief, now adulterer, now sorcerer, etc., he commit several sins? A distinction must be made: If these diverse insults are held