Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

D. Thomas, IIa IIae, from q. 71 to q. 89.

I say ¹: Sin is rightly defined by Aug., lib. XXII contra Faustum, c. 27: « A word, deed, or desire against the eternal law. »

It is proved. That definition is good which explains the material and formal element of the thing defined; for by these both is the thing distinguished. But, when it says, word, deed, or desire, the material element of sin is explained, which is the human act. When it says, against the eternal law, the formal element is explained; for from this the act is sinful, namely that it is against the eternal law.

[You will object: This definition does not apply to every sin. Therefore it is not legitimate. — Proof of the antecedent. This definition does not apply to the sin of omission, which is not a deed, etc. Therefore it does not apply to every sin.

I answer. I deny the antecedent. — To prove it, again I deny the antecedent. In morals, affirmation and negation are reduced to the same genus. But omission is a negation, or rather the voluntary privation of an act owed, which act is a kind of affirmation; for in voluntary and culpable omission there is an unwillingness to obey, and thereby a will of resisting the law. Therefore omission cannot be voluntary, nor consequently culpable in the individual, without some act which is its cause or occasion, not on the part of the work, but on the part of the worker. Therefore, by reason of this act or deed, it is fitly comprehended under this definition of sin. Therefore this definition is legitimate.]

I say 2°: It is essential to sin that it be an injury and offense of God.

It follows from the preceding. For it is essential to sin that it be against the law of God, as was said. But he who knowingly and willingly acts against the law offends the lawgiver, because he contradicts his will, and refuses him the obedience and subjection owed.

And from this you will gather that there cannot be given a merely philosophical sin, that is, one which is only against reason and not against God, nor an offense of him.

(It seems that, if the matter be considered in the abstract, philosophical sin could be distinguished from theological sin. For St. Thomas says, 1ª 2°, q. 71, a. 6. ad 5: « By theologians sin is considered principally according as it is an offense against God, but by the moral philosopher according as it is contrary to reason. » But this must be understood only hypothetically or conditionally, as is clear from these words of his, 2. 2., q. 20, a. 3, c: « If conversion to a changeable good could be without aversion from God, although it were inordinate, it would not be mortal sin. »

And he brings this reason in the same place: « In every mortal sin the principal reason of evil and gravity is from this, that it turns away from God. » Therefore, if conversion to a changeable good could be without aversion from God, sin would not be theological, but only philosophical, as « disagreeing with rational nature alone and right reason. »

I say: Merely philosophical sin cannot in fact exist.

It is proved 1° from the condemnation by Alexander VIII issued on August 24, 1690, against the following proposition, which Arnaldus had fabricated by twisting certain texts, so that he might attribute it, after his manner, to his adversaries: « Philosophical or moral sin is a human act disagreeing with rational nature and right reason; but theological and mortal sin is the free transgression of the divine law. Philosophical sin, however grave, in him who either does not know God or does not actually think of God, is a grave sin, but it is not an offense of God, nor a mortal sin dissolving the friendship of God, nor worthy of eternal punishment. » — This proposition was « declared and condemned as scandalous, temerarious, offensive to pious ears, and erroneous. »

It is proved 2° by reason. According to Augustine, theological sin is « a word, deed, or desire against the eternal law, » and as the Angelic Doctor observes in the former place related above, « Augustine defines sin more fittingly from this, that it is against the eternal law, than from this, that it is against reason, especially since by the eternal law we are regulated in many things that surpass reason. » Whence it follows that we are regulated by this law also in those things which pertain to reason. But whenever anything is done against right reason, the eternal law is injured. Therefore such an act is theological sin. — Proof of the minor. 1° Right reason is nothing else than a participation of the eternal law, or an intellectual light manifesting to us the eternal law. Therefore no one can act against right reason without at the same time injuring the eternal law.

If you object that he who acts against right reason may not attend to the eternal law, and consequently cannot injure it in any way, I answer that no one is ignorant of this principle of the eternal law: « Evil is to be avoided. » But whoever acts against right reason knows and necessarily advertes that his action is evil; for it is supposed that he spurns the dictamen of conscience. Therefore he injures the eternal law. Therefore theological sin is admitted.

2° From the very name it is understood that theological sin is committed against God. For he who knowingly acts against right reason commanding or forbidding perceives that he subverts the natural order, and knows at least implicitly that this order was established from eternity by the supreme legislator, that is, by God. Therefore he sins against God himself. Therefore such sin is theological.]

Because concerning this question theologians have been most divided, even Thomists, that I may satisfy all, I shall briefly set forth the principal points of each opinion, with the responses of the adverse party.

There is proposed the opinion placing the formal constitutive of sin of commission in something privative ?

1° According to Scripture, the holy Fathers, especially St. Thomas, sin is nothing, it is aversion from God, it is lack or privation of due perfection and rectitude. Ergo.

2° Sin is essentially evil, nay supreme evil. Yet evil is essentially privation; for every being, qua being, is good. Ergo.

3° and chiefly. If moral malice or the formal constitutive of sin were something positive, God would be cause of sin, etc. The consequent is more than false and expressly condemned in Concil. Trid., sess. VI, can. 61 ¹. Ergo. — Prob. sequelae maj. God ought to be cause of every real positive, otherwise he would not be first and most universal cause, which requires that every real positive, under every real and positive formality, be from him who is the fountain of all being. Ergo.

Responses of the adverse party

They observe 1° that evil is twofold: absolute and simply evil, which includes no goodness or entity, as privation of coldness in hot water; respective evil and secundum quid, which includes some entity and goodness, and thus is evil to one, while it can be good to another, as heat in water. In the act of sin both evils are found: the respective evil and secundum quid, namely a positive tendency toward an object dissonant from the rules of morals; and the absolute evil and simply, namely the privation of rectitude connoted and caused by the positive act, or accompanying it and founded in it.

They observe 2° that privation can be considered in two ways: in fieri and in facto esse. In fieri it is something positive, in facto esse it is nothing. It appears in death, which in fieri is something positive, namely disease or a lethal wound; in facto esse, mere privation of life. So in the act of sin: privation of rectitude in fieri is something positive, namely the tendency of the act toward an object dissonant from the rules of morals; in facto esse, a mere privation resulting from this tendency.

They observe 3° that there are two kinds of aversion: one privative, the other contrary; that in every sin there is aversion from God, not only privative but also, at least virtually and interpretatively, contrary, inasmuch as man by sinning not only withdraws from God, but virtually and interpretatively at least rises up against him, transgressing his law, denying him obedience and casting him off as friend and last end. These things observed,

They answer to the first, with St. Thomas, q. 2 de Malo, a. 1, ad 4, that sin is called nothing, not on account of its formal self, but on account of the mode or privation following or accompanying it.

Aversion is said on account of the same connoted privation, or aversion is taken not only privatively but also contrarily.

Privation of due perfection or rectitude is said because it founds and involves it, or we speak of sin as it is evil simply, not as it is moral and respective evil. Sometimes also the holy Fathers speak of habitual sin.

To the second they answer, that sin is evil, not simply and absolutely, but moral and respective, which does not consist in bare privation.

To the third, they deny the consequent. To the proof they distinguish. God is cause of every real positive under the character of entity, I concede; under the character of deformity, I deny. Or in other terms, he is cause of every real positive materially, I concede; formally, I deny. That is, God is cause of every real positive simply and absolutely, not as founding and connoting a consecutive or adjunct privation. But the formal constitutive of sin is real positive, not as effectible, but as defectible; not materially and absolutely, but formally, as founding privation: whence it does not follow that God is cause of sin.

They answer 2° by retorting the argument, and say, the adverse opinion labors under the same difficulty. For thus they argue: The foundation of the privation in which the adverse opinion places the formal constitutive of sin, reduplicatively as such, is something real positive; for negation or privation cannot be the foundation of another negation or privation, else to this prior negation another negation ought to be assigned as foundation, and so on to infinity. Ergo, if God necessarily causes every real positive in sin, he causes its foundation as such. — They subjoin: He truly and properly causes sin who causes its foundation as such, especially since formal sin, in this opinion, is privation. Now privation is not caused directly and per se, but results from the positing of the foundation, nor can it otherwise be caused; because, since it is nothing, it cannot of itself and directly terminate influx.

§ II.

There is proposed the opinion placing the formal constitutive of sin of commission in something positive, with the responses of the adverse party.

1° Scripture explains sin through conversion toward an evil object. Jerem., II, 13: My people have done two evils: they have forsaken the fountain of living water, and have digged to themselves cisterns, broken cisterns, that can hold no water. And Osee, IX, 10: They became abominable as those things which they loved.

2° St. Thomas, 1ª 2ª, q. 18, where he begins to treat ex professo of human acts in the order of morals, teaches, art. 5, ad 2, and q. 72, a. 1, c, and art. 9, ad 1; likewise q. 79, a. 2, ad 3, that the constitutive difference of a sinful act, qua such and as it is subdivided against moral good, is not a privation but something positive, namely a positive tendency of the act toward an object dissonant from reason; but that privation has reference to it only consequently.

And 1ª p., q. 48, a. 1, ad 2, and q. 1 de Malo, a. 1, c, says that evil simply differs in this from moral evil, that evil simply consists in privation, but moral evil in something positive to which privation is joined. Whence q. 2 de Malo, a. 11, ad 13: « Sin, he says, is not pure privation, as darkness, but is something positive. » And 2ª 2ª, q. 6, a. 2, ad 2: « Deformity [of sin] imports not only privation of due form, but also a contrary disposition, »

3° That is the formal constitutive of sin from which sin has that whereby it is first moral evil. Yet sin of commission has first that whereby it is moral evil through the positive and vital tendency toward an evil object. Ergo. — And 1° that thence it has being moral evil is proved, because that tendency proceeds freely from the will as subject to the rules of morals, and regards a moral object, namely one dissonant from the rules of morals. Ergo it pertains to the moral line, and contracts from that object some moral species, not goodness, not indifference. Ergo formal malice. 2° That from that tendency it has first that whereby it is moral evil is proved. That tendency morally evil precedes the act's privation of rectitude; for the act of sin lacks rectitude because it tends toward an evil object, since every motion tending from one term to another first per se regards the term to which, whence follows aversion or withdrawal from the term from which. Ergo.

And granted that privation would not follow but precede or at least accompany the act, as some will, nevertheless the argument would stand, because it cannot be but that the moral tendency of the act toward a moral object does not contract moral species, since every act is specified by its object.

4° Formal morality taken generically consists in something positive, namely in real transcendental order toward an object subjected to the rules of morals, and it is divided into three species: goodness, malice and indifference, as we said in the treatise on Human Acts. Yet a positive genus cannot be contracted through privation, but only through positive difference. Ergo the constitutive difference of moral malice, like that of goodness, is positive.

Responses of the adverse party

To the first it is answered that Scripture explains sin, now privatively, now positively, so that the privative is formal and the positive material. But others urge that this answer is not only gratuitous but also false, both because God complains no less of the positive than of the privative, and because only formal sin is abominable: here however the abomination is something positive, namely love.

To the second it is answered, that St. Thomas speaks of sin materially and considered in physical being, not formally and in the order of morals, or for formal malice; or, as others say, of sin of commission as it is commission, not as it is sinful. But true, say others, St. Thomas, 1ª 2ª, from q. 8 to 18 had already treated human acts in physical being; from q. 18 inclusive onward however he treats the goodness and malice of human acts. Ergo at least the texts cited from 2ª 2ª are badly expounded concerning the specification and constitution of sin as regards the material of sin. Moreover there and elsewhere the holy Doctor speaks in the same manner of the constitution of formal moral good. Ergo.

To the third it is answered, that this tendency does not terminate at the object reduplicatively as morally evil, or as deformed against the rules of morals, but only materially and speculatively; for it regards it formally as a certain good useful or delightful, since no one intending evil acts. Whence it follows that that tendency has from the object only that it be materially and fundamentally evil, and not formally.

To the fourth it is answered that morality in common is not a univocal genus to goodness and malice, but analogous, importing two diverse characters, one positive, the other negative. But others urge against that positive tendency of the act toward an evil object, which is a true positive species in the moral line, not good, not indifferent. Ergo evil. Ergo it stands under the genus of the same character.

§ I.

Whether every act joined to an omission, and incompatible with the observance of the precept that is omitted, is a sin, and of what species?

I suppose from the preceding treatise on Human Acts, dissert. I, a. 2, that the sin of omission can exist without any act which is of its essential character, yet not without every act which is the cause or occasion of it. There can also intervene an act only concomitantly, and which is not the cause or occasion of it,

I say 1° : Every act, though good from its object, which is the cause or occasion of the omission of an act commanded, is vitiated by the very omission and becomes evil. But an act which is not the cause or occasion of the omission, but stands to it only concomitantly, although it be incompatible with the commanded act, unless it be evil from elsewhere, is not a sin, nor is vitiated by the omission. Whence, if anyone out of affection for study omit Mass, the study is evil; but if anyone, after a firm resolution to omit Mass, lest he remain idle, studies, the study is not a sin.

The first part is clear : 1° Because to posit the cause or occasion of sin is to consent to sin and will it indirectly. But to consent to sin, and will it even indirectly, is sin, Rom., I, 32. 2° Because by the same precept both the omission is forbidden and the act which is its cause or occasion; thus, v. g., the affirmative precept of hearing Mass includes virtually the negative precept forbidding all things impeding the hearing of Mass.

The second part also is clear : because, since this act is supposed evil neither from itself nor from its circumstances, it can have no malice except from the omission. But it can have none from an omission of which it is not the cause or occasion, but toward which it stands only per accidens and concomitantly. Therefore.

If you say this act is done at an undue time, I answer : The supposition being made that one has previously efficaciously determined himself to omit the commanded act, v. g., Mass, then study does not occur at a time formally and privatively undue, but materially only; because then study is not forbidden by reason of itself, but by reason of the omission of Mass, of which it is not the cause or occasion. Whence it is better then to study than to remain idle.

Hence you will infer that persons playing at the time of Mass with one who has previously firmly resolved not to hear Mass do not sin, since this play, as standing only concomitantly to the omission of Mass, is not a sin, and thus the fellow-players do not share in the sin of the other : otherwise, for the opposite reason, it would have to be said if he omitted Mass on account of the play.

Moreover, understand the second part of the conclusion of an act which stands thus concomitantly to the omission, so however that it does not take away the power of fulfilling the precept, in case there be place and hope of retracting the evil resolution; for then although this act would stand consequently or only concomitantly to the first omission, it would nevertheless stand antecedently and causally to subsequent omissions, in case he changed his will, whose change is supposed to have place and hope present. Nay he would commit a new sin distinct from the omission, because not only is disobedience to a precept a sin, but especially to take away from oneself the possibility of fulfilling it; which is a sign of a heart hardened.

Hence you will infer that a cleric sailing, who after the impious resolution of not reciting the Hours throughout a long voyage throws his Breviary into the sea, commits besides the omission a distinct sin to be declared in confession, on account of the impossibility which he voluntarily contracts of fulfilling the precept, while there is place and hope, on account of the length of time, of retracting the evil resolution.

I judge the same of him who, after a firm resolution not to keep the vow of chastity, takes a wife; the same of him who, after a firm will not to restore what belongs to another, squanders it : and of other like cases. Otherwise of him who, after an efficacious resolution not to hear Mass, gives himself to sleep at the time of Mass drawing near, because it is unlikely that in so brief an interval he changed his mind; and accordingly sleep is not held to take away the moral power of hearing Mass, but to suppose it taken away.

I say 2° : Although an act good or indifferent of itself, which is the cause or occasion of a culpable omission, becomes evil, nevertheless the common opinion is, against the few, that it is not evil with any other malice than that of the omission, and thus need not necessarily be declared in confession; so that he who omitted Mass on account of study or play suffices if he say he omitted Mass.

The reason is, because, as the will of omitting is not a sin distinct either in species or number from the omission itself (for the will of omitting stands to the omission as the interior act to the exterior, which adds no goodness or malice to the interior), so neither does the act which is the cause or occasion of the omission, since it is evil precisely inasmuch as it includes the will of omitting.

It is confirmed. The omission and the act which is its cause or occasion are forbidden by the same precept, as has been said; for the law which commands hearing Mass, v. g., includes the negative precept forbidding the positing of an act impeding the hearing of Mass. Therefore both act and omission are against the same virtue of religion.

§ II.

At what time is the sin of omission made?

The question concerns the case in which someone, while the precept presses, is impotent to fulfill it, v. g., foreseeing in the morning the obligation of hearing Mass, made himself drunk. It is asked whether he sins with the sin of omission when he made himself drunk, or when the time of hearing Mass runs.

I say : The sin of omission is made at both times : inchoatively and as regards the affect, when the cause is posited; consummately and as regards the effect, when the time of fulfilling is present; provided however the omission remain voluntary in its cause.

The first part is admitted by all, and is clear; because sin begins then, when the will of sinning begins. But he who voluntarily posits the cause of a culpable omission wills at least indirectly the culpable omission itself. Therefore.

The second part is proved, 1° by overturning the foundation of the opposite opinion. The sin of omission consists in the voluntary privation of the act owed. But while the omission de facto occurs, then there is given the privation of the act owed, and such privation is sufficiently voluntary to be sinful. Therefore. — The first part of the minor is evident. — The second is proved, concerning which is the difficulty. For anything to be sin in itself, it suffices that in its cause it be voluntary. But a contingent omission, v. g., in sleep or drunkenness, is voluntary in its cause; for we suppose that the sleep or drunkenness was freely posited. Therefore. — The major is proved, 1° by various examples. Thus nocturnal pollution, although not formally free and voluntary in itself, is a sin, because it is voluntary in its cause, namely by an impure thought or touch. Thus homicide perpetrated in drunkenness by him who foresaw it is sinful in itself, because it is voluntary in its cause, as St. Thomas teaches, IIa IIae, q. 150, a. 4, c. Thus acts of sin committed from vincible ignorance are sinful in themselves, although involuntary in themselves, namely unknown, but voluntary only in their cause, namely the ignorance. Therefore. 2° If for formal sin there were always required that it be voluntary in itself, and the voluntary in cause did not suffice, no homicide, no pollution — say the same of many others — would be a sin in itself; because while they de facto happen they are no longer in the power of the slayer or of the one polluting himself.

2° The sin of omission consists in the voluntary cessation from the act owed. But before the time at which the obligation of the precept runs, the act is not owed. Therefore. As therefore, when one wishes to steal, before he takes what is another's, the completed sin of theft does not yet exist; so, when one wishes to omit, before he omits, the completed sin of omission does not yet exist.

It is confirmed. An actual omission must be accused in confession, no otherwise than an exterior act, and thus runs the common practice of the faithful and of confessors. Therefore it is sinful.

Obj.: From our opinion it follows that a man in his sleep could merit and confect the sacraments, since no greater liberty is required for meriting and for confecting the sacraments than for sinning. But each is unfitting. Therefore.

I answer. to the first, that it is not unfitting for a man in his sleep to merit by continuation of merit compared to his vigilance, especially if the effect follow per se from the cause freely willed, or be formally intended, as appears in the martyr, who in the instant of death, while not master of himself, merits the aureole of martyrdom. We deny however that he can validly confect a sacrament, not through defect of sufficient liberty, but because Christ, according to the common sense of the Church, instituted and willed the sacraments to be confected by a man master of himself, and with due moral certitude concerning the matter, partly on account of the reverence of the sacrament, partly on account of the danger of many inconveniences which would otherwise arise. Add that the words of one sleeping are not formal words, through defect of signification, but material words, as in a parrot uttering them.

You will ask 1° whether there ought to be imputed to him who voluntarily and culpably posited the cause all the sinful omissions and commissions following from it.

I answer. and let it be a general rule : To him who voluntarily and culpably posited the cause are imputed, as regards guilt and affect, all the sinful omissions and commissions which he foresaw, or ought and could humanly have foreseen to follow from such a cause; because by this very fact they are voluntary in their cause. But

You will ask 2° when one is held to have foreseen, or to have been able and bound humanly to foresee, sinful omissions and commissions, that they be imputed to him as fault.

I answer. in several ways : 1° when they follow per se or usually from such a cause; 2° when one sees similar things happen in others of like complexion; 3° when the precepts to be fulfilled draw immediately near.

Thence you will be able to gather various consequences for practice.