Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

D. Thomas, IIa IIae, from q. 71 to q. 89.

I say ¹: Sin is rightly defined by Aug., lib. XXII contra Faustum, c. 27: « A word, deed, or desire against the eternal law. »

It is proved. That definition is good which explains the material and formal element of the thing defined; for by these both is the thing distinguished. But, when it says, word, deed, or desire, the material element of sin is explained, which is the human act. When it says, against the eternal law, the formal element is explained; for from this the act is sinful, namely that it is against the eternal law.

[You will object: This definition does not apply to every sin. Therefore it is not legitimate. — Proof of the antecedent. This definition does not apply to the sin of omission, which is not a deed, etc. Therefore it does not apply to every sin.

I answer. I deny the antecedent. — To prove it, again I deny the antecedent. In morals, affirmation and negation are reduced to the same genus. But omission is a negation, or rather the voluntary privation of an act owed, which act is a kind of affirmation; for in voluntary and culpable omission there is an unwillingness to obey, and thereby a will of resisting the law. Therefore omission cannot be voluntary, nor consequently culpable in the individual, without some act which is its cause or occasion, not on the part of the work, but on the part of the worker. Therefore, by reason of this act or deed, it is fitly comprehended under this definition of sin. Therefore this definition is legitimate.]

I say 2°: It is essential to sin that it be an injury and offense of God.

It follows from the preceding. For it is essential to sin that it be against the law of God, as was said. But he who knowingly and willingly acts against the law offends the lawgiver, because he contradicts his will, and refuses him the obedience and subjection owed.

And from this you will gather that there cannot be given a merely philosophical sin, that is, one which is only against reason and not against God, nor an offense of him.

(It seems that, if the matter be considered in the abstract, philosophical sin could be distinguished from theological sin. For St. Thomas says, 1ª 2°, q. 71, a. 6. ad 5: « By theologians sin is considered principally according as it is an offense against God, but by the moral philosopher according as it is contrary to reason. » But this must be understood only hypothetically or conditionally, as is clear from these words of his, 2. 2., q. 20, a. 3, c: « If conversion to a changeable good could be without aversion from God, although it were inordinate, it would not be mortal sin. »

And he brings this reason in the same place: « In every mortal sin the principal reason of evil and gravity is from this, that it turns away from God. » Therefore, if conversion to a changeable good could be without aversion from God, sin would not be theological, but only philosophical, as « disagreeing with rational nature alone and right reason. »

I say: Merely philosophical sin cannot in fact exist.

It is proved 1° from the condemnation by Alexander VIII issued on August 24, 1690, against the following proposition, which Arnaldus had fabricated by twisting certain texts, so that he might attribute it, after his manner, to his adversaries: « Philosophical or moral sin is a human act disagreeing with rational nature and right reason; but theological and mortal sin is the free transgression of the divine law. Philosophical sin, however grave, in him who either does not know God or does not actually think of God, is a grave sin, but it is not an offense of God, nor a mortal sin dissolving the friendship of God, nor worthy of eternal punishment. » — This proposition was « declared and condemned as scandalous, temerarious, offensive to pious ears, and erroneous. »

It is proved 2° by reason. According to Augustine, theological sin is « a word, deed, or desire against the eternal law, » and as the Angelic Doctor observes in the former place related above, « Augustine defines sin more fittingly from this, that it is against the eternal law, than from this, that it is against reason, especially since by the eternal law we are regulated in many things that surpass reason. » Whence it follows that we are regulated by this law also in those things which pertain to reason. But whenever anything is done against right reason, the eternal law is injured. Therefore such an act is theological sin. — Proof of the minor. 1° Right reason is nothing else than a participation of the eternal law, or an intellectual light manifesting to us the eternal law. Therefore no one can act against right reason without at the same time injuring the eternal law.

If you object that he who acts against right reason may not attend to the eternal law, and consequently cannot injure it in any way, I answer that no one is ignorant of this principle of the eternal law: « Evil is to be avoided. » But whoever acts against right reason knows and necessarily advertes that his action is evil; for it is supposed that he spurns the dictamen of conscience. Therefore he injures the eternal law. Therefore theological sin is admitted.

2° From the very name it is understood that theological sin is committed against God. For he who knowingly acts against right reason commanding or forbidding perceives that he subverts the natural order, and knows at least implicitly that this order was established from eternity by the supreme legislator, that is, by God. Therefore he sins against God himself. Therefore such sin is theological.]

Because concerning this question theologians have been most divided, even Thomists, that I may satisfy all, I shall briefly set forth the principal points of each opinion, with the responses of the adverse party.

There is proposed the opinion placing the formal constitutive of sin of commission in something privative ?

1° According to Scripture, the holy Fathers, especially St. Thomas, sin is nothing, it is aversion from God, it is lack or privation of due perfection and rectitude. Ergo.

2° Sin is essentially evil, nay supreme evil. Yet evil is essentially privation; for every being, qua being, is good. Ergo.

3° and chiefly. If moral malice or the formal constitutive of sin were something positive, God would be cause of sin, etc. The consequent is more than false and expressly condemned in Concil. Trid., sess. VI, can. 61 ¹. Ergo. — Prob. sequelae maj. God ought to be cause of every real positive, otherwise he would not be first and most universal cause, which requires that every real positive, under every real and positive formality, be from him who is the fountain of all being. Ergo.

Responses of the adverse party

They observe 1° that evil is twofold: absolute and simply evil, which includes no goodness or entity, as privation of coldness in hot water; respective evil and secundum quid, which includes some entity and goodness, and thus is evil to one, while it can be good to another, as heat in water. In the act of sin both evils are found: the respective evil and secundum quid, namely a positive tendency toward an object dissonant from the rules of morals; and the absolute evil and simply, namely the privation of rectitude connoted and caused by the positive act, or accompanying it and founded in it.

They observe 2° that privation can be considered in two ways: in fieri and in facto esse. In fieri it is something positive, in facto esse it is nothing. It appears in death, which in fieri is something positive, namely disease or a lethal wound; in facto esse, mere privation of life. So in the act of sin: privation of rectitude in fieri is something positive, namely the tendency of the act toward an object dissonant from the rules of morals; in facto esse, a mere privation resulting from this tendency.

They observe 3° that there are two kinds of aversion: one privative, the other contrary; that in every sin there is aversion from God, not only privative but also, at least virtually and interpretatively, contrary, inasmuch as man by sinning not only withdraws from God, but virtually and interpretatively at least rises up against him, transgressing his law, denying him obedience and casting him off as friend and last end. These things observed,

They answer to the first, with St. Thomas, q. 2 de Malo, a. 1, ad 4, that sin is called nothing, not on account of its formal self, but on account of the mode or privation following or accompanying it.

Aversion is said on account of the same connoted privation, or aversion is taken not only privatively but also contrarily.

Privation of due perfection or rectitude is said because it founds and involves it, or we speak of sin as it is evil simply, not as it is moral and respective evil. Sometimes also the holy Fathers speak of habitual sin.

To the second they answer, that sin is evil, not simply and absolutely, but moral and respective, which does not consist in bare privation.

To the third, they deny the consequent. To the proof they distinguish. God is cause of every real positive under the character of entity, I concede; under the character of deformity, I deny. Or in other terms, he is cause of every real positive materially, I concede; formally, I deny. That is, God is cause of every real positive simply and absolutely, not as founding and connoting a consecutive or adjunct privation. But the formal constitutive of sin is real positive, not as effectible, but as defectible; not materially and absolutely, but formally, as founding privation: whence it does not follow that God is cause of sin.

They answer 2° by retorting the argument, and say, the adverse opinion labors under the same difficulty. For thus they argue: The foundation of the privation in which the adverse opinion places the formal constitutive of sin, reduplicatively as such, is something real positive; for negation or privation cannot be the foundation of another negation or privation, else to this prior negation another negation ought to be assigned as foundation, and so on to infinity. Ergo, if God necessarily causes every real positive in sin, he causes its foundation as such. — They subjoin: He truly and properly causes sin who causes its foundation as such, especially since formal sin, in this opinion, is privation. Now privation is not caused directly and per se, but results from the positing of the foundation, nor can it otherwise be caused; because, since it is nothing, it cannot of itself and directly terminate influx.

§ II.

There is proposed the opinion placing the formal constitutive of sin of commission in something positive, with the responses of the adverse party.

1° Scripture explains sin through conversion toward an evil object. Jerem., II, 13: My people have done two evils: they have forsaken the fountain of living water, and have digged to themselves cisterns, broken cisterns, that can hold no water. And Osee, IX, 10: They became abominable as those things which they loved.

2° St. Thomas, 1ª 2ª, q. 18, where he begins to treat ex professo of human acts in the order of morals, teaches, art. 5, ad 2, and q. 72, a. 1, c, and art. 9, ad 1; likewise q. 79, a. 2, ad 3, that the constitutive difference of a sinful act, qua such and as it is subdivided against moral good, is not a privation but something positive, namely a positive tendency of the act toward an object dissonant from reason; but that privation has reference to it only consequently.

And 1ª p., q. 48, a. 1, ad 2, and q. 1 de Malo, a. 1, c, says that evil simply differs in this from moral evil, that evil simply consists in privation, but moral evil in something positive to which privation is joined. Whence q. 2 de Malo, a. 11, ad 13: « Sin, he says, is not pure privation, as darkness, but is something positive. » And 2ª 2ª, q. 6, a. 2, ad 2: « Deformity [of sin] imports not only privation of due form, but also a contrary disposition, »

3° That is the formal constitutive of sin from which sin has that whereby it is first moral evil. Yet sin of commission has first that whereby it is moral evil through the positive and vital tendency toward an evil object. Ergo. — And 1° that thence it has being moral evil is proved, because that tendency proceeds freely from the will as subject to the rules of morals, and regards a moral object, namely one dissonant from the rules of morals. Ergo it pertains to the moral line, and contracts from that object some moral species, not goodness, not indifference. Ergo formal malice. 2° That from that tendency it has first that whereby it is moral evil is proved. That tendency morally evil precedes the act's privation of rectitude; for the act of sin lacks rectitude because it tends toward an evil object, since every motion tending from one term to another first per se regards the term to which, whence follows aversion or withdrawal from the term from which. Ergo.

And granted that privation would not follow but precede or at least accompany the act, as some will, nevertheless the argument would stand, because it cannot be but that the moral tendency of the act toward a moral object does not contract moral species, since every act is specified by its object.

4° Formal morality taken generically consists in something positive, namely in real transcendental order toward an object subjected to the rules of morals, and it is divided into three species: goodness, malice and indifference, as we said in the treatise on Human Acts. Yet a positive genus cannot be contracted through privation, but only through positive difference. Ergo the constitutive difference of moral malice, like that of goodness, is positive.

Responses of the adverse party

To the first it is answered that Scripture explains sin, now privatively, now positively, so that the privative is formal and the positive material. But others urge that this answer is not only gratuitous but also false, both because God complains no less of the positive than of the privative, and because only formal sin is abominable: here however the abomination is something positive, namely love.

To the second it is answered, that St. Thomas speaks of sin materially and considered in physical being, not formally and in the order of morals, or for formal malice; or, as others say, of sin of commission as it is commission, not as it is sinful. But true, say others, St. Thomas, 1ª 2ª, from q. 8 to 18 had already treated human acts in physical being; from q. 18 inclusive onward however he treats the goodness and malice of human acts. Ergo at least the texts cited from 2ª 2ª are badly expounded concerning the specification and constitution of sin as regards the material of sin. Moreover there and elsewhere the holy Doctor speaks in the same manner of the constitution of formal moral good. Ergo.

To the third it is answered, that this tendency does not terminate at the object reduplicatively as morally evil, or as deformed against the rules of morals, but only materially and speculatively; for it regards it formally as a certain good useful or delightful, since no one intending evil acts. Whence it follows that that tendency has from the object only that it be materially and fundamentally evil, and not formally.

To the fourth it is answered that morality in common is not a univocal genus to goodness and malice, but analogous, importing two diverse characters, one positive, the other negative. But others urge against that positive tendency of the act toward an evil object, which is a true positive species in the moral line, not good, not indifferent. Ergo evil. Ergo it stands under the genus of the same character.

§ I.

Whether every act joined to an omission, and incompatible with the observance of the precept that is omitted, is a sin, and of what species?

I suppose from the preceding treatise on Human Acts, dissert. I, a. 2, that the sin of omission can exist without any act which is of its essential character, yet not without every act which is the cause or occasion of it. There can also intervene an act only concomitantly, and which is not the cause or occasion of it,

I say 1° : Every act, though good from its object, which is the cause or occasion of the omission of an act commanded, is vitiated by the very omission and becomes evil. But an act which is not the cause or occasion of the omission, but stands to it only concomitantly, although it be incompatible with the commanded act, unless it be evil from elsewhere, is not a sin, nor is vitiated by the omission. Whence, if anyone out of affection for study omit Mass, the study is evil; but if anyone, after a firm resolution to omit Mass, lest he remain idle, studies, the study is not a sin.

The first part is clear : 1° Because to posit the cause or occasion of sin is to consent to sin and will it indirectly. But to consent to sin, and will it even indirectly, is sin, Rom., I, 32. 2° Because by the same precept both the omission is forbidden and the act which is its cause or occasion; thus, v. g., the affirmative precept of hearing Mass includes virtually the negative precept forbidding all things impeding the hearing of Mass.

The second part also is clear : because, since this act is supposed evil neither from itself nor from its circumstances, it can have no malice except from the omission. But it can have none from an omission of which it is not the cause or occasion, but toward which it stands only per accidens and concomitantly. Therefore.

If you say this act is done at an undue time, I answer : The supposition being made that one has previously efficaciously determined himself to omit the commanded act, v. g., Mass, then study does not occur at a time formally and privatively undue, but materially only; because then study is not forbidden by reason of itself, but by reason of the omission of Mass, of which it is not the cause or occasion. Whence it is better then to study than to remain idle.

Hence you will infer that persons playing at the time of Mass with one who has previously firmly resolved not to hear Mass do not sin, since this play, as standing only concomitantly to the omission of Mass, is not a sin, and thus the fellow-players do not share in the sin of the other : otherwise, for the opposite reason, it would have to be said if he omitted Mass on account of the play.

Moreover, understand the second part of the conclusion of an act which stands thus concomitantly to the omission, so however that it does not take away the power of fulfilling the precept, in case there be place and hope of retracting the evil resolution; for then although this act would stand consequently or only concomitantly to the first omission, it would nevertheless stand antecedently and causally to subsequent omissions, in case he changed his will, whose change is supposed to have place and hope present. Nay he would commit a new sin distinct from the omission, because not only is disobedience to a precept a sin, but especially to take away from oneself the possibility of fulfilling it; which is a sign of a heart hardened.

Hence you will infer that a cleric sailing, who after the impious resolution of not reciting the Hours throughout a long voyage throws his Breviary into the sea, commits besides the omission a distinct sin to be declared in confession, on account of the impossibility which he voluntarily contracts of fulfilling the precept, while there is place and hope, on account of the length of time, of retracting the evil resolution.

I judge the same of him who, after a firm resolution not to keep the vow of chastity, takes a wife; the same of him who, after a firm will not to restore what belongs to another, squanders it : and of other like cases. Otherwise of him who, after an efficacious resolution not to hear Mass, gives himself to sleep at the time of Mass drawing near, because it is unlikely that in so brief an interval he changed his mind; and accordingly sleep is not held to take away the moral power of hearing Mass, but to suppose it taken away.

I say 2° : Although an act good or indifferent of itself, which is the cause or occasion of a culpable omission, becomes evil, nevertheless the common opinion is, against the few, that it is not evil with any other malice than that of the omission, and thus need not necessarily be declared in confession; so that he who omitted Mass on account of study or play suffices if he say he omitted Mass.

The reason is, because, as the will of omitting is not a sin distinct either in species or number from the omission itself (for the will of omitting stands to the omission as the interior act to the exterior, which adds no goodness or malice to the interior), so neither does the act which is the cause or occasion of the omission, since it is evil precisely inasmuch as it includes the will of omitting.

It is confirmed. The omission and the act which is its cause or occasion are forbidden by the same precept, as has been said; for the law which commands hearing Mass, v. g., includes the negative precept forbidding the positing of an act impeding the hearing of Mass. Therefore both act and omission are against the same virtue of religion.

§ II.

At what time is the sin of omission made?

The question concerns the case in which someone, while the precept presses, is impotent to fulfill it, v. g., foreseeing in the morning the obligation of hearing Mass, made himself drunk. It is asked whether he sins with the sin of omission when he made himself drunk, or when the time of hearing Mass runs.

I say : The sin of omission is made at both times : inchoatively and as regards the affect, when the cause is posited; consummately and as regards the effect, when the time of fulfilling is present; provided however the omission remain voluntary in its cause.

The first part is admitted by all, and is clear; because sin begins then, when the will of sinning begins. But he who voluntarily posits the cause of a culpable omission wills at least indirectly the culpable omission itself. Therefore.

The second part is proved, 1° by overturning the foundation of the opposite opinion. The sin of omission consists in the voluntary privation of the act owed. But while the omission de facto occurs, then there is given the privation of the act owed, and such privation is sufficiently voluntary to be sinful. Therefore. — The first part of the minor is evident. — The second is proved, concerning which is the difficulty. For anything to be sin in itself, it suffices that in its cause it be voluntary. But a contingent omission, v. g., in sleep or drunkenness, is voluntary in its cause; for we suppose that the sleep or drunkenness was freely posited. Therefore. — The major is proved, 1° by various examples. Thus nocturnal pollution, although not formally free and voluntary in itself, is a sin, because it is voluntary in its cause, namely by an impure thought or touch. Thus homicide perpetrated in drunkenness by him who foresaw it is sinful in itself, because it is voluntary in its cause, as St. Thomas teaches, IIa IIae, q. 150, a. 4, c. Thus acts of sin committed from vincible ignorance are sinful in themselves, although involuntary in themselves, namely unknown, but voluntary only in their cause, namely the ignorance. Therefore. 2° If for formal sin there were always required that it be voluntary in itself, and the voluntary in cause did not suffice, no homicide, no pollution — say the same of many others — would be a sin in itself; because while they de facto happen they are no longer in the power of the slayer or of the one polluting himself.

2° The sin of omission consists in the voluntary cessation from the act owed. But before the time at which the obligation of the precept runs, the act is not owed. Therefore. As therefore, when one wishes to steal, before he takes what is another's, the completed sin of theft does not yet exist; so, when one wishes to omit, before he omits, the completed sin of omission does not yet exist.

It is confirmed. An actual omission must be accused in confession, no otherwise than an exterior act, and thus runs the common practice of the faithful and of confessors. Therefore it is sinful.

Obj.: From our opinion it follows that a man in his sleep could merit and confect the sacraments, since no greater liberty is required for meriting and for confecting the sacraments than for sinning. But each is unfitting. Therefore.

I answer. to the first, that it is not unfitting for a man in his sleep to merit by continuation of merit compared to his vigilance, especially if the effect follow per se from the cause freely willed, or be formally intended, as appears in the martyr, who in the instant of death, while not master of himself, merits the aureole of martyrdom. We deny however that he can validly confect a sacrament, not through defect of sufficient liberty, but because Christ, according to the common sense of the Church, instituted and willed the sacraments to be confected by a man master of himself, and with due moral certitude concerning the matter, partly on account of the reverence of the sacrament, partly on account of the danger of many inconveniences which would otherwise arise. Add that the words of one sleeping are not formal words, through defect of signification, but material words, as in a parrot uttering them.

You will ask 1° whether there ought to be imputed to him who voluntarily and culpably posited the cause all the sinful omissions and commissions following from it.

I answer. and let it be a general rule : To him who voluntarily and culpably posited the cause are imputed, as regards guilt and affect, all the sinful omissions and commissions which he foresaw, or ought and could humanly have foreseen to follow from such a cause; because by this very fact they are voluntary in their cause. But

You will ask 2° when one is held to have foreseen, or to have been able and bound humanly to foresee, sinful omissions and commissions, that they be imputed to him as fault.

I answer. in several ways : 1° when they follow per se or usually from such a cause; 2° when one sees similar things happen in others of like complexion; 3° when the precepts to be fulfilled draw immediately near.

Thence you will be able to gather various consequences for practice.

DISSERTATION II

ON THE SPECIFIC AND NUMERICAL DISTINCTION OF SINS

St. Thomas, q. 72.

Sin taken most generally is divided into original sin, which is derived from Adam to posterity through seminal propagation, and personal sin, which is committed by one's own will. Personal sin is subdivided into actual and habitual. Actual sin is an act or omission disconformable to the rules of morals; habitual sin is the stain left in the soul from actual sin. Of original and habitual sin specially below. Now of actual sin.

Actual sin is divided: 1° into mortal and venial ¹. Mortal is said of that which inflicts death upon the soul, depriving it of sanctifying grace, which is the life of the soul in the supernatural order, and turning it simply away from the last end; whence it is, by its very nature, irreparable, and it induces the guilt of eternal punishment. Venial is said of that which, since it does not deprive one of grace and charity, but only diminishes their fervor, nor turns one simply away from the last end, but only retards its attainment, leaves the principle of life and grace; whence it is not irreparable by its nature, nor does it induce the guilt of eternal punishment, but of temporal punishment only. Of both also we shall treat specially below.

2º Actual sin is divided into sin of commission and omission ², of which we have already spoken. Sin of commission is an act disconformable to the rules of morals; it fights against a negative precept. Sin of omission is the privation of an act owed; it fights against an affirmative precept.

3º Actual sin is divided into sin of heart, of mouth, and of deed ³. Yet this division is not always into diverse sins, but sometimes into diverse degrees of the same sin.

4° It is divided into sin of weakness, which arises from vehement passion; sin of ignorance, which arises from vincible ignorance; and sin of malice, which is committed with full liberty and as it were deliberately, without passion or ignorance.

5° Actual sin is one thing simply such, another against the Holy Spirit, which is sin from malice, whereby the special gifts of grace are repelled or assailed, which are effects of divine love, which is attributed to the Holy Spirit. Six are counted, namely: despair, presumption, impenitence, obstinacy, impugning of the truth known, and envy of fraternal grace.

6° Others are capital sins, others arise from them. The capital sins are counted seven, from St. Greg., book XXXI Moral., chapter 31, namely vainglory (some place pride), envy, avarice, anger, lust, gluttony, and sloth.

7° Finally sin is one thing material, another formal, and this in a twofold sense: 1º Material sin is the evil act itself in itself and considered entitatively; formal, the very malice or deformity of that act or omission. 2º Formal sin is said to be the free transgression of the law imputable to the will; material, a transgression of the law not free, and therefore not imputable to the will, such as are transgressions of the law from invincible ignorance.

As regards the sin of omission, since it is in itself a mere privation of the act due, it is certain that it is specifically distinguished by the acts themselves omitted specifically distinct in moral being; as all other privations are specifically distinguished by the opposite forms by which they deprive; namely in that manner in which privations can be distinguished. The question is therefore of the sin of commission.

I say: Sins are specifically distinguished by their order to objects specifically distinct in moral being ¹; because every act is specified by its object. Therefore an act morally evil is specified by an object morally evil.

It is confirmed. Every motion is specifically distinguished by order to the term to which. But, in sinful motion, the object is the term to which. Therefore.

This conclusion all Thomists hold with the Author, and many outsiders, even those among the Thomists who place the formal element of sin in the privative; because, they say, with diverse order to formally diverse objects standing, there follows diverse privation.

I said in the conclusion: « By order to objects specifically distinct in moral being; » because the specific distinction of objects in the order of being contributes nothing to the specific distinction of sins; for whether one steals a sheep or a horse, he commits a sin of the same species, namely of injustice. But

The question is whence the object has that it be specifically distinguished in moral being.

I answer. Generally speaking, objects are specifically distinguished in moral being when they have a special and distinct repugnance with the eternal law and right reason. Now they have a special and distinct repugnance or disconformity with the eternal law and right reason from a multiple head: 1° when they are opposed to different virtues; 2° when they are opposed to the same virtue, but in a different way, as is evident in theft and robbery, which although they are opposed to the same virtue of justice, are nevertheless specifically distinguished, because they are opposed to it in a different way; 3° when they are opposed to different precepts, not materially and on the part of the principle or commander, but formally on the part of the thing commanded or intrinsic motive. Whence it can be said that sins are also distinguished specifically, namely radically and mediately, by the virtues and precepts to which they are opposed.

Conclusions

From what has been said you will infer 1° that one who omits Mass on a feast day falling on Sunday, or does not fast on an ember Wednesday falling on the vigil of St. Matthew, commits in each case one sin specifically and numerically, in the first case against religion, in the second against temperance, because both the precept of hearing Mass on Sunday and on a feast day, and both of fasting on ember days and on the vigil of St. Matthew, are of the same account on the part of end and intrinsic motive. For the end and intrinsic motive of hearing Mass on Sunday and a feast day is the honesty of religion, and of the precept of fasting on the ember days and the vigil of St. Matthew, the honesty of temperance. Nor does it matter that perhaps the legislator, in commanding Mass on the day of St. Matthew, or fasting on his vigil, intended to honor the saint; for that end or motive is extrinsic and of the agent, just as if in commanding a fast he intended rain, fair weather, or peace, which ends or extrinsic motives do not constitute precepts of different account. Say the same of one who violates the same vow or oath repeated several times, of omitting the canonical hours to which he is bound by title of benefice and sacred order.

You will infer 2° on the contrary, that one who is bound by vow and the precept of his confessor to fast on the Friday of the ember days, if he does not fast, commits three sins specifically distinct: first, against temperance, by force of the ecclesiastical precept; second, against religion, by force of the vow; third, against the virtue of penance, by force of the precept of the confessor. For these three obligations are from different intrinsic motives, and thus of distinct account; for the intrinsic motive of the ecclesiastical precept is temperance, of the vow is religion, of the precept of the confessor imposing a fast after sins heard, with attention to the nature of the work and the circumstances, is punishment and satisfaction for sins.

It is certain 1° that these sins, considered materially and in physical being, differ not only in species, but in genus ¹. For the sin of commission, materially considered, is a positive act deprived of rectitude; the sin of omission is the lack or privation of an act owed. But of act and non-act, of being and non-being, there is no univocal genus, that is, expressed by one and the same name in the same sense.

It is certain 2° that sins of commission and omission, even considered formally and in moral being, can be distinguished in species, if they are exercised about diverse matters; for it is evident that omission of hearing Mass is distinguished in moral species from theft.

But the question is whether, if they are referred to the same object and proceed from the same motive, they are distinguished in species, as theft and non-restoration of a theft. Wherefore

I say: Sins of omission and commission, considered in moral being, if they proceed about the same object from the same motive, are of the same species ².

It is proved. 1º. Sins, like other human acts, have their species from the end. Therefore, if the sin of commission and of omission are ordered to the same end, or proceed from the same motive, they will be of the same species: namely, if they are ordered to the same end of the work, they will be of the same essential species, as to seize another's goods and not restore them; if to the same end of the agent, they will be of the same accidental species, as to omit Mass and steal in order to commit adultery.

It is proved. 2º. To do good and, from the same motive, to omit the opposite evil do not constitute distinct moral species, but are integral parts of the same justice, as St. Thomas teaches, II II°, q. 79, a. 1, c, according to that of Psalm XXXI, 15: Decline from evil and do good, « because both, says the holy Doctor, are required for the perfect act of justice. » But proportionally they stand thus: in the genus of evil, to do evil and, from the same motive, to omit the opposite good, stand as, in the genus of good, to do good and to omit evil. Therefore.

It is confirmed by the example of motion. Although in motion recession from the term from which and access to the term to which involve two changes, namely from being to non-being, and from non-being to being, they nevertheless do not constitute diverse species of motion, but one, which is adequately constituted from both as from integral parts. But in the motion of sin, recession from good takes place through omission, access to evil through commission. Therefore.

From these you will rightly observe, according to the mind of St. Thomas, that sins of commission and omission are not said to be of the same species as two individuals, e.g., two men contracting the same human species, but because they stand as integral parts from which one species in the genus of morals is adequately constituted, in that proportional manner in which the integral parts of penance constitute one sacrament.

From what has been said you will infer that an act which is borne directly upon an omission, e.g.: « I will not hear Mass, » although it be a commission, belongs nevertheless to the sin of omission, and is of the same moral species with it.

You will ask which sin is the graver, whether of commission or of omission.

I answer. Speaking per se and other things being equal, the sin of commission is the graver. For it is graver to hate God than, under pressure of a precept, not to love him; graver to afflict parents with insult than not to reverence them at the proper time.

I say 1°: The numerical distinction of sins is sought from the moral interruption of the acts of the will; because human acts have that they are sins from the act of the will. Whence St. Thomas, in II Sentent., dist. 42, a. 1, says: « According to the unity of the will must be taken the judgment concerning the unity of what is said in the genus of morals. » Therefore, where the act of the will is diverse and morally interrupted, there is a distinct sin.

The act of the will is then held to be morally interrupted when it perseveres neither formally nor virtually. Now it is held not to persevere formally or virtually from three headings: 1° When it is expressly revoked by a contrary act: as if anyone revoke his prior will of stealing, and immediately after it take it up again, there will be two sins numerically distinct; because these two volitions, although interpolated within the briefest time, are in no way connected with each other, nor can the second be called a continuation of the former formally and expressly revoked.

2° By voluntary cessation from the act of the will: as if anyone, seeing a woman, take morose delight, and spontaneously abandon that delight by turning himself to other things, but immediately, seeing the same or another woman, again take morose delight, he sins twice, for the reason already given; because these two voluntary delights are in no way connected with each other, nor can the second be called a continuation of the first voluntarily interrupted and interpretatively revoked. In these two theologians sufficiently agree, but about the third they dispute. Therefore

A third mode, according to which the same act of the will perseveres neither formally nor virtually, is assigned by several as involuntary cessation from the internal act of the will, for instance through natural distraction or forgetfulness, through sleep or drunkenness: because, say they, the act repeated after such an involuntary interruption is not continuous with the preceding, but diverse; but where acts are diverse, there are diverse sins.

I judge this true of sins merely internal, that is, which are consummated in the will itself, and do not tend efficaciously to external acts, such as heresy, hatred, envy, velleities, complacency, morose delights, etc.; for as often as they are repeated after cessation, even involuntary, so often are they perfectly consummated; nor does the prior act imply order to the second, nor are they in any way connected, continued, or dependent upon one another.

It is otherwise with internal acts tending efficaciously to an external work, at least when these reiterated acts of the will are connected with some external effect of the prior act: as if, from the purpose of killing your enemy, you hold a dagger ready, or lay snares, or set out on the way to seek him, etc. These or similar effects standing, although you often repeat the bad will, now thinking of it, now voluntarily thinking of other things or doing them, you commit not several sins but continue the first; because the prior act morally perseveres in the external effect placed by its force, and in it as in a bond all the following are connected with the prior.

I said: « At least when these reiterated acts of the will are connected with some external effect; » because many, not improbably, hold the same even if they are not connected with any external effect, as if you now firmly propose to kill your enemy, or to fornicate tomorrow, and waking in the morning renew this proposal, and as often as you reflect upon it you persist in it — they hold it one sin; because the prior act has been neither consummated nor voluntarily revoked, but perseveres, and by its force the second and following are elicited, which are held a continuation of the prior.

I say 2° : The will remaining the same, indeed also the same external act, sins are multiplied numerically from objects numerically distinct in moral being. But objects are held to be numerically distinguished in moral being when they do not stand toward each other morally after the manner of one thing, either because one is not part of the other, or because they are not parts integrating some one whole, or because they are not ordered to the same end and the same work to be consummated; for then, although there be one act physically, it is nevertheless held in the genus of morals virtually multiple, and to have as many malices numerically distinct as there are objects of this kind.

The reason is, because, as sins are multiplied and distinguished in species by objects distinct in species, so are they multiplied and distinguished in number by objects numerically distinct. Hence he who with one and the same bad will wills to kill, or de facto kills, three men, whether by one act or by several immediately succeeding, commits three sins numerically distinct; because since three men do not stand morally after the manner of one thing, they are three objects numerically distinct.

You will say : He who steals in one act a flock of sheep commits one sin, not as many as there are sheep. Therefore also he who kills many men in one act.

I answer. I deny the consequence. The disparity is that all the sheep of the flock stand after the manner of one thing, since they have no distinct rights which are violated, nor therefore are capable of distinct and peculiar injury. But three men, even if of the same family, do not stand after the manner of one thing, but each has his own distinct right which is violated, and thence is capable of particular and distinct injury. Nor does it matter that a family is reputed one person by a fiction of law. It is indeed so feigned, but so it is not, especially with respect to injury.

By which reason I judge it more probable that, if the flock belonged to three men, there would be three sins: although not a few deny this; because, say they, all the sheep are morally one whole, which is the proximate object of theft.

Consequences

From what has been said you will gather 1° that he who sets out from home with the will of stealing carries the ladder, climbs up, opens the chest, takes away the money, whether all at once or successively by portions; likewise he who with mind of fornicating seeks the girl, kisses her, looks at her, touches her impudently, and at last fornicates; likewise he who from the purpose of killing his enemy prepares dagger or gun, meets his enemy, provokes him, strikes, wounds, kills him: these men, I say, and others in similar cases, even if amid these preliminaries they repeat their evil will of stealing, fornicating, killing a hundred times, commit only one sin; because these reiterated wills are connected with the first in the effects, and those preceding effects are ordered to the theft, fornication, homicide, as to one end, and therefore are had after the manner of one thing, and are understood in the accusation of the completed work, so that it suffices to say in confession : « I have committed fornication, I have committed murder, etc. » Otherwise however, if means were employed toward those ends which would have special malice, as if one used magic arts to steal, love philters to fornicate, etc. It must be observed too that, if the impudicities preceding copula be done without intention of copula, although afterwards, the intention being changed, copula follow, they are distinct sins and to be accused separately, since then they are not united after the manner of one thing in the intended end; for the intention of copula set aside, they do not of themselves tend more toward fornication than toward pollution or sodomitical copula. Say the same, if they were done indeed from intention of copula, but which, some cause intervening, would not be perfected.

But whether the same must be said of impudicities, namely complacency, morose delight, touches, looks and kisses immediately following copula, and of the dispositions toward it, is doubtful. Some affirm, because they say they are appendages of copula which connaturally and regularly follow it. Others deny, because they hold they are dispositions toward another copula. Moreover, as to practice, if it be true, as the first opinion says, that those impudicities regularly follow toward copula, I do not see why it should be necessary to confess them distinctly, since on this hypothesis they are sufficiently understood by the confessor in the accusation of the copula.

You will gather 2º that he who, the same bad will remaining, during the same motion of concupiscence or hatred, pollutes himself thrice, fornicates thrice with the same woman or with several, kills three men successively, commits three sins; because three pollutions, three fornications, three homicides do not stand morally after the manner of one thing, but are three total actions complete in themselves, nor unifiable by their nature in some third in which they would be perfected and consummated.

Nor does the unity of the will stand in the way; for although it be one physically, it is morally multiple numerically, just as it would be multiple in species if in these acts there were objects specifically distinct, for instance if he fornicated once with his mother, afterwards with a married woman, then with a nun; or if among the slain were counted a father or a cleric. In all cases, notwithstanding its physical unity, it is morally multiple in species; so in our case it is morally multiple in number.

For the same reason, he who with one continued intention of stealing, twenty times with moral interruption, should filch twenty thousand florins, would sin mortally twenty times; because the individual thefts do not stand morally after the manner of one thing, since of themselves they are not ordered to each other, but each separately is a consummation of the internal will. So at least common sense apprehends.

Likewise a priest existing in mortal sin commits, more probably, as many sins as he absolves penitents without interruption; because each absolution is a total action and complete judgment, joined by no nexus with other absolutions and judgments. Say the same of him who baptizes several successively, for the same reason: otherwise, at least more probably to us, if with the same continued action he administer communion to several; because it seems to be the administration of one banquet, and therefore morally one action. Likewise a priest celebrating in mortal sin seems to commit only one sin; because, although the oblation, consecration and communion are actions physically distinct, they nevertheless constitute one mystery in which they are united.

You will gather 3° that he who with one continued motion of concupiscence acts impudently with a girl, often, though with some interruption, kissing her, touching her, etc., commits one sin; likewise he who with one rush of anger strikes his enemy several times, blasphemies several times, hurls several insults of the same kind at him, for instance calling him three or four times a thief, commits even so one sin, so that it suffices to say in confession : « Once I acted impudently by touches and kisses with a girl, once I blasphemed, once I quarreled with my companion, when I called him thief, when I struck him; » because these acts, notwithstanding physical interruption, are held, according to the common sense of men, one action, one conversation, one quarrel, one speech, as one eating is held while one successively eats several courses. Nor is the reason the same of these as of several fornications, pollutions, or killings, of which in the preceding corollary; for the disparity is that several killings, several fornications or pollutions are total actions complete in themselves, having a definite term in which they are consummated, so that they cannot be unified in some third in which they are consummated, and consequently neither among themselves. But those several acts here in question, namely several touches, several blows, etc., are not total and consummated actions, but apt of themselves to make one with one consummated external act, in which they are unifiable, and therefore unifiable among themselves, like the eatings of several dishes. So at least the common sense of men apprehends, which ought especially to be attended to as regards the multiplication or numerical unity of sins.

But whether, if one quarreling assail another with injuries of distinct kind, calling him now thief, now adulterer, now sorcerer, etc., he commit several sins? A distinction must be made: If these diverse insults are held

false, and if taken only as the effect of an angry mind belching forth indifferently whatever occurs, as often happens among quarreling women, they seem to be one sin, since there is no injury of honor or of fame, but each insult, though different, tends to this, that it irritate and offend the other. But if these are reckoned to be true and are truly imputed, there will be as many sins as there are insults of different kinds.

I say 1°: All sins are not interconnected¹.

It is proved. Such is the difference between the intention of the agent according to virtue, and the intention of the sinner, that the intention of the agent according to virtue is that he follow the rule of reason, and therefore the intention of all virtues tends unto the same thing, and on this account all virtues, at least in the perfect state, hold connection with one another in the right reason of things to be done, which is prudence; but the intention of the sinner is not unto this, that he depart from what is according to reason, but rather that he tend toward some desirable good from which it takes its species. But goods of this kind, toward which the intention of the sinner tends and by which it is specified, are diverse, holding no connection with one another, nay sometimes contrary among themselves: as prodigality and avarice, timidity and daring, intemperance and insensibility, etc. Therefore.

You will say: In Jacob., II, 10 it is said: Whosoever shall keep the whole law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all. But to be guilty of all sins and to have all sins is the same. Therefore.²

I answer. The Apostle speaks of sin on the part of aversion, and his sense is that he who commits one mortal sin turns away from God, despises him and incurs guilt of eternal punishment, which are common to all mortal sins.

I say 2° against the Stoics: Not all sins are equal³.

The conclusion is of faith expressly [set forth] in various places of Scripture⁴.

In Joann., XIX, 11 Christ says to Pilate: He that delivered me to thee hath the greater sin. Jerem., VII, 26: They have done worse than their fathers. Thren., IV, 6: The iniquity of the daughter of my people is made greater than the sin of Sodom. And elsewhere.

Whence Hieron., lib. II cont. Jovin., c. 16: « There are light sins, he says, there are grave: it is one thing to owe ten thousand talents, another a farthing. »

Proof by reason. Sins take their species from objects, as appears from the preceding. But not all the objects of sins are equal, as is evident per se. Therefore.

The other proof lies in the fundamental confutation of the Stoics, whereof presently in the reply to the objection.

Whence

Obj. with the Stoics: Sin is privation. But privation consists in the indivisible, nor does it admit more and less, as appears in darkness, death, blindness, etc. Therefore.

I answer. 1° sin is not pure privation, but an act deprived of due order; and it is specified not on the part of the privation, but on the part of the act, as St. Thomas taught in question 72 preceding, and we with him and all Thomists, even those who place the formal [element] of sin in the privative.

But grant that sin be pure privation,

I answer. 2º I distinguish the major. Sin is privation in a certain respect and in becoming, I concede the major; privation simply and in completed being, I deny the major. Similarly I distinguish the major. Privation simply and in completed being admits not more and less, I concede the minor; privation in a certain respect and in becoming, I deny the minor. There is therefore a twofold privation: one simple and in completed being, which leaves nothing of the opposite, as death and darkness; another in a certain respect and in becoming, which does not wholly take away the form of the opposite, and consequently has breadth so much greater or less, as it takes away more or less of the form opposed. As sickness, which is privation of health, admits more and less, because it does not take away totally the form opposed; for it leaves life, which is the root of health. But sin is thus privation in becoming, because it does not take away totally the form opposed; for it leaves reason and the natural inclination unto the honest good, which is the root of formal rectitude.

You will insist: Sin takes away totally the form opposed; thus e.g. in the act of lust nothing remains of the rectitude of temperance. Therefore.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent. Sin takes away totally the immediately opposed form, I concede; mediately opposed, I deny. Granted therefore that sin takes away totally the formal rectitude to which it is immediately opposed, nevertheless it takes away not totally its root, namely the practical principles of good, synderesis, the inclination of reason unto the honest good, but only strives against it and tends against it; and therefore the more it strives against and tends against it, the graver is the sin; as, although sickness takes away health totally in the infirm part, since however it takes not away life, but only tends toward and disposes unto its destruction, therefore it admits more and less, and the graver it is, the more it disposes unto death.