Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

[Four properties of virtues St. Thomas enumerates in prooemium of question 64. First, that they consist in mean; second, that they be interconnected among themselves; third, that they be unequal; fourth, that they endure after this life.]

§ I. — Whether virtue consists in mean?

[I say 1° : Moral virtue consists in mean ¹. Whence it is defined by Aristotle, II Ethic., c. 6 : « Habit choosing existing in mean » ².

It is proved. Moral virtue properly is perfective of appetitive part of soul concerning some determinate matter; but measure and rule of appetitive motion concerning appetibles is reason itself. But good of anything measured and ruled consists in this that it conform itself to its rule, neither exceeding it nor failing from it, as good in artificial things is to be conformable to rules of art : Therefore good of moral virtue consists in adaequation to measure of reason, not exceeding it, nor failing from it : which is to consist in mean.

I say 2° : Every moral virtue consists in mean of reason. It follows from preceding; for mean of reason is said what is constituted by reason in some matter. But, as we were just saying, moral virtue consists in mean through conformity toward right reason. Therefore ³.

It happens however that the mean, justice excepted, varies. In justice indeed is mean of thing, which is fixed, because compared to things themselves absolutely : E.g., if you owe one hundred, this, neither more nor less, you must repay. Other moral virtues however are concerned about interior passions, in which mean is not same for all, but diverse according to quality of persons : E.g. in temperance, what is mean for one is too little or too much for another. Moreover it must be observed, that even in justice mean depends on reason. Indeed it has from its specific reason that it be mean of thing, but has from general reason of virtue that it be also mean for reason; because nothing is more conformable to reason than constituting equality between right and debt.]

I say 3° : Intellectual virtues also consist in mean ⁴. Reason is because true, which is their object, mediates between excess and defect : for indeed truth is injured by affirming either more than thing has, or less than it has, or denying what it has. There is nevertheless disparity, that mean of speculative intellectual virtues be mean of thing, namely conformity to thing, independently from determination of reason; but mean of practical intellectual virtues, as prudence, be mean of reason, as depending upon determining reason.

I say 4° : Theological virtues per se and by reason of object do not consist in mean, but well accidentally and by reason of subject ⁵. Reason of first part, because we cannot transcend rule of these virtues; for God himself is, who is infinite truth, goodness and power. Whence, attention given to reason of object, we cannot love God too much, or believe and hope in him too much. Attention however given to reason of subject, or as far as concerns our part, we ought to be borne toward God according to measure of our condition, not with excessive effort whereby body be injured, not at unseasonable time which must needs be bestowed on others, as if someone give himself unto contemplation when he ought to attend affairs of family.]

§ II. — Whether all moral virtues are interconnected among themselves?

[Certain it is 1° all intellectual virtues not to be interconnected; for who has one science has not all sciences. Certain it is 2° all theological virtues not to be interconnected; for charity lost through sin, faith and hope can remain. Whence council Trident., sess. VI, can. 28, defined : « If anyone shall say, grace lost through sin, that faith is always lost together with it, or that faith which remains is not true faith...; let him be anathema. » Certain it is 3° all infused moral virtues to be interconnected, because they are properties of grace with which they are infused, and with which perishing they perish.

Virtue can moreover be considered twice over, in perfect state and in imperfect state ⁶. Imperfect virtue is that which does not attain essential reason of habit, but is some disposition or inclination toward some good, arisen either from temperament or from custom of certain acts of imperfect virtue; or, if it attain essential reason of habit, has nevertheless mode of disposition, inasmuch as it inheres not firmly enough in subject, nor subjects it constantly amid all occurring impediments. That virtues imperfect in either way are not interconnected, we confess spontaneously. For we see some, from natural complexion, which is called good disposition, or from some custom, prompt, e.g., unto works of liberality, who are not prompt unto works of chastity : and elsewhere essence of virtue is absolute, not relative, and thus for essence of one another is not necessarily required. Perfect virtue is, not only when it is in heroic degree, but also when it so firmly actuates and perfects subject, that it incline it unto good work well and constantly done promptly and easily in every event and notwithstanding obstacles and difficulties occurring from everywhere.]

I say : Acquired moral virtues in perfect state are so interconnected among themselves, that whoever lacks one, perfectly possesses none ⁷. It is common with St. Thomas, against the Scotists.

It is proved. 1° From Fathers ⁸. St. Ambrosius, book VI on Luke, upon those words : Beati pauperes spiritu, says: « Interconnected and chained together are virtues, so that he who has one seems to have several. » St. Augustinus, book VI de Trinit., c. 4, n. 6 : « Virtues which are in human mind, although each single one be understood now in one way now in another, are nevertheless by no mode separated from each other, so that whosoever be equals, for example, in fortitude, be equal also in prudence, and temperance, and justice. For if you say these are equal in fortitude, but that one excels in prudence : it follows that fortitude of this one be less prudent, and thereby neither are they equal in fortitude, when fortitude of that one is more prudent. And thus about remaining virtues you will find, if you run through all with same consideration. » St. Gregorius, book XXII Moral., c. 1 : « One virtue without others is either altogether none, or imperfect..., because neither is prudence true which is not just, temperate and strong; nor temperance perfect which is not strong, just and prudent. » And Tullius himself said in book II de Tuscul. quaest. : « If you confess yourself not to have one virtue, it is necessary you will have none. »

Prob. 2° by reason ⁹. Perfect virtue is not without perfect prudence. But perfect prudence is not without company of other virtues. Therefore. — Major is certain, because prudence, as regards elections, is rule of moral virtue : whence virtue is defined, « habit choosing as prudent man will have determined. » And clear, because unto right election inclination toward due end does not suffice, which is had through virtue, but also required that one rightly choose those things which are toward end; which is had through prudence, which is counseling, judging and prescribing those things which are toward end. Thence so often we see those who seem powerful with some virtue, suppose strong ones, magnanimous ones, liberal ones, penitents, devout ones, etc., through defect of prudence choose means badly in ordine to end of virtue. — Minor therefore is proved. Prudence is not perfect, if appetite be not perfectly rectified concerning particular ends and matters of all virtues. But rectitude of appetite concerning ends and matters of virtues is had through virtues themselves; for proper to each virtue is to rectify appetite concerning its own end and matter : e.g., it belongs to justice to rectify will concerning what is due to another; to temperance, to rectify appetite concerning delectables of touch; to fortitude, concerning audacities and fears. Therefore. — Major is proved. Prudence is right reason of things doable or elections of means. But there cannot be perfect and right reason of things doable, unless appetite be rightly affected concerning ends; for things doable or eligible hang upon right intention of ends, as conclusions in speculables hang upon principles. Therefore, as reason cannot rightly stand concerning conclusions unless it rightly stand concerning principles, so in practicables same reason cannot stand rightly concerning things doable or eligible, unless appetite rightly stands concerning ends; which rectitude, as was said, is had through virtues themselves.

Thence you have that prudence and virtues hang upon each other in diverse genus of cause. Prudence hangs on remaining virtues in genus of disposive cause, because judgment of prudence cannot be perfect, unless affection be well disposed concerning ends and matters of all virtues, which rectitude is had through virtues themselves, as was said. Remaining virtues however hang on prudence in genus of directive and intrinsic formal cause, because prudence directs election of means unto end, cutting off extremes whereby its judgment could be corrupted and mean of virtue impeded, which extremes wander through all genera of virtues.]

§ III. — Whether acquired moral virtues are necessarily connected with charity?

[Not here question of infused moral virtues, which are known to be inseparable from charity, as properties of sanctifying grace : nor of theological virtues; for faith and hope, according to Trident., sess. VI, cap. 6, precede charity in justification, and can. 28 of council strikes with anathema those who say that, « grace lost through sin, faith is always lost together with it, or that faith which remains is not true faith. » Dealt therefore now only with acquired moral virtues. For whose resolution,

I say : True acquired moral virtues can exist without charity, as they were in many gentiles, but imperfect ¹⁰.

First part is proved. Acquired moral virtue separated from charity has whatsoever pertains to essence of true virtue. Therefore. — The antecedent is proved. If something essential were lacking to virtue separated from charity, this would be order toward supernatural ultimate end. But order toward supernatural ultimate end is not something essential of acquired moral virtue : both because, as Angelicus says, IIa IIae, q. 47, a. 6, c, « end of moral virtues is human good, but human good of soul is to be according to reason : whence it must needs be that ends of moral virtues pre-exist in reason; » and because order toward supernatural end cannot be of essence of entitatively natural habit, such as acquired virtue is. Therefore.

It is confirmed. 1° Charity is not intrinsic and essential form of other virtues, otherwise all virtues would be of same species, but extrinsic only and accidental form, inasmuch as through her they are referred unto supernatural end, whereby as it were ornament they are formed in supernatural order. Therefore independently from charity they are true virtues. 2° Faith, according to definition of Trident., remains true virtue without charity. Why not acquired moral virtues?

Second part is proved. Perfect virtue is not without perfect prudence. But prudence, even acquired, is not totally destroyed through sin, but corrupted only in part, inasmuch as appetite is ill affected concerning end of some virtue against whom namely one sins. Therefore.

It is confirmed. Perfect virtue makes possessor simply good. Such however cannot sinner be called.

Thence you will infer that acquired moral virtues, although without charity they retain essence of virtue, are nevertheless not to be called virtues simply, but secundum quid; because they do not well order man respect simply ultimate end, but only respect ultimate end in some genus, and thus render man not absolutely and simply good. Whence virtues in gentiles are not to be called virtues simply, but according to essential reason of virtue. And perhaps opposite opinion pretends nothing else : whence question seems quasi nominal.]

§ IV. — On equality and duration of virtues.

[I say 1° : Intellectual virtues, speaking simply, are nobler than morals : both because they perfect nobler power, namely intellect; both because they have nobler object, namely things abstracted in common from matter ¹¹. Among moral virtues, prudence is nobler, because nearer to reason, in it indeed subjected; then justice, which resides in will; follows fortitude, lastly temperance, because good of reason shines more forth in fortitude than in temperance : fortitude indeed perfects appetite in those things which pertain immediately unto life and death, temperance in those which pertain mediately only unto both, namely foods and venereals. Greater however is good of reason in things pertaining unto life, whereon other things in man depend, than in foods and venereals.

I say 2° : Moral virtues do not remain after this life as regards their material element ; because there will no longer be place for delectation of foods and venereals, nor dangers of life, nor exchanges and distributions necessary unto use of this life; which all are matter about which moral virtues turn. They will remain nevertheless as regards formal element in fatherland, because appetite rectified and conformable to reason will remain ¹².

And let these few things concerning passions and virtues suffice for our institute. Who wishes to know more, let him read what St. Thomas treats more fully concerning these in cited places, likewise concerning seven gifts of Holy Spirit, eight beatitudes and twelve fruits of Holy Spirit, up to quest. 71.]