Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

D. Thomas, q. 56.

[Certain things are to be presupposed.

I suppose 1° that virtue is not subjected in the essence of the soul, but in its powers: partly because virtue is the perfection of a power, partly because it is an operative habit. But every operation of the soul takes place immediately through a power¹.

I suppose 2° that there is no virtue in the vegetative powers, nor in the members and external senses; for these are neither determined to one mode of acting, and, their due natural disposition being posited, they have no difficulty in their acts. And if by use they seem to acquire some facility, this is not caused from a habit of virtue, but only from the removal of impediments, just as external instruments become by very use more polished and apt.

I suppose 3º that there is no virtue in the interior apprehensive senses; because virtue is a perfect habit by which nothing happens except good and perfect operation: whence it must be that virtue be in that power which is consummative of the good work. But the knowledge of truth is not consummated in the sensitive apprehensive powers, but such powers are as it were preparatory to intellective cognition. Therefore in such senses there are not virtues whereby truth is known, but rather in the intellect².

Nor does it stand against this that there are virtues in the sensitive appetite, as we shall say presently. The disparity is that the sensitive appetite is moved by the will, and therefore the work of the appetitive virtue is consummated in the sensitive appetite, and on this account the sensitive appetite is the subject of virtue. But the sensitive apprehensive powers stand rather as moving with respect to the intellect; for phantasms stand to the intellective soul as colors to sight, and therefore the work of cognition terminates in the intellect. Wherefore cognitive virtues must be placed in it, and not in sense³.

I suppose 4º that the intellect, even considered in itself, is the subject of intellectual virtues⁴; because the intellect in itself is indifferent, not indeed with an indifference of liberty, but of perfectibility in order to its object; for it can attain it well or ill, namely attain the true or the false under the reason of true; and there is no small difficulty in the inquiry and attainment of truth. Whence it needs habits which perfect it with respect to these things. And these are understanding, wisdom, science, and art.

But, because those virtues give only the faculty of operating well in their own genus, they do not render the act morally good and honest, nor do they make man simply good, but secundum quid and with an addition, as good philosopher, good grammarian, good smith; therefore intellectual virtues are not called virtues simply, but secundum quid, because the name of virtue was primarily imposed to signify the principle of moral rectitude⁵.

But truly, if the intellect, both speculative and practical, be considered as moved by the will, whose office it is to move the other powers to their acts, and which is the principle of all moral good — for therefore man acts morally well because he has a good will: then in the intellect there can be virtues simply so called, and thus prudence is in the intellect.

I suppose 5º that there are in the will virtues in order to the supernatural good, such as charity toward God, and in order to the good of one's neighbor, because each good is not sufficiently proportioned to the will. For the supernatural good exceeds the proportion of the will with respect to species, since it is above the whole species of nature; the good of another exceeds it with respect to the individual, because by this very fact that the will is rooted in this supposit through individual difference, it is determined to the proper good of the supposit, according to that word of the Philosopher: « To each his own good is amiable ⁶. »

There remains therefore difficulty with respect to two things, namely: whether there are virtues in the will concerning the good of one's own supposit, and in the sensitive appetite as moved by the will⁷?

Therefore

I say 1°: There are not in the will virtues concerning the good of one's own private reason, but these are in the sensitive appetite, as will presently be proved. This is against the Scotists and certain others.

It is proved. Virtues are placed in a power when the power is not of itself complete, perfect, expeditious, and proportioned to its object, and thence suffers difficulty in attaining it. But the will concerning the good of the reason of one's own supposit is complete, perfect, expeditious, and proportioned. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. The will, as rational appetite, is nothing else than the very inclination to the good of reason. Therefore it is inclined either to no good or to its own good completely, perfectly, expediently, namely since it is proportioned to it with respect to species — and that is insofar as natural — and with respect to the individual. By what reason it is proved that the will is complete and proportioned not only to its own physical good, as certain will have it, but also to its own moral and honest good; because it is essentially a rational inclination, consequently to its own good consonant with reason.

You will object 1°: The will suffers difficulty in attaining the good of its own reason in the matter of temperance and fortitude. Therefore it needs to be perfected by virtues.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent. The will suffers difficulty in attaining the good of its own reason intrinsically and per se, I deny; it suffers difficulty extrinsically and per accidens, I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. Therefore this difficulty does not arise from the fact that the will is not sufficiently complete and proportioned of itself to this good, both with respect to species and with respect to the individual, but from some extrinsic impediment, namely from the immoderation of the passions. But that this difficulty be removed, a virtue in the will is not required, but it suffices that the impediment be removed by the moderation of the passions, which is done through the virtues of temperance and fortitude in the sensitive appetite, where those passions reside.

You will object 2º: The will is capable of vice inclining to evil adverse to reason. Therefore also of virtue toward good consonant with reason.

I answer. I deny the consequence. The disparity is: the will in itself is inclined to the good consonant with reason, and yet from repetition of evil acts vice is acquired inclining to the good contrary to reason. But it is in itself completely and perfectly inclined and proportioned to the proper good consonant with reason. Whence, however often such acts of good be repeated, no more is virtue acquired than by frequent descents a habit would be acquired in a stone inclining it downward. But if the will suffer any difficulty, it is removed through the virtues of temperance and fortitude in the appetite, or overcome through the habits of continence and constancy in the will.

I say 2°: The sensitive appetite, as born to obey reason, is the subject of virtue, namely temperance and fortitude⁸. This is common opinion against the Scotists.

I said, « as born to obey reason »; because the sensitive appetite, considered in itself and as common to man and brute, certainly is not the subject of virtue⁹.

It is proved. An act proceeding from one power moved and another moving cannot be perfect unless both powers be well disposed: as the act of the artisan cannot be fitting unless artisan and instrument be well disposed. But although the moving will is in itself well disposed to the proper good of reason, as I said, yet the sensitive appetite is not so disposed when moved, which since it is subject to the will not despotically but politically only, often departs from reason, and without the perfection of virtue superadded obeys it only with difficulty and with repugnance. Therefore¹⁰.

It is confirmed. Virtue must be placed in a subject capable and needy. But the sensitive appetite, as born to obey reason, is capable of virtue and needs it. Therefore. — Proof of the first part of the minor. That a power be capable of virtue there is required 1º that it can be directed by a superior; 2º that it be not determined to one mode of acting; 3º that it be elicitive of a perfect act. But the sensitive appetite 1° can be moved and directed by superior reason; 2º is not determined to one mode of acting, namely conformably to reason, but often deviates from it; 3° can elicit a perfect act, namely when its passions are moderated by temperance, fortitude, and the other virtues annexed. Therefore. — Proof of the second part of the minor. The sensitive appetite suffers grave difficulties in moderating the passions of the concupiscible and irascible. Therefore it needs virtues to overcome them.

You will say: Virtue is a good quality of the mind. But the sensitive appetite does not pertain to the mind. Therefore.

I answer. By mind in the definition of virtue is taken widely every faculty which participates reason. But the sensitive appetite, as moved by the will, participates reason. Therefore.

For the solution of objections there must always be held before the eyes the dependence of the sensitive appetite upon the will, by which actually moved, it participates reason concerning the singular honest good, that is, the election of the will, and perfect liberty, and through the same is regularly ruled by prudence existing in the practical intellect.]