Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

D. Thomas, q. 55.

[I. — The name virtue is derived from the substantive vis, which expresses fortitude, because the habits of the virtues make the soul strong, and each of their acts supposes some fortitude, without which it cannot be exercised. Sometimes virtus is taken for the very effect of an operative power, as Matth., VII, 22 : In thy name we have done many virtues. But here it is taken for a certain quality superadded to rational creature, whereby it comes to act promptly, easily and rightly.

Virtue is defined by Cicero, book II de Inventione : « A habit of mind consonant with nature in its manner and with reason. » True indeed it is that it is such a habit; but, as St. Aug. observes, book IV contra Julian. Pelagian., c. 3, n. 19, those who thus described virtue « knew not what is consonant with the nature of mortals to be freed and beatified. » He himself says, de Morib. Eccles. cathol., c. 6, that virtue is « a habit and as it were a quality of a wise soul, making the soul most good. » Whence came forth the following definition admitted by the Angelic Doctor¹ : « Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which one lives rightly, which no one uses ill, which God works in us without us. » Thus the Holy Doctor defends it there: « That definition perfectly embraces the whole reason of virtue. For the perfect reason of anything is gathered from all its causes. Now the aforesaid definition embraces all the causes of virtue. For the formal cause of virtue, as of any thing whatever, is taken from its genus and difference, when it is called a good quality; for the genus of virtue is quality, but the difference good. Yet a more fitting definition would be if habit were put in place of quality, which is the proximate genus. Virtue however has no matter out of which, like the other accidents, but has matter about which, and matter in which, namely subject. And the matter about which is the object of virtue, which could not be put in the aforesaid definition, because through the object virtue is determined to species, whereas here is assigned the definition of virtue in common: whence the subject is put in place of material cause, when it is said that it is a good quality of the mind. — But the end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation itself. But it must be noted that of operative habits some are always toward evil, as vicious habits, others indeed at one time toward good and at another time toward evil, as opinion stands to truth and falsity. Virtue however is a habit always standing toward good. And therefore, that virtue be distinguished from those things which always stand toward evil, it is said, by which one lives rightly; that however it be distinguished from those which stand at one time toward good, at another time toward evil, it is said, which no one uses ill. — But the efficient cause of infused virtue, of which the definition is given, is God. On which account it is said: Which God works in us without us. Which particle indeed, if it be taken away, the remainder of the definition will be common to all virtues both acquired and infused. »

From what has been said you will gather, 1° that virtue is essentially an operative habit of a good act².

That it is a habit, is clear; because habit in common is divided per se into virtue and vice; for by habits the powers of the rational soul are disposed, which stand indeterminately toward many things: if they be disposed fitly, it is virtue; if unfitly, vice³.

That it is an operative habit, also is clear; because virtue, from the very reason of the name, and as was said, imports a certain perfection of a power. Perfection added to any power conforms itself to it. Therefore, as rational powers are operative, so too are the virtues superadded to them⁴.

Finally, that it is an operative habit of a good act, equally is clear; because, since the rational powers are operative of acts, both in the genus of being and in the genus of morals, it must be that virtue, by which they are perfected, should attain both reasons, so as to be conformable to them. For, although a rational power can absolutely and of itself alone attain acts⁵ as to substance and morality, yet this it cannot do promptly, easily and readily; but through virtue it becomes prompt and ready toward both⁶. Of itself nevertheless and first it regards the acts' morality or goodness, secondarily their entity; because virtue is essentially in the genus of morals, since it is essentially ordered unto acting morally well.

You will gather 2° that power and virtue, in the reason of cause, are not placed in number, nor are several causes, but power is the cause and virtue the complement of the cause, whence together power rises into one complete cause. For, as I said, power can do without virtue what it can do with it (speaking of moral virtues in the natural order); but without virtue it can do this imperfectly only, incompletely and with difficulty, with virtue truly completely, easily and readily.

II. — Human virtue generically is divided into moral and intellectual. For human virtue, as was said, is an operative habit of a good act, or a habit perfecting man unto acting well. In man however the principle of acting is twofold, namely intellect or reason, and appetite. Therefore every human virtue is perfective either of reason or of appetite. If it be perfective of the intellect, whether speculative or practical, toward the good act of man, namely unto judging rightly, it will be intellectual virtue; if however it be perfective of the appetitive part, namely unto choosing rightly, it will be moral virtue⁷. Hence the Angelic Doctor rightly infers that moral virtue can indeed be without certain intellectual virtues, as without wisdom, knowledge and art, but not without intellect and prudence. For moral virtue is about election. Election however, that it be morally good, must be right, both as to the end convenient to reason, which cannot be without intellect judging rightly; and as to the means ordered to the end, which cannot be without prudence.

By moral virtue man is ordered unto morally good operation, which is its effect. But the operation itself can be considered as the matter about which moral virtue itself is concerned, and from this head the moral virtues are divided generically into virtues which are about actions and virtues which are about passions. « The reason of which, says St. Thomas, here q. 60, a. 2, o, is that good and evil in certain operations is regarded in themselves, however man be affected toward them, namely inasmuch as good and evil in them is taken according to the reason of commensuration to another. And in such there must be some virtue directive of operations in themselves, as buying and selling, and such-like operations, in which is regarded the reason of due or undue to another. And on this account justice and its parts are properly about operations as about proper matter. But in certain operations good and evil is regarded only according to commensuration to the agent; and therefore in these good and evil must be considered according as man is well or ill affected about suchlike. And on this account it must be that virtues in such are principally about interior affections, which are called passions of the soul: as is clear of temperance, fortitude and other suchlike. It happens however that in operations which are toward another the good of virtue is omitted on account of disordered passion of the soul, and then inasmuch as the commensuration of the exterior operation is corrupted, it is corruption of justice; inasmuch however as the commensuration of interior passions is corrupted, it is corruption of some other virtue: as, when through anger someone strikes another, in the very undue striking justice is corrupted, but in immoderateness of anger meekness is corrupted. And the same is clear in others. »

Thence is clear the nature of those virtues commonly called cardinal, and their number. Indeed, when we speak simply of virtue, human virtue is dealt with. Human virtue however, according to the perfect reason of virtue, is said to be that which requires rectitude of appetite. For such virtue not only makes faculty of acting well, but also causes the very use of the good work. But according to the imperfect reason of virtue, that is called virtue which does not require rectitude of appetite, because it only makes faculty of acting well, but does not cause use of a good work. It is established moreover that the perfect is more principal than the imperfect; and therefore those virtues which contain rectitude of appetite are called principal or cardinal. Suchlike however are the moral virtues, and among the intellectual prudence alone, which also in a certain way is moral, inasmuch as it is right reason of things doable⁸.

Four, as all know, are the cardinal virtues : prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude. The reason of this division is assigned by St. Thomas here a. 2, o : « The number, he says, of certain things can be taken either according to formal principles, or according to subjects, and in both ways four cardinal virtues are found. For the formal principle of the virtue of which we now speak is the good of reason. Which indeed can be considered in two ways: In one way according as it consists in the very consideration of reason; and thus there will be one principal virtue, which is called prudence. In another way, according as the order of reason is posited about something: and this either about operations, and thus it is justice; or about passions, and thus there must needs be two virtues. For the order of reason must needs be posited about passions, their repugnance to reason having been considered. Which indeed can be twofold: In one way, according as passion impels toward something contrary to reason; and thus passion must needs be repressed, and from this temperance is named. In another way, according as passion withdraws from that which reason dictates, as fear of dangers or labors ; and thus man must needs be firm in that which is of reason, lest he withdraw, and from this fortitude is named. — And likewise according to subjects the same number is found. Fourfold indeed is found the subject of this virtue of which we now speak, namely the rationale by essence, which prudence perfects, and the rationale by participation. Which is divided into three, that is, into the will, which is the subject of justice, and into the concupiscible, which is the subject of temperance, and into the irascible, which is the subject of fortitude. »

There are besides theological virtues, so called from their immediate object, which is God, as variously attained. But considered in themselves, according as they perfect the powers of human soul, they are reduced to moral and intellectual virtues. Of which there will be treated singly and fully in IIa IIae.]

D. Thomas, q. 56.

[Certain things are to be presupposed.

I suppose 1° that virtue is not subjected in the essence of the soul, but in its powers: partly because virtue is the perfection of a power, partly because it is an operative habit. But every operation of the soul takes place immediately through a power¹.

I suppose 2° that there is no virtue in the vegetative powers, nor in the members and external senses; for these are neither determined to one mode of acting, and, their due natural disposition being posited, they have no difficulty in their acts. And if by use they seem to acquire some facility, this is not caused from a habit of virtue, but only from the removal of impediments, just as external instruments become by very use more polished and apt.

I suppose 3º that there is no virtue in the interior apprehensive senses; because virtue is a perfect habit by which nothing happens except good and perfect operation: whence it must be that virtue be in that power which is consummative of the good work. But the knowledge of truth is not consummated in the sensitive apprehensive powers, but such powers are as it were preparatory to intellective cognition. Therefore in such senses there are not virtues whereby truth is known, but rather in the intellect².

Nor does it stand against this that there are virtues in the sensitive appetite, as we shall say presently. The disparity is that the sensitive appetite is moved by the will, and therefore the work of the appetitive virtue is consummated in the sensitive appetite, and on this account the sensitive appetite is the subject of virtue. But the sensitive apprehensive powers stand rather as moving with respect to the intellect; for phantasms stand to the intellective soul as colors to sight, and therefore the work of cognition terminates in the intellect. Wherefore cognitive virtues must be placed in it, and not in sense³.

I suppose 4º that the intellect, even considered in itself, is the subject of intellectual virtues⁴; because the intellect in itself is indifferent, not indeed with an indifference of liberty, but of perfectibility in order to its object; for it can attain it well or ill, namely attain the true or the false under the reason of true; and there is no small difficulty in the inquiry and attainment of truth. Whence it needs habits which perfect it with respect to these things. And these are understanding, wisdom, science, and art.

But, because those virtues give only the faculty of operating well in their own genus, they do not render the act morally good and honest, nor do they make man simply good, but secundum quid and with an addition, as good philosopher, good grammarian, good smith; therefore intellectual virtues are not called virtues simply, but secundum quid, because the name of virtue was primarily imposed to signify the principle of moral rectitude⁵.

But truly, if the intellect, both speculative and practical, be considered as moved by the will, whose office it is to move the other powers to their acts, and which is the principle of all moral good — for therefore man acts morally well because he has a good will: then in the intellect there can be virtues simply so called, and thus prudence is in the intellect.

I suppose 5º that there are in the will virtues in order to the supernatural good, such as charity toward God, and in order to the good of one's neighbor, because each good is not sufficiently proportioned to the will. For the supernatural good exceeds the proportion of the will with respect to species, since it is above the whole species of nature; the good of another exceeds it with respect to the individual, because by this very fact that the will is rooted in this supposit through individual difference, it is determined to the proper good of the supposit, according to that word of the Philosopher: « To each his own good is amiable ⁶. »

There remains therefore difficulty with respect to two things, namely: whether there are virtues in the will concerning the good of one's own supposit, and in the sensitive appetite as moved by the will⁷?

Therefore

I say 1°: There are not in the will virtues concerning the good of one's own private reason, but these are in the sensitive appetite, as will presently be proved. This is against the Scotists and certain others.

It is proved. Virtues are placed in a power when the power is not of itself complete, perfect, expeditious, and proportioned to its object, and thence suffers difficulty in attaining it. But the will concerning the good of the reason of one's own supposit is complete, perfect, expeditious, and proportioned. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. The will, as rational appetite, is nothing else than the very inclination to the good of reason. Therefore it is inclined either to no good or to its own good completely, perfectly, expediently, namely since it is proportioned to it with respect to species — and that is insofar as natural — and with respect to the individual. By what reason it is proved that the will is complete and proportioned not only to its own physical good, as certain will have it, but also to its own moral and honest good; because it is essentially a rational inclination, consequently to its own good consonant with reason.

You will object 1°: The will suffers difficulty in attaining the good of its own reason in the matter of temperance and fortitude. Therefore it needs to be perfected by virtues.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent. The will suffers difficulty in attaining the good of its own reason intrinsically and per se, I deny; it suffers difficulty extrinsically and per accidens, I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. Therefore this difficulty does not arise from the fact that the will is not sufficiently complete and proportioned of itself to this good, both with respect to species and with respect to the individual, but from some extrinsic impediment, namely from the immoderation of the passions. But that this difficulty be removed, a virtue in the will is not required, but it suffices that the impediment be removed by the moderation of the passions, which is done through the virtues of temperance and fortitude in the sensitive appetite, where those passions reside.

You will object 2º: The will is capable of vice inclining to evil adverse to reason. Therefore also of virtue toward good consonant with reason.

I answer. I deny the consequence. The disparity is: the will in itself is inclined to the good consonant with reason, and yet from repetition of evil acts vice is acquired inclining to the good contrary to reason. But it is in itself completely and perfectly inclined and proportioned to the proper good consonant with reason. Whence, however often such acts of good be repeated, no more is virtue acquired than by frequent descents a habit would be acquired in a stone inclining it downward. But if the will suffer any difficulty, it is removed through the virtues of temperance and fortitude in the appetite, or overcome through the habits of continence and constancy in the will.

I say 2°: The sensitive appetite, as born to obey reason, is the subject of virtue, namely temperance and fortitude⁸. This is common opinion against the Scotists.

I said, « as born to obey reason »; because the sensitive appetite, considered in itself and as common to man and brute, certainly is not the subject of virtue⁹.

It is proved. An act proceeding from one power moved and another moving cannot be perfect unless both powers be well disposed: as the act of the artisan cannot be fitting unless artisan and instrument be well disposed. But although the moving will is in itself well disposed to the proper good of reason, as I said, yet the sensitive appetite is not so disposed when moved, which since it is subject to the will not despotically but politically only, often departs from reason, and without the perfection of virtue superadded obeys it only with difficulty and with repugnance. Therefore¹⁰.

It is confirmed. Virtue must be placed in a subject capable and needy. But the sensitive appetite, as born to obey reason, is capable of virtue and needs it. Therefore. — Proof of the first part of the minor. That a power be capable of virtue there is required 1º that it can be directed by a superior; 2º that it be not determined to one mode of acting; 3º that it be elicitive of a perfect act. But the sensitive appetite 1° can be moved and directed by superior reason; 2º is not determined to one mode of acting, namely conformably to reason, but often deviates from it; 3° can elicit a perfect act, namely when its passions are moderated by temperance, fortitude, and the other virtues annexed. Therefore. — Proof of the second part of the minor. The sensitive appetite suffers grave difficulties in moderating the passions of the concupiscible and irascible. Therefore it needs virtues to overcome them.

You will say: Virtue is a good quality of the mind. But the sensitive appetite does not pertain to the mind. Therefore.

I answer. By mind in the definition of virtue is taken widely every faculty which participates reason. But the sensitive appetite, as moved by the will, participates reason. Therefore.

For the solution of objections there must always be held before the eyes the dependence of the sensitive appetite upon the will, by which actually moved, it participates reason concerning the singular honest good, that is, the election of the will, and perfect liberty, and through the same is regularly ruled by prudence existing in the practical intellect.]

[I suppose 1° that there are in us from nature certain seeds of virtues, both moral and intellectual ¹. For there are in human nature certain common principles naturally congenital, both of things knowable and of things to be done; as in reason certain natural principles of right and honest, in will natural inclination toward good of reason. So likewise in individuals there are certain dispositions toward virtues, as some are readier for sciences, others for fortitude, others for temperance; whence it is said, Job, XXXI, 18 : « From my infancy mercy grew up with me. » But these seeds are not essentially complete and consummated virtues; because what is from nature to man is common to all men, and is not taken away by sin; for even in demons the naturals remain, as St. Dionysius says, c. 4 de Div. nomin. But virtue is present not in all men, and is taken away by sin, at least frequent sin ². Therefore.]

I suppose 2° that certain virtues are acquired by our repeated acts ³, according to the common axiom : « From repeated acts habit is made. » The reason is because, although agents which have in themselves only the active principle of their operation acquire no habit by acting — as heating confers on fire no habit of heating — nevertheless those agents which have in themselves at once both the active principle and the passive principle of their act, insofar as the principle immediately elicitive of act elicits it only as moved by another superior principle existing in the same agent, through repeated acts acquire habit, inasmuch as from the superior moving principle there is derived into the elicitive principle of act a certain impression habitually remaining and expedient for doing those things which it does from the motion of the superior : which fixed impression is called habit; and if it be toward true or honest good, it is called virtue. As therefore from the fact that agent intellect moves passive intellect by imprinting upon it species and notions, intellectual virtue is acquired, v. g., science; so from the fact that intellect moves will, and will the sensitive appetite, virtue is acquired through repeated acts, both in will and in sensitive appetite, that is, a permanent and firm inclination toward honest good.

There remains therefore the question whether, besides the moral virtues acquired, there be others infused per se into us by God. Indeed that the theological virtues are infused per se into us by God is dogma of faith defined in the Council of Trent, Sess. VI, c. 7. Likewise that moral virtues acquirable by our acts can, God so dispensing, be infused per accidens into us admits no doubt, since in this there is no implication, and thus were they infused into Christ and the first parent. But the difficulty is, whether there be moral virtues of supernatural order, not acquirable by our acts, infused per se into us by God. For the resolution of which,

I say : Besides the moral virtues acquired, there are others infused per se into us by God ⁴. It is common with the Angelic against Scotus, whose opinion some theologians note with censure after the definition of the Council of Vienne, concerning which below.

It is proved 1° from Holy Scripture ⁵. God, according to Holy Scripture, teaches men the four cardinal virtues. For it is said, Sap., VIII, 7, of eternal Wisdom : « She teacheth sobriety, that is temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude [virtue], than which nothing is more useful in life to men. » But to teach and to infuse something is the same thing in God; for God teaches not as men do, merely proposing objects, but by infusing light. Whence I Joann., II, 27 : « You have no need that any man teach you; but as his unction teacheth you of all things. »

It is proved 2° by the authority of the Church. Clement V in the Council of Vienne, resolving the question which Innocent III, answering to the archbishop of Arles, cap. Majores, de baptismo, Decretal. lib. III, tit. 42, c. 3, had left undecided, namely : whether faith, charity, and other virtues be infused into infants in baptism? defines thus : « We attending to the general efficacy of the death of Christ, which through baptism is applied equally to all baptized, judged the opinion which says that informing grace and virtues are conferred in baptism alike upon infants and adults to be the more probable, and more consonant and accordant with the sayings of the saints and doctors of modern theology, with the approval of the sacred council we deemed it to be chosen. » By the virtues moreover, in this definition, are understood not only the theological, but also the moral ones; since concerning these also the question posed under Innocent III proceeded, as is plain from what was said. Therefore.

It is confirmed from the Roman Catechism, part II, c. 2, § 51, where it is said : « To this is added the noblest company of all the virtues, which are divinely poured forth into the soul together with grace. »

It is proved 3° by reason. 1º Man through the theological virtues infused is disposed, elevated, and rectified concerning the ultimate supernatural end ⁶. Therefore it is connatural and necessary that he be elevated and rectified equally, through the moral virtues infused, concerning the means attaining this supernatural end. — The consequence is plain, because elevation and rectification through the theological virtues is not only in order to the supernatural end considered in itself, but as attainable through means. But the supernatural end is attainable only through supernatural means.

2° As virtues are distinguished, so also are they multiplied according to formal objects. But one thing is the object and formal motive of acquired virtue, another of infused ⁷. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. The object and formal motive of acquired virtue is natural, that of infused, supernatural. Thus, v. g., although acquired and infused temperance agree in matter — for both are concerned with the delights of touch — they agree not in object and formal motive. Indeed both seek the mean; but infused temperance seeks the mean on another account than acquired temperance : this latter seeks the mean according to the rule of human reason in order to good of nature, health of body, and free use of natural reason; but the infused seeks the mean according to the rule of faith and the reasons of divine law in order to the supernatural end, wherefore it often prescribes stricter abstinence than the natural rule. Similarly of the other virtues. Therefore.]

[Four properties of virtues St. Thomas enumerates in prooemium of question 64. First, that they consist in mean; second, that they be interconnected among themselves; third, that they be unequal; fourth, that they endure after this life.]

§ I. — Whether virtue consists in mean?

[I say 1° : Moral virtue consists in mean ¹. Whence it is defined by Aristotle, II Ethic., c. 6 : « Habit choosing existing in mean » ².

It is proved. Moral virtue properly is perfective of appetitive part of soul concerning some determinate matter; but measure and rule of appetitive motion concerning appetibles is reason itself. But good of anything measured and ruled consists in this that it conform itself to its rule, neither exceeding it nor failing from it, as good in artificial things is to be conformable to rules of art : Therefore good of moral virtue consists in adaequation to measure of reason, not exceeding it, nor failing from it : which is to consist in mean.

I say 2° : Every moral virtue consists in mean of reason. It follows from preceding; for mean of reason is said what is constituted by reason in some matter. But, as we were just saying, moral virtue consists in mean through conformity toward right reason. Therefore ³.

It happens however that the mean, justice excepted, varies. In justice indeed is mean of thing, which is fixed, because compared to things themselves absolutely : E.g., if you owe one hundred, this, neither more nor less, you must repay. Other moral virtues however are concerned about interior passions, in which mean is not same for all, but diverse according to quality of persons : E.g. in temperance, what is mean for one is too little or too much for another. Moreover it must be observed, that even in justice mean depends on reason. Indeed it has from its specific reason that it be mean of thing, but has from general reason of virtue that it be also mean for reason; because nothing is more conformable to reason than constituting equality between right and debt.]

I say 3° : Intellectual virtues also consist in mean ⁴. Reason is because true, which is their object, mediates between excess and defect : for indeed truth is injured by affirming either more than thing has, or less than it has, or denying what it has. There is nevertheless disparity, that mean of speculative intellectual virtues be mean of thing, namely conformity to thing, independently from determination of reason; but mean of practical intellectual virtues, as prudence, be mean of reason, as depending upon determining reason.

I say 4° : Theological virtues per se and by reason of object do not consist in mean, but well accidentally and by reason of subject ⁵. Reason of first part, because we cannot transcend rule of these virtues; for God himself is, who is infinite truth, goodness and power. Whence, attention given to reason of object, we cannot love God too much, or believe and hope in him too much. Attention however given to reason of subject, or as far as concerns our part, we ought to be borne toward God according to measure of our condition, not with excessive effort whereby body be injured, not at unseasonable time which must needs be bestowed on others, as if someone give himself unto contemplation when he ought to attend affairs of family.]

§ II. — Whether all moral virtues are interconnected among themselves?

[Certain it is 1° all intellectual virtues not to be interconnected; for who has one science has not all sciences. Certain it is 2° all theological virtues not to be interconnected; for charity lost through sin, faith and hope can remain. Whence council Trident., sess. VI, can. 28, defined : « If anyone shall say, grace lost through sin, that faith is always lost together with it, or that faith which remains is not true faith...; let him be anathema. » Certain it is 3° all infused moral virtues to be interconnected, because they are properties of grace with which they are infused, and with which perishing they perish.

Virtue can moreover be considered twice over, in perfect state and in imperfect state ⁶. Imperfect virtue is that which does not attain essential reason of habit, but is some disposition or inclination toward some good, arisen either from temperament or from custom of certain acts of imperfect virtue; or, if it attain essential reason of habit, has nevertheless mode of disposition, inasmuch as it inheres not firmly enough in subject, nor subjects it constantly amid all occurring impediments. That virtues imperfect in either way are not interconnected, we confess spontaneously. For we see some, from natural complexion, which is called good disposition, or from some custom, prompt, e.g., unto works of liberality, who are not prompt unto works of chastity : and elsewhere essence of virtue is absolute, not relative, and thus for essence of one another is not necessarily required. Perfect virtue is, not only when it is in heroic degree, but also when it so firmly actuates and perfects subject, that it incline it unto good work well and constantly done promptly and easily in every event and notwithstanding obstacles and difficulties occurring from everywhere.]

I say : Acquired moral virtues in perfect state are so interconnected among themselves, that whoever lacks one, perfectly possesses none ⁷. It is common with St. Thomas, against the Scotists.

It is proved. 1° From Fathers ⁸. St. Ambrosius, book VI on Luke, upon those words : Beati pauperes spiritu, says: « Interconnected and chained together are virtues, so that he who has one seems to have several. » St. Augustinus, book VI de Trinit., c. 4, n. 6 : « Virtues which are in human mind, although each single one be understood now in one way now in another, are nevertheless by no mode separated from each other, so that whosoever be equals, for example, in fortitude, be equal also in prudence, and temperance, and justice. For if you say these are equal in fortitude, but that one excels in prudence : it follows that fortitude of this one be less prudent, and thereby neither are they equal in fortitude, when fortitude of that one is more prudent. And thus about remaining virtues you will find, if you run through all with same consideration. » St. Gregorius, book XXII Moral., c. 1 : « One virtue without others is either altogether none, or imperfect..., because neither is prudence true which is not just, temperate and strong; nor temperance perfect which is not strong, just and prudent. » And Tullius himself said in book II de Tuscul. quaest. : « If you confess yourself not to have one virtue, it is necessary you will have none. »

Prob. 2° by reason ⁹. Perfect virtue is not without perfect prudence. But perfect prudence is not without company of other virtues. Therefore. — Major is certain, because prudence, as regards elections, is rule of moral virtue : whence virtue is defined, « habit choosing as prudent man will have determined. » And clear, because unto right election inclination toward due end does not suffice, which is had through virtue, but also required that one rightly choose those things which are toward end; which is had through prudence, which is counseling, judging and prescribing those things which are toward end. Thence so often we see those who seem powerful with some virtue, suppose strong ones, magnanimous ones, liberal ones, penitents, devout ones, etc., through defect of prudence choose means badly in ordine to end of virtue. — Minor therefore is proved. Prudence is not perfect, if appetite be not perfectly rectified concerning particular ends and matters of all virtues. But rectitude of appetite concerning ends and matters of virtues is had through virtues themselves; for proper to each virtue is to rectify appetite concerning its own end and matter : e.g., it belongs to justice to rectify will concerning what is due to another; to temperance, to rectify appetite concerning delectables of touch; to fortitude, concerning audacities and fears. Therefore. — Major is proved. Prudence is right reason of things doable or elections of means. But there cannot be perfect and right reason of things doable, unless appetite be rightly affected concerning ends; for things doable or eligible hang upon right intention of ends, as conclusions in speculables hang upon principles. Therefore, as reason cannot rightly stand concerning conclusions unless it rightly stand concerning principles, so in practicables same reason cannot stand rightly concerning things doable or eligible, unless appetite rightly stands concerning ends; which rectitude, as was said, is had through virtues themselves.

Thence you have that prudence and virtues hang upon each other in diverse genus of cause. Prudence hangs on remaining virtues in genus of disposive cause, because judgment of prudence cannot be perfect, unless affection be well disposed concerning ends and matters of all virtues, which rectitude is had through virtues themselves, as was said. Remaining virtues however hang on prudence in genus of directive and intrinsic formal cause, because prudence directs election of means unto end, cutting off extremes whereby its judgment could be corrupted and mean of virtue impeded, which extremes wander through all genera of virtues.]

§ III. — Whether acquired moral virtues are necessarily connected with charity?

[Not here question of infused moral virtues, which are known to be inseparable from charity, as properties of sanctifying grace : nor of theological virtues; for faith and hope, according to Trident., sess. VI, cap. 6, precede charity in justification, and can. 28 of council strikes with anathema those who say that, « grace lost through sin, faith is always lost together with it, or that faith which remains is not true faith. » Dealt therefore now only with acquired moral virtues. For whose resolution,

I say : True acquired moral virtues can exist without charity, as they were in many gentiles, but imperfect ¹⁰.

First part is proved. Acquired moral virtue separated from charity has whatsoever pertains to essence of true virtue. Therefore. — The antecedent is proved. If something essential were lacking to virtue separated from charity, this would be order toward supernatural ultimate end. But order toward supernatural ultimate end is not something essential of acquired moral virtue : both because, as Angelicus says, IIa IIae, q. 47, a. 6, c, « end of moral virtues is human good, but human good of soul is to be according to reason : whence it must needs be that ends of moral virtues pre-exist in reason; » and because order toward supernatural end cannot be of essence of entitatively natural habit, such as acquired virtue is. Therefore.

It is confirmed. 1° Charity is not intrinsic and essential form of other virtues, otherwise all virtues would be of same species, but extrinsic only and accidental form, inasmuch as through her they are referred unto supernatural end, whereby as it were ornament they are formed in supernatural order. Therefore independently from charity they are true virtues. 2° Faith, according to definition of Trident., remains true virtue without charity. Why not acquired moral virtues?

Second part is proved. Perfect virtue is not without perfect prudence. But prudence, even acquired, is not totally destroyed through sin, but corrupted only in part, inasmuch as appetite is ill affected concerning end of some virtue against whom namely one sins. Therefore.

It is confirmed. Perfect virtue makes possessor simply good. Such however cannot sinner be called.

Thence you will infer that acquired moral virtues, although without charity they retain essence of virtue, are nevertheless not to be called virtues simply, but secundum quid; because they do not well order man respect simply ultimate end, but only respect ultimate end in some genus, and thus render man not absolutely and simply good. Whence virtues in gentiles are not to be called virtues simply, but according to essential reason of virtue. And perhaps opposite opinion pretends nothing else : whence question seems quasi nominal.]

§ IV. — On equality and duration of virtues.

[I say 1° : Intellectual virtues, speaking simply, are nobler than morals : both because they perfect nobler power, namely intellect; both because they have nobler object, namely things abstracted in common from matter ¹¹. Among moral virtues, prudence is nobler, because nearer to reason, in it indeed subjected; then justice, which resides in will; follows fortitude, lastly temperance, because good of reason shines more forth in fortitude than in temperance : fortitude indeed perfects appetite in those things which pertain immediately unto life and death, temperance in those which pertain mediately only unto both, namely foods and venereals. Greater however is good of reason in things pertaining unto life, whereon other things in man depend, than in foods and venereals.

I say 2° : Moral virtues do not remain after this life as regards their material element ; because there will no longer be place for delectation of foods and venereals, nor dangers of life, nor exchanges and distributions necessary unto use of this life; which all are matter about which moral virtues turn. They will remain nevertheless as regards formal element in fatherland, because appetite rectified and conformable to reason will remain ¹².

And let these few things concerning passions and virtues suffice for our institute. Who wishes to know more, let him read what St. Thomas treats more fully concerning these in cited places, likewise concerning seven gifts of Holy Spirit, eight beatitudes and twelve fruits of Holy Spirit, up to quest. 71.]