Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

Prooemium.

[After St. Thomas, I. IIae, from q. 22 to q. 48, had discussed the acts proper to man whereby the last end can be attained, from q. 22 to q. 48 he discusses the acts common to man and other animals, which are called passions; for inasmuch as they are subject politically to the empire of reason, they participate something of its regulation and of morality, and can conduce to the last end or turn away from it: whence the governing of them occupies a great part of the virtues, and from their disordination many vices spring up. Because however there are no grave controversies about this matter, and it is scarcely treated in the schools, although it matters greatly that tyros of theology not be ignorant of it, therefore we shall run through it summarily, yet sufficiently. Likewise of the virtues, of which the holy Doctor treats from q. 55 to 70, we shall say little, for the same reasons. Therefore all things which we shall say of the passions and virtues we shall embrace compendiously in a twofold dissertation.]

{ Question is asked 1° what passion is.

I answer. Common is the sense of all, that passion is an act of sensitive appetite whereby one is affected toward something or flees from it. But why, since it is an act, is it called passion? The reason is, because that act is apt to cause a transmutation in the natural disposition of the body, which transmutation inflicts passion, insofar as the subject suffers by losing something.

For the understanding of this it must be observed that to suffer is said in a threefold way. In one mode, commonly and widely, according as every receiving is suffering, even if nothing be cast off from the thing, as if it be said that air suffers while it is illuminated: and in this sense intellect and cognitive sense, receiving species, can be said to suffer. In another mode it is said properly to suffer when something is received with the casting off of another. And this happens in a twofold way. For sometimes there is cast off what is unfitting to the thing, and received what is fitting: thus, when the animal body is healed, it is said to suffer, because it receives health, sickness being cast off. Sometimes, conversely, it happens while there is cast off what is fitting to the thing, and received what is unfitting: thus to be sick is said to suffer, because infirmity is received, health¹

cast off. And this third mode is the most proper mode of passion.

Whence Augustine says, lib. IX de Civit., c. 4, n. 1: « Those motions of soul which the Greeks call πάθη, but some of ours, as Cicero, perturbations, some affections or affects, others truly, as this one [Apuleius] more expressively from the Greek, call passions. » Such motions therefore are most rightly called passions, and passion is defined by the Angelic Doctor² from Damascene in lib. II de Fide orthod., c. 22: « Motion of the sensible appetitive power, upon imagination of good and evil; » that is: Motion of sensitive appetite from imagination of good and evil, with bodily transmutation.

It is called motion, that is act or operation, and holds the place of genus; of sensitive appetite, because that appetite is its subject; from imagination of good or evil, whereby its principle is signified; with bodily transmutation, which distinguishes such motion from the motions of the will, which since it is not affixed to a corporeal organ, moves not itself with bodily transmutation, and from the motion of the sensitive cognitive part, which, although affixed to a corporeal organ, does not per se transmute the body physically, but only intentionally. But passion transmutes the body physically, at least the heart³; for in every passion something is added to or diminished from the natural motion of the heart, insofar as the heart is moved more intensely or more remissly according to systole and diastole.

Passion therefore imports two things⁴, namely the act of the soul, which stands as it were formal, and the bodily transmutation, which stands as it were material, from which nevertheless passion is named. If the first be wanting, there will be purely bodily passion; if the second be wanting, there will be no passion, but simply a motion or operation of the soul.

Question is asked 2° how many passions there are.

I answer. There are eleven passions, six in the concupiscible appetite and five in the irascible appetite.

In the concupiscible appetite are: love, or inclination into good apprehended simply, whose contrary is hatred, or aversion from evil simply; desire, or inclination into good apprehended as absent, but future, having as contrary flight, or aversion from evil apprehended as absent, but future; joy, which is also called pleasure or delight, or repose in good apprehended and really possessed, and it has as contrary sadness, or disquietude and languor of mind from evil apprehended and actually pressing.

In the irascible appetite truly are found: hope, or motion into good apprehended as arduous, but possible of attainment, whose contrary is despair, or motion away from good apprehended as arduous and impossible of attainment; daring, or motion into good apprehended as terrible and imminent, but as surmountable, having as contrary fear, or dejection of mind from evil apprehended as terrible and imminent, and not avoidable; anger, or vehement inclination to vindicate, that is to inflict harm upon the cause by which the evil unto which we are subjected was inflicted, and of this passion there is no contrary.

The reason of this distinction⁵. Since passion is an act of sensitive appetite, it is divided according to the division of appetite. Sensitive appetite is twofold, concupiscible and irascible; for in animals, as in other natural things, there is not only inclination to pursue what is convenient, but also to resist contraries and impediments. The first inclination in an animal is called concupiscible appetite, the second irascible appetite. The object of the concupiscible is sensible good or evil precisely as such, the object of the irascible is arduous good or evil. If therefore the concupiscible appetite tend toward good or evil simply, abstracting whether it be present or absent, in respect of good it is love, in respect of evil hatred; if it tend toward absent good or evil, in respect of good it is desire, in respect of evil flight; if it be occupied about present good or evil, in respect of good it is joy, in respect of evil sadness. But if the irascible appetite tend toward arduous and difficult good, either that good is possible of attainment, and hope is born, or it is impossible of attainment, and despair arises; if it flee arduous evil, either that evil is easy to repel, and daring rises up, or it is difficult to repel, and fear appears; or finally it is occupied about present evil to be avenged, and anger is provoked, to which no passion is opposed.

Hence you have that passions of the concupiscible differ from passions of the irascible in this, that passions of the concupiscible bear upon opposite objects; for they tend into good or recede from evil: but passions of the irascible bear upon the same object with contrary motions.

Question is asked 3° for what reason anger has not, like the rest, an opposite passion.

I answer. Passions of the concupiscible are mutually opposed according to the contrariety of objects, namely good and evil; but in passions of the irascible there is held a twofold contrariety: one indeed, as in the passions of the concupiscible, of good and evil, as between hope and fear; but the other contrariety is according to access and recess relative to the same term, as between hope and despair, between daring and fear. Of anger says St. Thomas here q. 23, a. 3, o: « It is singular in the passion of anger that it cannot have a contrary, neither according to access and recess, nor according to the contrariety of good and evil. » And the holy Doctor brings this reason: « For anger is caused from difficult evil now pressing, at whose presence it is necessary that either the appetite succumb, and so sadness does not issue forth beyond its terms, which is a passion of the concupiscible, or it have motion toward invading the harmful evil, which pertains to anger. But it cannot have motion toward fleeing, because the evil is already posited present or past. And thus to the motion of anger no passion is contrary according to the contrariety of access and recess. Likewise also nor according to the contrariety of good and evil, because to evil already pressing is opposed good already attained, which can no longer have the reason of arduous or difficult, nor after the attainment of good does there remain any other motion than the quieting of appetite in the good attained, which pertains to joy, the passion of the concupiscible contrary to sadness; nor is merely cessation from motion opposed to it, as the Philosopher says in his Rhetoric, that to grow mild is opposed to being angry; which is not a contrary opposition [as motion is opposed to motion], but negative or privative [as cessation of motion is opposed to motion]. »

Question is asked 4° whether passions can be good or bad.

I answer. 1. Passions of the soul can be considered in a twofold way: in one mode, in themselves; in another mode, insofar as they lie under the empire of reason and will. If therefore they be considered in themselves, namely as certain motions of irrational appetite, thus there is not in them moral good or evil, which depends upon reason; but if they be considered insofar as they lie under the empire of reason and will, thus there is in them moral good or evil. For sensitive appetite is nearer to reason itself and will than the exterior members, whose motions and acts nevertheless are morally good or bad, insofar as they are voluntary. Whence much more the passions themselves, insofar as they are voluntary, can be called morally good or bad. But they are voluntary, either from this that they are commanded by the will, or from this that they are not prohibited by the will.

But then they are good when they are moderated by reason; bad, when they are beyond the order of reason⁶. Hence Christ, having no sin, employed passions where he judged according to reason that they should be employed, thus Marc., III, 5, he looked round about with anger; ibid., XIV, 34, his soul was sad even unto death; Luc., XIX, 41, he wept over Jerusalem; Joann., XI, 33 and 34, he troubled himself and wept. And the Apostle, Rom., XII, 15, commands to rejoi-

⁷

ce with those who rejoice, weep with those who weep. And that is the common sense of men, that punishment can rightly be feared, good loved, evil fled, and deservedly; since sensitive appetite is from God as author of nature, there cannot fail to be some acts of it good, if they be regulated and commanded by reason.

But the rule and moderation of reason is attended to, not precisely according to intension or remission of passion, but according as, object and circumstances considered, right reason demands it intensified or remitted. Therefore not always does he sin who vehemently grows angry, or grieves, or fears, but he who exceeds what right reason demands in these or those circumstances. Whence Moses, Exod., XXXII, 19, is read to have been greatly angered on account of the adoration of the calf; Num., XXV, 11, the zeal and indignation of Phinees is praised; I Reg., II and IV, Heli is reprehended because he was not sufficiently indignant at his sons; finally Christ himself, as we already said, was saddened even unto death.

Question is asked 5° whether passion, while cooperating with reason and will, diminish or augment the goodness of the moral act.

Before the response, note that passions of the soul can stand in a twofold way toward will and reason, namely antecedently and consequently, and this latter in a twofold way⁸: 1° by way of redundancy; for when the superior part of the soul is intensely moved into something, the inferior part follows her motion; 2° by way of election, namely when man from judgment of reason elects to be affected with some passion, that he operate more promptly and fervently, the sensitive appetite cooperating. This noted,

I answer. 1° Passion antecedent to reason and will diminishes the goodness of the act, because it obscures the judgment of reason, whence depends the goodness of the moral act; for it is more laudable that one do the work of charity from judgment of reason than from mere passion of mercy⁹.

2° Passion consequent upon will by way of redundancy is a sign of intenser will, and thus indicates greater moral goodness, yet does not augment it¹⁰.

3° Passion consequent by way of election augments the goodness of the act¹¹; because, since the good of man consists in reason as in root, so much the more perfect is that good, the more widely it extends to the many things that suit man: whence no one doubts that to the perfection of moral good pertains that the acts of exterior members be directed by rule of reason. But sensitive appetite can obey reason, as was said. Therefore to perfection of moral good pertains that even the passions themselves of the soul be regulated by reason. Therefore as it is better that man both will good and do it by exterior act, so also is it better that man be moved toward good according to will and according to sensitive appetite, according to that of Psal. LXXXIII, 3: My heart and my flesh exulted in the living God; which is to be understood thus, that we take heart for the intellective appetite, flesh however for the sensitive appetite.]

St. Thomas, from q. 26 to q. 48.

§ I

On the passions of the concupiscible appetite.

St. Thomas, from q. 26 to q. 39.

[I. LOVE. — 1° Love, as such, is « complacency in good »¹. Understand a firm and robust complacency domineering the appetite; for if it be yet recent and weak, it will rather be the rudiment and beginning of love than love. Or otherwise:

« Love is propensity or inclination unto good according to itself, abstracting whether it be present or absent. »

Love is threefold, as appetite is threefold, namely rational or intellective, sensitive or animal, and natural². Rational love is inclination unto good apprehended by intellect; sensitive is inclination unto good apprehended by sense, and this alone is passion: natural is the inclination of each nature, whether cognoscitive or not, implanted by the author of nature unto good convenient to it, as of a stone toward the center.

Love, whether rational or sensitive, is divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence³. Because to love is to will good to someone, the motion of love tends into two things, namely into the good which one wills to someone, whether to himself or to another, and into him to whom he wills good. The first is love of concupiscence, the second love of friendship. Love of friendship is love simply, because what is loved with love of friendship is loved simply and according to itself. Love of concupiscence is love secundum quid, because what is loved with love of concupiscence is not loved simply and according to itself, but is loved for another. Whence, while you love someone because he is useful to you, you love yourself with love of friendship, but him with love of concupiscence; if however you will good to him on account of himself, you love him with love of friendship.

2° The principal cause of love is good, because good is the object of love; but the object of love is its moving cause. Another cause of love is cognition, because the object moves not unless known, whence it is said: « Of the unknown there is no desire. » The third cause of love is similitude, according to that Eccli., XII, 19: Every beast loveth its like; whence the common adage: « Like rejoices in like »⁴.

But similitude is twofold⁵: one actual, while two have the same thing in act, e. g., two men humanity, two walls whiteness; the other potential, while one has power unto the form which the other has in act, as various foods, which through nutrition or assimilation pass into the species of the animal, reduced under its form. The first similitude causes love of friendship. For when two acts are alike in the same form, they are in a certain way one in that form: as two men are one in the species of humanity, and therefore the affection of the one tends into the other as into one [conformed] to itself, and wills him good as to itself. The second similitude causes love of concupiscence, because it makes that he who has only in potency the form which the other has in act, desire it, in whose attainment he delight, if he be sentient and knowing.

Per accidens however from similitude hatred is born⁶, when namely the like in one is impeding of good or excellence in another; whence he becomes hateful to the other, not qua like, but qua impeding that good. And thence another common adage from the Philosopher, VIII Ethic., c. 1: « The potter hates the potter; » and that Prov., XIII, 10: Among the proud there are always contentions.

To these causes of love can be added sympathy or natural propensity of one unto another, society, familiarity, communication in goods or secrets.

3° The first effect of love is union: whence Dionysius, c. 4 de Divin. nomin., says love to be an uniting force⁷. Union moreover is twofold: one real, whereby the beloved is present to the lover; the other affective, whereby from preceding apprehension someone is affected toward another. The first love causes effectively, because it moves the lover unto seeking the presence of the beloved; yet not so that the beloved be substantially in the lover, for this is impossible, but in every way which is possible and fitting, namely that they be mutually present to each other, converse together, and be joined in other ways beseeming love.

The second effect of love is adherence⁸; third, ecstasis⁹; fourth, zeal¹⁰; fifth, injury to the lover¹¹; sixth and most universal, speaking of love as such, inasmuch as it comprehends rational, sensitive and natural [love], is the general influx into all things which the loving one does¹²: 1° because every agent acts on account of some end. But the end is the beloved good. Therefore every agent, whatsoever it do, acts from some love; 2° because love is lord of the appetite, whose it is to apply unto acting; 3° because love is the root of all other affections and passions which move the animal. But if we speak of the sensitive appetite and as it is passion, it is not the cause of all that the lover does, because certain things he does or can do from election of the will, without passion.

To these effects of love the holy Doctor joins four others, namely: liquefaction, fruition, languor and fervor. — All these things, which here we are forced only to note, will be read most usefully in the Angelic Doctor himself, in the places cited.

II. HATRED. — As love is propensity and weight unto good or the fitting, so hatred is aversion from evil or the unfitting¹³. Understand concerning hatred of abomination, whereby someone or something, for instance death, punishment, etc., we abominate and flee as evil; not concerning hatred of enmity, whereby we will evil to someone; for that is not aversion but prosecution of something which we apprehend as good with respect to ourselves and as evil with respect to him whom we hold in hatred of abomination.

Hatred is born from love, because from the fact that something is loved as fitting, its contrary, as unfitting, is held in hatred¹⁴.

III and IV. DESIRE and FLIGHT. — Desire is the affection of appetite tending unto good absent, whereby it differs from delight, which is of good present, and from love, which is of good according to itself, as it abstracts from present or absent¹⁵. Flight, which is opposed to desire, is aversion and recession from future evil.

V. JOY or delight. — Delight is the rest of appetite in good possessed: if it be rational appetite, it is spiritual delight; if of the sensitive appetite, it is sensible delight, which alone is passion, because it alone is with corporal transmutation¹⁶. For here the rest of appetite, whether rational or sensitive, ought not to be taken privatively for cessation from every act, as in insensible things, which when they attain their perfection feel it not, and therefore are held to rest through mere cessation of motion: but truly cognitive beings, while they attain their perfection, perceive or know it, and from that knowledge or sense is caused a certain motion of the soul in the good present complacent and resting, and that motion is delight.

Although intellectual delights in themselves are greater than sensual ones, because they are of nobler object and good more delectable in themselves, and are more firm; nevertheless, as regards us, sensual delights are greater than spiritual ones, partly because sensibles are more known to us than intelligibles, partly because sensual delights are with corporal transmutation, and are desired as certain necessary medicines: whence it happens that more follow sensual delights than spiritual ones.

The causes of delight are¹⁷: first, the very operation, for unto delight two things are required, namely attainment of convenient good and knowledge or perception of this attainment, but each is operation; second, motion or mutation and alteration; third, hope of the future; fourth memory of the past; fifth, similitude.

The effects of delight are¹⁸: 1° dilation of heart, which seems to unfold and diffuse itself; 2° it causes thirst and desire of itself, when namely imperfectly had; 3° it aids the act of reason, when it is itself spiritual, and impedes, nay sometimes absorbs this act, if it be corporeal ¹⁹;

4° it perfects the very operation whereby it is perceived.

VI. SORROW. — Sorrow is the affection of appetite caused from apprehension of evil present ²⁰. It is clear from what was said of delight, to which it is opposed. Similarly its causes and effects are known from the contrary causes and effects of delight.

The remedies of sorrow are ²¹: The first, any delight whatever. The second, tears, sighs, groans, and other exterior signs of sorrow: partly because everything noxious shut up within afflicts more, because the intensification of the soul about it is multiplied more; but when it diffuses unto exterior things, then the intensification of the soul is in a certain way disaggregated unto exterior things, and thus interior grief is diminished: partly because tears and groans are operations fitting to the saddened and grieving, but every fitting operation brings delight.

The third is the conversation of friends, because through this that friends grieve with him who suffers, he perceives himself loved by them; which is delightful. The fourth, for the wise, is contemplation of truth, because in contemplation of truth is greatest delight. The fifth, sleep and bath, whereby while the due state of the body disturbed by grief is restored, the mind is at once with the body refreshed.]

§ II. — On the passions of the irascible appetite.

[I and II. Hope and Desperation. — Hope is the motion of appetite tending unto future good difficult and arduous, possible however of attainment. Desperation, on the contrary, is the motion receding from arduous good impossible of attainment, at least morally ²². In youths and drunkards and others who use not deliberation, hope abounds, because through inconsiderateness of difficulties they easily judge themselves able to obtain what they will.

Audacity is the motion of appetite unto invading and overcoming ²³. It is said terrible, because light evils are despised. Nor does it stand against that every act of prosecution, such as audacity is, concerns good; for audacity is indeed concerning good, but also concerning evil under the rationale of good. For it is borne into evil to be overcome and put to flight, which victory and putting to flight is good and useful unto obtaining the good which appetite hopes.

IV. Fear. — Fear is the motion of appetite around future evil arduous imminent, unto which resistance can be made only with difficulty; or it is the casting down of mind conquered by gravity of peril ²⁴. The effect of fear is contraction, not only metaphorical whereby the appetite conquered by evil recedes and gathers itself into itself, but proper and corporal, inasmuch as from fear valor and spirits are contracted unto the interior parts, especially unto the heart, not that thence they make onset, as in anger, desire and audacity: as we see in cities that, when citizens fear, they withdraw themselves from exterior places and recur, as much as they can, unto interior and more fortified places, that they may be saved ²⁵.

From this effect several others are born, namely trembling, pallor, interclusion of voice, erection of hairs, sometimes sudden hoariness, fainting of spirit, stupor, disturbance of mind, thirst, aridity of the jaws, etc.

V. Anger. — Anger is appetite of vindication with fervor of blood around the heart ²⁶. It differs from hatred of enmity in this, that hatred wills evil to the neighbor as evil to him, but the angry man wills him evil under the rationale of just vindication.

The principal cause of anger is slight estimation and contempt, which is the greater the greater the excellence of the angry one.

The effects of anger are: 1° delight on account of hope of vindication, which is remedy of injury received; 2° fervor in the heart; 3° disturbance of mind and body; 4° taciturnity, either because the reason disturbed finds nothing worthy of the passion, or because so great is the disturbance that the tongue is impeded from natural use ²⁷.

[After human acts and passions, St. Doctor considers the principles of human acts, and first the intrinsic principles, which are powers and habits. But because concerning powers he already spoke in 1a p., q. 77, he treats here only of habits, and first of habits in general, from q. 49 to q. 54. But because what pertains to habits in general are properly philosophical and less necessary, therefore we omit them here. Then he considers habits in particular, and first of good habits, which are virtues; secondly, of evil habits, namely vices and sins. Therefore a few things will be said by us here of virtues, but afterward we shall treat of sins.]