Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

Prooemium.

[After St. Thomas, I. IIae, from q. 22 to q. 48, had discussed the acts proper to man whereby the last end can be attained, from q. 22 to q. 48 he discusses the acts common to man and other animals, which are called passions; for inasmuch as they are subject politically to the empire of reason, they participate something of its regulation and of morality, and can conduce to the last end or turn away from it: whence the governing of them occupies a great part of the virtues, and from their disordination many vices spring up. Because however there are no grave controversies about this matter, and it is scarcely treated in the schools, although it matters greatly that tyros of theology not be ignorant of it, therefore we shall run through it summarily, yet sufficiently. Likewise of the virtues, of which the holy Doctor treats from q. 55 to 70, we shall say little, for the same reasons. Therefore all things which we shall say of the passions and virtues we shall embrace compendiously in a twofold dissertation.]

{ Question is asked 1° what passion is.

I answer. Common is the sense of all, that passion is an act of sensitive appetite whereby one is affected toward something or flees from it. But why, since it is an act, is it called passion? The reason is, because that act is apt to cause a transmutation in the natural disposition of the body, which transmutation inflicts passion, insofar as the subject suffers by losing something.

For the understanding of this it must be observed that to suffer is said in a threefold way. In one mode, commonly and widely, according as every receiving is suffering, even if nothing be cast off from the thing, as if it be said that air suffers while it is illuminated: and in this sense intellect and cognitive sense, receiving species, can be said to suffer. In another mode it is said properly to suffer when something is received with the casting off of another. And this happens in a twofold way. For sometimes there is cast off what is unfitting to the thing, and received what is fitting: thus, when the animal body is healed, it is said to suffer, because it receives health, sickness being cast off. Sometimes, conversely, it happens while there is cast off what is fitting to the thing, and received what is unfitting: thus to be sick is said to suffer, because infirmity is received, health¹

cast off. And this third mode is the most proper mode of passion.

Whence Augustine says, lib. IX de Civit., c. 4, n. 1: « Those motions of soul which the Greeks call πάθη, but some of ours, as Cicero, perturbations, some affections or affects, others truly, as this one [Apuleius] more expressively from the Greek, call passions. » Such motions therefore are most rightly called passions, and passion is defined by the Angelic Doctor² from Damascene in lib. II de Fide orthod., c. 22: « Motion of the sensible appetitive power, upon imagination of good and evil; » that is: Motion of sensitive appetite from imagination of good and evil, with bodily transmutation.

It is called motion, that is act or operation, and holds the place of genus; of sensitive appetite, because that appetite is its subject; from imagination of good or evil, whereby its principle is signified; with bodily transmutation, which distinguishes such motion from the motions of the will, which since it is not affixed to a corporeal organ, moves not itself with bodily transmutation, and from the motion of the sensitive cognitive part, which, although affixed to a corporeal organ, does not per se transmute the body physically, but only intentionally. But passion transmutes the body physically, at least the heart³; for in every passion something is added to or diminished from the natural motion of the heart, insofar as the heart is moved more intensely or more remissly according to systole and diastole.

Passion therefore imports two things⁴, namely the act of the soul, which stands as it were formal, and the bodily transmutation, which stands as it were material, from which nevertheless passion is named. If the first be wanting, there will be purely bodily passion; if the second be wanting, there will be no passion, but simply a motion or operation of the soul.

Question is asked 2° how many passions there are.

I answer. There are eleven passions, six in the concupiscible appetite and five in the irascible appetite.

In the concupiscible appetite are: love, or inclination into good apprehended simply, whose contrary is hatred, or aversion from evil simply; desire, or inclination into good apprehended as absent, but future, having as contrary flight, or aversion from evil apprehended as absent, but future; joy, which is also called pleasure or delight, or repose in good apprehended and really possessed, and it has as contrary sadness, or disquietude and languor of mind from evil apprehended and actually pressing.

In the irascible appetite truly are found: hope, or motion into good apprehended as arduous, but possible of attainment, whose contrary is despair, or motion away from good apprehended as arduous and impossible of attainment; daring, or motion into good apprehended as terrible and imminent, but as surmountable, having as contrary fear, or dejection of mind from evil apprehended as terrible and imminent, and not avoidable; anger, or vehement inclination to vindicate, that is to inflict harm upon the cause by which the evil unto which we are subjected was inflicted, and of this passion there is no contrary.

The reason of this distinction⁵. Since passion is an act of sensitive appetite, it is divided according to the division of appetite. Sensitive appetite is twofold, concupiscible and irascible; for in animals, as in other natural things, there is not only inclination to pursue what is convenient, but also to resist contraries and impediments. The first inclination in an animal is called concupiscible appetite, the second irascible appetite. The object of the concupiscible is sensible good or evil precisely as such, the object of the irascible is arduous good or evil. If therefore the concupiscible appetite tend toward good or evil simply, abstracting whether it be present or absent, in respect of good it is love, in respect of evil hatred; if it tend toward absent good or evil, in respect of good it is desire, in respect of evil flight; if it be occupied about present good or evil, in respect of good it is joy, in respect of evil sadness. But if the irascible appetite tend toward arduous and difficult good, either that good is possible of attainment, and hope is born, or it is impossible of attainment, and despair arises; if it flee arduous evil, either that evil is easy to repel, and daring rises up, or it is difficult to repel, and fear appears; or finally it is occupied about present evil to be avenged, and anger is provoked, to which no passion is opposed.

Hence you have that passions of the concupiscible differ from passions of the irascible in this, that passions of the concupiscible bear upon opposite objects; for they tend into good or recede from evil: but passions of the irascible bear upon the same object with contrary motions.

Question is asked 3° for what reason anger has not, like the rest, an opposite passion.

I answer. Passions of the concupiscible are mutually opposed according to the contrariety of objects, namely good and evil; but in passions of the irascible there is held a twofold contrariety: one indeed, as in the passions of the concupiscible, of good and evil, as between hope and fear; but the other contrariety is according to access and recess relative to the same term, as between hope and despair, between daring and fear. Of anger says St. Thomas here q. 23, a. 3, o: « It is singular in the passion of anger that it cannot have a contrary, neither according to access and recess, nor according to the contrariety of good and evil. » And the holy Doctor brings this reason: « For anger is caused from difficult evil now pressing, at whose presence it is necessary that either the appetite succumb, and so sadness does not issue forth beyond its terms, which is a passion of the concupiscible, or it have motion toward invading the harmful evil, which pertains to anger. But it cannot have motion toward fleeing, because the evil is already posited present or past. And thus to the motion of anger no passion is contrary according to the contrariety of access and recess. Likewise also nor according to the contrariety of good and evil, because to evil already pressing is opposed good already attained, which can no longer have the reason of arduous or difficult, nor after the attainment of good does there remain any other motion than the quieting of appetite in the good attained, which pertains to joy, the passion of the concupiscible contrary to sadness; nor is merely cessation from motion opposed to it, as the Philosopher says in his Rhetoric, that to grow mild is opposed to being angry; which is not a contrary opposition [as motion is opposed to motion], but negative or privative [as cessation of motion is opposed to motion]. »

Question is asked 4° whether passions can be good or bad.

I answer. 1. Passions of the soul can be considered in a twofold way: in one mode, in themselves; in another mode, insofar as they lie under the empire of reason and will. If therefore they be considered in themselves, namely as certain motions of irrational appetite, thus there is not in them moral good or evil, which depends upon reason; but if they be considered insofar as they lie under the empire of reason and will, thus there is in them moral good or evil. For sensitive appetite is nearer to reason itself and will than the exterior members, whose motions and acts nevertheless are morally good or bad, insofar as they are voluntary. Whence much more the passions themselves, insofar as they are voluntary, can be called morally good or bad. But they are voluntary, either from this that they are commanded by the will, or from this that they are not prohibited by the will.

But then they are good when they are moderated by reason; bad, when they are beyond the order of reason⁶. Hence Christ, having no sin, employed passions where he judged according to reason that they should be employed, thus Marc., III, 5, he looked round about with anger; ibid., XIV, 34, his soul was sad even unto death; Luc., XIX, 41, he wept over Jerusalem; Joann., XI, 33 and 34, he troubled himself and wept. And the Apostle, Rom., XII, 15, commands to rejoi-

⁷

ce with those who rejoice, weep with those who weep. And that is the common sense of men, that punishment can rightly be feared, good loved, evil fled, and deservedly; since sensitive appetite is from God as author of nature, there cannot fail to be some acts of it good, if they be regulated and commanded by reason.

But the rule and moderation of reason is attended to, not precisely according to intension or remission of passion, but according as, object and circumstances considered, right reason demands it intensified or remitted. Therefore not always does he sin who vehemently grows angry, or grieves, or fears, but he who exceeds what right reason demands in these or those circumstances. Whence Moses, Exod., XXXII, 19, is read to have been greatly angered on account of the adoration of the calf; Num., XXV, 11, the zeal and indignation of Phinees is praised; I Reg., II and IV, Heli is reprehended because he was not sufficiently indignant at his sons; finally Christ himself, as we already said, was saddened even unto death.

Question is asked 5° whether passion, while cooperating with reason and will, diminish or augment the goodness of the moral act.

Before the response, note that passions of the soul can stand in a twofold way toward will and reason, namely antecedently and consequently, and this latter in a twofold way⁸: 1° by way of redundancy; for when the superior part of the soul is intensely moved into something, the inferior part follows her motion; 2° by way of election, namely when man from judgment of reason elects to be affected with some passion, that he operate more promptly and fervently, the sensitive appetite cooperating. This noted,

I answer. 1° Passion antecedent to reason and will diminishes the goodness of the act, because it obscures the judgment of reason, whence depends the goodness of the moral act; for it is more laudable that one do the work of charity from judgment of reason than from mere passion of mercy⁹.

2° Passion consequent upon will by way of redundancy is a sign of intenser will, and thus indicates greater moral goodness, yet does not augment it¹⁰.

3° Passion consequent by way of election augments the goodness of the act¹¹; because, since the good of man consists in reason as in root, so much the more perfect is that good, the more widely it extends to the many things that suit man: whence no one doubts that to the perfection of moral good pertains that the acts of exterior members be directed by rule of reason. But sensitive appetite can obey reason, as was said. Therefore to perfection of moral good pertains that even the passions themselves of the soul be regulated by reason. Therefore as it is better that man both will good and do it by exterior act, so also is it better that man be moved toward good according to will and according to sensitive appetite, according to that of Psal. LXXXIII, 3: My heart and my flesh exulted in the living God; which is to be understood thus, that we take heart for the intellective appetite, flesh however for the sensitive appetite.]

St. Thomas, from q. 26 to q. 48.

§ I

On the passions of the concupiscible appetite.

St. Thomas, from q. 26 to q. 39.

[I. LOVE. — 1° Love, as such, is « complacency in good »¹. Understand a firm and robust complacency domineering the appetite; for if it be yet recent and weak, it will rather be the rudiment and beginning of love than love. Or otherwise:

« Love is propensity or inclination unto good according to itself, abstracting whether it be present or absent. »

Love is threefold, as appetite is threefold, namely rational or intellective, sensitive or animal, and natural². Rational love is inclination unto good apprehended by intellect; sensitive is inclination unto good apprehended by sense, and this alone is passion: natural is the inclination of each nature, whether cognoscitive or not, implanted by the author of nature unto good convenient to it, as of a stone toward the center.

Love, whether rational or sensitive, is divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence³. Because to love is to will good to someone, the motion of love tends into two things, namely into the good which one wills to someone, whether to himself or to another, and into him to whom he wills good. The first is love of concupiscence, the second love of friendship. Love of friendship is love simply, because what is loved with love of friendship is loved simply and according to itself. Love of concupiscence is love secundum quid, because what is loved with love of concupiscence is not loved simply and according to itself, but is loved for another. Whence, while you love someone because he is useful to you, you love yourself with love of friendship, but him with love of concupiscence; if however you will good to him on account of himself, you love him with love of friendship.

2° The principal cause of love is good, because good is the object of love; but the object of love is its moving cause. Another cause of love is cognition, because the object moves not unless known, whence it is said: « Of the unknown there is no desire. » The third cause of love is similitude, according to that Eccli., XII, 19: Every beast loveth its like; whence the common adage: « Like rejoices in like »⁴.

But similitude is twofold⁵: one actual, while two have the same thing in act, e. g., two men humanity, two walls whiteness; the other potential, while one has power unto the form which the other has in act, as various foods, which through nutrition or assimilation pass into the species of the animal, reduced under its form. The first similitude causes love of friendship. For when two acts are alike in the same form, they are in a certain way one in that form: as two men are one in the species of humanity, and therefore the affection of the one tends into the other as into one [conformed] to itself, and wills him good as to itself. The second similitude causes love of concupiscence, because it makes that he who has only in potency the form which the other has in act, desire it, in whose attainment he delight, if he be sentient and knowing.

Per accidens however from similitude hatred is born⁶, when namely the like in one is impeding of good or excellence in another; whence he becomes hateful to the other, not qua like, but qua impeding that good. And thence another common adage from the Philosopher, VIII Ethic., c. 1: « The potter hates the potter; » and that Prov., XIII, 10: Among the proud there are always contentions.

To these causes of love can be added sympathy or natural propensity of one unto another, society, familiarity, communication in goods or secrets.

3° The first effect of love is union: whence Dionysius, c. 4 de Divin. nomin., says love to be an uniting force⁷. Union moreover is twofold: one real, whereby the beloved is present to the lover; the other affective, whereby from preceding apprehension someone is affected toward another. The first love causes effectively, because it moves the lover unto seeking the presence of the beloved; yet not so that the beloved be substantially in the lover, for this is impossible, but in every way which is possible and fitting, namely that they be mutually present to each other, converse together, and be joined in other ways beseeming love.

The second effect of love is adherence⁸; third, ecstasis⁹; fourth, zeal¹⁰; fifth, injury to the lover¹¹; sixth and most universal, speaking of love as such, inasmuch as it comprehends rational, sensitive and natural [love], is the general influx into all things which the loving one does¹²: 1° because every agent acts on account of some end. But the end is the beloved good. Therefore every agent, whatsoever it do, acts from some love; 2° because love is lord of the appetite, whose it is to apply unto acting; 3° because love is the root of all other affections and passions which move the animal. But if we speak of the sensitive appetite and as it is passion, it is not the cause of all that the lover does, because certain things he does or can do from election of the will, without passion.

To these effects of love the holy Doctor joins four others, namely: liquefaction, fruition, languor and fervor. — All these things, which here we are forced only to note, will be read most usefully in the Angelic Doctor himself, in the places cited.

II. HATRED. — As love is propensity and weight unto good or the fitting, so hatred is aversion from evil or the unfitting¹³. Understand concerning hatred of abomination, whereby someone or something, for instance death, punishment, etc., we abominate and flee as evil; not concerning hatred of enmity, whereby we will evil to someone; for that is not aversion but prosecution of something which we apprehend as good with respect to ourselves and as evil with respect to him whom we hold in hatred of abomination.

Hatred is born from love, because from the fact that something is loved as fitting, its contrary, as unfitting, is held in hatred¹⁴.

III and IV. DESIRE and FLIGHT. — Desire is the affection of appetite tending unto good absent, whereby it differs from delight, which is of good present, and from love, which is of good according to itself, as it abstracts from present or absent¹⁵. Flight, which is opposed to desire, is aversion and recession from future evil.

V. JOY or delight. — Delight is the rest of appetite in good possessed: if it be rational appetite, it is spiritual delight; if of the sensitive appetite, it is sensible delight, which alone is passion, because it alone is with corporal transmutation¹⁶. For here the rest of appetite, whether rational or sensitive, ought not to be taken privatively for cessation from every act, as in insensible things, which when they attain their perfection feel it not, and therefore are held to rest through mere cessation of motion: but truly cognitive beings, while they attain their perfection, perceive or know it, and from that knowledge or sense is caused a certain motion of the soul in the good present complacent and resting, and that motion is delight.

Although intellectual delights in themselves are greater than sensual ones, because they are of nobler object and good more delectable in themselves, and are more firm; nevertheless, as regards us, sensual delights are greater than spiritual ones, partly because sensibles are more known to us than intelligibles, partly because sensual delights are with corporal transmutation, and are desired as certain necessary medicines: whence it happens that more follow sensual delights than spiritual ones.

The causes of delight are¹⁷: first, the very operation, for unto delight two things are required, namely attainment of convenient good and knowledge or perception of this attainment, but each is operation; second, motion or mutation and alteration; third, hope of the future; fourth memory of the past; fifth, similitude.

The effects of delight are¹⁸: 1° dilation of heart, which seems to unfold and diffuse itself; 2° it causes thirst and desire of itself, when namely imperfectly had; 3° it aids the act of reason, when it is itself spiritual, and impedes, nay sometimes absorbs this act, if it be corporeal ¹⁹;

4° it perfects the very operation whereby it is perceived.

VI. SORROW. — Sorrow is the affection of appetite caused from apprehension of evil present ²⁰. It is clear from what was said of delight, to which it is opposed. Similarly its causes and effects are known from the contrary causes and effects of delight.

The remedies of sorrow are ²¹: The first, any delight whatever. The second, tears, sighs, groans, and other exterior signs of sorrow: partly because everything noxious shut up within afflicts more, because the intensification of the soul about it is multiplied more; but when it diffuses unto exterior things, then the intensification of the soul is in a certain way disaggregated unto exterior things, and thus interior grief is diminished: partly because tears and groans are operations fitting to the saddened and grieving, but every fitting operation brings delight.

The third is the conversation of friends, because through this that friends grieve with him who suffers, he perceives himself loved by them; which is delightful. The fourth, for the wise, is contemplation of truth, because in contemplation of truth is greatest delight. The fifth, sleep and bath, whereby while the due state of the body disturbed by grief is restored, the mind is at once with the body refreshed.]

§ II. — On the passions of the irascible appetite.

[I and II. Hope and Desperation. — Hope is the motion of appetite tending unto future good difficult and arduous, possible however of attainment. Desperation, on the contrary, is the motion receding from arduous good impossible of attainment, at least morally ²². In youths and drunkards and others who use not deliberation, hope abounds, because through inconsiderateness of difficulties they easily judge themselves able to obtain what they will.

Audacity is the motion of appetite unto invading and overcoming ²³. It is said terrible, because light evils are despised. Nor does it stand against that every act of prosecution, such as audacity is, concerns good; for audacity is indeed concerning good, but also concerning evil under the rationale of good. For it is borne into evil to be overcome and put to flight, which victory and putting to flight is good and useful unto obtaining the good which appetite hopes.

IV. Fear. — Fear is the motion of appetite around future evil arduous imminent, unto which resistance can be made only with difficulty; or it is the casting down of mind conquered by gravity of peril ²⁴. The effect of fear is contraction, not only metaphorical whereby the appetite conquered by evil recedes and gathers itself into itself, but proper and corporal, inasmuch as from fear valor and spirits are contracted unto the interior parts, especially unto the heart, not that thence they make onset, as in anger, desire and audacity: as we see in cities that, when citizens fear, they withdraw themselves from exterior places and recur, as much as they can, unto interior and more fortified places, that they may be saved ²⁵.

From this effect several others are born, namely trembling, pallor, interclusion of voice, erection of hairs, sometimes sudden hoariness, fainting of spirit, stupor, disturbance of mind, thirst, aridity of the jaws, etc.

V. Anger. — Anger is appetite of vindication with fervor of blood around the heart ²⁶. It differs from hatred of enmity in this, that hatred wills evil to the neighbor as evil to him, but the angry man wills him evil under the rationale of just vindication.

The principal cause of anger is slight estimation and contempt, which is the greater the greater the excellence of the angry one.

The effects of anger are: 1° delight on account of hope of vindication, which is remedy of injury received; 2° fervor in the heart; 3° disturbance of mind and body; 4° taciturnity, either because the reason disturbed finds nothing worthy of the passion, or because so great is the disturbance that the tongue is impeded from natural use ²⁷.

[After human acts and passions, St. Doctor considers the principles of human acts, and first the intrinsic principles, which are powers and habits. But because concerning powers he already spoke in 1a p., q. 77, he treats here only of habits, and first of habits in general, from q. 49 to q. 54. But because what pertains to habits in general are properly philosophical and less necessary, therefore we omit them here. Then he considers habits in particular, and first of good habits, which are virtues; secondly, of evil habits, namely vices and sins. Therefore a few things will be said by us here of virtues, but afterward we shall treat of sins.]

D. Thomas, q. 55.

[I. — The name virtue is derived from the substantive vis, which expresses fortitude, because the habits of the virtues make the soul strong, and each of their acts supposes some fortitude, without which it cannot be exercised. Sometimes virtus is taken for the very effect of an operative power, as Matth., VII, 22 : In thy name we have done many virtues. But here it is taken for a certain quality superadded to rational creature, whereby it comes to act promptly, easily and rightly.

Virtue is defined by Cicero, book II de Inventione : « A habit of mind consonant with nature in its manner and with reason. » True indeed it is that it is such a habit; but, as St. Aug. observes, book IV contra Julian. Pelagian., c. 3, n. 19, those who thus described virtue « knew not what is consonant with the nature of mortals to be freed and beatified. » He himself says, de Morib. Eccles. cathol., c. 6, that virtue is « a habit and as it were a quality of a wise soul, making the soul most good. » Whence came forth the following definition admitted by the Angelic Doctor¹ : « Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which one lives rightly, which no one uses ill, which God works in us without us. » Thus the Holy Doctor defends it there: « That definition perfectly embraces the whole reason of virtue. For the perfect reason of anything is gathered from all its causes. Now the aforesaid definition embraces all the causes of virtue. For the formal cause of virtue, as of any thing whatever, is taken from its genus and difference, when it is called a good quality; for the genus of virtue is quality, but the difference good. Yet a more fitting definition would be if habit were put in place of quality, which is the proximate genus. Virtue however has no matter out of which, like the other accidents, but has matter about which, and matter in which, namely subject. And the matter about which is the object of virtue, which could not be put in the aforesaid definition, because through the object virtue is determined to species, whereas here is assigned the definition of virtue in common: whence the subject is put in place of material cause, when it is said that it is a good quality of the mind. — But the end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation itself. But it must be noted that of operative habits some are always toward evil, as vicious habits, others indeed at one time toward good and at another time toward evil, as opinion stands to truth and falsity. Virtue however is a habit always standing toward good. And therefore, that virtue be distinguished from those things which always stand toward evil, it is said, by which one lives rightly; that however it be distinguished from those which stand at one time toward good, at another time toward evil, it is said, which no one uses ill. — But the efficient cause of infused virtue, of which the definition is given, is God. On which account it is said: Which God works in us without us. Which particle indeed, if it be taken away, the remainder of the definition will be common to all virtues both acquired and infused. »

From what has been said you will gather, 1° that virtue is essentially an operative habit of a good act².

That it is a habit, is clear; because habit in common is divided per se into virtue and vice; for by habits the powers of the rational soul are disposed, which stand indeterminately toward many things: if they be disposed fitly, it is virtue; if unfitly, vice³.

That it is an operative habit, also is clear; because virtue, from the very reason of the name, and as was said, imports a certain perfection of a power. Perfection added to any power conforms itself to it. Therefore, as rational powers are operative, so too are the virtues superadded to them⁴.

Finally, that it is an operative habit of a good act, equally is clear; because, since the rational powers are operative of acts, both in the genus of being and in the genus of morals, it must be that virtue, by which they are perfected, should attain both reasons, so as to be conformable to them. For, although a rational power can absolutely and of itself alone attain acts⁵ as to substance and morality, yet this it cannot do promptly, easily and readily; but through virtue it becomes prompt and ready toward both⁶. Of itself nevertheless and first it regards the acts' morality or goodness, secondarily their entity; because virtue is essentially in the genus of morals, since it is essentially ordered unto acting morally well.

You will gather 2° that power and virtue, in the reason of cause, are not placed in number, nor are several causes, but power is the cause and virtue the complement of the cause, whence together power rises into one complete cause. For, as I said, power can do without virtue what it can do with it (speaking of moral virtues in the natural order); but without virtue it can do this imperfectly only, incompletely and with difficulty, with virtue truly completely, easily and readily.

II. — Human virtue generically is divided into moral and intellectual. For human virtue, as was said, is an operative habit of a good act, or a habit perfecting man unto acting well. In man however the principle of acting is twofold, namely intellect or reason, and appetite. Therefore every human virtue is perfective either of reason or of appetite. If it be perfective of the intellect, whether speculative or practical, toward the good act of man, namely unto judging rightly, it will be intellectual virtue; if however it be perfective of the appetitive part, namely unto choosing rightly, it will be moral virtue⁷. Hence the Angelic Doctor rightly infers that moral virtue can indeed be without certain intellectual virtues, as without wisdom, knowledge and art, but not without intellect and prudence. For moral virtue is about election. Election however, that it be morally good, must be right, both as to the end convenient to reason, which cannot be without intellect judging rightly; and as to the means ordered to the end, which cannot be without prudence.

By moral virtue man is ordered unto morally good operation, which is its effect. But the operation itself can be considered as the matter about which moral virtue itself is concerned, and from this head the moral virtues are divided generically into virtues which are about actions and virtues which are about passions. « The reason of which, says St. Thomas, here q. 60, a. 2, o, is that good and evil in certain operations is regarded in themselves, however man be affected toward them, namely inasmuch as good and evil in them is taken according to the reason of commensuration to another. And in such there must be some virtue directive of operations in themselves, as buying and selling, and such-like operations, in which is regarded the reason of due or undue to another. And on this account justice and its parts are properly about operations as about proper matter. But in certain operations good and evil is regarded only according to commensuration to the agent; and therefore in these good and evil must be considered according as man is well or ill affected about suchlike. And on this account it must be that virtues in such are principally about interior affections, which are called passions of the soul: as is clear of temperance, fortitude and other suchlike. It happens however that in operations which are toward another the good of virtue is omitted on account of disordered passion of the soul, and then inasmuch as the commensuration of the exterior operation is corrupted, it is corruption of justice; inasmuch however as the commensuration of interior passions is corrupted, it is corruption of some other virtue: as, when through anger someone strikes another, in the very undue striking justice is corrupted, but in immoderateness of anger meekness is corrupted. And the same is clear in others. »

Thence is clear the nature of those virtues commonly called cardinal, and their number. Indeed, when we speak simply of virtue, human virtue is dealt with. Human virtue however, according to the perfect reason of virtue, is said to be that which requires rectitude of appetite. For such virtue not only makes faculty of acting well, but also causes the very use of the good work. But according to the imperfect reason of virtue, that is called virtue which does not require rectitude of appetite, because it only makes faculty of acting well, but does not cause use of a good work. It is established moreover that the perfect is more principal than the imperfect; and therefore those virtues which contain rectitude of appetite are called principal or cardinal. Suchlike however are the moral virtues, and among the intellectual prudence alone, which also in a certain way is moral, inasmuch as it is right reason of things doable⁸.

Four, as all know, are the cardinal virtues : prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude. The reason of this division is assigned by St. Thomas here a. 2, o : « The number, he says, of certain things can be taken either according to formal principles, or according to subjects, and in both ways four cardinal virtues are found. For the formal principle of the virtue of which we now speak is the good of reason. Which indeed can be considered in two ways: In one way according as it consists in the very consideration of reason; and thus there will be one principal virtue, which is called prudence. In another way, according as the order of reason is posited about something: and this either about operations, and thus it is justice; or about passions, and thus there must needs be two virtues. For the order of reason must needs be posited about passions, their repugnance to reason having been considered. Which indeed can be twofold: In one way, according as passion impels toward something contrary to reason; and thus passion must needs be repressed, and from this temperance is named. In another way, according as passion withdraws from that which reason dictates, as fear of dangers or labors ; and thus man must needs be firm in that which is of reason, lest he withdraw, and from this fortitude is named. — And likewise according to subjects the same number is found. Fourfold indeed is found the subject of this virtue of which we now speak, namely the rationale by essence, which prudence perfects, and the rationale by participation. Which is divided into three, that is, into the will, which is the subject of justice, and into the concupiscible, which is the subject of temperance, and into the irascible, which is the subject of fortitude. »

There are besides theological virtues, so called from their immediate object, which is God, as variously attained. But considered in themselves, according as they perfect the powers of human soul, they are reduced to moral and intellectual virtues. Of which there will be treated singly and fully in IIa IIae.]

D. Thomas, q. 56.

[Certain things are to be presupposed.

I suppose 1° that virtue is not subjected in the essence of the soul, but in its powers: partly because virtue is the perfection of a power, partly because it is an operative habit. But every operation of the soul takes place immediately through a power¹.

I suppose 2° that there is no virtue in the vegetative powers, nor in the members and external senses; for these are neither determined to one mode of acting, and, their due natural disposition being posited, they have no difficulty in their acts. And if by use they seem to acquire some facility, this is not caused from a habit of virtue, but only from the removal of impediments, just as external instruments become by very use more polished and apt.

I suppose 3º that there is no virtue in the interior apprehensive senses; because virtue is a perfect habit by which nothing happens except good and perfect operation: whence it must be that virtue be in that power which is consummative of the good work. But the knowledge of truth is not consummated in the sensitive apprehensive powers, but such powers are as it were preparatory to intellective cognition. Therefore in such senses there are not virtues whereby truth is known, but rather in the intellect².

Nor does it stand against this that there are virtues in the sensitive appetite, as we shall say presently. The disparity is that the sensitive appetite is moved by the will, and therefore the work of the appetitive virtue is consummated in the sensitive appetite, and on this account the sensitive appetite is the subject of virtue. But the sensitive apprehensive powers stand rather as moving with respect to the intellect; for phantasms stand to the intellective soul as colors to sight, and therefore the work of cognition terminates in the intellect. Wherefore cognitive virtues must be placed in it, and not in sense³.

I suppose 4º that the intellect, even considered in itself, is the subject of intellectual virtues⁴; because the intellect in itself is indifferent, not indeed with an indifference of liberty, but of perfectibility in order to its object; for it can attain it well or ill, namely attain the true or the false under the reason of true; and there is no small difficulty in the inquiry and attainment of truth. Whence it needs habits which perfect it with respect to these things. And these are understanding, wisdom, science, and art.

But, because those virtues give only the faculty of operating well in their own genus, they do not render the act morally good and honest, nor do they make man simply good, but secundum quid and with an addition, as good philosopher, good grammarian, good smith; therefore intellectual virtues are not called virtues simply, but secundum quid, because the name of virtue was primarily imposed to signify the principle of moral rectitude⁵.

But truly, if the intellect, both speculative and practical, be considered as moved by the will, whose office it is to move the other powers to their acts, and which is the principle of all moral good — for therefore man acts morally well because he has a good will: then in the intellect there can be virtues simply so called, and thus prudence is in the intellect.

I suppose 5º that there are in the will virtues in order to the supernatural good, such as charity toward God, and in order to the good of one's neighbor, because each good is not sufficiently proportioned to the will. For the supernatural good exceeds the proportion of the will with respect to species, since it is above the whole species of nature; the good of another exceeds it with respect to the individual, because by this very fact that the will is rooted in this supposit through individual difference, it is determined to the proper good of the supposit, according to that word of the Philosopher: « To each his own good is amiable ⁶. »

There remains therefore difficulty with respect to two things, namely: whether there are virtues in the will concerning the good of one's own supposit, and in the sensitive appetite as moved by the will⁷?

Therefore

I say 1°: There are not in the will virtues concerning the good of one's own private reason, but these are in the sensitive appetite, as will presently be proved. This is against the Scotists and certain others.

It is proved. Virtues are placed in a power when the power is not of itself complete, perfect, expeditious, and proportioned to its object, and thence suffers difficulty in attaining it. But the will concerning the good of the reason of one's own supposit is complete, perfect, expeditious, and proportioned. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. The will, as rational appetite, is nothing else than the very inclination to the good of reason. Therefore it is inclined either to no good or to its own good completely, perfectly, expediently, namely since it is proportioned to it with respect to species — and that is insofar as natural — and with respect to the individual. By what reason it is proved that the will is complete and proportioned not only to its own physical good, as certain will have it, but also to its own moral and honest good; because it is essentially a rational inclination, consequently to its own good consonant with reason.

You will object 1°: The will suffers difficulty in attaining the good of its own reason in the matter of temperance and fortitude. Therefore it needs to be perfected by virtues.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent. The will suffers difficulty in attaining the good of its own reason intrinsically and per se, I deny; it suffers difficulty extrinsically and per accidens, I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. Therefore this difficulty does not arise from the fact that the will is not sufficiently complete and proportioned of itself to this good, both with respect to species and with respect to the individual, but from some extrinsic impediment, namely from the immoderation of the passions. But that this difficulty be removed, a virtue in the will is not required, but it suffices that the impediment be removed by the moderation of the passions, which is done through the virtues of temperance and fortitude in the sensitive appetite, where those passions reside.

You will object 2º: The will is capable of vice inclining to evil adverse to reason. Therefore also of virtue toward good consonant with reason.

I answer. I deny the consequence. The disparity is: the will in itself is inclined to the good consonant with reason, and yet from repetition of evil acts vice is acquired inclining to the good contrary to reason. But it is in itself completely and perfectly inclined and proportioned to the proper good consonant with reason. Whence, however often such acts of good be repeated, no more is virtue acquired than by frequent descents a habit would be acquired in a stone inclining it downward. But if the will suffer any difficulty, it is removed through the virtues of temperance and fortitude in the appetite, or overcome through the habits of continence and constancy in the will.

I say 2°: The sensitive appetite, as born to obey reason, is the subject of virtue, namely temperance and fortitude⁸. This is common opinion against the Scotists.

I said, « as born to obey reason »; because the sensitive appetite, considered in itself and as common to man and brute, certainly is not the subject of virtue⁹.

It is proved. An act proceeding from one power moved and another moving cannot be perfect unless both powers be well disposed: as the act of the artisan cannot be fitting unless artisan and instrument be well disposed. But although the moving will is in itself well disposed to the proper good of reason, as I said, yet the sensitive appetite is not so disposed when moved, which since it is subject to the will not despotically but politically only, often departs from reason, and without the perfection of virtue superadded obeys it only with difficulty and with repugnance. Therefore¹⁰.

It is confirmed. Virtue must be placed in a subject capable and needy. But the sensitive appetite, as born to obey reason, is capable of virtue and needs it. Therefore. — Proof of the first part of the minor. That a power be capable of virtue there is required 1º that it can be directed by a superior; 2º that it be not determined to one mode of acting; 3º that it be elicitive of a perfect act. But the sensitive appetite 1° can be moved and directed by superior reason; 2º is not determined to one mode of acting, namely conformably to reason, but often deviates from it; 3° can elicit a perfect act, namely when its passions are moderated by temperance, fortitude, and the other virtues annexed. Therefore. — Proof of the second part of the minor. The sensitive appetite suffers grave difficulties in moderating the passions of the concupiscible and irascible. Therefore it needs virtues to overcome them.

You will say: Virtue is a good quality of the mind. But the sensitive appetite does not pertain to the mind. Therefore.

I answer. By mind in the definition of virtue is taken widely every faculty which participates reason. But the sensitive appetite, as moved by the will, participates reason. Therefore.

For the solution of objections there must always be held before the eyes the dependence of the sensitive appetite upon the will, by which actually moved, it participates reason concerning the singular honest good, that is, the election of the will, and perfect liberty, and through the same is regularly ruled by prudence existing in the practical intellect.]

[I suppose 1° that there are in us from nature certain seeds of virtues, both moral and intellectual ¹. For there are in human nature certain common principles naturally congenital, both of things knowable and of things to be done; as in reason certain natural principles of right and honest, in will natural inclination toward good of reason. So likewise in individuals there are certain dispositions toward virtues, as some are readier for sciences, others for fortitude, others for temperance; whence it is said, Job, XXXI, 18 : « From my infancy mercy grew up with me. » But these seeds are not essentially complete and consummated virtues; because what is from nature to man is common to all men, and is not taken away by sin; for even in demons the naturals remain, as St. Dionysius says, c. 4 de Div. nomin. But virtue is present not in all men, and is taken away by sin, at least frequent sin ². Therefore.]

I suppose 2° that certain virtues are acquired by our repeated acts ³, according to the common axiom : « From repeated acts habit is made. » The reason is because, although agents which have in themselves only the active principle of their operation acquire no habit by acting — as heating confers on fire no habit of heating — nevertheless those agents which have in themselves at once both the active principle and the passive principle of their act, insofar as the principle immediately elicitive of act elicits it only as moved by another superior principle existing in the same agent, through repeated acts acquire habit, inasmuch as from the superior moving principle there is derived into the elicitive principle of act a certain impression habitually remaining and expedient for doing those things which it does from the motion of the superior : which fixed impression is called habit; and if it be toward true or honest good, it is called virtue. As therefore from the fact that agent intellect moves passive intellect by imprinting upon it species and notions, intellectual virtue is acquired, v. g., science; so from the fact that intellect moves will, and will the sensitive appetite, virtue is acquired through repeated acts, both in will and in sensitive appetite, that is, a permanent and firm inclination toward honest good.

There remains therefore the question whether, besides the moral virtues acquired, there be others infused per se into us by God. Indeed that the theological virtues are infused per se into us by God is dogma of faith defined in the Council of Trent, Sess. VI, c. 7. Likewise that moral virtues acquirable by our acts can, God so dispensing, be infused per accidens into us admits no doubt, since in this there is no implication, and thus were they infused into Christ and the first parent. But the difficulty is, whether there be moral virtues of supernatural order, not acquirable by our acts, infused per se into us by God. For the resolution of which,

I say : Besides the moral virtues acquired, there are others infused per se into us by God ⁴. It is common with the Angelic against Scotus, whose opinion some theologians note with censure after the definition of the Council of Vienne, concerning which below.

It is proved 1° from Holy Scripture ⁵. God, according to Holy Scripture, teaches men the four cardinal virtues. For it is said, Sap., VIII, 7, of eternal Wisdom : « She teacheth sobriety, that is temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude [virtue], than which nothing is more useful in life to men. » But to teach and to infuse something is the same thing in God; for God teaches not as men do, merely proposing objects, but by infusing light. Whence I Joann., II, 27 : « You have no need that any man teach you; but as his unction teacheth you of all things. »

It is proved 2° by the authority of the Church. Clement V in the Council of Vienne, resolving the question which Innocent III, answering to the archbishop of Arles, cap. Majores, de baptismo, Decretal. lib. III, tit. 42, c. 3, had left undecided, namely : whether faith, charity, and other virtues be infused into infants in baptism? defines thus : « We attending to the general efficacy of the death of Christ, which through baptism is applied equally to all baptized, judged the opinion which says that informing grace and virtues are conferred in baptism alike upon infants and adults to be the more probable, and more consonant and accordant with the sayings of the saints and doctors of modern theology, with the approval of the sacred council we deemed it to be chosen. » By the virtues moreover, in this definition, are understood not only the theological, but also the moral ones; since concerning these also the question posed under Innocent III proceeded, as is plain from what was said. Therefore.

It is confirmed from the Roman Catechism, part II, c. 2, § 51, where it is said : « To this is added the noblest company of all the virtues, which are divinely poured forth into the soul together with grace. »

It is proved 3° by reason. 1º Man through the theological virtues infused is disposed, elevated, and rectified concerning the ultimate supernatural end ⁶. Therefore it is connatural and necessary that he be elevated and rectified equally, through the moral virtues infused, concerning the means attaining this supernatural end. — The consequence is plain, because elevation and rectification through the theological virtues is not only in order to the supernatural end considered in itself, but as attainable through means. But the supernatural end is attainable only through supernatural means.

2° As virtues are distinguished, so also are they multiplied according to formal objects. But one thing is the object and formal motive of acquired virtue, another of infused ⁷. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. The object and formal motive of acquired virtue is natural, that of infused, supernatural. Thus, v. g., although acquired and infused temperance agree in matter — for both are concerned with the delights of touch — they agree not in object and formal motive. Indeed both seek the mean; but infused temperance seeks the mean on another account than acquired temperance : this latter seeks the mean according to the rule of human reason in order to good of nature, health of body, and free use of natural reason; but the infused seeks the mean according to the rule of faith and the reasons of divine law in order to the supernatural end, wherefore it often prescribes stricter abstinence than the natural rule. Similarly of the other virtues. Therefore.]

[Four properties of virtues St. Thomas enumerates in prooemium of question 64. First, that they consist in mean; second, that they be interconnected among themselves; third, that they be unequal; fourth, that they endure after this life.]

§ I. — Whether virtue consists in mean?

[I say 1° : Moral virtue consists in mean ¹. Whence it is defined by Aristotle, II Ethic., c. 6 : « Habit choosing existing in mean » ².

It is proved. Moral virtue properly is perfective of appetitive part of soul concerning some determinate matter; but measure and rule of appetitive motion concerning appetibles is reason itself. But good of anything measured and ruled consists in this that it conform itself to its rule, neither exceeding it nor failing from it, as good in artificial things is to be conformable to rules of art : Therefore good of moral virtue consists in adaequation to measure of reason, not exceeding it, nor failing from it : which is to consist in mean.

I say 2° : Every moral virtue consists in mean of reason. It follows from preceding; for mean of reason is said what is constituted by reason in some matter. But, as we were just saying, moral virtue consists in mean through conformity toward right reason. Therefore ³.

It happens however that the mean, justice excepted, varies. In justice indeed is mean of thing, which is fixed, because compared to things themselves absolutely : E.g., if you owe one hundred, this, neither more nor less, you must repay. Other moral virtues however are concerned about interior passions, in which mean is not same for all, but diverse according to quality of persons : E.g. in temperance, what is mean for one is too little or too much for another. Moreover it must be observed, that even in justice mean depends on reason. Indeed it has from its specific reason that it be mean of thing, but has from general reason of virtue that it be also mean for reason; because nothing is more conformable to reason than constituting equality between right and debt.]

I say 3° : Intellectual virtues also consist in mean ⁴. Reason is because true, which is their object, mediates between excess and defect : for indeed truth is injured by affirming either more than thing has, or less than it has, or denying what it has. There is nevertheless disparity, that mean of speculative intellectual virtues be mean of thing, namely conformity to thing, independently from determination of reason; but mean of practical intellectual virtues, as prudence, be mean of reason, as depending upon determining reason.

I say 4° : Theological virtues per se and by reason of object do not consist in mean, but well accidentally and by reason of subject ⁵. Reason of first part, because we cannot transcend rule of these virtues; for God himself is, who is infinite truth, goodness and power. Whence, attention given to reason of object, we cannot love God too much, or believe and hope in him too much. Attention however given to reason of subject, or as far as concerns our part, we ought to be borne toward God according to measure of our condition, not with excessive effort whereby body be injured, not at unseasonable time which must needs be bestowed on others, as if someone give himself unto contemplation when he ought to attend affairs of family.]

§ II. — Whether all moral virtues are interconnected among themselves?

[Certain it is 1° all intellectual virtues not to be interconnected; for who has one science has not all sciences. Certain it is 2° all theological virtues not to be interconnected; for charity lost through sin, faith and hope can remain. Whence council Trident., sess. VI, can. 28, defined : « If anyone shall say, grace lost through sin, that faith is always lost together with it, or that faith which remains is not true faith...; let him be anathema. » Certain it is 3° all infused moral virtues to be interconnected, because they are properties of grace with which they are infused, and with which perishing they perish.

Virtue can moreover be considered twice over, in perfect state and in imperfect state ⁶. Imperfect virtue is that which does not attain essential reason of habit, but is some disposition or inclination toward some good, arisen either from temperament or from custom of certain acts of imperfect virtue; or, if it attain essential reason of habit, has nevertheless mode of disposition, inasmuch as it inheres not firmly enough in subject, nor subjects it constantly amid all occurring impediments. That virtues imperfect in either way are not interconnected, we confess spontaneously. For we see some, from natural complexion, which is called good disposition, or from some custom, prompt, e.g., unto works of liberality, who are not prompt unto works of chastity : and elsewhere essence of virtue is absolute, not relative, and thus for essence of one another is not necessarily required. Perfect virtue is, not only when it is in heroic degree, but also when it so firmly actuates and perfects subject, that it incline it unto good work well and constantly done promptly and easily in every event and notwithstanding obstacles and difficulties occurring from everywhere.]

I say : Acquired moral virtues in perfect state are so interconnected among themselves, that whoever lacks one, perfectly possesses none ⁷. It is common with St. Thomas, against the Scotists.

It is proved. 1° From Fathers ⁸. St. Ambrosius, book VI on Luke, upon those words : Beati pauperes spiritu, says: « Interconnected and chained together are virtues, so that he who has one seems to have several. » St. Augustinus, book VI de Trinit., c. 4, n. 6 : « Virtues which are in human mind, although each single one be understood now in one way now in another, are nevertheless by no mode separated from each other, so that whosoever be equals, for example, in fortitude, be equal also in prudence, and temperance, and justice. For if you say these are equal in fortitude, but that one excels in prudence : it follows that fortitude of this one be less prudent, and thereby neither are they equal in fortitude, when fortitude of that one is more prudent. And thus about remaining virtues you will find, if you run through all with same consideration. » St. Gregorius, book XXII Moral., c. 1 : « One virtue without others is either altogether none, or imperfect..., because neither is prudence true which is not just, temperate and strong; nor temperance perfect which is not strong, just and prudent. » And Tullius himself said in book II de Tuscul. quaest. : « If you confess yourself not to have one virtue, it is necessary you will have none. »

Prob. 2° by reason ⁹. Perfect virtue is not without perfect prudence. But perfect prudence is not without company of other virtues. Therefore. — Major is certain, because prudence, as regards elections, is rule of moral virtue : whence virtue is defined, « habit choosing as prudent man will have determined. » And clear, because unto right election inclination toward due end does not suffice, which is had through virtue, but also required that one rightly choose those things which are toward end; which is had through prudence, which is counseling, judging and prescribing those things which are toward end. Thence so often we see those who seem powerful with some virtue, suppose strong ones, magnanimous ones, liberal ones, penitents, devout ones, etc., through defect of prudence choose means badly in ordine to end of virtue. — Minor therefore is proved. Prudence is not perfect, if appetite be not perfectly rectified concerning particular ends and matters of all virtues. But rectitude of appetite concerning ends and matters of virtues is had through virtues themselves; for proper to each virtue is to rectify appetite concerning its own end and matter : e.g., it belongs to justice to rectify will concerning what is due to another; to temperance, to rectify appetite concerning delectables of touch; to fortitude, concerning audacities and fears. Therefore. — Major is proved. Prudence is right reason of things doable or elections of means. But there cannot be perfect and right reason of things doable, unless appetite be rightly affected concerning ends; for things doable or eligible hang upon right intention of ends, as conclusions in speculables hang upon principles. Therefore, as reason cannot rightly stand concerning conclusions unless it rightly stand concerning principles, so in practicables same reason cannot stand rightly concerning things doable or eligible, unless appetite rightly stands concerning ends; which rectitude, as was said, is had through virtues themselves.

Thence you have that prudence and virtues hang upon each other in diverse genus of cause. Prudence hangs on remaining virtues in genus of disposive cause, because judgment of prudence cannot be perfect, unless affection be well disposed concerning ends and matters of all virtues, which rectitude is had through virtues themselves, as was said. Remaining virtues however hang on prudence in genus of directive and intrinsic formal cause, because prudence directs election of means unto end, cutting off extremes whereby its judgment could be corrupted and mean of virtue impeded, which extremes wander through all genera of virtues.]

§ III. — Whether acquired moral virtues are necessarily connected with charity?

[Not here question of infused moral virtues, which are known to be inseparable from charity, as properties of sanctifying grace : nor of theological virtues; for faith and hope, according to Trident., sess. VI, cap. 6, precede charity in justification, and can. 28 of council strikes with anathema those who say that, « grace lost through sin, faith is always lost together with it, or that faith which remains is not true faith. » Dealt therefore now only with acquired moral virtues. For whose resolution,

I say : True acquired moral virtues can exist without charity, as they were in many gentiles, but imperfect ¹⁰.

First part is proved. Acquired moral virtue separated from charity has whatsoever pertains to essence of true virtue. Therefore. — The antecedent is proved. If something essential were lacking to virtue separated from charity, this would be order toward supernatural ultimate end. But order toward supernatural ultimate end is not something essential of acquired moral virtue : both because, as Angelicus says, IIa IIae, q. 47, a. 6, c, « end of moral virtues is human good, but human good of soul is to be according to reason : whence it must needs be that ends of moral virtues pre-exist in reason; » and because order toward supernatural end cannot be of essence of entitatively natural habit, such as acquired virtue is. Therefore.

It is confirmed. 1° Charity is not intrinsic and essential form of other virtues, otherwise all virtues would be of same species, but extrinsic only and accidental form, inasmuch as through her they are referred unto supernatural end, whereby as it were ornament they are formed in supernatural order. Therefore independently from charity they are true virtues. 2° Faith, according to definition of Trident., remains true virtue without charity. Why not acquired moral virtues?

Second part is proved. Perfect virtue is not without perfect prudence. But prudence, even acquired, is not totally destroyed through sin, but corrupted only in part, inasmuch as appetite is ill affected concerning end of some virtue against whom namely one sins. Therefore.

It is confirmed. Perfect virtue makes possessor simply good. Such however cannot sinner be called.

Thence you will infer that acquired moral virtues, although without charity they retain essence of virtue, are nevertheless not to be called virtues simply, but secundum quid; because they do not well order man respect simply ultimate end, but only respect ultimate end in some genus, and thus render man not absolutely and simply good. Whence virtues in gentiles are not to be called virtues simply, but according to essential reason of virtue. And perhaps opposite opinion pretends nothing else : whence question seems quasi nominal.]

§ IV. — On equality and duration of virtues.

[I say 1° : Intellectual virtues, speaking simply, are nobler than morals : both because they perfect nobler power, namely intellect; both because they have nobler object, namely things abstracted in common from matter ¹¹. Among moral virtues, prudence is nobler, because nearer to reason, in it indeed subjected; then justice, which resides in will; follows fortitude, lastly temperance, because good of reason shines more forth in fortitude than in temperance : fortitude indeed perfects appetite in those things which pertain immediately unto life and death, temperance in those which pertain mediately only unto both, namely foods and venereals. Greater however is good of reason in things pertaining unto life, whereon other things in man depend, than in foods and venereals.

I say 2° : Moral virtues do not remain after this life as regards their material element ; because there will no longer be place for delectation of foods and venereals, nor dangers of life, nor exchanges and distributions necessary unto use of this life; which all are matter about which moral virtues turn. They will remain nevertheless as regards formal element in fatherland, because appetite rectified and conformable to reason will remain ¹².

And let these few things concerning passions and virtues suffice for our institute. Who wishes to know more, let him read what St. Thomas treats more fully concerning these in cited places, likewise concerning seven gifts of Holy Spirit, eight beatitudes and twelve fruits of Holy Spirit, up to quest. 71.]