Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

DISSERTATION V

ON CONSCIENCE

I say 1° : Conscience, quasi cum alio scientia [knowledge-with-another], or the conjunction and application of knowledge to some particular fact ¹ , can be defined: « The judgment or dictate of the practical intellect dictating from common principles that something in particular here and now is to be shunned as evil, or done as good; » or, as commonly said, « dictating concerning the goodness or malice of those things which are to be done by us here and now. » Conscience therefore is the conclusion of the practical syllogism. Thus, e.g., synderesis says: « Evil is to be shunned. » Reason subsumes: « Yet adultery is evil. » And conscience concludes in the particular: « Therefore adultery is to be shunned by me here and now. »

The definition is explained. It is called judgment or dictate, because conscience is an act, not a power or habit; for a power cannot be laid aside, and a habit is hard to move, but conscience can be laid aside and easily changed. It is called judgment or dictate of the intellect, because conscience pertains to the intellect, not to the will, as appears from the very etymology of the name; for conscience, as I said, is cum alio scientia. It is called judgment of the practical intellect, because the intellect, as while occupied by moral science with general conclusions concerning the goodness or malice of human actions, is called speculative-practical; so while occupied through conscience with particular conclusions concerning the goodness or malice of this act to be placed or shunned here and now, is called practice-practical.

It is called judgment, not imperium, which is expressed in words of the imperative mood: « Do this; » because an imperium of this kind supposes conscience, and is often disconformable to it, as when conscience dictates that something be shunned as evil, and man, reason commanding and conscience remorseful, does it.

It is called dictating something in particular to be done or shunned ² ; because although conscience be also of past things by testifying, approving, reproving, remorsing — of which Apostle, II Cor., I, 12 : This is our glory, the testimony of our conscience; and Isa., LXVI, 24, concerning the conscience of the damned: Their worm shall not die — therefore conscience in all its breadth ought to have been defined, « dictating something to be, to be about to be, or to have been done or shunned. » Because however we treat here of conscience as rule of things to be done, therefore we define under the limitation placed.

[ Conscience differs from Synderesis, which is not a practice-practical judgment concerning things to be done here and now, but « the habitus of operable principles, » which habitus also pertains to the intellect. The Angelic Doctor thus determines the nature of synderesis, Ia p., q. 79, a. 12, c. : « Synderesis is not a power, but a habitus: although certain ones placed synderesis as a certain power higher than reason, others indeed said it is reason itself, not as it is reason, but as nature. For the evidence of this it must be considered that man's ratiocination, since it is a certain motion, proceeds from the understanding of certain things, namely naturally known without investigation of reason, as from a certain immobile principle, and terminates at understanding also, inasmuch as we judge through principles per se naturally known concerning the things found out by ratiocinating. But it stands established that, as speculative reason ratiocinates about speculative things, so practical reason ratiocinates about operable things. There must therefore be naturally indited in us, as principles of speculative things, so also principles of operables. But first, the principles of speculative things naturally indited in us do not pertain to any special power, but to a certain special habitus, which is called the understanding of principles, as appears in VI Ethic., c. 6. Whence also the principles of operables naturally indited in us pertain not to a special power, but to a special natural habitus, which we call synderesis. Whence synderesis is said 'to instigate toward good and murmur about evil,' inasmuch as we proceed through first principles to find out, and judge what is found. It appears therefore that synderesis is not a power, but a natural habitus. »

Synderesis therefore is habitus, but conscience act.

Through synderesis the intellect possesses general principles whose light we can judge of the morality of actions, and conscience is an act of the intellect commanded by the will whereby we apply moral principles to judging of the morality of our actions in the singular.

Sometimes however synderesis is named conscience, but improperly, because habitus is taken for the act of which it is principle. Which our Doctor marks ibidem, a. 13, c. : « Properly speaking, conscience names an act. But since habitus is the principle of act, sometimes the name of conscience is attributed to the first natural habitus, namely synderesis, as Jerome, in glossa Ezech. I, calls synderesis conscience, and Basil, natural judgment, and Damascene says that it is the light of our intellect. For it is customary that causes and effects be mutually named. » ]

I say 2° : Conscience is divided commonly into true and false or erroneous, uncertain and probable or opinionative, and doubtful; into perplexed, scrupulous and lax; because reason judges in just so many ways from common principles of the licitness or illicitness of a particular action, as will appear from the enumeration and explanation of each.

True conscience is that which from true principles dictates something in particular to be licit or illicit which is really such.

False or erroneous conscience is that which from false principles, nevertheless reputed true, dictates something to be licit or illicit which is not really such. And it is twofold, vincibly and invincibly erroneous, like ignorance itself.

Certain conscience is that which formally and in itself, and in all the principles from which it is immediately formed, is such as to exclude every reasonable fear of the opposite.

Probable or opinionative conscience is that which from merely probable principles dictates something to be licit or illicit, with fear of the opposite part.

Doubtful conscience is the suspension of the intellect assenting to neither part of a contradiction, either because of contrary reasons equally probable, and it is called doubtful positively; or because it has no reasons pro or contra, and is called doubtful negatively. It would better be called un-knowing or ignorant. For one asking whether the sands of the sea are equal, one would better answer: « I know not, » than: « I doubt; » because if asked further why I doubt, I should have nothing to answer. Conscience doubtful in either way does not seem conscience properly and strictly so called, because it is not a definite judgment, such as conscience ought to be.

[ Perplexed conscience is that whereby someone, constituted amid two precepts, believes he sins whichever part he choose. E.g., if one could by perjury save the life or liberty of the accused in court, and were distressed on the one side by the precept of religion not to perjure himself, and on the other, led by error, by the precept of charity toward his neighbor, nor could resolve the difficulty. ]

Scrupulous conscience is that which from futile and utterly contemptible reasons judges or fears lest an action be evil. I say: « Judges or fears, » because if it truly from these light and vain reasons judge the action evil, it is truly conscience; but if it only fear lest it be evil against the judgment it has of its goodness, it is not properly conscience, but rather the shadow or likeness of conscience. The first is called scruples formed, the second scruples agitated. Against the former it is not lawful to act, well against the latter, as I shall say below.

Lax or loose conscience is that which from very slight and contemptible moments judges that not evil which is really evil, or a light evil which is grave, when either can easily be detected. To this approaches the pharisaical conscience, which makes great things small and small things great, straining out the gnat and swallowing the camel, Matth., XXIII, 24. These two consciences, scrupulous and lax, differ in this, as appears, from the probable, that the probable rests upon weighty moments, not these; whence they belong to the erroneous.

In a twofold way we can conform to conscience: negatively, by not acting against it; positively, by acting according to it.

I say 1°: It is never licit to act against conscience, whether prohibiting or commanding, whether true or erroneous, even if it err vincibly; so that, if conscience dictate something to be prohibited, that cannot be put into act, and if it dictate something to be commanded, that cannot be omitted.

This is common opinion with the Author¹.

It is proved 1° from that of the Apostle ad Rom., XIV, 23: All that is not of faith is sin. For by faith the holy Fathers and interpreters commonly understand conscience.

It is proved 2° by reason². 1° Conscience is the proximate and immediate rule of human acts, namely inasmuch as it intimates or applies the law here and now commanding or prohibiting, whether because by force and name of law it prohibits or commands this act, although perhaps the law neither prohibit nor command it. Therefore to act against conscience is to act against the law actually binding, at least judged such; which cannot come to pass without contempt of law. 2° He sins who wills sin and is allured by it³. But he who acts against conscience, even erring, wills sin. Therefore. — Proof. of the minor. He wills sin who does what he judges to be sin. But he who acts against conscience does what he judges to be sin. Therefore.

I say 2°: We are bound not only not to act against an invincibly erroneous conscience, but we are bound absolutely to act according to it, while it dictates something to be done as of precept⁴.

It is proved: 1° Because omission of the act which invincibly erroneous conscience dictates to be of precept is no more from faith than the doing of the act which it dictates to be prohibited. 2° Because not to act according to invincibly erroneous conscience commanding something is to act against it: thus, e.g., if conscience dictate to thee invincibly that thou must lie in order to save the life of thy neighbor, if thou act not according to it by lying, by this very fact thou actest against it. But from the preceding conclusion it stands that it is not licit to act against an invincibly erring conscience. Therefore.

[ Not only he who acts with an invincibly erroneous conscience does not sin, but also, more probably, acquires merit. The reason is, that to pronounce some act good, at least inadequately, it suffices that it be directed by the dictate of reason and prudence. Since therefore one who acts prudently acts, without doubt he ought to merit on account of the good end which he intends and by whose power he acts, namely the glory of God or charity toward neighbor, etc.; just as, on the contrary, he demerits who does a work materially good but apprehended as evil, on account of the evil end unto which it is directed. This is drawn from this principle, that, if integrally or adequately, that is materially at once and formally, acts are specified by object and end; nevertheless, under the latter respect, their morality is determined by end alone, as the Angelic Doctor teaches, Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 3, c.: « Moral acts properly take their species from the end. » Whence he concludes, Quodlib. II, a. 27, c.: « A human act is judged virtuous or vicious according to the good apprehended, into which the will tends, and not according to the material object of the act. » And herein he consents to Augustine saying lib. II de Moribus Ecclesiae et Manich., c. 13, n. 27: « If the end to which the things we do are referred, that is for the sake of which we do whatever we do, have been not only blameless but also laudable, then at length our deeds also are worthy of some praise. » To which accords Bernard in lib. de Praecepto et Dispensat., c. 14, n. 41: « And indeed, he says, I should call worthy of praise pious intention alone, nor shall good will itself be plainly defrauded of due recompense even in a work not good. » ]

I say 3°: More probably we are bound to act according to a vincibly erring conscience commanding something to be done, not absolutely, but conditionally and on the hypothesis that it be not laid aside, as it can and ought to be laid aside. It is the opinion of John of St. Thomas, Serra and many others, against Sylvius and many others.

It is manifest by the same reasons: both because omission of the act which erroneous conscience dictates to be of precept is not from faith; and because not to act according to a vincibly erring conscience commanding something to be done is to act against it, as I was just now saying of invincibly erring conscience. Therefore.

You will say: One can and is held to lay aside that conscience. Therefore he is not held to act according to it. Indeed he can and is held to lay it aside; but, if he lay it not aside, what must he do? In this supposition alone our conclusion runs. And we say that he is held to follow it, because he cannot act against it; but he would act against it if he did not follow it. — Thou wilt infer: Therefore he will be bound to sin, because he sins by following it. So it is. He will be bound to sin, not absolutely, but from a supposition voluntary on his part, which he can take away by laying aside his conscience. Which is not inconvenient.

You will ask 1° how he who labors under vincibly erroneous conscience ought to lay it aside.

I answer. that he ought to lay it aside with prudence and maturity, lest, if he lay it aside rashly, and perhaps the conscience which he suspects to be erroneous be not erroneous, he expose himself to danger of doing ill what conscience prohibited, or omitting ill what it commanded. He ought therefore to employ humble prayer to the Father of lights, examine the whole matter exactly, consult books or learned men, and employ such diligence as prudent and upright men are wont to employ in weighty affairs. Speaking regularly, however, there suffices for the unlettered, indeed also for scrupulous lettered men, the judgment of pastor, confessor, or superior, saying that the conscience is erroneous; because by right it is presumed that God denies not to those whom he has set as rectors of others the light necessary for ruling them, while they themselves lack it.

[ These things indeed are true regarding him who here and now in any way advertises or suspects the necessity of inquiring into the licitness of an action before he put it into act. But it can happen that, even if the error be truly vincibly contracted, because it was formerly incurred culpably, the agent in the present neither adverts to it nor suspects it. This happens to a confessor who once cultivated theology insufficiently, or too long neglected its study through negligence. Of such a confessor St. Thomas most rightly says, q. 17 de Veritate, a. 8, ad 8, that « he is never excused from sin, » whether he act according to conscience or against it. And the reason of this decision is evident, because there remains the sin, however old it be supposed, of culpable ignorance of those things which one is held to know, that he rightly fulfill the duties of his own state. This guilt is indeed not incurred at the instant at which one is about to act, but it is a fault of diligence formerly omitted and independent of present action. Whence the gravity of this sin is not drawn from the action now to be put forth, but must be estimated from the common principles concerning sins of ignorance. Hence is also seen why, in this case, he is more guilty who acts against conscience than he who acts according to it. For the latter has only the aforesaid guilt of ignorance; the former truly, besides this, adds now another guilt of an action put forth against conscience, from the principle enunciated by the Apostle, Rom., XIV, 23: All that is not of faith is sin. — If he who labors under such ignorance retract the admitted fault through congruent penance and added diligence, as is fitting, he is to be equated with him who lives in invincible ignorance. ]

You will ask 2° whether a subject can obey a superior against conscience dictating that it is illicit here and now to obey him.

I answer. in the negative; because, as was said, it is never licit to act against conscience, and it binds by force of divine precept, which outweighs the precept of man. Yet if it be vincibly erroneous, the subject ought to lay it aside and obey.

Yet beware lest here thou confuse conscience about the liceity or illicenity of obedience to be rendered here and now to a superior, with doubt or speculative judgment about the injustice of his precept, as certain men seem here to confuse, and therefore treat and resolve this question very perplexedly. These things are wholly diverse, and a subject can doubt, or even judge more probably speculatively that the superior commands ill, and nevertheless practically judge himself held here and now to obey him. That this may be explained,

You will ask 3° whether a subject doubting or judging more probably the precept of a superior to concern something illicit, can and ought obey him.

I answer. A subject who is not certain, but doubts, or even judges more probably the precept of the superior to concern something illicit, speaking regularly, can and is held to obey him, forming for himself a morally certain conscience of the liceity of his obedience from the following principles.

1° The holy Fathers teach that one must obey a superior when it is not certain that what he commands is against God. Aug., lib. XXII contra Faustum, cap. 75: « A just man, he says, if perchance he serve as soldier under a king, even a sacrilegious one, could rightly, at his command, wage war, observing the order of civil peace; of which it is certain either that what is commanded is not against the precept of God, or that it is uncertain whether it be. » St. Bernard., lib. de Praecept. et Dispensat., c. 9, n. 21:

« Whatever man commands in God's stead, provided it be not certain that it displease God, is altogether to be received no otherwise than if God command it. » St. Bernardine of Siena, in the dialogue on Obedience: « A subject reasonably doubts whether what is commanded be sin: is he then not held to obey the prefect? »

2° The superior has certain right of commanding, nor is he stripped of his right on account of the subject's doubt. Therefore the subject is held to obey him; for right of commanding and obligation of obeying are correlates.

3° From denial of obedience, while manifest cause cannot be assigned, authority is enervated in superiors, obedience perishes among subjects, quarrels and contentions are born between superiors and inferiors, and thus government is impeded in many things, with scandal of others.

From these principles therefore, although there remain a speculative doubt or more probable judgment about the dishonesty of the precept, which I suppose invincible, the subject can form for himself a morally certain conscience about the honesty of his obedience, thus discoursing: I can and am held to obey a superior when I am not certain that what he commands me is against God. But I am not certain that what he here and now commands me is against God. Therefore I can and am held here and now to obey him. The major is morally certain, from the principles posited. The minor is physically certain, and therefore also the conclusion, which is conscience, is morally certain.

I said, « speaking regularly; » because the conclusion admits exception, if namely from obedience there follow a graver inconvenience than from disobedience. For a superior is not judged prudent to will binding in these circumstances, otherwise he would abuse his right. And if he insist, ignorant perhaps of the inconvenience, the subject is understood to obey as much as he can and ought. Nor can it be said that he has certain right of commanding in these circumstances, but rather on the contrary it seems certain that he has it not.

I say 1°: To act against conscience, whether right or erroneous, is not of itself a special sin; because the precept of acting according to conscience is not a special precept, but general, such as the precept of obeying the law. Whence that it be against right conscience, e.g., to steal, conscience remorsing, it retains the species of the sin committed, namely theft; but that it be against erroneous conscience pertains to that species of sin which conscience dictates against which one acts ¹ : as, if conscience dictate that one must lie to save the life of his neighbor, not lying pertains to sin of homicide; if it dictate that to swear would be sacrilege, if he swear it will be sacrilege. The reason is, because an act is specified by its object, not as it is in itself, but as it is in apprehension.

I say 2°: What is done against conscience, whether vincibly or invincibly erring, is mortal or venial; because as species so also quantity of malice is taken from the object, not according to itself, but as apprehended and proposed to the will ². Whence whoever acts against conscience dictating something to be mortal sins mortally; if conscience dictate it venial he sins venially. Except, unless what conscience vincibly erring dictates venial or light be in reality grave and mortal; because voluntary error, such as vincible is, does not take away essential gravity of sin. Whence whoever steals gold thinking vincibly it to be venial sin nevertheless sins mortally.

I say 3°: If erring conscience dictates something to be evil, but determines it not to be mortal or venial — which happens not rarely — a distinction must be made. Either conscience proposes, at least confusedly, the matter about which it is concerned as something grave or as something light: if the first, to act against it will be mortal; if the second, venial. Always the same reason holds, because quantity of malice of will is from the object apprehended through reason. But if in no way, nor even confusedly, it advert to gravity or lightness, it seems more probable that then to act against it is mortal sin; because thus the agent exposes himself to peril of sinning mortally, and wills to commit the sin whatsoever it be. — It is confirmed. Whoever is ready to swear anything whatsoever, whether true or false, if not advertent to true or false he swear, sins mortally by swearing, even though he swear truth. Ergo similarly.

Moreover for some modification of this resolution, for tranquillity of consciences, we judge with Sylvius, that if anyone were so disposed in mind, that if there came into his mind what he does to be mortal, he would nowise will to commit it, he would be excused from mortal; because from that habitual disposition it is presumed that he does not apprehend as mortal what he does.

I say 1° : If there be question of conscience erring vincibly, it seems beyond doubt that the confessor is bound to admonish his penitent : 1° Because, as physician, he ought to guard against his formal sins, from which he is not excused by a conscience erring vincibly. 2° Because such a penitent is in an evil state and incapable of absolution. The same must be said of those who ask whether this be sin or not; because by the very fact that they ask, they seem to doubt, and not to have invincible ignorance, and moreover the confessor is not only judge of the penitent, but is doctor, whose office it is to instruct, especially those who beg to be instructed. And I esteem both parts of the conclusion true, even though no hope of amendment appear; because the same reasons urge, and besides no inconvenience follows from admonition; for equally does the penitent sin formally whether admonished or not, since his vincible ignorance will not excuse him from formal sin.

You will ask by what signs the confessor can know that the error was vincible in the penitent.

I answer. Let him interrogate : 1° whether he adverted to any indecency in this act; 2° whether his own conscience dictated to him that he ought at least to consult a confessor, or another prudent man; 3° whether out of shame or fear he neglected the occasion of asking. If the penitent answer affirmatively to one or other of these, he can be held to be laboring under inculpable error; otherwise if he deny all. Gury, de Conscientia, n. 38.

I say 2° : If there be question of a conscience erring invincibly, a distinction is needed. Either there is hope of amendment, and no danger of graver inconvenience from admonition, or there is no hope of amendment, or there is danger of a graver inconvenience than the material sin of the penitent. If there be hope of amendment, and no danger of a graver inconvenience than the material sin of the penitent, the confessor is bound to admonish him; because, as doctor, he is bound, where no inconvenience is feared, to instruct his penitent, and to guard against sins in him, even material ones. But if there be no hope of amendment, or only a very slight one, or if there be, yet graver inconveniences are justly feared than the material sin of the penitent, as a rule the confessor neither is bound nor can admonish. The reason of the first part, because, hope of amendment set aside, the gravest inconvenience follows, namely that this penitent will sin formally, whereas before he sinned only materially, and that being admonished he is damned, who not admonished might have been saved. It is better therefore to leave him in good faith : whence Aug., hom. 41, among the 50,¹

si quis, dist. 7 de Poenit. : « If I knew that I did not profit you, I would not admonish you, I would not terrify you. » The reason of the second part is, that of several evils the less is to be chosen.

I said, « as a rule, » because certain cases are excepted.

Excepted is 1° if the penitent be invincibly ignorant of what is necessary with necessity of means for salvation, as that God is triune, incarnate, that sorrow for sins is necessary together with the sacrament for obtaining remission of sins, and the like. For whether there be hope of amendment or not, the confessor ought on these points to admonish and instruct his penitent, partly because otherwise the penitent is not capable of absolution, partly because even if he do not admonish him, he will no more be saved on account of ignorance of these things. It is better therefore to place him in that state in which he can be saved, if he wish, and from which it is likely that hope of amendment will not be excluded throughout the whole course of life.

2° Excepted is the case where the invincible ignorance of the penitent verges toward scandal of many or damage to the common good ; as if a priest ministering the sacraments were invalidly ordained, if the nullity of some marriage were notorious, etc. The penitent must be admonished, whether there be hope of amendment or not, because the good of many, especially the common good, prevails over the good of any particular person.

Certain authors add, and not badly, even if the ignorance of the penitent verge toward grave damage to some particular person ; because it seems to belong to charity and equity that I rather guard against the damage of an unwilling innocent² than the damage of him who is supposed to incur it by his own will and malice.

Here a distinction must be made : namely whether grave damage, to be borne by a particular person from such an error, casts into peril the salvation of his soul or only temporal goods. If the former, the one erring invincibly seems bound to be admonished, because, if perchance he acquiesce not in the admonition, at least the peril of salvation will be removed from the other, and the lost good will be compensated by a good of the same nature and weight. If the errant one, unwilling to obey, perish, he will perish by his own fault, and it cannot be said that his soul should be preferred to another's soul. In the latter case, since the good of a superior order is to be preferred to the good of an inferior order, we hold that the errant one, probably not going to obey the admonition, is to be left in good faith. If it be objected that the consent of him who would suffer damage of this kind ought not be presumed, we answer that he is not reasonably unwilling, because the order of charity requires that provision be made for the eternal salvation of the neighbor at temporal loss, even grave. Moreover, the confessor, concerning whom here chiefly there is question, is bound ex officio to provide for the spiritual good of the penitent, not indeed for the temporal good of another, and since he cannot avert these two evils simultaneously, he ought choose the less, or rather permit it.

3° Excepted by certain more recent authors, and well, is the case where the ignorance concerns the natural law, as regards secondary principles, v. g., pollution, venereal delectation, etc. Because although invincible ignorance of these things can exist for a time (which nevertheless many deny), this ignorance cannot long endure, and easily and shortly becomes vincible, on account of the suspicion of malice which an act evil and dishonest of itself carries with it. Whence if the penitent be not admonished, when the occasion arises he will reckon this suspicion as ill-founded because of the silence of confessors, and will easily contemn it, and thus he will persevere in sin already formally, from a conscience erring vincibly ; but if he be admonished, there is hope that he will sin with greater remorse, will open his wicked habit to confessors, receive salutary remedies from them, and finally come to himself.

You will say against the second part of the second conclusion : A penitent in whom there is no hope of amendment, if admonished, ought not be held sufficiently disposed for absolution. Therefore.

I answer. I deny the antecedent. For that one be held sufficiently disposed, it suffices that he detest sin above every evil in its kind, nor is it necessary that he descend to singulars; otherwise, human frailty attended to, few would be true penitents : « Contrite, says St. Thomas, Quodlibet 1, a. 9, he is bound in general to will to suffer whatsoever punishment rather than sin...; but to descend in particular to this punishment or that he is not bound. Nay more, anyone would act foolishly who should solicit himself or another concerning punishments of this particular kind... And therefore to descend in such matters to singulars is to lead man into temptation and furnish occasion of sinning. » He teaches the same in Suppl., q. 3, a. 1.

From what has been said you will gather : 1° that if the confessor discover that the marriage of the penitent is null, which however the penitent himself believes invincibly valid, if he prudently judge that the penitent once admonished would not depart from the putative wife, or that if he depart, grave inconveniences and scandals would follow, namely hatreds and long-lasting quarrels, incontinence, defamation or desertion of an honest family or of children, and the like, he ought be silent and leave the penitent in good faith. But if there be question of contracting marriage, attention must be given to the irreverence toward the sacrament, and to the evils naturally apt to follow from an invalid marriage if the penitent be not admonished; and these must be weighed against the inconveniences foreseen to follow if he be admonished, and what seems less must be chosen, admonishing or keeping silence. As a rule, while future act is concerned, the thing still remaining intact, lesser evils follow if he be admonished than if he be not; whence as a rule in this case the penitent must be admonished. From these cases resolve others similar.

You will gather 2° that the confessor is bound to admonish a penitent whom he sees laboring under an erroneous conscience against himself, namely judging to be sin what is not, or mortal what is only venial. V. g., a layman thinks himself bound under mortal sin to be present at Vespers on Sundays and feasts, or that he cannot drink for refreshment on a fast day ; a religious or nun believes herself bound under mortal sin by regular silence or fasting; a wife reckons many mortalities in the use of matrimony which are only venial : in these, I say, and like cases, the confessor ought to admonish the penitent; because, as was said, as doctor he ought to instruct him, and as physician to guard against his formal sins, especially since there follows no inconvenience outweighing the inconvenience which follows if he be not admonished. For that thence the penitent perhaps sin venially more easily and frequently is far less inconvenient than if he sin mortally once only from an erroneous conscience.

It is asked 1° what scruple is. What a scrupulous conscience is.

I answer. Scruple is said metaphorically from a scruple, which is a rough pebble getting into the shoe of one walking, hurting him not so much as molesting him, and delaying his step. Whence a scruple is nothing else than a light and empty little reason occurring concerning the malice of an action, whose solution is not found; and thereupon the mind either opines, or suspects, or doubts, or fears with anxiety, lest the action be evil. It can be about the past, as when someone from a futile reason fears that he omitted some sin or circumstance in confession, that he consented to temptation, etc.; or about the present or future, as when someone from a like motive fears that what he does, or is about to do, be sin.

A scrupulous conscience can be distinguished two ways, as I already said in art. 1: One formed from scruples, and it is a dictamen of practical reason by which one judges, for light and empty reasons, that what he does is illicit, or doubts about it. This conscience is called scrupulous improperly, and it is either erroneous or doubtful, and of it we do not treat here: insofar as it pertains to error, it was treated in the preceding articles; insofar as it pertains to doubt, it will be treated in the following article. The other is agitated and tortured by scruples, namely while one judges what he does to be licit, yet for slight causes fears and is anxious lest it be illicit. Whence, as is plain, insofar as it is scrupulous, it is not properly conscience, but the shadow and likeness of conscience. Therefore by the name of scrupulous conscience is commonly understood either that scruple which is as it were the dictamen of a scrupulous intellect, or the very anxiety caused by scruples, or the disposition of a soul inclined to scruples. Of scrupulous conscience thus taken the following things are to be understood.

It is asked 2° by what signs a scrupulous conscience can be recognized.

I answer. Chiefly by these: 1° If he reputes as sins those things which everywhere among the wise and God-fearing are held as nothing, or often doubts about them and questions others. 2° If he either has no faith in the prudent and learned man, e.g., a prelate or confessor, asserting the action to be licit, or complies with anxious fear, again and again consulting the same man or others, trusting no one and always seeking the greatest security. 3° If in confession he sets forth his sins so exactly that he omits no circumstance, though light or most light, nay sometimes impertinent, often repeating and dwelling upon the same things, and does not acquiesce when the confessor admonishes that it suffices; or never rests concerning confessions made with due diligence, often repeating them in whole or in part. 4° If he recites the prescribed prayers, whether of the breviary, of penance, of a vow, or in the celebration of Mass, with fastidious slowness, frequently repeating them and halting to recall intention and attention. Besides these, the scrupulous man himself can and ought to acknowledge that he is scrupulous, and so to comport himself, chiefly from the testimony of his confessor or of another upright and learned man, to whom his conscience has been laid open, who judges him to be scrupulous.

It is asked 3° whether it is licit to act against a scrupulous conscience.

I answer. Not only is it licit, but expedient, nay obligatory, to act against a scrupulous conscience, such as we said is vexed by scruples.

The reason of the first part is, because a conscience of this kind is not, as I said, true conscience, but the shadow of conscience; nor a judgment, but a certain anxiety and ill-founded fear, or a strong imagination by which man is miserably vexed.

The reason of the second and third parts is, because scrupulous conscience is a certain sickness of mind disturbing peace, taking away devotion, engendering sloth, and a great hindrance in the progress of the spiritual life, nay a disposition to the most grievous sins of despair, blasphemy and infidelity. Care must nevertheless be taken lest the scrupulous man, overcome by his scruples, truly judge in practice that he acts ill, or doubt of it in practice; for then it would be a doubtful or erroneous conscience, against which it is not licit to act. But it is not easily to be believed of a scrupulous man who asserts that he acted with doubt; for ordinarily he takes doubt for anxiety or fearfulness, or for speculative doubt, which is not conscience.

It is asked 4° what are the chief causes of scruples.

I answer. That some are intrinsic, some extrinsic. The intrinsic are: First, a natural complexion suspicious and timid, such as is usually the melancholic. Second, weakness and inconstancy of mind, not holding firmly to things once determined, or to practical principles sufficiently known: under this head women are more frequently scrupulous than men. Third, an ignorance whereby one cannot discern between licit and illicit, between temptation and consent; or such subtlety of genius as suffices to devise reasons for doubting, and does not suffice to solve them. Fourth, hidden pride, whereby one, trusting too much to his own judgment, will acquiesce in no counsel. Fifth, excessive austerities, by which, with the head weakened, the mind is easily disturbed.

The chief extrinsic causes are: First, the society of scrupulous men, the direction of a scrupulous confessor, or the reading of cases of conscience in one who is less able to discern. Second, the devil, who by this art tempts, to turn men away from the exercise of the virtues. Third, God himself permitting it so, whether in punishment of past sins, or for the exercise of humility and patience, or to shake off tepidity in his service, or on account of other ends known to himself.

It is asked 5° by what remedies the scrupulous are to be cured.

I answer. 1° Generally speaking, the causes of scruples are to be removed by their contraries; for contraries are cured by contraries. Hence let the melancholic be healed by the help of a physician; let the timorous by frequent meditation contemplate the goodness of God, and apprehend him, not as a hard master or merciless exactor, but as a good Father; let the proud not lean upon their own prudence; and so of the rest. 2° Let him have recourse by frequent and humble prayer to God, the consoler of the afflicted; let him offer to him the troubles of his mind with patience and submissive resignation in satisfaction for his sins, meanwhile conceiving a filial confidence of obtaining help at last, and of tranquillity returning after the storm. 3° Let him take the life and common sense of God-fearing men for his rule, holding it for certain that God does not suffer these to err commonly. 4° Let him beware of idleness and vagrant thoughts, especially about the acts of past life, which open a door to scruples; but let him apply himself diligently to labor, and to that labor above all which best helps and delights the mind, provided it contain nothing evil. 5° But the remedy supremely necessary, and perhaps the only one, for curing the scrupulous, in the common judgment, is blind and absolute obedience to the sayings, counsels and precepts of a prudent and wise man, to whom his conscience has been laid open, namely his confessor or director.

It is asked 6° how the confessor ought to act with a scrupulous person.

I answer. 1° Where the confessor perceives his penitent to be scrupulous (and this he will be able to know from the signs assigned), let him admonish him that he is scrupulous and to be cured according to the rules for the scrupulous, lest perchance, despising scruples, he despise conscience itself.

2° Let him impress upon him the necessity of blind and absolute obedience to all the sayings and precepts of his confessor, his own judgment despised and scruples neglected; and if he be not disposed in mind to render this obedience, or to endeavor after it, he is to be dismissed as incurable, since, as I said, he can scarcely be healed by any other remedy. But that he may persuade him to this obedience entire and blind, let him set before him: 1° that the scrupulous man, having a disturbed judgment and an impaired imagination, cannot be governed by his own judgment; wherefore it was said to him before all others, Prov., I, 5: Lean not upon thy own prudence, since thou art wise in thy own conceit.

2° That it belongs to a proud mind, and is against the rules of prudence and humility, to prefer one's own judgment, especially when so disturbed, to the judgment of the director. 3° That although the director err, the scrupulous man himself will not sin by obeying, according to the unanimous doctrine of the Saints and of spiritual masters; because he will do what is safer and what God requires of him.

3° Let him teach him that positive laws, whether divine or human, do not bind under grave loss and great difficulty, which is called moral impotence; but great anxiety and molestation is great difficulty. Hence let him forbid the scrupulous man who is continually anguished in the recitation of the hours, and always fears that he omitted something or was willingly distracted, to repeat; nay, if he were so scrupulous that there would scarcely be an end of repeating, and that hence he would suffer grave and continual molestations, the recitation of the breviary would be altogether to be interdicted to him, as morally impossible.

4° Let him command him to repute nothing, whether act done or to be done, a mortal sin, unless it stand certain to him to be mortal, and so certainly that he could swear it to be mortal; because in doubt, as the rule of law has it, « concerning matters commonly contingent there is a prudent presumption. » Since therefore the scrupulous man is wont to doubt or imagine that sins exist, or are mortal, which are not, by law they are presumed in doubt not to be such. Moreover, since he doubts even of the most evident things, and suspects evil where there is not even a shadow of evil, the burden would be intolerable if he had to hold in practice for sin whatever falls under his doubt.

5° When the scrupulous man is anxious about past confessions, whether he was sufficiently contrite, whether he confessed all sins and all circumstances, never permit him to repeat them unless these two concur together: first, that he be certain they were mortal; second, that he be equally certain they were not duly confessed. Likewise do not permit him to confess doubtful present sins, but only certain ones, and simply, with the circumstances absolutely necessary; and admonish him not to institute an anxious and utterly exact examination, but only a moderate one: and when he has only doubtful sins, command him to celebrate without being heard, or to approach the holy synaxis. The reason of these things is, because the positive law of the material integrity of confession does not bind under grave loss, as we said above of positive laws in general. Grave, however, would be the loss and damage of the scrupulous man if he should have to confess all doubts, whether present or past; there would be no end of scruples, but rather they would be multiplied and entangled, and thus the anxiety would be perpetual and the torment intolerable; whence, if he omit certain sins, it is not imputed to him.

Finally, for a crown to all, let the confessor remember not to waver in his decisions, as if doubting or merely opining, but let him define and command with certainty; otherwise the anxiety will not be quieted, but rather increased. Moreover, with the timid let him proceed in gentleness of spirit, with the proud somewhat roughly; yet let him not drive them to despair, but mix oil with wine.

It is asked 7° how one ought to answer the objections of scrupulous men.

For that they may withdraw themselves from the counsels and precepts of confessors, the scrupulous say: 1° that the confessor did not understand everything sufficiently well; 2° that they know themselves better than anyone else; 3° if I were in danger of death, I would not wish to act thus, and to die in that state; 4° that in doubts the safer side is to be chosen, and certainty preferred to uncertainty.

To the first must be answered, that a prudent man does not act blindly and without deliberation, and that if the confessor had not understood sufficiently, he would not prescribe this or that. Besides, given that the confessor errs, God will never impute the error to the scrupulous man who humbly obeys the mandates of his confessor.

To the second answer, that the conscience of scrupulous men, insofar as they are scrupulous, is weak and erroneous, and therefore no stand is to be taken upon its judgment, according to that of Prov., I, 5: Lean not upon thy own prudence.

To the third answer, that scrupulous men would do many things in the article of death which are not necessary, but useless, or certainly that they would acquiesce in the counsel of a prudent man.

To the fourth answer, that doubt ought not to remain for scrupulous men where the authority and mandate of the confessor accede to one side, and that they ought to hold as certain and safe what he persuades or commands them.

Note 1°. Doubt is distinguished threefold: speculative, speculative-practical and practically-practical. Merely speculative is that which turns upon the nature, substance, value, quality and condition of things, whether speculative or moral: as if you doubt whether the angelic nature is universal, whether baptism conferred in rose water is valid. Speculative-practical is that which turns upon the goodness or malice, licitness or illicitness of an act in itself and in common, which goodness or malice is called objective and material: as if you doubt whether it is licit to baptize in rose water, to journey on a feast day, etc. Practically-practical is that which turns upon the goodness or malice, licitness or illicitness of an act to be done here and now, with all the circumstances attended to, which is called formal goodness or malice: as if you doubt whether it is licit for you here and now to baptize in rose water a dying infant.

What I said of doubt must be said of judgment, namely that it is threefold: merely speculative, concerning the nature or quality of things; speculative-practical, concerning the objective goodness or malice of actions; and practically-practical, concerning the formal goodness or malice of actions.

That the doubt or judgment which we call speculative-practical may be such, it must regard action in itself indeed, but as to be exercised, or in order to practice, and to influence it, inasmuch as from it the doubt or judgment practically-practical is formed: otherwise it will be purely speculative. But in the doubt or judgment alone practically-practical is situated the doubtful or probable conscience.

Note 2° doubt is again distinguished into negative and positive. Negative is, when there are no reasons or only very light ones for or against; and, as I already noted, it is improperly called doubt, and better named nescience or ignorance. Whence they err who recognize this doubt alone as doubt properly so called. Positive doubt is, when because of contrary reasons, on either side equally or nearly equally probable, the mind fluctuates suspended between both parts, assenting to neither.

Note 3°. Certitude, which is opposed to doubt, can be distinguished threefold: metaphysical, physical and moral. Metaphysical certitude is the adherence of the mind to truth which cannot be otherwise even by God, as: The whole is greater than its part; anything either is or is not. Physical certitude is the assent to truth which cannot be otherwise according to ordinary laws, although it could be otherwise through miracle, as a faggot thrown into fire to burn. Moral certitude is the assent to some truth founded and reasonable without fear of the opposite, although the opposite could absolutely and without miracle be, such as is that which is had in law through two witnesses worthy of faith, or that which is had about the baptism of anyone from the baptismal register; because, although it could happen that two witnesses held worthy of faith depose falsely, and that the pastor wrote falsely, yet that rarely happens, and it is a remote danger, which ought not prudently to be feared: otherwise there would be no end of doubts. These observations run through various parts of Theology; whence, set down once for all, they are to be firmly retained in memory.

I say: It is never licit to act with a doubtful conscience, probable or more probable properly so called ¹]

instead of a probable or more probable practically-practical doubt or judgment concerning the formal goodness or malice of the action; but only a morally certain conscience is the rule of our actions. It is certain and common, even among probabilists.

It is proved. 1° Conscience is the immediate rule of our actions. But a rule ought to be certain and infallible, at least morally: otherwise it would not be proposed as a rule, but would be regulable. Therefore.

2° He who acts with a doubtful conscience, probable or only more probable, does not act prudently. Therefore he sins. — The antecedent is proved. That anyone may act prudently, he ought to have no reasonable and founded fear of the formal dishonesty of his act; for the act of prudence is always practically true and morally certain. But he who acts with a doubtful conscience, or one only probable and more probable, concerning the formal honesty of his act, has a reasonable and founded fear of the formal dishonesty of his act, because those consciences do not go beyond the bounds of probability or opinion, whose account it is that it is with reasonable and founded fear of the opposite; and otherwise, if there were not reasonable and founded fear, it would already be moral certitude. — It is confirmed. He who takes a drink of which he doubts whether it is poisoned, or which he believes only probably and more probably not to be poisoned, while he has another not poisoned, acts imprudently. Therefore similarly.

3° He who does what he reasonably suspects offends God, by this very fact offends him, and contemns his friendship; just as he who would do what he reasonably suspects offends a friend, by this very fact would offend him and contemn his friendship. But he who acts with a doubtful conscience, probable or only more probable, does what he reasonably suspects offends God. Therefore.

[Perplexed, that is, when someone, placed between two precepts, one of which cannot be fulfilled without the other being omitted, remains in doubt which of the two he ought to prefer, and believes he will sin by omitting either one.

I answer. 1ª If the perplexed person can suspend the action, he is bound to defer it until he has consulted his confessor or another man expert and prudent, by whose judgment his conscience be formed.

2° If he cannot consult and there is present necessity of acting, because the action cannot be suspended without grave damage, then he is bound to choose the lesser evil, avoiding rather the transgression of the natural law than of the divine or human positive law; for the law of the lower order must always yield to the law of the higher order. It is supposed however that, in departing from the precept of lesser weight, he does not intend evil, but rather so acts as to avoid evil.

3° If both precepts seem equally grave to him, or he does not discern what the lesser evil is, let him choose whichever part, he will not sin, because in this case the liberty required for sinning formally is lacking, and from elsewhere necessity of sinning is never given. — So St. Alph., lib. I, tract. 1, n. 10, and Gury, n. 43.]

We resolved in the preceding dissertation, from the common opinion, that it is not licit to act with a doubtful conscience, probable or more probable, but that only a morally certain conscience is the rule of our actions. Now we ask whether upon an opinion or speculative-practical judgment, probable or more probable, concerning the objective and material honesty of an action, there can be founded mediately, namely through reflex principles intervening, a morally certain conscience concerning the formal and subjective honesty of the action; consequently whether it is licit