Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

I say 1° : The event following, foreseen and in some manner intended, adds to goodness and badness of exterior act, whether it follow per se or per accidens¹.

It is proved. So much better or worse is the act, so much better or worse is the will. But better or worse is the will of him who, foreseeing and intending many goods or evils about to follow from his work, performs it, than if he foresaw and intended none of these. Therefore.

I said, « in some manner intended »; because, in order that the event following add to malice, it need not be directly intended, but suffices that it be intended indirectly and interpretatively. Now it is indirectly and interpretatively intended when it is thus foreseen as about to follow that it could and ought to have been impeded. Then there exists obligation of impeding and desisting from the act to which it follows, when there underlies no right or legitimate reason for performing that act.

But what, when right or legitimate reason of not performing the act is present or absent, notwithstanding the evil event followed thence? This is work, this labor; nor can one rule be assigned. To this must attention be given : whether the event follows from that act per se or per accidens and by intervention of another cause; whether the act influences that evil event gravely or lightly, remotely or proximately. Moreover the evil of the event must be compared with the goodness of the act. Greater indeed reason is required that an act be legitimately performed from which evil follows per se, than if it follows per accidens and by intervention of another cause; greater, if the act influences proximately and gravely, than if lightly and remotely; greater, if the utility of the act do not preponderate, or at least not equal the evil of the event. With all these things attended to, judgment must be formed morally whether there be or be not right and legitimate reason for performing the act. Wherefore consult what I said concerning indirect voluntariness or voluntariness in cause, art. 1 of the first dissertation of this Treatise.

I say 2° : The event following per se from the act, even though it be not foreseen, nor willed in itself, adds to goodness or badness²; because what follows per se from the act pertains in a certain manner to its species, and therefore is virtually and implicitly willed in the very act. Moreover that act is the better from whose nature several goods are wont to follow, and that the worse from whose nature several evils are wont to follow. But an event is judged to follow per se from the act when it happens always or usually. Hence scandal following public fornication augments its malice, although the fornicator thought not of it, because it follows per se from such an act.

Understand nevertheless this conclusion with this modification : that from the same act there follow not per se two effects equally immediate, one good, the other bad, according to the other principle of the holy Doctor, IIa 2ae, q. 64, a. 7, c., namely that, when of one act there are two effects equally immediate, one can be within intention, the other beside intention and not imputable, as appears in defense against unjust invader, from which equally immediately follow salvation of the invaded and death of the invader. Concerning which I shall speak more fully on Right and Justice.

I say 3° : The event following per accidens from the act, if it be not somehow intended, as was said in the first conclusion, adds not to goodness or badness³ : 1° because no judgment is given concerning any thing according to what it is per accidens; 2° because such an event is in no manner voluntary, neither in itself nor in its cause. You have example in the woman who for just cause goes forth into public, from which she foresees the lapse of someone about to follow.