Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

We do not inquire here whether the exterior act is good or evil. We suppose this as certain; for by the very fact that it is voluntary, conformable or disconformable to reason, it has all that is required in order that it be good or evil. Moreover, on exterior acts there are the eight precepts of the Decalogue.

But we inquire whether the exterior act is good or evil by a goodness or malice formally distinct from the goodness or malice of the interior act, which it superadds to it¹. And the question concerns the exterior act inasmuch as it is the mere execution of the interior act. For if some goodness were annexed accidentally and from without to the exterior act, e. g., the special grace of the exterior reception of the sacraments, or the grace of indulgence attached to almsgiving or to exterior prayer, it is certain that the exterior act would add this accidental goodness to the interior act. Likewise, if for the execution of the exterior act the interior act must needs be intensified or multiplied, as often happens, then also it is evident that the exterior act adds goodness or malice to the interior: yet not per se and by reason of itself, but only occasionally, because on occasion of the exterior act the interior act is intensified or multiplied.

I say 1°: The exterior act, precisely as the execution of the interior act, adds to it no goodness or malice simply, in the order to essential reward or punishment, but only secundum quid, in the order to accidental reward or punishment: whence it does not render the one acting better or worse simply, but only secundum quid.

It is proved first part². The exterior act is either considered as the object of the interior act, or as its effect or execution. But in neither way does it add to the interior a distinct goodness or malice. Therefore. — The first part of the minor is proved. If the exterior act be considered as the object of the interior act, the whole goodness or malice which is in it objectively is transfused into the act formally, so that the object has nothing objectively which is not in the act formally. Therefore the exterior act, as object, has no distinct goodness or malice which it superadds to the goodness or malice of the interior act, since it is on both sides the same, with this difference, that it is objectively in the exterior act, as in the object and motive of the will, and in the interior act formally, as in the subject. — The second part of the min. is proved, concerning which especially is the difficulty. The exterior act, precisely as effect and execution of the interior act, has no intrinsic moral goodness or malice, but is good or evil denominatively and extrinsically only from the goodness or malice of the interior act. Therefore it adds to the interior no distinct goodness or malice. — The foregoing is proved 1° by the most formal words of St. Thomas here a. 3, ad 3: « As, he says, health is derived from what is healthy in the animal to medicine and urine...; in this manner the goodness of the exterior act is derived from the goodness of the will. » Therefore, as health is in medicine and urine denominatively and extrinsically only, so moral goodness or malice in the exterior act. The same foregoing is proved 2° by a decisive reason. Liberty is the foundation of morality, and therefore intrinsic moral goodness or malice can be only there where there is intrinsic liberty. But in the exterior act of the executive power there is not intrinsic liberty; for this is intrinsically subjected in the will alone. Therefore.

It is confirmed. If the exterior act adds something to the interior act, either that superadded thing is willed by the interior act, as by the exterior act it is exercised, or it is not: if it be not willed, it is not a moral good or evil, and thus it adds nothing of goodness or malice; if it be willed, by this very fact it is prehad in the interior act of the will, in which is the foundation of all morality. Therefore.

It is proved the second part of the conclusion³. The interior act is compared to the exterior as tendency and motion to the term and end. But every tendency and motion is perfected and consummated in this, that it attain the end and reach the term; whence the will is not perfect unless it be such that, the opportunity being given, it operate. Therefore the exterior act adds to the interior goodness or malice, not simply, or distinct from the goodness or malice of the interior, but secundum quid, that is, the same extended and consummated, or its extension and consummation.

Whence it follows that it makes the one acting better, not simply, but secundum quid, and that it is in the order to punishment or reward, not essential, but accidental.