Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

A moral act can be defined : « An act proceeding from deliberate will, with subjection to the rules of morals, » which are eternal law and right reason.

I say 1° : Morality in common does not consist in extrinsic denomination drawn from the rules of morals.

It is proved¹. Moral being, and above all moral goodness, is a perfection existing in human acts on the side of the thing, caused by virtue, by free will, and by God. Therefore it is not mere extrinsic denomination and being of reason.

It is confirmed. God rewards and punishes unto eternity on account of acts good or bad morally. But it is absurd that eternal reward, or torment, be decreed on account of extrinsic denominations and beings of reason. Therefore.

I say 2° : Liberty is requisite unto morality; nevertheless morality does not formally consist therein.

The first part stands established, because necessary acts are not subjected to the rules of morals, nor are they directible by them, but only free acts; for in vain would law be applied to a necessary and unvarying act. Therefore liberty is the foundation, or condition sine qua non, of morality. And therefore the Angelic Doctor says : « There begins the genus of morals where dominion of will is first found. »

Proof of the second part. Liberty is conceived in the act before morality. For by this very fact that an act going forth from will under indifference of judgment is conceived, it is conceived free, and not yet moral, because not yet conceived the law to which it be subjected : nay, granting there were no law or rule of morals, it would still be conceived free, and there would be no morality. Therefore.

It is confirmed. To be free pertains to the order of nature; for thereby are free agents distinguished from those not free. Therefore.

I say 3° : Morality in common consists formally in tendence, or real transcendental relation, toward the object subjected to the rules of morals.

It is proved. In the same manner, proportion being preserved, must one speak of the act in esse moris as of the act in esse naturae; for the act in physical esse is the foundation of the act as moral. But the act in esse naturae is constituted formally through order and real transcendental tendence toward the object considered in esse naturae or physically; for it compares to the object as motion and way to term. Therefore the moral act is constituted formally through order and real transcendental tendence toward the object considered in esse moris, that is, as subjected and regulable through the rules of morals.

You will ask how many be the species of morality.

Answer. It stands agreed among all that goodness and badness are species of morality. Goodness is real transcendental order toward an object consonant with the rules of morals. Badness, if placed positively, it is plain that it is a real order of the act toward an object dissonant from the rules of morals; but if placed privatively, it will be privation of consonance and rectitude.

How in this opinion it is saved that badness be a species of morality, we shall try to explain in the treatise on Sins, where this difficulty will be ventilated more fully.

The difficulty here is whether indifference also be a species of morality. Both sides are disputed among the Thomists.

It seems to us somewhat more probable that indifference be a species of morality; because St. Thomas, below, q. 92, a. 2, c., teaches that law has three acts, namely to forbid, to command, and to permit; and adds : « There are moreover three differences of human acts. Some acts are good from their own genus...; and with respect to these is placed the act of law commanding or imperating... Some indeed are acts evil from their own genus, as vicious acts ; and with respect to these law has to forbid. But some are acts indifferent from their own genus ; and with respect to these law has to permit. » — I subjoin. But that act is truly and formally moral which is subjected to law, and concerning which law has a special act. Therefore.

This reason of St. Thomas is further strengthened. That act is truly moral which proceeds from deliberate will with positive subjection to the rules of morals. But an act indifferent from its object can proceed from deliberate will with positive subjection to the rules of morals. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. He who doubts whether some work be licit — suppose, whether it be licit to labor today — suspends the work, consults the law or reason, nor indulges in labor unless previously the law or reason has answered that no feast day falls, that it is licit to labor. He, as is evident, acts deliberately and with subjection to the law which he first consults and to which he subjects himself so far, that he would abstain from the work if the law forbade it, and he exercises it because he sees it not forbidden by the law, but left most free to him through it. Which assuredly is altogether to subject oneself to the law and to be ruled through the law, not to refuse the disposition of the law, as the opposite opinion says.