Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

DISSERTATION IV

ON HUMAN ACTS IN ESSE MORIS. St. Thomas, qq. 18, 19 and 20.

A moral act can be defined : « An act proceeding from deliberate will, with subjection to the rules of morals, » which are eternal law and right reason.

I say 1° : Morality in common does not consist in extrinsic denomination drawn from the rules of morals.

It is proved¹. Moral being, and above all moral goodness, is a perfection existing in human acts on the side of the thing, caused by virtue, by free will, and by God. Therefore it is not mere extrinsic denomination and being of reason.

It is confirmed. God rewards and punishes unto eternity on account of acts good or bad morally. But it is absurd that eternal reward, or torment, be decreed on account of extrinsic denominations and beings of reason. Therefore.

I say 2° : Liberty is requisite unto morality; nevertheless morality does not formally consist therein.

The first part stands established, because necessary acts are not subjected to the rules of morals, nor are they directible by them, but only free acts; for in vain would law be applied to a necessary and unvarying act. Therefore liberty is the foundation, or condition sine qua non, of morality. And therefore the Angelic Doctor says : « There begins the genus of morals where dominion of will is first found. »

Proof of the second part. Liberty is conceived in the act before morality. For by this very fact that an act going forth from will under indifference of judgment is conceived, it is conceived free, and not yet moral, because not yet conceived the law to which it be subjected : nay, granting there were no law or rule of morals, it would still be conceived free, and there would be no morality. Therefore.

It is confirmed. To be free pertains to the order of nature; for thereby are free agents distinguished from those not free. Therefore.

I say 3° : Morality in common consists formally in tendence, or real transcendental relation, toward the object subjected to the rules of morals.

It is proved. In the same manner, proportion being preserved, must one speak of the act in esse moris as of the act in esse naturae; for the act in physical esse is the foundation of the act as moral. But the act in esse naturae is constituted formally through order and real transcendental tendence toward the object considered in esse naturae or physically; for it compares to the object as motion and way to term. Therefore the moral act is constituted formally through order and real transcendental tendence toward the object considered in esse moris, that is, as subjected and regulable through the rules of morals.

You will ask how many be the species of morality.

Answer. It stands agreed among all that goodness and badness are species of morality. Goodness is real transcendental order toward an object consonant with the rules of morals. Badness, if placed positively, it is plain that it is a real order of the act toward an object dissonant from the rules of morals; but if placed privatively, it will be privation of consonance and rectitude.

How in this opinion it is saved that badness be a species of morality, we shall try to explain in the treatise on Sins, where this difficulty will be ventilated more fully.

The difficulty here is whether indifference also be a species of morality. Both sides are disputed among the Thomists.

It seems to us somewhat more probable that indifference be a species of morality; because St. Thomas, below, q. 92, a. 2, c., teaches that law has three acts, namely to forbid, to command, and to permit; and adds : « There are moreover three differences of human acts. Some acts are good from their own genus...; and with respect to these is placed the act of law commanding or imperating... Some indeed are acts evil from their own genus, as vicious acts ; and with respect to these law has to forbid. But some are acts indifferent from their own genus ; and with respect to these law has to permit. » — I subjoin. But that act is truly and formally moral which is subjected to law, and concerning which law has a special act. Therefore.

This reason of St. Thomas is further strengthened. That act is truly moral which proceeds from deliberate will with positive subjection to the rules of morals. But an act indifferent from its object can proceed from deliberate will with positive subjection to the rules of morals. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. He who doubts whether some work be licit — suppose, whether it be licit to labor today — suspends the work, consults the law or reason, nor indulges in labor unless previously the law or reason has answered that no feast day falls, that it is licit to labor. He, as is evident, acts deliberately and with subjection to the law which he first consults and to which he subjects himself so far, that he would abstain from the work if the law forbade it, and he exercises it because he sees it not forbidden by the law, but left most free to him through it. Which assuredly is altogether to subject oneself to the law and to be ruled through the law, not to refuse the disposition of the law, as the opposite opinion says.

By principles of morality we understand all those things from which it comes about that act be good, or evil, or indifferent. The Author assigns three here q. 18, a. 2, 3 et 4, namely object, circumstances and end. For although the end is also a circumstance, since nevertheless it influences action most greatly, therefore the Holy Doctor treats specially of it, and with him commonly theologians. But those things which are wont to be disputed concerning these three principles of morality we shall weigh in this article through several paragraphs. Whence be

§ I. — Whether the first and specific goodness or malice of human act is from the object ?

By object we understand here not whatsoever is objected to the will, for thus the very circumstances would also be its object; but that which is first and per se attained by the will.

I say 1° : The first and essential goodness, or malice of human act, is drawn from the object morally considered¹.

It is proved. As in naturals first and essential goodness is taken from form which gives species, as in man from rational form, and the first evil from defect of form which gives species, as if generated thing does not attain specific form, suppose man be not generated but something in place of man ; so in morals first and essential goodness is regarded from form giving species to human act, and first malice from defect of this form. But form giving species to human act is the object. Therefore. — The minor is proved. Human act is motion and tending toward object as toward term. But motion and tending regards term as proper form; for it is compared to it as potency to act, perfectible and determinable to perfective and determinative. Therefore.

I said : « From object morally considered, » because around same object physically considered acts specifically diverse can turn, good and evil: as around same thing alien, act of injustice, taking away, act of justice, restoring; around same wife adultery and conjugal act; around same man love and hatred.

Object must therefore be taken morally, and as it stands to directing reason, and is conformable or disconformable to it.

You will say. Human act draws first and specific morality from what it first regards. But it regards the end, as St. Thomas teaches here a. 6, c., and above q. 1, a. 3, c. And it is clear because object is willed on account of end. Therefore end is prior willed.

I answer. I distinguish the minor. Human act first regards end of work, I concede; end of worker, I deny. End of work, which also is called intrinsic, coincides with object; end of worker comes to it from extrinsic and accidentally, so that without it the same act could stand.

Whether and how human act takes goodness or malice from circumstances and from end ?

TO BE NOTED BEFOREHAND

1° Circumstance is « an accident of human act, morally affecting it already constituted in moral being ² ».

It is explained ³. It is called accident, because circumstance is said metaphorically from place. Therefore as in local things that is said to stand around something which is indeed extrinsic to it, yet attains it or approaches it; so in morals circumstance is said to be that which is outside substance of act, yet attaining it somehow. But what is outside substance of thing, as being such that without it the thing can be and be conceived, pertains nevertheless to itself, is called its accident. So is, e.g., circumstance of sacred place respecting theft.

It is said, « affecting human act already constituted in moral being, » because, if it gave first and essential moral species, it would no longer be circumstance, but would pass into condition of object and essential difference.

It is said, « morally affecting it, » that is, modifying it in ordine to rules of morals; because, if it affect physically, it will indeed be circumstance of act qua physical, not qua moral, as that one give alms in gold or silver, morning or evening, with right or left hand; of which there is not question here.

2° Seven circumstances of human acts are commonly assigned, comprehended in this verse: Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando⁴. For in acts must be considered, who did it, with what aids or instruments he did it, what he did, where he did it, why he did it, how he did it, and when he did it.

Note, these things which we recounted, in order that they be circumstances, are not to be taken insofar as substance of act depends upon them, but insofar as they affect it accidentally. Whence

Quis, signifies not substance of agent, but its quality, e.g., that he be priest, religious or layman, unmarried or married, rich or poor, superior or subject.

Quid, denotes likewise not substance of effect, but some accident joined to it, suppose quality or quantity : e.g., in theft, it denotes not that stolen thing be alien, for that pertains to substance of theft, but that it be sacred or profane, that it be of great or small quantity; in homicide, that slain one be parent or cleric; in lust, that partner be kinswoman or wedded one, etc.

Ubi, signifies not bare place, certain it is that act done somewhere is done somewhere, but quality of place: as that it be public, sacred, etc.; for if fornication take place in public place, scandal arises, if in sacred place, it is sacrilege.

Quibus auxiliis, signifies accidental instruments or means which the agent used; as if he used help of devil or witchcraft, if he killed by poison or sword, etc.

Cur, denotes end, not intrinsic and of work, for that pertains to substance of act, but extrinsic and of working : as if someone steal to get himself drunk.

Quomodo, signifies accidental mode whereby act is done, e.g., intensely or remissly, from contempt or levity, from ignorance or fear, from malice or passion.

Quando, signifies accidental condition of time, namely either quality, as if work be done on feast day, or day of communion; or quantity, as if act endure long or little.

Question is resolved.

I say 1° : Human act draws some goodness or malice from circumstances⁵.

It is proved 1°. Concerning goodness or malice of human acts judgment must be made in same mode, at least analogically, as concerning goodness and malice of natural things. But in natural things whole goodness and perfection is not taken from sole form giving species, but also from accidents: thus, e.g., whole goodness and perfection of man is not taken from his sole substantial form, but from various accidents, as from color, figure, due proportion of members, etc. Therefore whole goodness of human act is not taken from sole object giving species, but also from circumstances which are its accidents.

2° Therefore human act draws goodness or malice from object, because it says habit of convenience or disconvenience toward right reason. But circumstances also can import habit of convenience or disconvenience toward right reason: thus, e.g., not only is it disconvenient to reason to steal, but also to steal in sacred place.

I say 2° : Human act sometimes draws from circumstances species of good or evil, sometimes only aggravation or diminution of goodness or malice within same species ; or, as commonly is said : Certain circumstances are changing species, certain only aggravating within same species⁶.

Changing-species circumstance is that which of itself adds onto human act special and distinct goodness or malice; only aggravating, that which increases only presupposed goodness or malice and modifies it within same species.

Among aggravating circumstances, some aggravate notably, others lightly. It is held notably aggravating in quantitative matter, or which consists in number, weight and measure, when separately taken and separated from act it would suffice unto mortal sin : as he who stole beyond twenty-five aurei would sin mortally: as he who beyond twenty-five asses, which I suppose suffice unto mortal sin, stole another twenty-five. In other matters however it is held notably aggravating, when it notably exceeds ordinary measure of sinning in suchlike matters: as if anyone spend whole night in impurities with woman, if anyone persevere through months and years in fraternal hatred, if anyone killed enemy cutting him limb from limb, etc.

If neither of these occur, it is held lightly aggravating : suppose thief filched thirty asses; that after quarrel someone angry remained in hatred for some small time.

Species-changing circumstances certainly must be accused in confession. That notably aggravating circumstances also must be accused holds the more common and safer opinion⁷, of which in treatise on Penance.

I say 3° : Human act draws goodness or malice from end⁸.

Clear from what was said, because end, like other circumstances, can say order of conformity or disformity toward reason. So conformable to reason is it, not only to give alms, but also to give in satisfaction for sins; just as repugnant to reason is it, not only to steal, but also to steal to get oneself drunk.

§ III. — Certain little questions concerning preceding paragraphs briefly resolved.

You will ask 1° from what act good from object, commanded unto good end, draws specific and essential goodness.

I answer. Commanded act taken in itself and specifically draws its specific and essential goodness from object, accidental from end: 1° Because what comes upon act constituted in its species is accidental to it. But command and ordering of act good of itself unto extrinsic end comes upon it already constituted in its species. Therefore. 2° Act takes essential species from what it primarily and immediately regards. But commanded act, considered in itself and specifically, primarily and immediately regards object: thus e.g., volition of giving alms, commanded by penance, primarily and immediately regards honesty of mercy, only secondarily and mediately honesty of penance. Therefore.

But if commanded act be taken formally and reduplicatively as commanded, it has essential species from end; because, as such, it is reckoned one and same with commanding act, and regards same object.

Nevertheless, because it happens to that act, considered in itself, that it be commanded, and command and ordering unto extrinsic end supervenes upon it already constituted in its species, simply speaking, comparison made between those species, it must be said that that which it has from object is essential, and that which it has from end accidental.

You will ask 2° how goodness or malice both of object and of circumstances ought to be intended that act be good or evil.

I answer. That act be morally evil, it suffices that malice be indirectly virtually or implicitly willed in another to which it is annexed; that however it be good, there is required that goodness be formally and directly in itself willed, at least in exercised act.

Our Doctor expresses this whole response in these words here q. 19, a. 7, ad 3 : « Evil happens out of singular defects, good truly out of whole and integral cause. Wherefore, whether will be of that which is of itself evil and under reason of good, or be of good under reason of evil, always will will be evil. But unto this that it be good will, it is required that it be of good under reason of good, that is that it will good, and on account of good. »

Reason moreover of first part is: 1° because otherwise malice cannot be intended; for no one intending evil operates, as I said above and philosophers commonly teach; and if anyone be so wicked that he seem to covet malice in his act, he covets it not except by reason of some goodness which he apprehends in it. 2° Because malice not only is not to be coveted, but is to be avoided. It is not avoided however, by this very fact that indirectly and implicitly it is intended. Suffices therefore that one covet in a thing delectability, to which he sees malice annexed.

Reason of second part is, because honesty is per se and on account of itself appetible, and thus right reason says it to be appetend.

I said : « At least in exercised act ; » because it is not necessary that agent say in signed act, e.g.: « I will give alms because honest, » but suffices that he will alms under that reason whereby it is honest, namely because it relieves misery of neighbor.

You will ask 3° whether good intention makes honest evil election, or is vitiated from evil election.

I answer. Good intention, as moving unto evil election, is vitiated from it, and evil election is not made honest by good intention ; its malice nevertheless is diminished secundum quid.

First part is proved and explained in case. Titius steals to give alms, or lies to save life of neighbor. Intention of saving life of neighbor or relieving his need formally, as moving unto theft or lie, is vitiated and becomes evil : 1° Because thus it is cause of evil, namely theft or lie. But cause of evil does not say good, but defect. Therefore. 2° Intention, as moving unto election, contains it virtually; for intention and volition of end is not anyhow, but as to-be-attained through means. Therefore by this very fact that he wills to acquire through evil medium, it is inordinate and evil.

I said : « Formally as moving, unto evil election, » because in itself and from object it is good; good indeed is willing to succor needy neighbor. Of which art. seq.

Second part is proved, wherein is against Cassianus, Collat. 17. Malice from object, while object remains unchanged, is immutable and unchangeable; whence neither would good intention itself be vitiated from perverse election, unless because, as moving, it includes virtually in its object the very evil election, as was said, and thus its object is changed. But object of evil election, e.g., theft, is not changed by good intention. Therefore. Whence Apostle, Rom., II, 8, condemns those who say : Let us do evil, that good may come. And Alexander III, c. 4 super eo, de usuris, says: « Sacred Scripture forbids to lie for life of another. »

Third part is proved. Malice or gravity of sin is regarded from voluntary affection toward sin, or toward that which in sin is wont to please, namely delectable good. But, in case, although malice of theft or lie sought from object be not diminished, voluntary affection toward sin, or toward delectable good which in sin is wont to please, is nevertheless diminished ; because he covets evil or sin only from love of honest good, and as clothed with reason of useful good, for attaining that honest good. Therefore.

intended is better, so much more is fault of lie diminished. »

You will ask 4° whether evil intention vitiates good election, or conversely is made honest from good election.

I answer. Good election, as election, is sullied by evil intention, and evil intention is not rectified by good election.

It is proved. In good election, precisely as election, honesty of medium is not loved, but medium is loved precisely as useful unto evil end : e.g., who gives alms solely on account of vain glory cares not for honesty of alms, but only intends vain glory, so that, if alms were not of itself honest and conduced unto vain glory, he would assume it. Intention itself moreover of vain glory thence becomes worse, because it orders that which of itself is good unto evil. For perversion it is that good serve evil, and nobler be ordered unto less noble, as unto end, resting there. This whole reason will appear more clearly from art. seq.

The difficulty concerns the conflict of manifold moralities opposed one to another, whereof one namely is good, another evil; or whether the same act can be at once good and evil from diverse heads, good from object, evil from end or some other circumstance, and conversely.

I say 1°: An act otherwise good in itself, whose evil end is the total and adequate reason why it is chosen, is from no part good, but wholly evil. It is the common teaching ¹

It is proved 1° from Scripture. I Cor., v, 6, the Apostle says: A little leaven corrupts the whole lump. By leaven moreover is understood the depraved intention, which while it is the total cause of an act otherwise good, infects and corrupts the whole of it.

It is proved 2° by reason. When one gives alms precisely for vainglory or luxury, so that vainglory or luxury be the total and adequate cause of bestowing the alms, the honesty of the alms is nowise desired, but desired only as the means of attaining glory or luxury; so that, even if it had no honesty of itself, it would nevertheless be assumed for attaining the evil end. But the honesty of the object reflects no goodness into the act unless directly desired in itself, as was said before. Therefore.

I say 2°: An act otherwise good in itself, whose evil end is not the total and adequate reason why it is chosen, can be good from object and evil from end. A fortiori an act good from object and end, upon which supervenes some venially evil circumstance, can be partly good and partly evil ²

It is proved. An act good whose extrinsic evil end is not the total and adequate cause why it is assumed, e.g., alms done partly on account of one's own honesty of mercy, partly for vainglory, draws and retains goodness from the object, notwithstanding the concurrence of the further extrinsic end, evil namely, of vainglory. Therefore it is good from object and evil from end. — Proof of the antecedent: It cannot be but that the goodness of the object willed in itself and for itself reflect goodness into the act. For to love the good in itself and for itself is necessarily and essentially good. But honest alms, in the case, is loved in itself and for itself, and not precisely and solely for vainglory, which we suppose not to be its total and adequate cause. Therefore.

What I said of the act good from object and evil from end must be said a fortiori of the act good from object and end, into which mingles some venially evil circumstance, e.g., if into alms done from the sole motive of mercy there mingle tepidity or inconsiderateness.

I say 1° : There are given acts indifferent from their species¹. It is common opinion.

It is proved. Human acts draw their species from the object morally considered : so that those which have a good object be good; those evil, evil; those indifferent, indifferent. But there are human acts which have an indifferent object, that is, neither commanded nor forbidden by law, as to lift up a straw, to go into the field, and the like. Therefore.

Greater is the difficulty about acts indifferent in the individual. The question is not about indeliberate acts which proceed from imagination or impulse of nature, as it usually is to scratch the beard, to move hand or foot; for these, since they are not human and moral acts through defect of liberty, it sufficiently stands established that they are neither morally good nor bad.

Likewise the question is not about indifference toward moral goodness and badness in the supernatural order, but in the natural order only. For it stands established that there are given acts indifferent, neither good nor bad, neither meritorious nor demeritorious, in the supernatural order : thus alms done by an infidel or sinner from motive of mercy, although good morally in the natural order, since however it proceeds not from grace, which is the principle of goodness and merit in the supernatural order, is neither good nor bad in that order, nor meritorious of reward or of punishment in that order, because in no manner does it pertain to that order.

The question therefore is only about deliberate acts and their indifference toward goodness and badness in the natural order.

In which sense

I say : No act is nor can be indifferent in the individual². It is the more common opinion with the Author against Scotus, the Scotists and Vasquez.

It is proved by the fundamental reason. Man, as often as he acts deliberately, even concerning an object indifferent in itself, is held to act on account of honest end : if he do this, he acts well; if he do it not, he acts badly. Therefore no act indifferent exists in the individual. — Proof of the antecedent. 1° Man, as often as he acts deliberately, is held to act as man, or according to the dignity and exigency of rational nature, and as distinguished from brutes. But this is to act on account of honest good, which is the end of rational creature. Therefore. 2° As natural beings are directed by natural inclination from the author of nature to their proper ends, so free and moral agent, such as man is, is directed by precepts to his proper end, which is honest good conformable to reason. Therefore. 3° The Apostle, I Cor., X, 31, commands all things to be done on account of the glory of God, that is, on account of honest end in which the glory of God is virtually and implicitly included. Therefore. 4° Work not directed to honest end is otiose work, therefore evil; because work is called otiose not because it is on account of evil end, but because it lacks good and honest end, or, as the holy Fathers say, because it lacks utility or necessity. Therefore. 5° Man acting deliberately cannot act on account of sensible delightful good as on account of end. Therefore he is held to act on account of honest good. — The antecedent is plain. Because sensible delightful good is end of brutes and of the sensitive part, not of rational creature.

But what the adversaries say, that it is licit to act on account of commodity and recreation of nature, we concede, provided this be done according to the dictation of reason. But to act on account of commodity and recreation of nature according to dictation of right reason is not to seek delight as end, but to refer it to honest ends, and consequently to act well.

Objection : that worn saying of St. Jerome, Epist. 89, ad Aug. :

« Good is continence, bad is luxury : between both indifferent is walking about, to dispose the excrements of the belly, to throw forth rheums with spittle. This is neither good nor bad. » Therefore.

Answer St. Jerome speaks of acts indifferent viewed on the part of object, and according to species.

[You will say : No species is there under which it contains not, or can contain, some individual. But some human act is indifferent according to its species, as proved above. Therefore some individual human act can be indifferent.

Answer. I distinguish the major. No species is there which under itself contains not, or can contain, some individual, yet without the abstraction which species has, I concede; with the same abstraction which species has, I deny. I distinguish also the minor. Some human act is indifferent according to its species in this sense, that it has not from its species that it be good or bad morally, I concede; in this sense, that indifference be owed it from its species so that it cannot be ordered to moral good or moral evil, I deny. And therefore I deny consequence —

For, as St. Thomas says³, « that some act be indifferent according to its species can be understood in several ways : In one way thus, that from its species indifference be owed it; and thus the argument proceeds [that is, the objection in the minor]. But in this manner no act is indifferent from its species; for there is no object of human act which cannot be ordered either to evil or to good through end or circumstance. In another way it can be called indifferent from its species, because it has not from its species that it be good or bad : whence through something else it can become good or bad. As man has not from his species that he be white or black, nor yet does he have from his species that he be not white or black; for whiteness or blackness can supervene upon man from elsewhere than from the principles of the species. »

Require other objections and answers in the same place.]

I suppose that the human will, in order to be good, generally speaking, ought to be conformed to the divine will ¹, because the first rule and measure of the good will of man is the divine will: for what is first in any genus is the measure of the others of that genus; but the divine will is the first and supreme good. But in what and how it ought to be conformed, there is difficulty.

For whose elucidation it must be noted that in the object of the will two things are to be considered: one which is quasi-material, namely the thing itself willed; another which is quasi-formal, namely the very account of willing, which is the end. Conformity with respect to the thing willed is called conformity in the materially willed; and conformity with respect to the account of willing is called conformity in the formally willed. The question proceeds concerning both, supposing however that the divine will becomes known concerning the particular work; for, if it does not become known, the will can be good without conformity with respect to this work: thus II Reg., VII, 3, David is praised because he willed to build the house of the Lord, which God nevertheless did not will.

But the divine will can become known to us in three ways, namely by revelation, by operation and by precept. For this very fact that God reveals something, or operates it, whether immediately through himself, or through secondary causes intervening, or commands it to be done, it is manifest that he wills that very thing.

These things noted and supposed,

I say: The human will, in order to be right, is bound to be conformed to the divine will in the formally willed, but not in the materially willed, unless his will become known by precept or prohibition ². It is common with the Author.

The first part is proved ³. The formally willed element of the divine will, or its motive as ultimate reason of willing, is the common and divine good, or the common good of the whole universe, insofar as it is ultimately ordered to God himself ⁴ and to his glory; for the Lord made all things for himself. But the human will, in order to be right, ought to will whatever it wills for the common and divine good, as its last end. Therefore. — Proof of minor 1° The natural appetite of every part is ordered to the common good of the whole. Therefore, a fortiori, what is appetited by the rational appetite ought to be referred to the common good ⁵. 2° The human will could not be right except insofar as it appetites the true and honest good, as we proved above. But, in appetiting the true and honest good, it virtually and implicitly appetites the divine good, of which the honest good is the beginning and participation. Therefore.

Proof of the second part. The same thing willed which is the material object of the will can, under diverse consideration, be good and evil. E. g., the death of a robber considered by the judge as necessary to the common good, is good; considered by the wife as harmful to the family, is evil. Consequently the will by which the judge, whose duty is to attend to the common good, wills the death of the robber, is good; and the will by which the wife, whose duty is to attend to the good of the family, does not will the death of her husband, is also good; because the will that does not will a thing under the aspect of evil is not less good than that which wills a thing under the aspect of good. But God, as universal provider, attends in willing to universal reasons, such as the common good of the universe, to which contraries must be and be conserved, and the manifestation of his attributes: according to which reasons the thing willed by God is good, which nevertheless according to particular reasons, to which man ought to attend and to which God wills him to attend, is evil. Therefore the human will, in order to be right, is not bound to be conformed to the divine will in the materially willed. — The minor will become clear by example. God, as supreme director and provider of the whole world, according to the exigency and universal reasons of the common good and of his glory, wills my father to die in heresy and be damned. That death and damnation, considered according to those universal reasons, is good, and therefore good is the will that wills it. I, a private man, whose duty it is not to attend to those universal reasons, but to particular ones, whether of my own supposit, according to the natural inclination by which I am good from God, or of a parent, according to piety, which, even at the command of God, I am bound to follow, do not will that death and damnation. That death and damnation, considered according to those particular reasons, is evil. Therefore good is the will that does not will it; so that, although on the one side I seem to depart from the divine will, yet on the other, by so willing, I am conformed indirectly to the divine will itself, because God himself wills that I so will. Whence Aug., in Enchirid., c. 101, n. 26, says: « Sometimes with a good will man wills something that God does not will... Just as if a good son should will his father to live, whom God with a good will wills to die. »

It is confirmed. No one of sound mind would say that I am bound to will all things harmful to me which, God willing, happen to me: hunger, sickness, the burning of house and barn, the rigor of cold, the heat of the sun, serpents, fleas, etc., as I was saying, the death and damnation of my parents; so that it would not be permitted me, as far as I can, to flee them or strive against them.

I said: « Unless the divine will becomes known by precept or prohibition; » because the willing of God commanding or prohibiting has always annexed to it the will of obliging man to will and to do what he commands, or not to will nor to do what he prohibits: which the other wills have not, whether of good pleasure, of counsel, or of permission.

For the solution of the objections against the second part of the conclusion, it must be observed that the materially willed can be considered in two ways: first, in itself and absolutely; second, formally and reduplicatively, as it underlies the formally willed or the universal end which God intends. The second part therefore of the conclusion is to be understood of the materially willed in itself, with the particular reasons attended to, not of it reduplicatively, as it underlies the formally willed and the universal end of the divine will; for this is to be conformed to it precisely in the formally willed itself.

We do not inquire here whether the exterior act is good or evil. We suppose this as certain; for by the very fact that it is voluntary, conformable or disconformable to reason, it has all that is required in order that it be good or evil. Moreover, on exterior acts there are the eight precepts of the Decalogue.

But we inquire whether the exterior act is good or evil by a goodness or malice formally distinct from the goodness or malice of the interior act, which it superadds to it¹. And the question concerns the exterior act inasmuch as it is the mere execution of the interior act. For if some goodness were annexed accidentally and from without to the exterior act, e. g., the special grace of the exterior reception of the sacraments, or the grace of indulgence attached to almsgiving or to exterior prayer, it is certain that the exterior act would add this accidental goodness to the interior act. Likewise, if for the execution of the exterior act the interior act must needs be intensified or multiplied, as often happens, then also it is evident that the exterior act adds goodness or malice to the interior: yet not per se and by reason of itself, but only occasionally, because on occasion of the exterior act the interior act is intensified or multiplied.

I say 1°: The exterior act, precisely as the execution of the interior act, adds to it no goodness or malice simply, in the order to essential reward or punishment, but only secundum quid, in the order to accidental reward or punishment: whence it does not render the one acting better or worse simply, but only secundum quid.

It is proved first part². The exterior act is either considered as the object of the interior act, or as its effect or execution. But in neither way does it add to the interior a distinct goodness or malice. Therefore. — The first part of the minor is proved. If the exterior act be considered as the object of the interior act, the whole goodness or malice which is in it objectively is transfused into the act formally, so that the object has nothing objectively which is not in the act formally. Therefore the exterior act, as object, has no distinct goodness or malice which it superadds to the goodness or malice of the interior act, since it is on both sides the same, with this difference, that it is objectively in the exterior act, as in the object and motive of the will, and in the interior act formally, as in the subject. — The second part of the min. is proved, concerning which especially is the difficulty. The exterior act, precisely as effect and execution of the interior act, has no intrinsic moral goodness or malice, but is good or evil denominatively and extrinsically only from the goodness or malice of the interior act. Therefore it adds to the interior no distinct goodness or malice. — The foregoing is proved 1° by the most formal words of St. Thomas here a. 3, ad 3: « As, he says, health is derived from what is healthy in the animal to medicine and urine...; in this manner the goodness of the exterior act is derived from the goodness of the will. » Therefore, as health is in medicine and urine denominatively and extrinsically only, so moral goodness or malice in the exterior act. The same foregoing is proved 2° by a decisive reason. Liberty is the foundation of morality, and therefore intrinsic moral goodness or malice can be only there where there is intrinsic liberty. But in the exterior act of the executive power there is not intrinsic liberty; for this is intrinsically subjected in the will alone. Therefore.

It is confirmed. If the exterior act adds something to the interior act, either that superadded thing is willed by the interior act, as by the exterior act it is exercised, or it is not: if it be not willed, it is not a moral good or evil, and thus it adds nothing of goodness or malice; if it be willed, by this very fact it is prehad in the interior act of the will, in which is the foundation of all morality. Therefore.

It is proved the second part of the conclusion³. The interior act is compared to the exterior as tendency and motion to the term and end. But every tendency and motion is perfected and consummated in this, that it attain the end and reach the term; whence the will is not perfect unless it be such that, the opportunity being given, it operate. Therefore the exterior act adds to the interior goodness or malice, not simply, or distinct from the goodness or malice of the interior, but secundum quid, that is, the same extended and consummated, or its extension and consummation.

Whence it follows that it makes the one acting better, not simply, but secundum quid, and that it is in the order to punishment or reward, not essential, but accidental.

I say 1° : The event following, foreseen and in some manner intended, adds to goodness and badness of exterior act, whether it follow per se or per accidens¹.

It is proved. So much better or worse is the act, so much better or worse is the will. But better or worse is the will of him who, foreseeing and intending many goods or evils about to follow from his work, performs it, than if he foresaw and intended none of these. Therefore.

I said, « in some manner intended »; because, in order that the event following add to malice, it need not be directly intended, but suffices that it be intended indirectly and interpretatively. Now it is indirectly and interpretatively intended when it is thus foreseen as about to follow that it could and ought to have been impeded. Then there exists obligation of impeding and desisting from the act to which it follows, when there underlies no right or legitimate reason for performing that act.

But what, when right or legitimate reason of not performing the act is present or absent, notwithstanding the evil event followed thence? This is work, this labor; nor can one rule be assigned. To this must attention be given : whether the event follows from that act per se or per accidens and by intervention of another cause; whether the act influences that evil event gravely or lightly, remotely or proximately. Moreover the evil of the event must be compared with the goodness of the act. Greater indeed reason is required that an act be legitimately performed from which evil follows per se, than if it follows per accidens and by intervention of another cause; greater, if the act influences proximately and gravely, than if lightly and remotely; greater, if the utility of the act do not preponderate, or at least not equal the evil of the event. With all these things attended to, judgment must be formed morally whether there be or be not right and legitimate reason for performing the act. Wherefore consult what I said concerning indirect voluntariness or voluntariness in cause, art. 1 of the first dissertation of this Treatise.

I say 2° : The event following per se from the act, even though it be not foreseen, nor willed in itself, adds to goodness or badness²; because what follows per se from the act pertains in a certain manner to its species, and therefore is virtually and implicitly willed in the very act. Moreover that act is the better from whose nature several goods are wont to follow, and that the worse from whose nature several evils are wont to follow. But an event is judged to follow per se from the act when it happens always or usually. Hence scandal following public fornication augments its malice, although the fornicator thought not of it, because it follows per se from such an act.

Understand nevertheless this conclusion with this modification : that from the same act there follow not per se two effects equally immediate, one good, the other bad, according to the other principle of the holy Doctor, IIa 2ae, q. 64, a. 7, c., namely that, when of one act there are two effects equally immediate, one can be within intention, the other beside intention and not imputable, as appears in defense against unjust invader, from which equally immediately follow salvation of the invaded and death of the invader. Concerning which I shall speak more fully on Right and Justice.

I say 3° : The event following per accidens from the act, if it be not somehow intended, as was said in the first conclusion, adds not to goodness or badness³ : 1° because no judgment is given concerning any thing according to what it is per accidens; 2° because such an event is in no manner voluntary, neither in itself nor in its cause. You have example in the woman who for just cause goes forth into public, from which she foresees the lapse of someone about to follow.