Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

I say: Of faith it is that there exists in fallen man liberty of arbitrium or of indifference ¹. It is against Lutherans and Calvinists, to whom, as to the thing, Jansenius subscribed, although, as to the word, he admits free will, as is plain from what was said in the preceding article.

It is proved from Scripture. Ecclus., XV, 17 and 18: He added water and fire before thee: stretch forth thy hand unto which thou wilt. Before man is life and death, good and evil, that which shall please thee shall be given thee. ibid., XXXI, 10: Eternal glory shall be his who could transgress, and hath not transgressed, could do evil, and hath not done it. I Cor., VII, 36: Let him do what he will; he sinneth not if he marry. And soon after, 37: Having no necessity, but having power of his own will.

It is proved from the Council of Trent, session VI, canon 5: « If anyone say that it is not in the power of man to make his ways evil... ; let him be anathema. »

It is proved from the Fathers, especially from Augustine, whom the heretics claim. Above all, St. Augustine wrote the book On Grace and Free Will for this very end, that he might prove that both ought to be admitted: « Because, he says, c. 1, n. 1, there are certain ones who so defend the grace of God that they deny the free will of man, I therefore took care..... to write something. » And cap. 2, n. 2: « The divine precepts themselves would profit man nothing, unless he had the free choice of will, by which, doing them, he might arrive at the promised rewards. » And further below, n. 4: « How does he command, if there is no free will? » Lib. II de Nuptiis et Concupisc., c. 3, n. 8, addressing the Pelagians: « That free will exists in men..., we say to both parties. Hence you are not Celestians and Pelagians. » For this indeed speaks the Catholic faith.

It is proved by reason, which Augustine himself urges in the places cited and in many others ². If man were not free with liberty of arbitrium and indifference, vain would be counsels, exhortations, precepts, prohibitions, rewards and punishments. For either man would be necessarily determined to do the things commanded or counseled, and thus in vain would be commanded or counseled what he could not fail to do; or he would be necessarily determined not to do them, and thus in vain would he be prohibited from that from which he could not abstain. Therefore.

It is confirmed. Man in this state of fallen nature sometimes elicits meritorious and demeritorious acts ³. But for this is required liberty from necessity ⁴, as I shall say in the following article. Therefore.

It is proved by reason a priori ⁵. Man by sin did not cease to be of intellectual nature. But intellectual nature free will follows inseparably, as is plain from what was said of the root of liberty. Therefore.

It is proved from experience, whereby it appears that man freely chooses one thing and rejects another ⁶.

Obj. from Augustine: The holy Doctor 1° in Enchir., c. 30, says: « By ill using free will, man lost both himself and it. » 2° In the imperfect Work against Julian he is wholly bent upon impugning the liberty of indifference, as the basis of the whole Pelagian heresy. 3° Ibid., lib. I, c. 105, acknowledges from original sin a necessity of sinning: « Thou errest greatly, he says, who thinkest that there is no necessity whatever of sinning. » 4° In cap. v ad Galat., that famous saying: « That which more delights us, according to it we must needs work. »

I answer, to the first: free will is said by Augustine to have been lost by the sin of Adam, not as though it were extinguished as to substance, but because it was made worse and weakened as to good; in about that sense in which a father is said to lose a son whom excessive indulgence suffers to become scandalous. Moreover this is plainer not from the Pelagian sense, but from the very words objected. For he says that man by sin lost free will, just as he lost himself. But he lost himself not as to substance, as though he had ceased to be man, but as to perfection of justice and facility of virtue, insofar as he lies subject to ignorance, concupiscence and disease. Thus Augustine himself explains himself in express terms lib. I ad Bonifac., against two Epistles of Pelagius, c. 2, n. 5: « Who of us, he says, would say that by the sin of the first man free will perished from the human race? Liberty indeed perished through sin, but that which was in paradise, of possessing full justice together with

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immortality; wherefore human nature needs divine grace. »

To the second. St. Augustine impugns the liberty of indifference, not in the sense of Catholics, but in the sense of Pelagians, against whom he is writing. The Pelagians contended that the liberty of man was in no wise wounded by original sin, whose existence they denied, nor inclined more to sin than to good, but constituted in perfect equilibrium, moving itself with equal moment toward virtues and vices, as in nature integral. This Pelagian indifference Augustine impugns, but not that which the Catholic faith establishes, whereby, although attenuated in force and inclined to evil, man so remains lord of his own acts that he can act or not act, act this or that — aided, namely, by grace, where the question is of salutary work; but grace, urgent necessity pressing, fails him not according to its exigency, as I said in the treatise on God.

To the third ⁹. St. Augustine speaks of a moral necessity of sinning, taken for great difficulty of abstaining from sin, because of the vice of nature corrupted by original sin, whence follows a certain vague and indeterminate necessity of sometimes sinning. Moreover Augustine sometimes speaks of sins taken materially, such as the undeliberate motions of concupiscence and involuntary ignorance, which are called sins materially and improperly, inasmuch as they are effects of sin and move to sin, and from which man cannot be without in this life.

To the fourth. Augustine speaks either of delight deliberate or undeliberate. If of the undeliberate, a moral necessity must be understood, taken for great difficulty of acting otherwise. For Augustine himself teaches that resistance can be made to greater delight: « Man, he says, lib. LXXXIII quaest., q. 70, even with pain can restrain the great delight of hunting ¹⁰. » If he speak of deliberate delight, as it is commonly understood, necessity must indeed be understood

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simply so called, but hypothetical, and consequent upon the will. For that which delights us the more deliberately is that which we deliberately love and choose before another. But we must needs embrace and follow in external work what we deliberately choose before another, just as it is necessary that I speak while I am speaking. But this necessity, as is plain, follows the very free determination of the will, and thus injures not its liberty. Of which again, when treating of grace.