Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

Fear is defined in law: « Trembling of mind from the cause of future and imminent danger, » that is, disquietude and disturbance. One fear is grave, another light. Grave fear is one kind absolutely grave, namely whereby a grave and imminent evil is feared, as death, exile, hard imprisonment, etc.; this is called such as befalls a man of constancy, that is, whereby men otherwise of constancy are commonly moved, although at times they ought not to be moved; for no one ought to be moved by any fear whatever, e. g., to perjury. Another fear is respectively grave, whereby although a man of constancy would not be moved, yet a timid person would be moved, as a child, a woman, an old man.

Fear is light when a light evil is feared, or indeed a grave one, but not imminent; as if, under a serene sky, or with frost pinching, you should fear lightning. To absolutely grave fear is reduced reverential fear, whereby one fears superiors gravely incensed and threatening. But if threats and grave indignation are absent, it can be called light, unless perhaps respectively as regards daughters of the family, who have a timid disposition.

I say 1°: Things done out of fear are mixed of the voluntary and the involuntary¹.

It is proved of the conclusion. Things done out of fear, considered in themselves, are not voluntary; nay, thus they are involuntary; but they are made voluntary and willed out of fear, namely in order to avoid the evil that is feared. This whole matter is clear in the common example. The merchant, considering his goods in themselves, setting aside the peril of shipwreck, would not wish to cast them overboard; but a tempest having arisen and the peril of death being imminent, he wills to cast them overboard. Therefore.

I say 2°: Things done out of fear are voluntary simply, and involuntary secundum quid².

It is proved. That which is voluntary here and now, all circumstances weighed, and involuntary only considered in itself and prescinded from here and now, or from the individuating circumstances, is voluntary simply and involuntary secundum quid. But what is done out of fear is voluntary here and now, all circumstances attended to, and involuntary only considered in itself and prescinded from the circumstances. Therefore. — The min. is clear in the casting of goods into the sea out of fear of shipwreck.

It is confirmed. What is done out of fear is willed absolutely and efficaciously, and not-willed inefficaciously and conditionately only: so the merchant, the tempest pressing in, wills absolutely and efficaciously to cast overboard his goods, which he would not will to cast overboard were the tempest absent. But what is willed absolutely and efficaciously, and not-willed inefficaciously and conditionately only, is voluntary simply and involuntary secundum quid. Therefore.

From what has been said you will gather, 1° that contracts entered into out of grave fear are valid by natural law. Some, however, are invalidated by positive law: concerning which when we treat of contracts.

You will gather 2° that grave fear does not excuse from the whole sin in those things which are intrinsically and immutably evil, or, as is said, forbidden because evil, because they remain voluntary simply. Hence he who out of fear of death denies the faith, commits perjury, fornicates, etc., sins mortally. It does excuse, however, from so much of the sin, and the more so the graver the fear, because it diminishes the voluntary.

But in those things which are not intrinsically evil, but evil because forbidden, grave fear regularly excuses from the whole, not because they are not voluntary simply, but because positive laws, whether divine or human, by the intention of their legislators do not oblige regularly with so great a loss. Whence works of this kind, which are evil only by reason of the law, the obligation of the law ceasing, cease to be evil. Hence he who out of fear of death or of grave infamy, or of another grave evil, did not fast in Lent, or did not hear Mass on a feast day, etc., would not sin.

I said, « regularly, » because sometimes positive laws, whether divine or human, oblige even with loss of life: 1° when that which the law commands is of such moment that in the judgment of prudent men it outweighs the life of a particular individual. It is clear in the soldier commanded not to abandon his post, or to break upon the enemy with evident peril of death. 2° When transgression of the law would redound to contempt of religion or of ecclesiastical authority, as happened to the Machabees, whom tyrants threatened with death unless they ate swine's flesh in contempt of the law; since it is better that the law, the faith, or religion be not despised than that the life of one private person be preserved. But of these specially when we treat of Laws.