Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus II

*« Since through certain acts it is necessary to arrive at beatitude, human acts must consequently be considered, that we may know by what acts one arrives at beatitude, or impedes the way to beatitude. But, because operations and acts are concerned with singulars, therefore every practical science is perfected in particular consideration. Moral consideration therefore, since it treats of human acts, must first indeed be treated in the universal, secondly however in the particular.

» Concerning the universal consideration of human acts, the first thing occurring to be considered is about the human acts themselves, secondly about their principles. Now some human acts are proper to man, others are common to man and other animals. And since beatitude is the proper good of man, those acts stand more closely related to beatitude which are properly human, than acts which are common to man and other animals. First therefore must be considered the acts which are proper to man, secondly the acts which are common to man and animals, which are called the passions of the soul ¹ »

» Concerning the first two things occur to be considered: first, the condition of human acts; secondly, the distinction of those acts. But since those acts are properly called human which are voluntary, because the will is rational appetite, which is proper to man, we must consider acts insofar as they are voluntary. First therefore must be considered the voluntary and the involuntary in common; secondly, the acts which are voluntary as elicited by the will itself, as existing immediately of the will itself; thirdly, the acts which are voluntary as imperated by the will, which are of the will itself through mediating other powers. And because the acts of the will have certain circumstances by which they are judged, first must be considered the voluntary and involuntary, and consequently the circumstances of those acts in which the voluntary and involuntary are found ² »]

PRAENOTANDA

[That it may be clearly known of what acts there is question in the present treatise, certain distinctions must be established. Since man is rightly defined « a rational animal, » those acts alone which proceed from his nature perfectly, that is rationally, are to be imputed to him, as human and subject to the rules of morality. Hence

Acts done in man necessarily, such as respiration, are indeed natural; but, as pertaining only to animality, they are imperfect and not properly acts in the sense we understand here, that is, human.

There are acts which would of themselves be human if they were referred to a deliberated and free end, but which sometimes arise unforeseen without any deliberation and intention, such as laughter, which proceeds from a power proper to a rational being, but often not rationally. Such acts are not yet human, but are called acts of a man, as proceeding from a man in a mode not perfectly human.

A human act, in the theological sense, is therefore an operation proceeding from a man in a human manner, that is rationally or from deliberated will, consequently with knowledge of the end and freely. It truly pertains to man as defined above.

A human act proceeds from the will either immediately, without the aid of another faculty, and is elicited, because it is considered only in the will itself, by which immanent operation it elicits it: such are love and hate. If that act of the will does not rest in itself but commands another act, for this reason it is said to be imperating. But the act which proceeds from the will only mediately, that is determined by the command of the will and distinguished from its own act, such as meditation and walking, is imperated.

A human act is not to be considered only physically; but, since it tends to a known and chosen end, it is subject to rules which render the prosecution of the end legitimate or illegitimate, and from this heading it is constituted in moral being. Therefore a human act becomes moral from its relation to the rule of honesty or morals: if it is conformable to it, it is good, because « good is from an integral cause; » if it discord from it, it is evil, because « evil is from any defect whatsoever; » but if it is neither against nor alongside such a rule, the act is indifferent.]

DISSERTATION I

ON THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY

St. Thomas, q. 6.

I say 1°: The voluntary is rightly defined commonly thus: « That which proceeds from an intrinsic principle, with cognition of the end. »

The definition is explained. By intrinsic principle is understood any elicited appetite, rational as well as sensitive; but, because among elicited appetites the will is the more principal, from the principal appetite the voluntary is denominated. Therefore by the first particles the voluntary is distinguished from the violent, whose principle is outside; likewise from what is willed simply, which does not proceed from any influx of will, but is its object and term extrinsically denominated from volition; thus rain is willed by the farmer, but not voluntary to him. By the last particles it is distinguished from natural motion; because, although natural motion is from an intrinsic efficient principle, yet it is not from an intrinsic final principle, or it is not with cognition of the end, as appears in the motions of vegetative things and in the motion of heavy and light bodies toward the center: whence such things are not said to move themselves toward the end, but to be moved by another knowing, by whom there is impressed on them the principle of their motion toward the end. Likewise by these particles are excluded from the reason of voluntary the acts of intellect anticipating the act of will and not commanded by it; because, although they are from an intrinsic efficient principle, they do not suppose cognition of the end from which they are caused.

I say 2°: The voluntary is divided 1° into perfect and imperfect ¹. Perfect is that which proceeds from perfect cognition of the end; imperfect that which proceeds from imperfect cognition of the end. For since two things concur to the voluntary, namely the intrinsic principle and cognition of the end, the proper perfection of the voluntary by which it is distinguished from the natural cannot be sought from the intrinsic principle in which it agrees with the natural. Therefore from cognition of the end alone, by which it is distinguished from the natural.

Hence it follows that the perfect voluntary belongs to rational nature alone, the imperfect to brutes ²; because perfect cognition is had when not only is apprehended the thing which is the end, but also is known the reason of the end and the proportion of means to end; and such cognition, since it is collative and discursive, belongs to intellectual nature alone. But imperfect cognition of the end is that which consists in the mere apprehension of the thing which is the end, without the knowledge of the reason and dignity of the end and the proportion of means to end. And such cognition of the end is found in brutes through sense and natural estimation. Therefore the imperfect voluntary agrees with brutes, the perfect with rational nature alone; yet not with all its acts, but only those which proceed with full cognition and advertence; whence sudden motions, motions of children, of the insane, of the half-asleep, are only imperfectly voluntary.

2° The voluntary is divided into necessary and free. Free is that which proceeds from appetite with an indifferent judgment and power toward the opposite, as in man acting with full advertence concerning created goods. Necessary, that which proceeds from appetite with a judgment determined to one without power toward the opposite, as in brutes and human motions preceding the deliberation of reason.

3° The voluntary is divided into the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in cause. Voluntary in itself is whatever proceeds per se from the will expressly willing it, or every act which per se is intended, elicited, commanded, or positively admitted by the will; as, if you deliberately hate an enemy, you wish to kill, you command killing, you positively consent to one willing to kill. It is called also direct, express, and explicit voluntary.

Voluntary in cause is that which in itself is not immediately intended, elicited, or commanded by the will, but follows nevertheless from something willed per se and in itself, and therefore is reckoned willed in another as in its cause: thus quarrels are voluntary in cause for him who deliberately makes himself drunk, knowing that in drunkenness he quarrels freely everywhere, although elsewhere he detests quarrels. It is called also indirect, imperfect, and interpretative voluntary.

For this voluntary, the indirect one or that in cause, theologians commonly require three conditions. The first is that the effect was foreseen, or ought and could have been foreseen in a human way to follow from such cause; failing this, drunkenness is not indirectly voluntary for him who, ignorant of the force of wine and drinking to satiety, becomes drunk, as happened to Noë. Second, that it can. Third, that he ought to remove this cause and impede this effect; for if by no law am I bound to remove this cause, but on the contrary have just reason for positing it, there is no reason why what follows from it against my intention should be imputed to me, at least morally. Hence disordered motions are not imputed as voluntary to the confessor or surgeon, since these are not bound on that account to omit their ministry, but on the contrary have just cause for exercising it.

But when is anyone bound to omit or remove the cause from which an evil effect follows? A question difficult of solution on account of the diversity of cases occurring; for which are to be seen the things I say in the treatise de Jure et Justitia, dissert. VI, a. 12, in the premises, from which I repeat these few things.

That it may be discerned when the cause ought, or ought not, to be omitted or removed on account of the evil effect to follow from it, whether per se or per accidens, the evil effect must be compared with the good, and at the same time weighed how great is the influx of the cause into the evil effect: so that if the cause influences per se and proximately into the evil effect, and this outweighs the good effect, there is grave obligation of omitting or removing the cause; but none if the good effect outweighs, or at least equals, the evil. By what reason we said that just defense need not be omitted, from which proximately follows the death of the unjust invader, because the life of the innocent outweighs or at least equals the life of the noxious man; nor ought the damnation which the unjust invader incurs be attended to, because this does not follow from the just defense of invasion, but from the malice of the invader, to lay aside which lies in his own hand.

But if the cause influences remotely and lightly into the evil effect, and from it some good effect also follows, although it does not outweigh or equal the evil, there is no obligation of removing the cause, because less reason is required for positing a cause influencing only lightly and remotely into evil, than if it influenced gravely and proximately.

Hence you are not bound to abstain from honest and useful conversation on account of the motions arising from it. But if the cause influencing lightly and remotely be venially evil in itself, or from it no good effect follows, then there will be obligation of removing it, but light and only under venial sin, unless in this and the preceding case there be question of grave damage to a neighbor: because that obligation must be estimated according to the quantity of the influx of the cause; for since the effect is voluntary only in the cause, and is contained lightly and remotely in the cause, it is lightly voluntary in it, and consequently imputable to light fault, and further there is light obligation of removing the cause on account of that effect. Hence you are bound under venial sin to abstain from honest but useless conversation, or from curious reading from which you foresee disordered motions will follow, and this not only by reason of the cause itself, which already is venial in itself, but also by reason of the effect itself. I said, for these last two assertions, « unless the evil effect be grave damage to a neighbor; » for then there would be grave obligation of removing the cause, because charity commands us not only not to cause evil to our neighbor, but also, insofar as we conveniently can, to prevent it.

4° The voluntary is divided into positive and negative ³. The author calls it direct and indirect. The positive or direct voluntary is that which proceeds from the will by real influx, as are all acts elicited or commanded by the will. The negative or indirect voluntary indeed does not proceed from the will by real influx, yet depends upon it, whence it is said to proceed from it negatively, as the omission of Mass in one who, adverting to its approaching celebration, applies himself to study, without saying actually and positively: « I do not will to hear it. »

[5° The voluntary is divided into express and tacit. The express voluntary is that which is declared distinctly by word or sign. The tacit voluntary is that which is not distinctly declared, but is gathered from some fact or omission, according to rule 43 of Law: « Who is silent seems to consent. » Truly in interpreting that voluntary one must proceed cautiously and discreetly, on account of this other rule of Law, which is 44: « He who is silent does not confess, but certainly neither does he seem to deny. » There must be added, therefore, that the former rule be rightly understood: « When he is bound to speak, and can. »]

These are the more common divisions of the voluntary; certain others will occur in what follows.

You will ask whether the perfect voluntary is the same as free.

I answer. negatively. For there is given a voluntary necessary from the perfection of cognition, which is perfectly, and more perfectly, voluntary than free, namely beatific love. For this proceeds from a maximally intrinsic principle, namely from the will loving God with whole heart, whole affection, and endeavor, and is accompanied by most perfect cognition, namely the clear vision of God most perfectly flowing into that love and equaling the whole universality of intellect and will.

You will say. The same argument can be made of that necessary love by which God loves himself and produces the Holy Spirit. For it would be absurd to imagine God loving himself with lesser inclination and more imperfect cognition than creatures, whom he loves freely.

Note 1°. The question is not of omission directly voluntary, namely when the one omitting in act wills positively to omit; for all confess that then, for the omission to be voluntary, no precept or obligation of positing the act omitted is required, because then the will is terminated directly and positively to it. But the question is of omission indirectly voluntary, namely when someone, being advertent, posits some act incompossible with the act omitted; e.g., someone, while the practical judgment dictates that Mass is presently to be celebrated and can be heard, chooses to remain at home, or to play, or to study, yet without saying: « I will to omit Mass. »

Note 2° that distinction must be made between culpable and voluntary omission; for it is certain that omission is not culpable without a precept of positing the act omitted.

I say 1°: For omission to be voluntary, there is not required a precept or obligation of positing the act omitted.

It is proved 1° by the fundamental reason. The voluntary is from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end. But, the precept of positing the act omitted being set aside, its omission is from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end. Therefore. — Proof of the minor: 1° We suppose the intellect to advert to what is omitted, otherwise it would be mere forgetfulness or negative omission. 2° This omission hangs upon the will, whether it be posited or not posited. 3° The will elicits advertently some act incompossible with the omitted act, whereby liberty is exercised in act, and from which the omission follows. Therefore, the precept being set aside, omission is from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end, and the omission is indirectly voluntary and thus elicited. What the adversaries oppose against this fundamental reason we shall say in the solution of the objections.

It is confirmed. He who omits freely omits voluntarily. But he who, intent upon study, omits Mass on a feria omits no less freely than on a feast day. Therefore.

It is proved 2° a posteriori. Many are the indirect voluntary omissions of acts not precepted; thus, e.g., he who, given to study or prayer, omits warming himself, or recreation, or some other convenience licit indeed but not precepted — not by direct volition of those omissions, but out of voluntary choice of study or prayer at that time, or on that occasion when he could licitly enjoy these conveniences; these, I say, are indirectly voluntary omissions, as no one, I think, will deny, since they are meritorious. Therefore it is plain that an indirect voluntary omission can exist without precept.

I say 2°: The effect consequent upon or concomitant with the omission is not voluntary without obligation of impeding it, unless perchance the omission be ordered as a means toward this effect.

It is proved 1° a priori. The effect following or accompanying the omission, the obligation of impeding it being set aside, proceeds neither physically nor morally from the will: not physically, because the will precisely omitting has no physical influx upon the existence of this effect, nor can omission, since it is a non-being, cause it physically; not morally, because there is no reason why an effect upon which the will has in no wise physical influx should be referred back to it as cause, unless because it could and ought to have impeded it. But by the very fact that it can and ought to impede such an effect, the effect begins to belong to it, and there is due to it the care of impeding it; whence omission of impeding is reckoned as volition of the effect, because no one is presumed unwilling to fulfill his debt, unless he wills the opposite the more. Therefore, the obligation of impeding the effect consequent upon the omission being set aside, that effect is not voluntary.

It is confirmed from the difference which exists between the omission itself and the effect following or accompanying it respectively with respect to the will. Omission per se immediately, no other cause intervening, depends upon the will; for the will can equally immediately nill as will. Whence, that the nolition, or omission of willing, be indirectly voluntary, it needs no other cause than only advertence and the suspension of influx after the vital manner, which is furnished by eliciting another act incompossible with the act omitted; for then the omission proceeds indirectly from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end. But the effect following, or accompanying, the omission is not per se immediately from the will, but mediately, through another cause intervening: thus, e.g., while I omit to part two quarrelers, the killing ensuing thence is caused neither by my will nor by my omission, but by the sword of the slayer; likewise, when a sailor omits to steer the ship, neither his will nor his omission submerges the ship, but the tempest. That therefore such an effect be referred back to the will as to its cause, and be called interpretatively voluntary, something must be assigned whereby it comes about that it belongs in some way to the will and has some connection with it; and nothing else can be assigned except a precept of impeding that effect, as I said in the first proof.

It is proved 2° a posteriori. There are effects following or accompanying voluntary omission which are in no wise voluntary through defect of the obligation of impeding them: thus God voluntarily omits to impede the sins of men, and yet sins are not voluntary in him, because he is not bound to impede them.

I said in the conclusion, « Unless perchance the omission be ordered as a means toward this effect »; because then it is manifest that such an effect would be directly intended and willed, consequently positively and directly voluntary: as if someone, to that end that he suffer cold for mortification's sake, omit to approach the fire; cold is positively voluntary in him, because per se intended and willed.

Obj. 1° against the first conclusion: St. Thomas, here a. 3, c., says: « Since therefore the will, by willing and acting, can impede this, that it will not and act not, and sometimes ought, therefore not to will and not to act is imputed to it as existing from it. » Therefore, according to St. Thomas, omission without precept is not voluntary.

I answer. St. Thomas speaks of omission insofar as it is at once culpable and voluntary, as is plain from this word « imputed ».

Obj. 2°: An omission, e.g., of Mass, is not voluntary unless it have the character of privation, because negative omission was already in the will before one willed or nilled, and not while the time of Mass was present. But, the precept being set aside, omission of Mass has not the character of privation, but of mere negation. Therefore. — Proof of the minor: Privation is the lack of a form due to the subject. But, the precept being set aside, hearing Mass is not due. Therefore. And this is the principal foundation of Gonet.

I answer, with Contenson: I deny the minor; to prove it, distinguish the minor. The precept being set aside, hearing Mass is not due legally and morally, that is, by way of obligation — grant the minor; it is not due physically and naturally, that is, by way of disposition and exigency — I deny the minor. A twofold debt therefore must be distinguished, one moral and of obligation, by force of a law that binds; the other natural, by force of a disposition that demands. And to this twofold debt corresponds a twofold privation: one is the lack of the act due by force of precept; the other, the lack of the act due by force of the disposition toward it. Although therefore the work, e.g., the hearing of Mass on a feria, is not due by force of precept, nevertheless, advertence being posited and the dictamen proposing in practice that Mass be celebrated here and now, Mass is due by a natural debt, that is, of exigency and disposition; for it cannot be denied that the thought and dictamen concerning some act are a disposition toward it, since the beginning of every work is the thought of it. When therefore man rejects this dictamen, and thereby prudently and knowingly turns himself to an act incompossible with hearing Mass, he stands not only negatively but privatively toward it, and voluntarily omits it: just as, e.g., while matter is disposed to some form, that form is due to it; and if, notwithstanding this disposition, another be introduced, it is said to be deprived of it.

Four causes of the involuntary are commonly assigned: violence, fear, concupiscence and ignorance. But note, once for all, that when it is said that violence, or fear, or concupiscence, or ignorance cause the involuntary, the sense is not that violence, fear, concupiscence, or ignorance physically influence the act of will, upon its very involuntariness so to speak, but that they move physically or morally toward an act which simply or relatively is contrary to the inclination of the will; whence that involuntariness is caused by love of some opposite good. Thus, e.g., while one is moved by fear of shipwreck to cast goods overboard, that casting is involuntary in a certain respect [secundum quid], because it repugns to the affection which the one casting has for preserving his goods; whence the involuntary found in that casting is not caused by fear, but by love of his goods.

The proper sense, therefore, of these questions is, that acts from violence, fear, concupiscence and ignorance are involuntary simply or in a certain respect, inasmuch as they suppose in the agent an inclination simply or in a certain respect contrary to the present act toward which they move. I suppose that violence cannot be inflicted upon the will as to elicited acts, well indeed as to commanded acts.

The first part stands, because the violent, which is from an extrinsic principle with the patient resisting, is against the inclination of the patient. But an act elicited by the will is not from an extrinsic principle but intrinsic, namely from the will, nor against the inclination of the patient, since it is nothing else than the very inclination of the will toward its object. Whence St. Anselm rightly said, de Lib. arbit., cap. 6: « No one unwilling can will anything, because he cannot will, unwilling to will. »

Plain also is the second part, because the members, or exterior powers, can be moved by force from without or impeded against the command of the will ¹, as if, e.g., the will wished to see, one could forcibly close the eyes, and if it wished not to see, one could force open the eyes: and so of the rest. Therefore.

Of these commanded acts the question is whether violence causes the involuntary in them. Wherefore

I say: Violence causes the involuntary simply, or the act done under violence is involuntary simply.

Understand the conclusion of absolute violence, which one cannot overcome with all legitimate effort employed, not of violence in a certain respect, which one could conquer if he resisted as much as he morally can.

It is proved of the conclusion. The voluntary is from an intrinsic principle and consequently according to inclination; the violent is from an extrinsic principle and against the inclination of the patient; for we defined it « that which is from an extrinsic principle with the patient resisting ». Therefore what is violent is not voluntary.

From these authors commonly gather that a woman oppressed by violence from a man, resisting him both within and without as much as she morally can, sins nowise; because this violence destroys altogether the voluntary, without which there is no sin.

But if you ask what and how much the woman ought to do, that she be held to resist as much as she morally can, and thus suffer absolute violence simply so called,

I answer. First that she cannot kill the oppressor; because, as we say de Jure et Just., dissert. X, a. 6, § 2, chastity is a good of lower order than the life of man. She can however resist with cries, blows, slaps, wounding of the oppressor, yet not lethally, and the like; and to these she is bound, short nevertheless of danger to her own life and reputation; because, if such danger be present, and elsewhere there be absent danger of interior consent to lust, she is not bound to resist externally at so great loss of higher goods; because external resistance is an affirmative precept which does not bind always, and at so great cost. I said, « provided danger of consent to interior lust be absent »; which since it rarely is absent, rarely also is she bound to employ these at peril of life or reputation.

[Too absolutely does our Author deny that, in the case proposed, it is licit for the woman even to kill the oppressor.

Theologians commonly hold it licit to kill an unjust invader of goods of fortune, « if they be of great moment, and cannot otherwise be defended or recovered than by the death of the despoiler, » as Sylvius says, in IIam IIae, q. 64, a. 7.

And the same many cited by St. Alphonsus hold, lib. IV, n. 383; and this card. Gousset holds at least as more probable, n. 617, and Gury, n. 397. But chastity, and especially virginity, considered in itself, far surpasses goods of fortune. Therefore much more is it licit to kill the aggressor, if no other way be at hand for preserving chastity. So say the authors just named.

Moreover everyone is bound to turn away proximate danger of mortal sin. But in the case the woman is placed in proximate danger of consenting to another's lust, which consent would be mortal sin. Therefore she not only can but is bound to turn away that danger, even by killing of the aggressor.

If you say that everyone is bound to prefer the eternal salvation of his neighbor to his own temporal good, I answer:

1° The aggressor freely and knowingly casts himself into danger of salvation, and cannot require that the woman renounce a good, even temporal, which far surpasses other goods of the same order, to turn away from a criminal such danger as is willed at least in its cause.

2° The woman, if she repel not the force by every possible means, is herself constituted in danger of the same kind, namely of consenting to lust and losing through mortal sin the supernatural life of the soul. But not only is she not bound, she cannot even licitly prefer the salvation of another to her own salvation. Therefore. Whence St. Antoninus says in Summa, part. III, tit. 4, c. 3, § 2: « The woman uses her natural right, whereby she may repel force with force, and she is bound rather to provide for her own salvation than for another's; for she exposes herself to danger of consenting to an act of sin by suffering herself to be oppressed, on account of the difficulty of the pleasure. »

It must therefore be concluded, against our Author, that this violence does not destroy the voluntary altogether; for that cannot be judged altogether involuntary which is not removed by all possible and licit means.]

Fear is defined in law: « Trembling of mind from the cause of future and imminent danger, » that is, disquietude and disturbance. One fear is grave, another light. Grave fear is one kind absolutely grave, namely whereby a grave and imminent evil is feared, as death, exile, hard imprisonment, etc.; this is called such as befalls a man of constancy, that is, whereby men otherwise of constancy are commonly moved, although at times they ought not to be moved; for no one ought to be moved by any fear whatever, e. g., to perjury. Another fear is respectively grave, whereby although a man of constancy would not be moved, yet a timid person would be moved, as a child, a woman, an old man.

Fear is light when a light evil is feared, or indeed a grave one, but not imminent; as if, under a serene sky, or with frost pinching, you should fear lightning. To absolutely grave fear is reduced reverential fear, whereby one fears superiors gravely incensed and threatening. But if threats and grave indignation are absent, it can be called light, unless perhaps respectively as regards daughters of the family, who have a timid disposition.

I say 1°: Things done out of fear are mixed of the voluntary and the involuntary¹.

It is proved of the conclusion. Things done out of fear, considered in themselves, are not voluntary; nay, thus they are involuntary; but they are made voluntary and willed out of fear, namely in order to avoid the evil that is feared. This whole matter is clear in the common example. The merchant, considering his goods in themselves, setting aside the peril of shipwreck, would not wish to cast them overboard; but a tempest having arisen and the peril of death being imminent, he wills to cast them overboard. Therefore.

I say 2°: Things done out of fear are voluntary simply, and involuntary secundum quid².

It is proved. That which is voluntary here and now, all circumstances weighed, and involuntary only considered in itself and prescinded from here and now, or from the individuating circumstances, is voluntary simply and involuntary secundum quid. But what is done out of fear is voluntary here and now, all circumstances attended to, and involuntary only considered in itself and prescinded from the circumstances. Therefore. — The min. is clear in the casting of goods into the sea out of fear of shipwreck.

It is confirmed. What is done out of fear is willed absolutely and efficaciously, and not-willed inefficaciously and conditionately only: so the merchant, the tempest pressing in, wills absolutely and efficaciously to cast overboard his goods, which he would not will to cast overboard were the tempest absent. But what is willed absolutely and efficaciously, and not-willed inefficaciously and conditionately only, is voluntary simply and involuntary secundum quid. Therefore.

From what has been said you will gather, 1° that contracts entered into out of grave fear are valid by natural law. Some, however, are invalidated by positive law: concerning which when we treat of contracts.

You will gather 2° that grave fear does not excuse from the whole sin in those things which are intrinsically and immutably evil, or, as is said, forbidden because evil, because they remain voluntary simply. Hence he who out of fear of death denies the faith, commits perjury, fornicates, etc., sins mortally. It does excuse, however, from so much of the sin, and the more so the graver the fear, because it diminishes the voluntary.

But in those things which are not intrinsically evil, but evil because forbidden, grave fear regularly excuses from the whole, not because they are not voluntary simply, but because positive laws, whether divine or human, by the intention of their legislators do not oblige regularly with so great a loss. Whence works of this kind, which are evil only by reason of the law, the obligation of the law ceasing, cease to be evil. Hence he who out of fear of death or of grave infamy, or of another grave evil, did not fast in Lent, or did not hear Mass on a feast day, etc., would not sin.

I said, « regularly, » because sometimes positive laws, whether divine or human, oblige even with loss of life: 1° when that which the law commands is of such moment that in the judgment of prudent men it outweighs the life of a particular individual. It is clear in the soldier commanded not to abandon his post, or to break upon the enemy with evident peril of death. 2° When transgression of the law would redound to contempt of religion or of ecclesiastical authority, as happened to the Machabees, whom tyrants threatened with death unless they ate swine's flesh in contempt of the law; since it is better that the law, the faith, or religion be not despised than that the life of one private person be preserved. But of these specially when we treat of Laws.

I say 1°: Antecedent concupiscence rather causes a thing to be voluntary than involuntary¹. For a thing is said to be voluntary from the fact that the will is borne toward it. But through concupiscence the will is inclined to will what concupiscence desires. Therefore concupiscence contributes more to making a thing voluntary than involuntary.

I say 2°: Antecedent concupiscence increases absolute voluntariness, and diminishes perfect and free voluntariness.

The first part is proved. Absolute voluntariness is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end materially, such as belongs to brutes. But antecedent concupiscence causes the will, with prior knowledge of the end materially, to be borne toward the object with greater force and inclination than if there were no concupiscence. Therefore. — The minor is proved: 1° By reason; for, concupiscence impelling, the intellect proposes to the will the object as more desirable, and therefore to be pursued with greater efficacy. 2° By experience; for we see that those who pursue an object with love are carried toward it with greater force than if they were not affected by this passion. Therefore.

The second part is proved. Perfect voluntariness is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end formally as end, that is, with knowledge of the dignity of the end and of the proportion of the means to it. But concupiscence diminishes, nay sometimes takes away this knowledge. Therefore. — The minor is proved. For it diminishes the judgment of reason, nay sometimes destroys it and causes madness, as experience shows. But knowledge of the end formally as end pertains to the judgment of reason. Therefore.

The third part is proved. Free voluntariness is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end under indifference concerning the thing proposed. But antecedent concupiscence diminishes this indifference. Therefore. — The minor is proved: 1° Because it diminishes the judgment of reason, as I was just saying. 2° Because concupiscence causes the intellect to propose to the will, in pursuing the object, all the aspects of the desirable and deficient good, and to attend less to the aspects of the honest good by which the will would be withdrawn from that object. Therefore it diminishes indifference.

Hence you will infer that antecedent concupiscence diminishes sin, insofar as it disturbs the judgment and diminishes liberty, nay sometimes exempts from all sin, when it is so violent that it altogether takes away the judgment of reason and indifference, and renders one mad.

Ignorance on the part of the will is divided into ignorance antecedent, concomitant and consequent¹ : and of ignorance taken in this sense the question is here. Antecedent ignorance is that which precedes every act of the will, so that it is not at all willed or voluntary; it is nevertheless the cause of willing or doing what would not be done if knowledge were present: as in one who, with sufficient diligence used, kills a friend, thinking invincibly that he was killing a stag, whom he would not have killed had he known him to be a friend. It is also called invincible. Yet antecedent and invincible ignorance do not coincide, for antecedent, as here taken, adds over and above simply invincible ignorance that it be the cause why something is done which would not be done were it absent; which does not belong to every invincible ignorance, as is clear in concomitant ignorance, which, as I shall say presently, is invincible, and yet not antecedent. Whence every antecedent ignorance is invincible, but not conversely.

Concomitant ignorance is that which also precedes every act of the will, nor is it at all willed, and therefore invincible, like the antecedent, but it is not the cause of willing or doing what would not be done if knowledge were present. It is clear in one who killed an enemy, thinking invincibly that he was killing a stag, whom he would just the same have killed had he known him to be an enemy.

Consequent ignorance is that which follows an act of the will, so that it is willed either directly or indirectly, and it is the cause why something is done which would not be done were it absent. That which is directly willed is called affected, as when someone directly and positively wills to be ignorant of something, whether that he may sin more freely, or that he may have an excuse in sins, or on account of something else; of this is understood that Job, XXI, 14 : The wicked said to God: Depart from us, and we will not the knowledge of thy ways. And that Psal., XXXV, 4 : He would not understand that he might do well. Indirectly willed it is, when someone, although he does not will directly and positively to be ignorant, yet neglects to learn; whence this ignorance is called voluntary or willed indirectly and in its cause, namely negligence of learning. Which negligence, if it be grave, such that either none or only very slight diligence was used according to the quality of the matter, the ignorance is called crass and supine; but if the negligence be slight, such that notable diligence was used in learning, yet not wholly sufficient, the ignorance is called light or lightest, according to the quantity of diligence used in learning, respectively to the quality of the thing to be learned. These things noted,

I say 1° : Antecedent ignorance causes the involuntary simply²; because the work proceeding from it is done without cognition, and is, as to the circumstance ignored, against the inclination, whether actual, or habitual and interpretative, of the agent; for he would not will to do it if the ignorance were absent. It is clear in him who, sufficient diligence being used, thinking invincibly that he was killing a stag, killed a friend. For although this killing, as to the substance of the act, and as it is a killing as such, be voluntary, yet not inasmuch as it is the killing of a friend; under that reason indeed it repugns the inclination of the slayer, and is done without cognition.

I say 2° : Concomitant ignorance does not make the voluntary simply; because the work proceeding from it is done without cognition, or with an ignorance which is neither voluntary in itself nor in its cause, since it is invincible. Nor does it make the involuntary positively and contrarily; because this work is not against the inclination of the agent, for it would be done just the same if cognition were present. But it makes the involuntary negatively, or not voluntary; because it is done without the cognition required for the voluntary. It is clear in him who, thinking invincibly that he was killing a beast, killed an enemy, whom he would just the same have killed had he known him.

I say 3° : Consequent ignorance causes the voluntary simply, because it itself is simply voluntary, whether directly in itself, or indirectly in its cause, namely negligence of learning. Therefore the work proceeding from it is voluntary simply; for he who wills the cause wills also the effect. If you say that it is done without cognition, I answer that it is done indeed without formal cognition and in itself, yet not without virtual cognition and in its cause, namely in the ignorance which could and ought to have been driven away. He however is said to know virtually who could and ought to have known and would not. Yet it causes the involuntary secundum quid; because the work following from it is against some sort of inclination of the agent, for if knowledge were present, it would not be done, as is supposed. But if you suppose the ignorance to be so affected that, were it absent, the work would nonetheless be done; as if, e.g., someone rejects knowledge, not that with it present he may abstain from sin, but that he may sin without remorse: I confess that then it will not be involuntary secundum quid, but also neither will it be consequent ignorance in the sense of the conclusion, which is precisely that it be the cause why that is done which would not be done were it absent.

From what has been said you will gather that antecedent ignorance altogether excuses from sin, because it causes the involuntary simply: but concomitant does not altogether excuse, because it does not take away all willingness, whether habitual or actual conditioned to sinning; nor yet accuse, because it is involuntary and invincible. Whence, in the case posited, he who kills an enemy, thinking invincibly that he kills a beast, remains always guilty of internal homicide, on account of the evil will of killing the enemy, if he knew him; he is nevertheless excused from external homicide and from the punishments and censures, which are inflicted only on account of the external work, because the external work is not voluntary. Consequent however causes sin, because it causes the voluntary simply; it diminishes nevertheless, because it causes the involuntary secundum quid, and the lighter it is the more it diminishes, so that sometimes it makes venial out of mortal.

What I have said here of ignorance can be said of inadvertence, which is a kind of actual ignorance, or at least is equated to ignorance in ordine to the voluntary. Let these things suffice now on the present matter, for there will be further mention of it when treating of the causes of sins.