Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

The question concerns reprobation as such, insofar as it regards angels and men; but whether something special, namely original sin, enters into the motive of the reprobation of men, I shall say below.

Likewise, the question concerns reprobation both positive and negative. But it must be observed that many Thomists understand by negative reprobation not, as we do, the simple permission of falling short of glory, but a positive exclusion from it as from an unowed benefit, which they therefore hold to be gratuitous and independent of foreseen demerits: this we shall impugn in the following §. Whence, in order that we may first lay down what is certain among all Catholics, let it be:

§ I. — On the motive of positive reprobation.

I say: Positive reprobation, both of angels and of men, is from foreseen demerits: that is, God decrees the punishment of eternal damnation to no one except on account of foreseen sins. So hold all Catholics, against Calvin and the other predestinarians.

Proof 1° from all those passages of Scripture in which God's goodness is commended, especially in this, that he does not will punishments and torments except as it were compelled by our demerits. Ezech. 33:11: I desire not the death of the wicked, but that he be converted, and live; Wisd. 1:13,16: God made not death, neither hath he pleasure in the destruction of the living... But the wicked with works and words have called it to them.

2° From the Fathers. Damascene, bk. II On the Orthodox Faith, ch. 26: «God is moved of himself to show mercy, but to punish only on the presupposition of guilt.» Augustine, bk. III Against Julian, ch. 18, n. 35: «God is good, God is just. He can free some without good merits, because he is good; he cannot damn anyone without evil merits, because he is just.» This is true not only of the execution itself of damnation, but also of the intention itself; for a just judge not only does not punish, but does not even intend to punish, except on the presupposition of guilt.

3° By reason. God wills nothing except insofar as it has the character of a good. But punishment does not of itself have the character of a good, but only on the presupposition of guilt; for it is not a good that someone be punished, unless he has sinned: indeed the contrary would be evil and unjust, and therefore punishment is called an occasioned good. Therefore God does not will punishment except on the presupposition of guilt.

And hence it is clear why, in predestination, glory can be intended as a crown and reward before foreseen merits, although in execution it depends on merits; but punishment cannot be intended before foreseen demerits: because, namely, a crown and reward is something good of itself, and therefore can be first efficaciously willed, and the means prepared from its volition; but punishment, as I have said, is only an occasioned good arising from presupposed guilt. Another difference is that predestination is the cause of the means that lead to glory; but reprobation is not the cause of that which leads to punishment, namely, of guilt. Whence God can will gratuitously to give someone glory as a reward, before he foresees merits on that one's part, because he himself is the one who confers them; but it is repugnant to his justice and goodness that he should will punishment for someone before he foresees some demerit on that one's part. And thus the principal objection is forestalled.

§ II. — On the motive of negative reprobation.

The positive exclusion from glory under the title of an undue benefit is impugned.

Our contest here is with certain Thomists, who locate negative reprobation, both of angels and of men, in a positive exclusion from glory as from an undue benefit, and thus hold it to be gratuitous and prior to foreseen demerits. From this intention of positively excluding from glory, they hold that God proceeds to prepare a means by which this exclusion may be had, namely the permission of sin, which once foreseen, He decrees for those thus excluded the eternal punishment of damnation, namely the pain of sense and the pain of loss, which is the very exclusion from glory, no longer as from an undue benefit, but as a punishment for guilt. For they hold that the first exclusion from the kingdom is not a punishment, but only the second; because, they say, the first is a mere negation of a thing not owed, the second is a privation on account of guilt: just as, if a king should deny someone a dignity which is not owed to him, it is not a punishment; but if he should deny it to him on account of his demerits, being otherwise about to grant it, it is a punishment. So hold Alvarez, the Salmanticenses, John of St. Thomas, Gonet, Contenson, and others.

We, however, do not acknowledge a negative reprobation of this kind, of which we find not even a trace in St. Thomas, and we judge it to be harsher. We say, rather, with the Holy Doctor, as is clear from the preceding article, that negative reprobation is nothing other than the will of permitting that some, by their own will and fault, fail of glory, and we grant that it is prior to foreseen demerits, as we shall say once we have shown the present opinion of certain Thomists to be less true. Hence

I say: God positively excludes no one from glory under the title of an undue benefit, and before foreseen demerits. And thus negative reprobation is not the will of excluding from glory before guilt, but is the will of permitting that some fall from glory by their own guilt. So hold, after Capreolus, Cajetan, here a. 5, Ferrariensis, Contra gent. III, ch. 161, Nazarius, here a. 3, controversy I, Marcus Serra, here a. 3, doubt 2, ad 2, the most learned Fathers Anton. Goudin, tract 3, q. 3, a. 1, On Reprobation, and Hyacinth de Graveson, class 3 of the Letters, letter 9, from whom we shall borrow in large part what we are about to say here.

Proof, 1°, by an argument drawn from Scripture. According to Scripture, and especially the Apostle, God, as far as it is from Himself, sincerely wills that all be saved, so that their damnation proceeds from themselves alone. But if God, before any guilt foreseen on the part of the reprobate, had decreed positively to exclude him from glory and eternal salvation, and were to seek out means for that as for an end intended by Himself, it is plain that, as far as it is from Himself, He would not merely not will him to be saved, but on the contrary would will him to be excluded from salvation and to perish forever. Therefore before sin there was no such will in God, but a bare permission that some, by their own will and guilt, should fall from eternal life.

The adversaries answer that the will for the salvation of the reprobate is antecedent, which does not preclude the consequent will of excluding them from salvation and eternal life.

But on the contrary. Indeed the consequent will of excluding from salvation on account of the circumstance of guilt on the part of the reprobate does not stand in the way of the will of saving, as far as is on the part of God; for it is not repugnant that God, as far as it is from Himself, should will to save some whom, nevertheless, in view of their guilt, He wills actually to damn: as is explained by the example of a judge, who wills a thief to be put to death on account of his guilt, whom he would have willed to live before the guilt. But the consequent will of excluding from salvation and glory apart from any guilt in no way stands together with the antecedent will of saving, as far as is on the part of God. For by what other circumstance, besides guilt, could God be moved so that, without contradiction, He should consequently will to exclude from glory and salvation those whom antecedently, as far as it is from Himself, He wills to be saved? Not that the defectibility of free will might be shown, not that He might allow creatures to carry out their own movements, not that we might recognize the necessity of grace, not that it might be shown that efficacious grace is owed to no one, not that the virtue of others might shine forth the more, nor any other similar circumstances; for to all these things exclusion from glory before foreseen guilt contributes nothing, but all these things flow from the permission of guilt alone. If you should say: that it might be shown that glory is owed to no one; I answer that this is sufficiently shown by permitting that some should fail of it. Moreover, I shall say presently that to those ordained to glory by the antecedent will, it is in some sense owed.

Proof, 2°, from St. Thomas, who, in explaining reprobation, never makes mention of that positive will of excluding from glory before guilt, but explains it by the bare permission of failing of the last end and falling into guilt, and, this being supposed, of inflicting the punishment of damnation: « It belongs, says the Holy Doctor, here a. 3, obj., to divine providence to permit some to fail of that end [glory], and this is called reprobating. » And at the end of the body [of the article]: « Reprobation includes the will of permitting someone to fall into guilt, and of inflicting the punishment of damnation for the guilt. »

Proof, 3°, by a reason already proposed more than once from St. Thomas. God wills each thing according as it has the nature of a good. But that someone ordained to glory, as to his highest good, should be excluded from it, is not of itself good, but only if by guilt he shows himself unworthy of it: hence in actual execution no one is excluded from it except on account of guilt; indeed, according to the order of justice, it cannot happen otherwise. Therefore.

It is confirmed. God does not will punishment before guilt, as the adversaries grant. But to be excluded from glory forever is the gravest punishment and the height of misery, indeed the very essential damnation, namely the pain of loss. Therefore.

I know that the adversaries answer that the exclusion from glory in execution, as it is a privation of beatitude on account of guilt, is indeed a punishment of damnation, but not likewise in intention, as from an undue benefit: just as, they say, if a king should deny someone a dignity which is not owed to him, it is not a punishment; but if he should deny it on account of guilt, being otherwise about to grant it, it is a punishment.

( But on the contrary: 1° Glory, whether it be an owed benefit or not — of which presently — as things nevertheless stand, is the highest and only true good of the rational creature, outside of which nothing remains for it but the height of misery. Therefore, under whatever title this exclusion be decreed before guilt, it is nothing other than to decree the height of misery before guilt. And this is all the more true because, the elevation of man to the supernatural order being supposed, his natural happiness is so joined with the supernatural, that the natural cannot be had apart from the supernatural. Hence to be excluded from the supernatural is to be excluded from the natural. Wherefore, if God, before guilt, willed to exclude the reprobate from glory, by that very fact He willed to exclude them from their natural happiness, that is, He willed the innocent to be forever supernaturally and naturally miserable. And hence the example adduced does not help the adversaries, but rather stands against them. For granted that it is not a punishment when a king denies someone a dignity not owed to him, without which he can lead a happy life; yet if he had so ordained someone to a certain dignity that his whole happiness consisted in it, and without it he would be utterly miserable, by that very fact by which he denied it to him, he would cast him down from his whole happiness and render him utterly miserable. Since, therefore, God has ordained every intellectual creature to glory as to its happiness, so that outside of it a creature can be nothing but miserable, both naturally and supernaturally, under whatever title He excludes it from glory, He constitutes it miserable. )

2° The response of the adversaries supposes something false, namely that glory stands in relation to the reprobate as something wholly undue. For, by this very fact that man is ordained by God to glory, glory, by force of this ordination, becomes in a certain way owed to him, and he has to it a right at least inchoate, resting not indeed on his own merits, but on the fidelity and sincerity of the divine ordination; from which, therefore, God cannot exclude him, unless by his own guilt he shows himself unworthy of it.

Proof, lastly, from the self-contradiction of the opposite opinion. The adversaries say that God, in the business of reprobation, began from the intention of manifesting His punitive justice, and by force of this intention immediately excluded the reprobate from glory as from an undue benefit, and afterward decreed to permit guilt. But exclusion from an undue benefit, and before guilt, is a means wholly unsuited, indeed repugnant, to the showing of punitive justice, as is evident, because it rather shows that punitive justice has no place in it. Therefore.

We judge, therefore, that it must be said, and firmly held, that God, before guilt, not only does not will to exclude anyone from glory, but even wills, as far as it is from Himself, that all attain to it, yet according as their condition and the order of His wisdom allows: and this is the will sincerely ordaining all to glory, and preparing for them the means. But, because free will can fail, and has its unfailingness from God alone, therefore God from eternity purposed that He would permit some to fail of glory through their own guilt; for so demanded both the condition of a defectible nature, and the order of providence, and the very good of the universe and the splendor of justice, which would have no place if no guilt were permitted, or if, once permitted, it were blotted out through mercy. To others, however, He purposed to apply efficacious helps, lest they should fail, but that they should infallibly attain to glory. And thus was made the election of the former, but the reprobation of the latter begun. But the defect of guilt, now foreseen, God orders to the good of justice, by decreeing for it the punishment of damnation; and thus reprobation is completed, which, as I have said, is the will of permitting guilt, and of inflicting, for the guilt, the punishment of damnation.

The objections are resolved.

You will object, 1°, with our Gonet, that passage to the Romans, IX, 11: When they had not yet done anything good or evil, it was said: Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated. There the reprobate, figured by Esau, are said to have been held in hatred, when they had not yet done anything evil. But by that hatred is understood the will of excluding from the kingdom. Therefore.

I answer. I deny the minor. For hatred there is taken broadly and improperly for a lesser love, inasmuch as God did not will salvation for the reprobate, as He willed it for the elect, by a consequent will. So St. Thomas explains this passage, in III Sent., dist. 32, q. 1, a. 2, ad 4.

You will object, 2°, with the same author, that solemn passage of St. Thomas' commentary to Hannibaldus, d. 41, a. 3: « To the divine will regarding the salvation of man a twofold will seems to be opposed, namely a will of contradiction, according to which He wills someone not to be saved, and a will of contrariety, according to which He wills someone to be damned. The first will does not require any reason on the part of the thing willed, since the salvation of glory is not a debt of human nature, for no reason is required why I do not give to one to whom I am not obliged to give; but the will of damnation regards the reason of the thing willed in the one damned, since damnation is inflicted out of what is due. » But to will not to save is the same as to will to exclude from glory. Therefore.

I answer, 1°, that our most learned Father Echard proves by many arguments that this work to Hannibaldus is not St. Thomas', especially because before Thomas Nerius, in the year 1560, none of our own listed it among the works of the Holy Doctor, neither Ptolemy of Lucca, nor Bernard Guidonis, nor William of Tocco, nor St. Antoninus, nor others. On the contrary, this commentary is cited under the name of Brother Hannibaldus the Cardinal by several ancient authors: by our own Rainerius of Pisa, in his Pantheologia — he was writing in the year 1333; by Bandellus, in the treatise On the Conception of the Blessed Virgin, ch. 23; by Denis the Carthusian, in II, d. 1, q. 1, p. 9, and elsewhere.

I answer, 2°. But, granted that this work is a genuine offspring of St. Thomas, the adversaries thereby gain nothing. For I deny the minor of the argument: because the author, by the will of not saving, does not understand the will of excluding from glory, for this is opposed to the will of saving not merely contradictorily, but contrarily, and is the same as the will of damning: for just as God, when in execution He excludes the reprobate from glory, truly damns them; so, when He wills to exclude, He wills to damn. Therefore the author, by the will of not saving, understands only the will of not helping efficaciously toward salvation; for this is what is opposed contradictorily and not contrarily to the will of saving, and which does not require a reason on our part. For although glory is owed to one who has grace, unless by guilt he shows himself unworthy, yet it is not owed to him that he be infallibly brought to glory through efficacious helps; and in this sense the author said that the salvation of glory is not owed to human nature, namely that it be conferred on it efficaciously and infallibly. Hence, even before guilt, God can, under the title of an undue benefit, will not to save him, that is, not to help him efficaciously; which is to will to permit that he fall from glory through guilt.

But you will say: Whether this exclusion be explained by way of a positive will of rejecting from glory, or by a mere permission of failing of it, the same effect will follow; for the reprobate will equally infallibly fail of glory and perish. Therefore it is in vain that a positive exclusion is denied, in order that a permissive one be established.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent. The same effect will follow on the part of the reprobate, I concede; on the part of God, I deny. For, according to the former way, God would be the author of why some are not saved, because He Himself would be the one who repelled them from salvation and prepared means to that end, which must in no way be granted; but, according to the latter way, it is clearly understood that no one falls from glory by the will of God, but only by his own guilt, God comporting Himself toward this only permissively: just as, whether God decrees guilt by an effective decree, as Calvin holds, or by a merely permissive decree, as Catholics hold, guilt will equally infallibly follow; but with this difference, that on the former hypothesis God would be the author of sin, not on the second. Since, therefore, God must not be called the author of perdition (which consists in exclusion from glory) any more than of guilt: just as we say that God only permits sin, so we must say that God only permits that some, by their own guilt, fail of glory.

§ III. — The motive of negative reprobation is asserted.

We always understand negative reprobation as we have hitherto defined and defended it from St. Thomas, namely, the will to permit that some, by their own fault, fail of glory. It can, however, be considered in two ways, either absolutely or comparatively: absolutely, as it is the reprobation of some; comparatively, as it is the reprobation of these rather than of those, and the question is asked about both.

I say, 1°: The motive of negative reprobation, taken absolutely, is not sought from the foreseen demerits of the reprobate, but from the divine goodness.¹

Proof of the first part, 1°, from that saying of the Apostle to the Romans, IX, 12 and 13: When as yet they had done nothing good or evil... Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated; which hatred, as has been said, is understood as a lesser love, by which certain ones are left to their own defectibility, without the special helps that preserve from defect; which is to reprobate negatively. From which St. Augustine, Epistle 194², ch. 3, n. 14 and following; book II Against the Two Letters of the Pelagians, ch. 7, n. 13 and following, and the book On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 8, n. 15 and following, shows that no merits of an evil action are the cause of reprobation.

Proof, 2°. Negative reprobation precedes the sin of the reprobate; for it is, as we have said, the will to permit that some sin, and by sinning fail of glory. Therefore the sin of the reprobate cannot be its motive.

Proof, and the second part is explained by the reasoning of St. Thomas³: « From the divine goodness itself a reason can be taken for the predestination of some and the reprobation of others. For thus it is said that God made all things on account of His own goodness, that the divine goodness might be represented in things. But it is necessary that the divine goodness, which in itself is one and simple, be represented in things in manifold ways, because created things cannot attain to the divine simplicity. And hence it is that for the completion of the universe diverse grades of things are required, of which some hold a high and some the lowest place in the universe. And that the manifoldness of grades may be preserved in things, God permits certain evils to happen, lest many goods be hindered. Let us, then, consider the whole human race just as the whole universe of things. God willed, therefore, in men — as to some, whom He predestines, to represent His goodness by way of mercy, in sparing them; and as to some, whom He reprobates, by way of justice, in punishing them. And this is the reason why God chooses some and reprobates others. And this cause the Apostle assigns, to the Romans, IX, 22 and 23, saying: Willing to show his wrath, that is, the vengeance of justice, and to make known his power, endured, that is, permitted, with much patience vessels of wrath, fit for destruction, that he might show the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy, which he prepared unto glory. And in II to Timothy, II, 20, he says: In a great house there are not only vessels of gold and of silver, but also of wood and of earth; and some indeed unto honor, but some unto dishonor. »

Therefore, according to St. Thomas and the truth of the matter, the motive of reprobation is sought from the divine goodness, which God willed to represent in manifold ways — in the elect by way of mercy, in sparing them; in the reprobate by way of justice, in punishing them: and so the good of justice is the reason for negative reprobation. It is not, however, the total reason, nor one excluding other reasons, such as the completion and the good of the universe, which would be deprived of many goods if all defects were prevented, and the office of universal provider, and the reason of a gentle providence, by which provision is made for each according to his own condition and need — for the defectible, defectibly.

I say, 2°: Negative reprobation, taken comparatively, has no reason but the divine will. Thus, in these very terms, the Holy Doctor, adding to the former words⁴: « But why He chose these unto glory and reprobated those has no reason but the divine will. » And this he proves, both from Augustine, Tract. 26 on John, n. 2, where he says: « Why He draws this one, and does not draw that one, do not wish to judge, if you do not wish to err; » and from examples in natural and artificial things: « Just as, he says, in natural things a reason can be assigned [since prime matter as a whole is in itself uniform] why one part of it is under the form of fire, and another under the form of earth, established by God in the beginning, so that there might thus be a diversity of species in natural things; but why this part of matter is under this form, and that under another, depends on the simple divine will: just as it depends on the simple will of the craftsman that this stone is in this part of the wall, and that one in another; although the reason of the art requires that some be in this place, and some in that. »

Reason also proves this. For among those who are equal in defectibility, no reason can be assigned why one rather than another is permitted by the provider to fail, apart from the will of the provider. But all creatures ordered to the supernatural end can equally fail from it through sin, and it is from God alone that they have it that they do not fail. Therefore it depends on the will of God alone that these rather than those are permitted to fail.

And this reasoning holds good in every opinion. For it is certain, in every opinion, that God could, by conferring more abundant helps, have preserved from sin and perdition all who sin and perish, just as He preserved others; or at least could have placed them in such a series of things in which, given the common helps, they would have used them well. Why, then, did He not do so? Because He did not will to.

You will say: God abandons no one, unless He is first abandoned by him through sin, as the Council of Trent says, sess. VI, ch. 11. But to will to permit that some fail of glory, which is to reprobate negatively, is to abandon them. Therefore God does not reprobate anyone negatively, except with a fault presupposed, by which He is abandoned.

I answer, 1°, that many understand what is said in the major to refer to abandonment through the withdrawal of sanctifying grace, which God withdraws from no one except on account of a preceding sin; but not to abandonment through the withdrawal of actual grace.

I answer, 2°. Granted that this abandonment is to be understood of the withdrawal of actual grace, I distinguish the major. God properly abandons no one, unless He is first abandoned by him, I concede the major; improperly, I deny the major. God, then, is understood to abandon someone in a twofold way: 1° by permitting him to his own defectibility, that is, by not preserving him from sin through a special and efficacious help not owed to him; yet without on that account withdrawing from him any of the ordinary helps by which, if he did not resist, he would arrive at good. And this is an improper abandonment, for which it is not necessary that man first abandon God through sin, since the permission of sin is included in that manner of abandoning, as is clear. 2° God is understood to abandon a man when He withdraws from him the common helps and the ordinary protection which He has toward the good, and this is properly to abandon; in which way God abandons no one, unless He is first abandoned by him through sin. This second dereliction is a punishment; the first is not.

You will reply: We taught above, in the preceding dissertation, a. 4, § 3, from St. Thomas, that no one is deprived of efficacious help except by his own fault; that is, that man is deprived of efficacious help, not because God does not will to give it, but because man does not will to receive it, and puts an obstacle, by sinning and resisting the sufficient helps. How then do we now say that God, before any fault, improperly abandons man, by withdrawing efficacious help from him?

I answer that these are reconciled thus. God, in conferring sufficient grace, has an antecedent will to confer efficacious grace, if man, by his own evil will, does not resist the sufficient grace. And thus it is true that man is deprived, on account of his fault, of the efficacious grace which God, in the conferring of the sufficient grace, willed by an antecedent will to give him. God could indeed impede the evil will; but, as universal provider and for higher ends, He wills, by a consequent will, through the withdrawal of that more abundant help, to permit him to his own evil will. And thus it is also true that, before any fault, he is deprived of that more abundant efficacious grace, by which he would in fact have been preserved from defect and evil will.

§ IV. — Whether original sin is the motive of the reprobation of men?

In order to separate the certain from the uncertain, I suppose, 1°, that original sin was a sufficient motive for the reprobation of all men: that is, that God could rightly, had He willed it, have reprobated all men on account of original sin, since, according to the Scriptures, we are born children of wrath and guilty of death both temporal and eternal. Hence the question is, whether the reprobation of men was actually brought about on account of it.

I suppose, 2°, that nothing prevents original sin, in those in whom it is not remitted, from actually entering into the motive of their reprobation, since it is foreseen prior to reprobation, and since some are actually damned on account of it.

I suppose, 3°, that original sin, in those in whom it has been remitted, can be said to concur in reprobation in a twofold sense: 1° insofar as it is the source and origin of actual sins on account of which, if they are final, men are reprobated. And in this sense original sin can be said to be the motive of the reprobation of those in whom it has been remitted, not formally and in itself, but radically and in its effects. And this is to say, not that original sin, but the actual sin flowing from the original, is the motive of reprobation. 2° Because, although original sin, insofar as it is a stain of the person, is removed by baptism, it is nevertheless not removed insofar as it is an infection of nature. For through original sin the weakness of nature was increased, and concupiscence made more unbridled, and these remain, once the guilt has been removed. Whence it comes about that man is more defectible and more prone to sin, and on account of this greater defectibility and proneness, requires more, from his condition, to be permitted to fail; and so original sin, in those in whom it has been remitted, by reason of this greater defectibility and more ardent concupiscence which it caused, and which, once the guilt itself has been removed, remain, can be said to concur in reprobation. But — and mark this well — this greater weakness or defectibility does not concur in reprobation as its motive, but only as a condition without which not, or as a disposition or aptitude on the part of the matter, just as the baseness of clay is not the motive why a potter fashions certain vessels unto dishonor. For however defectible nature might be, God would not permit it to fail except on account of some good, as we have already observed above; but that a defectible nature, having no guilt, be permitted to fail, precisely and in itself does not have the character of a good, except insofar as this defect is ordered to some good. Therefore this weakness of nature, increased by original sin, cannot be called the motive on account of which God permits some to fail; but, as has been said, it functions only as a condition without which not, or as a disposition of the matter for failing. The motive, however, must be sought from some good which God intends from that defect, such as the good of the universe, the manifestation of the attributes, especially of justice, etc. These things being supposed,

I say: Original sin is not the motive of the reprobation of those in whom it has been remitted.

Proof, 1°, from the authority of Scripture and the Council of Trent. Scripture testifies in many places that sins once remitted do not harm the sinner, nor does God remember them. Thus Ezekiel, XXXIII, 12: The wickedness of the wicked shall not hurt him, in whatsoever day he shall be converted. And chapter XVIII, 22, concerning the wicked man who repents: I will not remember all his iniquities. And the Council of Trent, session V, canon 5, where it thus defines concerning original sin, from the Apostle, Romans, VIII, 1: «In those born again God hates nothing, because there is nothing of condemnation to those who are truly buried together with Christ through baptism.» But if, on account of original sin, God were to reprobate him in whom it has been remitted, this would harm him, God would remember it, He would have something of hatred in him, and something of condemnation would remain in him. Therefore.

It is confirmed. Through baptism God is so reconciled to man that He fully pardons the sin and the punishment of the sin, both eternal and temporal. But it is utterly repugnant to so full and sincere a reconciliation that God should retain the sin thus pardoned as a motive of reprobation; for these two are incompossible: I will efficaciously pardon original sin, and: I will efficaciously reprobate on account of it, or in punishment of it — just as it is incompossible that a judge should sincerely pardon a murderer's crime, and yet wish the murderer to be hanged on account of it; which, however, the opposite opinion must admit. Therefore.

Our Gonet answers that God, with respect to those in whom original sin has been remitted, accepted it as the motive of reprobation only as to intention, so that He did indeed reprobate them on account of original sin; but, in disposing of the means, He was unwilling to use that means, and instead took up actual sins: just as, he says, although predestination is gratuitous as to intention, it is not so as to execution.

But on the contrary: 1° This answer is given gratuitously, having no foundation in authority or in reason. 2° That decree of reprobation as to intention, according to the answer given, remains idle and useless. To what purpose, then, is it to imagine it in God? It is otherwise with the intentive decree of predestination, by virtue of which the means are put in place.

Others answer that original sin can be considered in a twofold way, as it is a stain of the person and as it is an infection of nature. Under the first aspect, they say, it is removed by baptism and is not the motive of reprobation; under the second, it remains and is the motive of reprobation.

But on the contrary, I infer: Therefore something of condemnation remains in those born again. Nowhere indeed can our adversaries escape this difficulty; for whatever you should say remains from original sin as a motive of reprobation, you will be forced to admit that something of condemnation remains. But, since the difficulty is chiefly about the mind of Saints Augustine and Thomas,

Proof, 2°, of the conclusion from each of the two holy Doctors. St. Augustine, On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 8, nn. 17 and 18, sets up this very question of ours. For he asks the reason and cause why God should reprobate those to whom He has bestowed His grace and remitted original sin, by denying them the gift of perseverance: which is, I say, the very same question we are now treating. But he does not resolve it by recourse to original sin, as he would have had to do, had he recognized that original sin, in those in whom it has been remitted, was the cause and motive of their reprobation; rather he answers simply that he does not know, and takes refuge in the inscrutable judgments of God: «If it should be asked of me, he says, why God did not give perseverance to those to whom He gave the love by which they might live as Christians, I answer that I do not know. For not arrogantly, but recognizing my own small measure, I hear the Apostle saying, Romans, III, 9: O man, who art thou that repliest against God? and, ibid., XI, 33: O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How inscrutable are his judgments!... It is indeed a matter for wonder, and greatly for wonder, that to certain of His own sons, whom He has regenerated in Christ, to whom He has given faith, hope, and love, God does not give perseverance; while He forgives such great crimes to the sons of others, and, having imparted His grace to them, makes them His own sons. Who would not wonder at this?» Likewise St. Thomas, when he treats professedly of reprobation, as here, a. 3, does not refer it to original sin as to its cause, but to certain general principles common to angels and men, such as the defectibility of nature, and the character of general providence, which must permit certain defects, and on account of them inflict punishment for the manifestation of its justice.

But you will say: St. Augustine, in arguing against the Pelagians, constantly has recourse to original sin as the motive of reprobation in men: «Let him who is freed, he says, chapter 8, n. 16, On the Gift of Perseverance [from the mass of perdition], love grace; let him who is not freed, acknowledge the debt.» And Epistle 194⁵, c. 3, n. 14: «We seek the merit of the hardening, and we find it. For by the merit of sin the whole mass has been condemned.» And innumerable similar passages.

I answer, 1°, that the words of Augustine, if not explained, would imply that all men, not only in intention but also in execution, are hardened, reprobated, and damned on account of original sin; which our adversaries do not admit, nor should any Catholic admit it, in those in whom it has been remitted through baptism.

I answer, 2°. I distinguish the antecedent: that St. Augustine, in arguing against the Pelagians, constantly has recourse to original sin as a sufficient motive of reprobation, I concede; as to a motive actually accepted, I deny. It is explained. The Pelagians contended that God would be an unjust respecter of persons, if He reprobated some over others without foreseen demerits. To silence this complaint, Augustine answers that no one has just cause to complain, since all are in the mass of perdition through original sin, and thence have in themselves a sufficient motive of reprobation. But whether this motive was actually accepted, in those in whom it has been remitted, Augustine does not discuss in these passages, because the Pelagians' objection did not require it; but elsewhere, when he treats this question professedly, not only does he not assert it, but on the contrary he says that he does not know the cause of this reprobation, as we have seen.

I answer, 3°, that St. Augustine often refers reprobation to original sin, not formally and in itself, but radically and by reason of its effects, namely either the actual sins which arise from the original, or by reason of the greater weakness and defectibility left behind by original sin; not that this is the motive of reprobation, but because it concurs with it as a condition and a greater disposition toward failure, as we said above.

You will insist: St. Augustine expressly asserts that original sin was even the accepted motive of the reprobation of those in whom it has been remitted; for he says, Epistle 194⁶, c. 8, n. 34: «What did God love in Jacob, before he was born or had done anything good, except the gratuitous gift of His mercy? And what did He hate in Esau, before he had done anything evil, except original sin?» But original sin had been remitted in Esau, who, being the son of Isaac, was undoubtedly circumcised.

I answer as before: 1° that these words, unless explained, prove too much; 2° that they are to be understood thus, that original sin was a sufficient motive for holding Esau in hatred and reprobating him; for it is not certain that Esau was reprobated as to eternal damnation; 3° that it can be understood of original sin as to its effect, namely the greater weakness, which, as has been said, concurs in its own way in reprobation. But according to this understanding, hatred is not taken strictly, but broadly for lesser love, as St. Thomas interprets it here, a. 3, ad 1, and in III Sentences, dist. 32, q. 1, a. 2, ad 4; in which sense also the hatred of father and mother is understood, Luke, XIV, 26. Whence the sense is that God left Esau, whose nature was vitiated by original sin and made more prone to evil, to his own weakness, while He protected Jacob, infected with the same stain, by a special mercy; and thus in Jacob He loved mercy, and in Esau He held original sin in hatred, that is, He loved him less, by not coming to the aid of the weakness contracted from original sin. Some similar testimonies of St. Thomas are to be taken by the same solutions.